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DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM AND CITIZENSHIP
IN THE ENLARGED EU. THE EFFECTS
OF GLOBALISATION AND DEMOCRATISATION*

ABSTRACT

The author investigates the relationship between nationalism and democratisation of citizenship from the end of the Cold War up to the EU enlargement comprising 25 countries.

Generally, nationalism in Eastern Europe has been written about or discussed as immature democracy. However, recent neo-nationalism cannot be explained by this connotation. Furthermore, it may be explained by the effect of the introduction of democracy, or more precisely, by the introduction of democratic procedure into multinational states or a society of heterogeneous values. So the democratic system worked another style, a dark side of democracy, ethnic cleansing, which Michael Mann investigates. Hence, the «countries between» Germany and Russia historically and traditionally always had to have a strong spirit for freedom and liberal nationalism, because only liberalism against oppression by large autocratic powers saved their nations and allowed them to continue.

Yet, nowadays even democratic societies in Western Europe experience wide gaps between the interests of the national elite and that of citizens. Citizens decry the government or politics, and populism or strong xenophobia (not only against their government but even stronger antagonism against foreigners, especially immigrants) which grows quickly, as does radical nationalism.

This is explained as the deficit of democracy. It has proven true if we investigate the framework of a country as perpendicular relations. But when comparing other countries, if we investigate laterally, it is not only the deficit of democracy, but rather «participatory democracy». Participatory democracy complicates issues, because the «civic interests» of countries oppose and interfere with each other. From the Western point of view, immigration needs to be prohibited or limited in order to save their own countries from

unemployment, or to protect security and order. But seen from the Eastern point of view, it looks like Western countries are following a double standard and interfere with their own rules, because the free movement of people, goods, money, services, and information is the very first subject for attaining EU membership. Eastern citizens also complain about the CAP subsidies, in which corporate interests are protected. The effect is that governmental parties have been defeated in many countries and populist parties have obtained a high percentage of votes, not only from former EU members but also from the 10 new member countries.

Why is nationalism, populism or antagonism rising at present among citizens of the enlarged Europe? The article addresses this theme.

I. DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM UNDER THE ENLARGED EU¹

Nowadays, one of the most important issues of the enlarged EU is nationalism – with the protection of citizens national interests on the one hand, and neo-nationalism of minorities and immigrants on the other.

Reflecting on citizen's voice in boycotting «others» – strangers to one's own countries – is also relevant to nationalism and chauvinism. Under the process of the EU enlargement and democratisation, and in spite of supra-nationalism or trans-nationalism, why is nationalism today recovering its spirits world-wide? The rise of nationalism is not only a European issue, but is also relevant in the US, Japan, China, and the world. In this chapter, the author wishes to investigate and analyse the renewed prosperity of nationalism's in the 21st century through the enlarging EU.

After the End of the Cold War and the collapse of the Socialist system in Eastern Europe, in 1989, an euphoria of liberty and independence spread throughout all of Eastern and Western Europe: «There is one integrated Europe, and we return to (that one) Europe!». Eighteen years later, the EU has enlarged to 27 countries, including Romania, Bulgaria from 1 January 2007. Almost all of Europe has integrated, except the former Yugoslavia and others.

The EU declared it would play an important role in the new world order at the end of 2003², criticising the US unilateralist policy toward the Iraq war under globalisation. After the Iraq war, the EU started to actively participate in international questions, cooperating with the United Nations, as well as the East Asian and North Korean

issue. The role of the enlarged EU is to lead the international norm in areas like citizenship, human rights and democratisation through economic development and peaceful ways, taking a significant position in the international society.

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War brought the era of democracy. After the collapse of the socialist system, liberalisation and democratisation was enjoyed, and the CIS and former Eastern Europe started to contest democratisation. As Anthony Lake, an American presidential aide noted, through the enlargement policy of democratisation, rather than the containment policy against Soviet Union under the Cold War, «The Pax Democratica» is penetrating all over the world³. It comes from the universal idea of the post-Cold War, with the US power maintaining peace and making some provocative debate.

