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BANGLADESH'S "SILENT CRISIS"?

UNRAVELING THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL MANDATES AND LOCAL INTEGRATION REALITIES FOR CLIMATE-DISPLACED POPULATIONS IN BANGLADESH

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Abstract

Climate change presents an increasingly urgent global challenge, with Bangladesh standing as among the most vulnerable nations to its effects. As a result, climate-induced internal displacement which occurs when people are forced to leave their homes due to adverse impacts of climate change, has become a common occurrence in the country, posing significant challenges to both the displaced populations and the receiving cities. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), constitute the largest displaced group globally, yet face significant protection gaps, particularly in the absence of binding international legal frameworks. The urgency to address these challenges is underscored by the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, which emphasizes the sustainable reintegration, local integration, and resettlement.

This study specifically focuses on the complexities of local integration processes for climate-induced IDPs in Bangladesh as a neglected element in the climate change-migration-urbanization nexus. Despite government and non-state actors' efforts, fragmented policies and inadequate coordination limit their effectiveness, pushing affected populations into high urban socioeconomic vulnerability and marginalization. The research aims to illuminate the role of public institutions and policies in ensuring durable solutions, especially post-displacement local integration, through the lens of multi-level governance systems and how these play out in the subnational context of cities, notably in Khulna. By juxtaposing *'de jure*' rights provisions and '*de facto'* experiences of city representatives and climate-IDPs themselves, this study contributes to the broader discourse on the interconnected challenges and opportunities of climate-induced internal displacement to urban areas.

Keywords: Climate-induced displacement, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Durable solutions, Local integration, Bangladesh, Khulna, Adaptation strategies, Sustainable urban development.

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Acronyms

BCCSAP	Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
BCCTF	Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CDC	Community Development Committee
CMS	Climate Migrant Survey
DCIIDP	Disaster and Climate-Induced Internally Displaced Person
DDM	Department of Disaster Management
DDR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DSS	Department of Social Services
GCM	Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
GIZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH* ("German Agency for Development Cooperation")
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Center
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KCC	Khulna City Corporation
KDA	Khulna Development Authority
KfW	*Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* ("Credit Institute for Reconstruction")
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGD	Local Government Division
LIUPC	Livelihoods Improvement of the Urban Poor Communities project
MLG	Multi-Level Governance
MoDMR	Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief
MoEF	Ministry of Environment and Forests
MoEFCC	Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change
MoSW	Ministry of Social Welfare
NID	National ID card
NSIDM	National Strategy on Internal Displacement Management
NSMDCIID	National Strategy on the Management of Disaster and Climate Induced Internal Displacement
SDF	Social Development Framework
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SOD	Standing Orders on Disaster
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UMIMCC	Urban Management of Internal Migration due to Climate Change project
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Introduction

a) Problem Statement

Climate change has become a pressing global issue, and Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries to its effects. As a result, climate-induced internal displacement which occurs when people are forced to flee their homes due to adverse impacts of climate change (e.g. sea-level rise, flooding, drought, and other extreme weather events) has become a common occurrence in the country, posing significant challenges to both the displaced populations and the host communities.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are defined as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border" (UN General Assembly, 1998, 5). However, while making up the largest proportion of displaced people in the world, they continue facing the biggest protection gaps (Refugees International, 2021). In fact, while the rights of refugees – displaced outside their countries of origin or habitual residence – are enshrined in numerous international legally-binding instruments, those of IDPs are not and so they remain at the mercy of their governments, who are not rarely the cause for their displacement (ibid.). Efforts to address the plight of IDPs generally receive far less attention, funding, and resources and especially *climate*-induced IDPs are prone to experiencing the magnification of vulnerabilities due to their unique cumulative circumstances (ibid.). For instance, according to the first special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, the loss of land, homes and property often leads not only to a sudden loss of livelihoods and sources of income, but as a consequence exposes many of these individuals to poverty, food insecurity, violence and forms of physical and mental abuse, loss of a legal identity and additionally impedes personal human development as access to basic services and education is inaccessible for persons displaced by climate change (Beyani, 2015, §19). Indicative of the invisibility of climate-IDPs' plight is also the fact that despite so many international frameworks, no single body of international law or a legally binding international convention that effectively categorizes or protects the human rights of the respectively displaced populations, has to date been established (Alverio et al., 2023, 18). Because of this disengagement and despite the international commitments to 'leave no one behind' as a principle of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, IDPs are often "invisible and marginalized" at international, regional, and national levels (ibid.).

As the impacts of climate change are expected to continue worsening, solutions to address these vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly urgent. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons based on the historical UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) (henceforth 'Guiding Principles'), a landmark policy framework to deal with internal displacement, has been proposed in 2010 to guide States in their practical implementation process of the Guiding Principles. It addresses the three proposed solutions, notably a) Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (or simply 'return'), b)

Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge (or in short 'local integration'), and c) Sustainable integration in another part of the country (in short 'resettlement').

As climate displacement tends to lead to permanent displacement due to the complete loss of property and livelihoods at their places of origin, durable solutions for effective post-displacement local integration as an adaptation strategy arguably become the key to addressing climate displacement. Local integration of climate-induced internally displaced populations is a complex process that involves both municipal and community-led initiatives. Increasingly, States are recognizing the urgency to establish frameworks that tackle internal climate displacement. Bangladesh is one of the States that has particularly stood out to incorporate internal displacement in their disaster management strategies. The Government and non-state actors have developed various policies and programs to address climate-induced internal displacement and promote sustainable urban development. However, many of these efforts have been fragmented and lack adequate coordination, resulting in limited effectiveness and equity which further pushes affected populations into situations of high social vulnerability and societal marginalization. Indeed, there is a need for more research on the effectiveness of these efforts, particularly the roles of community-based and municipal adaptation strategies in ensuring durable solutions.

b) Conceptual Framework

In recent years, the world has been observing increased climate variability and more extreme climate events which have produced ever increasing numbers of individuals to be "uprooted from traditional livelihood options" and displaced internally or across borders (Ahsan, 2019, 187). This trend has produced growing concerns about the economic, political, environmental, social, and security impacts such migration influxes may have on societies (e.g. Saha, 2012).

However, mainstream maximalist narratives viewing migration as a burden to societies and even a threat to international security (Kahraman and Güngördü, 2022, 307; Saha, 2012, Rana and Ilina, 2021) have consistently overlooked the socioeconomic potential locked at the local level and how effective urban management of internal migration and cooperative planning institutions may even help stimulate local economies and produce desirable realities of local tolerance, citizenship, participation, trust, and social cohesion (Alverio et al. 2023, 14). Especially when bringing in factors such as climate change, which tends to displace affected populations to nearby urban areas with no option to return home in the long term, local integration of climate-induced internally displaced persons (henceforth climate-IDPs or climate-induced IDPs) then becomes an integral part to the solution of displacement management. The 2018 OECD report on Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees recognizes that "When it comes to migrant integration, the local level matters. Where migrants go and how they integrate into their new communities depends on the specific characteristics of cities and regions." (OECD, 2018, 5) Or as megacities expert Robert Muggah formulates it "cities are where the future happens first" (Muggah, 2017). In other words, the localization of solutions at city-level and bottom-up initiatives for the effective integration of climate-induced displaced

populations becomes essential to buffer the increasing pressures that climate displacement may produce on urban areas.

In Bangladesh, the 8th most affected country by climate change, an average of one million people each year are displaced due to floods and another 110,000 per year due to cyclones (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 3f.). Of these climate-induced IDPs, many flee to nearby cities where they end up in protracted situations of high poverty (Ahsan, 2019, 187). The lack of an effective and systematic response to these influxes has resulted in the marginalization of climate IDPs in informal slums where living conditions are dire (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 3). However, this marginalization is not only a spatial one. It is accompanied by high socioeconomic, political, and even legal exclusionary dynamics. That is, having often lost any type of documentation due to the climate change related events that triggered their displacement, the affected individuals arrive in the cities without a legal status and without being registered. Consequently, they do not have access to any social services or political participation. At the same time, climate IDPs are deprived of their livelihoods leaving them with little economic means to sustain themselves, especially in cities where their predominantly agricultural skills are of little use to the local economy, pushing many into a "downward spiral of urban poverty" (Ahsan, 2019, 186). As a result, urban extreme poverty and the expansion of informal settlements has become ever more pronounced in cities of Bangladesh (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 3), not rarely producing situations of tension and conflict between the host communities and the climate-IDPs (Martin et al., 2022, 7).