However, Francis Fukuyama's prediction of *The End of History* through the victory of democracy, didn't happen, and regional and national conflicts occurred in the real international society during the 1990s. Samuel Huntington analysed them as *The Clash of Civilizations*, and induced the European-American cohesion policy against these situations⁴. During Central Europe's democratisation, the federalist systems of Balkan countries collapsed, forming nation-states from which national-regional conflicts began. Transformation for democratisation after the end of the Cold War brought the rise of nationalism all over the world. Nationalism started to assert itself under democratisation and globalisation.

The rise of nationalism under globalisation and European integration can be divided into three types: a) radical nationalism, b) liberal nationalism, and c) xenophobic nationalism.

a) Radical Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing

Sabrina P. Ramet analysed the rapid growth of the radical right in the process of democratisation in former Eastern Europe. Michael Mann indicates in his famous book *Dark Side of Democracy* that «democracy has always carried with it the possibility that the majority might tyrannise minorities, and this possibility carries more ominous consequences in certain types of multi-ethnic environments»⁵.

However, the examination of the concrete issue of the relationship between democratisation and nationalism was avoided deliberately, and a conventional expression of radical nationalism

was assumed to be the effect of an immature democracy. But seeing the Nazi Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Northern Ireland and the US, we can understand that democracy and the massacre of minorities can be concomitant, so we have to investigate why democracy has brought such «ethnic cleansing». Mann stressed that «there is always the possibility and peril of the autocracy against minorities by majorities under the democratic nation-states»⁶.

b) Liberal Nationalism and Democratisation

On the other hand, «liberal nationalism» spread under the democratising of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Stefan Aurel writes in his book, «Nationalism is negative connotations in Central Europe». Michnik, and Havel, who are fierce opponents of nationalism, could be labelled «Liberal nationalists». The bias of favouring patriotism over nationalism is shared by Western republican tradition, concerning political solidarity, citizenship as a desirable alternative⁷.

Many researchers argued that nationalism in Eastern and Central Europe was backward nationalism and it was impossible to form a Western type of democracy like France and the UK's as such democracy would change to Eastern type nationalism. But Auer wrote that Central Europe's nationalism was patriotic but not chauvinistic, and not xenophobic, but friendly to foreign countries nationalism. That means proto-liberal nationalism combining a European identity and European system⁸.

c) Deficit of Democracy and Xenophobic Nationalism

However, from the middle of the 1990s, and especially from the turn of the century 2000-2001, the radical right and neo-nationalism grew rapidly in almost all European countries. Political parties like the Northern League and Forza Italia led by Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Joerg Heider's Freie Demokratische in Austria, Jean-Marie LePen's Front National in France, and the Pim Fortein Party in the Netherlands, all insisted and declared they were defending their national interests and citizen's interests, criticising their government and attacking immigrants. They advocated the protection of liberal farmers from unemployment, Euro-scepticism, anti-immigration, anti-EU policy, agitating national rights and interests⁹.

Many organised violent attacks against «others» (that is, against

immigrants and foreign companies) began not only in the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe, but also in the EU Eastern borders at first, and even in the middle of Western Europe in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Moreover, the referendum on the ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty was rejected on 30 May 2005, in France, and on 3 June of the same year in the Netherlands, and further ratification was suspended.

In France, labour and unemployed demonstrations broke out, and immigrants responded to the anti-immigrant and discriminatory policies¹⁰ by rioting.

The above-mentioned issues on the recent trends toward nationalism are not due to «immaturity of democracy», but occur in the process of overcoming the deficits of democracy, and of introducing «people's participation in democracy». Involving «the people»: the inhabitants of towns, farmers, minorities, unemployed or unskilled workers, can extend xenophobic nationalism and antagonism against «others» as national and European identity grows. How is this phenomenon connected to EU enlargement?

2. THE DISCUSSION OF THE EU

2.1. Is the EU Declining under Globalisation and Nationalism?

«The EU is declining», stated Péter Balázs, the former EU Ambassador of Hungary, former EU Commissioner, and now Professor of Central European University, at the International Conference by the EU's Jean Monnet Project convened at the University of Padua in March 2006 on the subject «The Questions of Immigrants, Minorities and Border are Those of the Most Significant Issues». However, these issues cause the discrimination and opposition under the globalisation and enlargement of the EU¹¹.