Although in the past years Bangladesh has actively sought to address the issue of climate change induced displacement at national level and produced several political frameworks to account for the protection of climate-induced IDPs, transformation of these policies into national law and actual implementation in the cities have so far legged behind (Scott and Salamanca, 2021, 2). Furthermore, there has been a continued disconnect at the local level between the affected populations and the receiving cities. In other words, despite their inevitable long-term residence in the cities, the *de facto* emplacement and local integration of climate-induced IDPs in urban areas continues to be a neglected issue with little attention given to their personal experiences and to local governments' needs and challenges to effectively integrate them.

This thesis therefore aims at shedding light on the tendentially overlooked climate IDPs, revealing the local drivers of and barriers to the local integration of climate-induced IDPs in Khulna, a city located in the coastal belt of Bangladesh, and explore solutions for future climate-resilient cities to better integrate these climate change-affected populations in a multi-level governance approach by scrutinizing the principal research question:

To what extent do 'de jure' institutional policies translate into or are associated with 'de facto' local integration outcomes of climate-induced IDPs in Khulna, Bangladesh?

It will do so by scrutinizing the various policy provisions that already exist on international, national, and subnational levels for climate-induced IDPs, specifically in the framework of the research nexus Climate Change, Urbanization, Migration, and Local Integration. By comparing the policies that exist in theory ('*de*

jure') with the actual realities on the ground ('*de facto'*) related to the local integration of climate-induced IDPs in Khulna city, the paper will make a crucial contribution to holistic and balanced knowledge creation, in that both bottom-up and top-down perspectives are taken into consideration. That is, by exploring personal experiences of both the affected IDPs themselves ('micro-level') as well as representatives of Khulna city representatives ('meso-level') through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and a Climate Migrant Survey (CMS), this research seeks to shed light on the discrepancies between the theoretical policy dimension and the practical integration outcomes on the ground. This paper thus hypothesizes that the notable amount of specific human rights provisions made at international and national levels do not correspond with the realities of climate-IDPs at the most local level. It is further expected that, while the lives of climate-IDPs may improve after arriving in Khulna in terms of livelihood security and income opportunities, many systemic gaps remain hindering effective local integration of climate-IDPs and perpetuating living standards that do not meet the standards advocated for in international and national policy frameworks. Through a multi-level governance lens, this paper will hence examine the institutional strengths and weaknesses, especially in the form of policy provisions and public institutional set-ups. It will also identify the key socio-economic and institutional factors contributing to or impeding the successful local integration of climate-IDPs. Using the Khulna city case study, the thesis shall examine the specific barriers and challenges to the effective implementation of international and national de jure policies at local levels and ultimately propose policy pathways for a rights-based, participatory, and sustainable urban management framework for the integration of climate-IDPs.

Fig. 1: Originality of thesis contribution



The specific objectives of this paper can thus be summarized as follows:

1. To identify the role that institutions play in the effective local integration of climate-induced IDPs in urban areas, especially through the identification and evaluation of existing policies at international, national, and subnational levels and their gaps thereof.
2. To identify current strategies and practices of local city governments in Bangladesh, specifically Khulna City Corporation (KCC) and Khulna Development Authority (KDA), regarding durable integration solutions for climate-induced internally displaced populations and their coherence with national and international human rights standards.
3. To evaluate the effectiveness of the micro-level adaptation strategies of climate-IDPs to locally integrate on the one hand, and meso-level approaches of Khulna city to ensure effective local

integration of climate IDPs on the other hand, as well as the level of cooperation between these micro- and meso-levels.

4. To correlate empirical results with existing academic models for successful integration of refugees and test their applicability to the climate-induced internal displacement context.
5. To provide recommendations for the improvement of local integration processes of climate-induced IDPs in Bangladesh that can be relevant also to other countries affected by high climate-induced internal displacement through municipally supported integration strategies for long term adaptation to climate change.