Under globalisation, starting in the 1980s to the 21st century, free labour movement, a rising number of immigrants, and the widening of the EU's Eastern borders, triggered questions of nationalism throughout Europe. Nationalism in the enlarging EU is just the expression of the effects of globalisation and the wave of democratisation which cannot be avoided in this era.

On the other hand, Teo Zommer, the «Zeit» main-editor rejects these opinions. He writes «Don't cooperate with the EU decline» and cautions against widening Euro-scepticism. He insists that Europe, historically, has always overcome these difficulties as the many problems there are now like interruption of the European Constitutional Treaty or economic nationalism and newcomers' problems of adjustment. He estimates European potential soft power, and the main subject is the surmounting of nationalism and Euro-scepticism¹².

José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission criticised the economic nationalism of France and Italy, who speak of «integration priority» but stumble on the priority. He also insists on the social security based on the idea of a social Europe, besides the economic development and competitiveness¹³.

Hungarian political scientist Ágh Attila notes that participatory democracy progressed in Eastern Europe throughout history. In Western Europe, an elite democracy, structural democracy, and such representative councils were developed, but in Eastern Europe independence and national movements developed under and against the rule of the Habsburg Monarchy, Ottoman Empire, and the Soviet Union¹⁴. However, their movements also often changed to boycott «others», other nations, and minorities.

Why did the democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe split into liberal nationalism and radical nationalism? What was the turning point? And why are nationalism and xenophobia in Western and Eastern Europe erupting as mutual distrust, antagonism, or economic protectionism in the process of correcting the deficits of democracy and participatory democracy? Where do democracy and nationalism coincide and where do they revert to national interest and boycott of «others» (minorities)?

2.2. *What Is Democracy? What Is Nationalism?*

What is democracy? According to the *Encyclopedia of Sociology*¹⁵, it comes from Greek demos + kratos, and started from the direct democracy and adhocacy, republic and liberal democracy, and recent representative parliamentalism of Western Europe and the USA. Recent themes are equality of ruler and ruled, homogeneity and equality of members, as well as self-autonomy, participation, detachment, and subsidiarity.

What is nationalism, on the other hand? Ernest Garner indicates «Nationalism is a political principle which political and national unit harmonizes each other, and it progresses under the modernization and industrialization». According to Anthony Smith, «Nationalism lays on the human loyalty above all, over the religions and philosophy. It advocates political behaviour and solidarity for their motherlands» (*Encyclopedia of International Politics*)¹⁶.

Both democracy and nationalism have diversities, instabilities and complexities which depend on each region and nation (people), and which cannot be defined precisely even by hundreds of encyclopaedias or libraries. Both have peoples rule and participation as part of their etymology, but *where* do they go past the investigation of rational self- and others interests, and turn into loyalty and solidarity for the motherland and the boycott or attack against others? After all, people themselves (citizen, folk, farmer, mass, nation) are very different. As already pointed out, even in the 17 years of democratisation that followed the Cold War, there were some variations of nationalism:

(1) Liberal nationalism protecting the interests of citizens, widening the regional and class gap after the collapse of Socialism and globalisation;

(2) Radical nationalism which protects national (people's) interests, and when damaged by «others», attacks violently, destroys «others», and protects their own unity¹⁷;

(3) Xenophobic nationalism which evades foreign people and companies when they spoil national interests, and excludes immigrants and aliens even if they are social losers and the poor.

I will investigate the three types of nationalism that are emerging under the EU enlargement.

3. DEMOCRATISATION AND LIBERAL NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE 1990S

There are not a few books about nationalism and democracy in Central Europe in the process of enlarging the EU.

Proto-liberal nationalism in Central Europe that exists «between» historical and geographical big powers (Germany and Russia), always insisted on liberty and independence from the rule of these big powers, and established their own republic and

democracy, which Stefan Auer or Ogura wrote about in their books¹⁸.