This thesis will use a mixed-methods approach, including on the one hand desk research to identify and analyze relevant policy documents and on the other hand empirical research through the collection of field data. For the latter, both qualitative and quantitative methods will be applied to conduct the semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KII) with key municipal stakeholders involved in providing durable solutions for climate-induced IDPs in Khulna, Bangladesh, and the Survey with climate-IDPs regarding their *de facto* integration into urban areas and local communities. The data collected from the KIIs and the survey will be analyzed using thematic analysis and descriptive statistics. The empirical contribution will be made by using a city case study, notably Khulna City, which shall provide valuable insights into practices and challenges that may compare to other urban contexts in the world, thereby offering the foundation for evidence-based policy development.

Overall, this thesis is expected to contribute to the understanding of the role public institutions may play in ensuring durable solutions for climate-induced internally displaced populations in Bangladesh and to offer insights into the human face of climate displacement. It seeks to contribute to the academic mobility literature dealing with the interrelatedness of Migration, Urbanization, and Climate Change. Local Integration as a neglected component in this triple-nexus, is expected to provide new insights into the management of internal displacement due to climate change through the dual lens provided by both micro-(climate-IDPs') and meso-(cities')level perceptions regarding successful local integration of climate IDPs. It will do so by combining the policy dimensions through desk research of current policy frameworks at the various levels of governance with the empirical dimension through field data. Most importantly, this thesis will test the applicability of the international IASC Framework for Durable Solutions against the realities of climate-IDPs through the case study of Bangladesh at national and Khulna at subnational level.

The findings of this thesis will be useful for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers working on climate-induced internal displacement and local integration in Bangladesh and other similar contexts. The recommendations provided in this thesis can help to improve the effectiveness of the current policies and practices of the government of Bangladesh when providing durable solutions for climate-induced internally displaced populations.

c) Chapter Overview

The thesis seeks to explore the degree to which local integration of climate-induced internally displaced persons is (or is not) institutionalized at various levels of governance and the ways this process is perceived on the ground by climate migrants themselves and city municipalities to examine durable solutions for

effective long-term local integration of the affected populations. It will do so by first delving into the rich academic discourse surrounding institutions, exploring their historical significance and contemporary roles which shall lay the foundation to interpret the subsequent chapters of the thesis (Chapter I). It will then move on to examining the current state of the art in policy and legal international, national, and local *de jure* standards through a multi-level governance lens identifying the extent to which these determine the level of the adaptive capacity of climate-IDPs to integrate locally (desk research approach) (Chapter II). In the empirical Chapter III, the paper will give the word to climate migrants' personal local integration experiences (micro-level) and municipalities' perceptions (meso-level) regarding the key challenges they are facing. This shall help examining the *de facto* effectiveness of policy and legal standards identified in the first chapter (interviews and survey approach). The final chapter shall then discuss the findings from the theoretical (Chapter II) and empirical (Chapter III) chapters, culminating in a set of key policy recommendations that may guide future policy interventions. The summarized approach to this paper's research process is visualized in *Fig. 2*. The overall results are expected to contribute to the neglected link in the climate change-migration-urbanization nexus literature, notably local integration, and give a clearer idea about the factors at stake for successful local integration in the climate change induced post-displacement and urbanization context.

Fig. 2: Integrated approach to analyzing the interplay between institutional mandates and local integration realities of climate-displaced populations in Bangladesh



d) Locating Local Integration in the Climate Change – Migration – Urbanization Triple Nexus

Human migration, here defined as a "longer-term change of habitual place of residence perceived as more voluntary" (Rigaud et al., 2018, 3), has long been used as a strategy to find desirable livelihood opportunities in new destinations when risks and vulnerabilities in places of origin become too precarious to remain *in-situ* (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 1). These risks and vulnerabilities have traditionally been considered to be political (conflicts), religious, economic, or socio-cultural in nature. However, human movement in the context of climate change has become ever more prevalent in mobility literature. This type of human movement has been termed in varying ways, ranging from environmental migration, environmental mobility, environmental movement, climate-induced migration, climate-induced internal displacement, or simply human displacement, encompassing the continuum from voluntary (migration, movement, mobility) to more unvoluntary or even forced instances of movements (displacement, relocation) (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 1, Rigaud et al., 2018, 3). Based on this continuum, a person engaging in human movement may remain inside

his or her country of habitual residence or geographical jurisdiction (internal migrant or internally displaced person) or cross international borders (international/cross-border migrant or refugee). Although the topic of environmental migration has increasingly shaped academic and even political debates, the 2018 World Bank Groundswell Report admits that "there is no universally agreed upon terminology for human movement in the context of environmental change" (Rigaud et al., 2018, 3).