Liberal nationalism generally has its roots in the historical tradition of Central Europe, and indicates their liberalisation, democratising and freedom cohesion to the Europeanisation of their countries, like «Return to Europe». Concretely, they protect their own rights and interests coexisting with Europeanisation,

In Poland, for example, the historical and traditional republican system like *Respublica-Rzeczpospolita* by the Polish aristocracy (*Szlachta*) consists of the relation between religion and nation-state, religious education, and criticism of abortion. It is strongly connected with Western European culture, especially Christianity and conservative democracy. This might be the basis of Polish liberal democracy and it sometimes has a similarity with American neo (religious) conservatism. Polish patriotism is essentially liberal, and is completely different from national chauvinism or xenophobia, respecting diversity and pluralism like Adam Michnik, based on solidarity, as wrote Auer¹⁹. Their nationalism for liberty and independence always combines strongly with the support of liberal democracy of Europe and the USA like Frederic Chopin and Adam Mickiewicz, and Tadeusz Kosciuszko historically.

Czech people also have their own traditional liberal nationalism. It mainly puts their confidence in democracy against the German autocracy rule. Hence, Czech nationalism has excluded German influence from modernisation and industrialisation which finally led to the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland. Czech nationalism is based on the democracy under the 19th century Slavic idea of peace and equality. Tomas Masaryk's idea of liberty and independence also followed such historical and traditional Czech nationalism. Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic after the Cold War, was the symbol of such Czech nationalism which integrates traditional liberal democracy with morals and norms.

The new Czech Republic has once again started to cooperate with Germany, formally apologising to Germans for their exile after the WWII. However, it sometimes has a superiority complex towards neighbouring countries, and has been especially negative towards the Balkan national conflicts and their deadlocks²⁰.

On the other hand, Hungarian nationalism is a more pragmatic one which cooperates with democratisation and Europeanisation.

Hungary has moved to introduce foreign investment and foreign companies actively, and promoted a rapid economic development. In their background, there are foreign Jewish companies and assistance from monetary capitalists like Gyorgy Soros and others. Hungary organised «Visegrad Regional Cooperation» after the failed *coup d'état* by Soviet military and conservatives and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, aggressively organised security with its neighbours and accessed the top of NATO. In the framework of Europeanisation, they were among the Central European countries that experienced the greatest political and economic stability and development.

3.1. Neo-Nationalism Rising from the Right and Left

However, under such a wave of neo-liberal marketisation and democratisation, based on the achievement of the Copenhagen criteria to join the EU, neo-nationalism, especially the right radical movement, developed in Central Europe from the early 1990s.

For example, Istvan Csurka's MIEP (Justice and Life Party) in Hungary, Andrzej Lepper's Self-Defence in Poland, Daniela Todor's Great Romanian Party in Romania, or Vladimir Meciar's Democratic Slovakian Movement in Slovakia. They actively advocate the protection of nations, and regard liberalisation and privatisation as the introduction of Jewish capital which spoils their national capital, criticise Europeanisation and foster Euro-scepticism, are against globalisation and Americanisation, foster anti-Semitism, and are against national minorities. At first, these forces did not get much peoples support.

But in the context following the general election of 2004 to join the EU that reflected the difficulties before and after the negotiation of immigrants, CAP agrarian questions and budget issues, neo-nationalists grew in power again and many nationalists and radical rights, gained new power in Parliament²¹.

After the enlargement of the EU, the difficulties with domestic policies of each country makes radical nationalism grow in Central European countries that historically had a strong liberal nationalism.

4. RADICAL DEMOCRACY AND RADICAL NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS IN THE 1990S

On the other hand, the case of Balkan countries is quite different from Central Europe. In Central Europe, government and citizens could adjust their interests to the European one by democratisation and Europeanisation at least until joining the EU. But Balkan countries, especially former Yugoslavia, were completely different. Yugoslavia was a champion of so-called non-alliance and self-management socialism in Josip Broz Tito's era, and strongly pulled together its heterogeneous nationalities, and went a self-independent way against Soviet rule.

But after the Cold War, and under the process of making independent nation-states, each heterogeneous nationality conflicted with and excluded «other» nationalities violently and militarily. Therefore, in 1991, the former Yugoslavian Federation was destroyed by the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and quick approval by Germany and Vatican. Furthermore, national and regional conflict aggravated regions that were historically characterised by multinational coexistence, like Bosnia and Kosovo, and culminated in the Bosnian and Kosovo bombing²². Why did such things happen there?

4.1. Radical Democracy and Radical Nationalism

The national conflict of former Yugoslavia is an example of a combination of radical nationalism and radical democracy²³. After the collapse of the Socialist system, nation-states formed as the direct reflection of the majorities changed, to the majority's autocracy.

In the Socialist era, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union functioned with a pyramid structure of democratic centralism of the communist system and each nation's regional autonomy under the socialist federal states based on multi-national coexistence. It worked as a combination of the absolute centralised ruling system and regional autonomy, and made possible many nationalities regions to include one federal state, and formed a stabilised and structural framework which prevented national conflicts for 40 years!

However, the enlargement of democratisation and the majority principle by free election made collapse the multi-national and stabilised order under the communist system.

The spokesman of democracy in former Yugoslavia became Serbia's majority which stripped out the communists autocratic but paternalistic norms. The spokesman of the rich «regional» majority in Croatia and Slovenia insisted on their own interests, and would not compromise with the first majority nation, declaring independence one after another. Therefore the introduction of democracy did not cause integration and stability, but disruption and collapse of federalism.

According to radical nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Nevjeste Rugova in Kosovo are spokesmen of their own countries and their own majority as populists, and they excluded and oppressed minorities according to majority interests, as democracy by majority.

Thus, in a multinational country, a majority radical democratic system resorted to radical exclusion, ethnic cleansing's massacre «legitimately»²⁴.

In Central and Eastern Europe many multi-national states also exist. However, there are a few cases as former Yugoslavia in which radical nationalism bursts out. Why did brutal national conflicts continue a long time only in former Yugoslavia and not in other regions? What separated Yugoslavia from other countries like Romania and Bulgaria?

4.2. The Cause of Widening the Radical Nationalism

What caused radical nationalism in Yugoslavia? Many multinational countries like the Soviet Union, China, and India have also suffered from regional and national conflicts, but did not widen like the former Yugoslavia.

The first and most important reason might be regional and ethnic autonomy and federalism in the former Yugoslavia. It was centralised by a communist system, but not by ethnic structure; generally, each region was an independent autonomous structure in Tito's Yugoslavia. Each region was autonomous from each majority nationality. So when the communist centralised system collapsed, it was very easy for the multinational federalism to collapse. Other countries were not so federalised and regionally independent, but rather more concentrated one-party system countries, even if they were multinational states.

Yugoslavia was more a regional-national federal socialist

republic. When the communist centralised system collapsed, such factor made it very easy to achieve independence.

Other reasons are:

- the aid and approval of big neighbouring countries, like Germany and the Vatican. The quick collapse of the former Yugoslavia and independence of Croatia and Slovenia were caused with the help of these countries and the independence of these countries gave legitimacy to further division and independence;

- the inflow of armaments. An enormous armament flow into former Yugoslavia came from neighbour countries because of the lack of need of armament after the Cold War;

- the lack of the so-called «EU effect». Other multinational countries like Romania and Slovakia also suffered nationality conflicts, but they had an aim to join the EU, and apparently, EU criteria prevented these countries from making conflicts²⁵.

After the Kosovo bombing in 1999, the presidential election, and general election at the end of 2000, the former Yugoslavia changed slowly to a representative parliamentary democracy by intervention of the US and Western Europe. Therefore, after ten years of mayhem, the EU offered the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, to promote peace, democratisation, human rights and economic development in 1999, and the negotiation with neighbouring countries started in 2000. Erhard Buzek, former Austrian Vice-President became the special representative, and regional stabilisation started in 2001. Croatia concluded this treaty first and started negotiations to join the EU in 2005. CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) was also extended to Balkan countries in 2006²⁶. Radical democracy in the Balkans is now slowly changing and is starting to go toward Europeanisation.

5. XENOPHOBIC NATIONALISM AND CONFLICT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS (WEST-EAST EUROPE IN THE 2000S)

At present, xenophobic nationalism, which is more difficult than the previous two examples, is widening in all European countries.

After the Maastricht Treaty (in 1993), the «deficit of democracy» was indicated in Western Europe. When the Community's supra-national authority gained ground and supra-national structure decided the issues were relevant to citizens, the question was raised

about whether or not the profit of the EU enlargement could come down to general citizens, and whether or not the decision-making of the EU was relevant to the people²⁷.

However, under globalisation and with greater regional integration, people call for a system that reflects the opinions of each country and nation, and the interest of each citizen does not always fit or deepen mutual understanding; rather they spark conflict with each other.

The friction of national interests between Western Europe and the newcomers of Central and Eastern Europe, is an archetypal example as the immigrant question and CAP subsidises. Because of these questions, the zero-sum game might be started between old affiliated countries and newly affiliated countries, and/or between budget donation countries and budget vested interest countries.

The author will briefly illustrate these three problems.

5.1. Immigrant Questions

Concerning the immigrant questions, there are two borders: one is the enlarged EU border, and the second is the old border between old and newcomer countries.

This question includes the Schengen Treaty, too.

The Schengen Treaty, which came into effect in 1995, secured the free movement of people, goods, services and capital.

The countries that concluded the treaty can go freely across the borders. This however, increased the number of immigrants into Germany, France, the UK and other countries, and with unemployment still remaining, it might be very difficult to admit immigrants from newcomer countries.

That is why, just before the EU enlarged to 25 countries, the limits of immigrants were set at 2+3+2 years (longest 7 years) by each country.

This was not good enough for newcomers, because the free movement of four things (people, goods, services, capital) is the first 4 criteria of 31 by the Copenhagen criteria, and candidate countries had to strictly comply with these conditions. The Polish government said that the immigrants from Poland are not all Polish, but many are Russian, Belarus, Ukrainian, and others who are outside of the European border, and due to a big wage difference and

unemployment are obliged to go into Western Europe²⁸.

So newcomer countries criticised the older countries, saying that it is double standard or Protectionism²⁹.

5.2. CAP Agrarian Subsidies and Citizen's Conflict

The CAP subsidies account for 40 to almost 50% of the EU budget. There are three different interests: donors (Germany, the UK), vested interests (France, Spain), and newcomers.

As an effect of agrarian farmers' wider dissatisfaction with CAP subsidies, the radical rights and conservatives grew in the general or presidential elections in France and other countries. For example, LePen's success in the French first presidential election, or growing populism, in which many farmers and unskilled workers vote not for the socialist party, but the more radical and EU-Skeptical party.

Under such a situation, the EU was obliged to decide to start to pay their CAP subsidies from a quarter of all possible subsidies, and in 10 years, they can get 100%. From such a situation, Leppel's Self Defense and Pies (Law and Justice Party) grew in power, and the Left Democrat Alliance was defeated in the 2005 general election.

5.3. As Advanced before Rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by Referendum in France. «Strengthening of Chauvinistic Nationalism»

On 29 May 2005 in France, and on 1 June in the Netherlands, the ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty was rejected by the referendum³⁰.

Looking at this situation, the European Summit in June 2005 decided to postpone the ratification indefinitely, and adopted the Plan D of Democracy, Dialogue and Debate.

It was said that this shows «the fatigue of the enlarging EU», but rather in my opinion it comes from the «participating in democracy», not only the «deficit of democracy».

This means that:

- as the result of «participating in democracy», like a referendum, citizen's antagonism is burned out against «others» who undermine their interests;
- citizens declared that the EU interests do not directly connect with their own interest; rather, it binds or restricts their behaviour;

– to that effect, the civic claim for their interests emerged not as solidarity with neighbour countries, but as xenophobia which hates immigrants and the enlargement of the EU.

As to the Constitutional Law itself, the Ambassador of the EU Delegation in Lithuania in 2003 expressed his personal scepticism about a fast and sloppy way of ratification³¹.

It seems that diverse and gradual democracy by 25 countries weakens the EU integration and slows down its development process by the European elite, but the new type of efficient, strong and integrated EU by 25 countries introduces the apprehension of the participating countries of the EU and hesitation of the citizens. And ironically, widening «participatory democracy» as the reflection of the «deficit of democracy» realistically promotes xenophobic nationalism, not cooperation with neighbour citizen's solidarity, but deepens the antagonism of their interests. Citizen's interests in both old and new member countries are economic stability, prosperity, promotion of employment and solid social security. Citizens of new member countries thought that their interests can be realised by joining the EU, but citizens of Western Europe thought that they will be damaged by the enlargement of the EU and inflow of immigrants. So the Plan D (Democracy, Dialogue, and Debate) is very important, but not succeeded until now from seeing mutual understanding.

Considering the rejection of the Constitutional Law by referendum, now the EU enlargement is facing the difficult moment of dual duplicating dimension of conflict between nationalism and democracy, and elite and citizens.

6. EPILOGUE - THE REMAINING SUBJECT OF NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

As we saw, democratisation and emerging nationalism after the end of the Cold War brought liberal nationalism, radical nationalism, and xenophobic nationalism in each region, and all of them emerged as an effect of each region's style of democratisation. Especially under globalisation and regionalism, the «protection of the national interest» occurs extensively, including developed countries in the 21st century. And by the significance of the citizen's voice and «participating democracy», each national interest is a

mutual confrontation, as in an ironic zero-sum game which protects *each national interest* against global mutual interests.

Radical nationalism, especially ethnic cleansing, might be the darkest part of politics which killed «others» by violence or military force, but it is also one of the effects of democratisation as populism which represent the majority's voice. In the early 21st century, under the enlargement of the EU, a melting-pot of democratisation, national interest and citizen's interest, itself a positive claim, have transformed themselves into xenophobia toward «others». That is, under globalisation and regionalisation, democratisation in each region brings liberal nationalism which surpasses Western Europe, and sometimes brings radical nationalism which shows the dark side of democracy. The problem is that democratisation by citizen participation is not always successful, but sometimes brings xenophobia by the antagonism of each citizen.

How to cope with such liberal, radical, and xenophobic nationalism, each of which emerged from each citizen's (farmer and unemployed) actual conditions and urgent demands? It completely depends on the successful execution of the Lisbon Strategy: employment, social security, and economic development. At the start and interruption of the negotiation for Western Balkan and Turkey's joining the EU, immigration and agrarian questions could become a cause of more severe conflicts. The subject of how to manage and adjust the conflict of each interest between the EU «unification priority» centripetal force and citizen participation and nationalism, and how to develop these interests together is vitally significant for the future of the enlarging EU.

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¹ About the democracy and nationalism under the enlarging the EU, see the following: S.P. Ramet (ed.), *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999; S. Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, London-New York, Routledge Curzon, 2004; C.W. Haerpfer, *Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe, 1991-1998*, London-New York, Routledge, 2004; J. Hughes, G. Sasse and C. Gordon, *Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe*, Hampshire, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004; R. Di Quirico (ed.), *Europeanisation and Democratisation, Institutional Adaptation*, Florence, European Press Academic Publishing, 2005; J. Beaumont and A. Canavero (eds.), *Globalization*,

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² *Constructing World Orders, Pan European International Conference*, The Hague, September 2004; *Establishing New World Orders*, ECSA World, Brussels, December 2004; R. Reid, *The United States of Europe. The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*, New York, Penguin Books, 2004; C.A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century*, New York, Knopf, 2002.

³ B. Russett, *Pax Democratica*, translated by Takehiko Kamo, Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1990, p. 2.

⁴ F. Fukuyama, *The End of the History*, translated by S. Watanabe, Tokyo, Mikasa Shobo, 1992; S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, translated by Shuzei, Tokyo, Shueisya, 1998.

⁵ S.P. Ramet (ed.), *The Radical Right...*, cit.; M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Y. Yasushi and T. Susumu (eds.), *European Neo Right*, Tokyo, A. Shimbunsya, 1998; K. Haba, *Globalization and European Enlargement*, cit.

⁶ M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy...*, cit., p. 2. At first, the term of «ethnic cleansing» was made by advertisement agency in the US, and widened all over the world, T. Toru, *War Advertising Agency*, Tokyo, Kodansya, 2002.

⁷ S. Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, cit., p. 19.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 58-59. The example was Polish aristocracy's Republic like Sirafra's Republic, K. Ogura (ed.), *West and East in Modern Europe*, Tokyo, Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2004.

⁹ About European radical nationalism and skepticism see: H. Kitschelt et al., *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, Chicago, University of Michigan Press, 1997; R. Hammsen et al., *Euroscepticism*, European Studies, 2005; *Nationalism Reframed Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; K. Haba, *Globalization and European Enlargement...*, cit.

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