Scientists and environmentalists have first started bringing climate change-induced migration as a prospective global challenge to attention in the 1980s, warning that "environmental change could lead to severe human displacement" (Rana and Ilina, 2021). This claim prompted a two-decade long debate between maximalists and minimalists polarizing around the relative impacts of climate change on displacement (ibid.). During that period, climate mobility literature has largely focused on the causes, drivers, and factors that trigger migration decisions (Jacobson 1988, Massey et al. 1998, Henry et al. 2004, Carr 2005, Kniveton et al. 2008, and Black et al. 2011a in Rana and Ilina, 2021, 1). De Sherbinin et al. agree that it is "the search for the relative influence of climate factors that preoccupies much empirical research […]" (De Sherbinin et al., 2022, 3). For instance, much of literature highlights the cumulative causation of migration arguing that displacement occurs when people already face high intersecting vulnerabilities and that climate-related disasters only act as 'threat multipliers' (Scott and Salamanca, 2021; Rigaud et al., 2018; De Sherbinin, 2020, De Sherbinin et al., 2022). In other words, "… environmental (including climatic) factors may occasionally have direct impacts on population movements, but are more likely to operate through intermediate drivers, namely economic, social, demographic, and political ones" (De Sherbinin, 2020) making 'climate' only the "final nudge" that pushes individuals to leave their homes (De Sherbinin et al., 2022). Similarly, De Sherbinin (2020) argues that environmental factors "exist as part of a broader constellation of macro-, meso-, and micro-level drivers", whereas Scott and Salamanca (2021) identify "systemic discrimination" and power dynamics as "root cause of exposure and vulnerability to disaster-related harm" with differentiated impacts across race, gender, class, and other divides. This discussion in migration and climate change literature can be summarized as the 'environmental determinism versus multi-causality'-debate (Siddiqui et al., 2018).

Yet, although these examples in literature warn about the unidimensional categorization of climate-induced migrants as 'climate displaced' persons, arguing that the factors driving affected individuals to cities are intrinsically multidimensional, this thesis argues that the climate dimension should still be considered as a key factor for the migration experience with direct impacts on the levels of vulnerability and the likelihood of successful integration after migration to urban areas. Similarly, the climate-related motivations that lead people to out-migrate in the first place may potentially influence the way in which they perceive their new urban environments and the type of integration they then opt for (for instance permanent or temporary) (Joarder and Miller, 2013, 1512). Considering the climate dimension as a key for the migration experience of IDPs in Bangladesh can therefore arguably help better understand the specific types of pressures and challenges that destination regions may experience and hence also shed light on the potential integration outcomes of climate-induced IDPs (ibid., 1523). A greater understanding of these aspects can create more

effective protective urban integration management frameworks and resettlement policies targeting the specialized and distinct needs of these populations (ibid.).

Furthermore, debates in climate mobility literature have conceived human migration as an adaptation strategy alternative to *in-situ* adaptation (or adaptation at the place of origin) and 'non-migration' to find "desirable livelihood opportunities in a new destination by escaping from the environmental risks and vulnerabilities in origins" (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 1). More specifically, 'adaptation' has been referred to by several scholars as "adjustments" in a system's behavior that reduce vulnerability to climate variability and change and increase coping ability (Siddiqui et al. 2018, 7; Sikder et al., 2015, 6). "These adjustments may be in response to, or in anticipation of, real or perceived climate stressors" (Siddiqui et al., 2018, 7). And these stressors may be characterized as exposure either to sudden-onset shocks, such as floods, or to slow-onset incremental stresses, as occur for instance when temperature and rainfall patterns change, or sea levels rise (ibid.). In the urban context, adaptation, or the capacity to adapt, may be more specifically understood as "the inherent capacity of a system, population or individual/household to undertake actions that can help avoid loss and speed recovery from any impact of climate change" (Sikder et al., 2015, 6). Academics and policymakers have then viewed migration as having adaptive potential because it demonstrates individuals' capacity to undertake the specific action of moving to a different place in order to "generate income, diversify livelihoods, and [thereby] spread risk in the face of climate change" (Ober and Saktapolrak, 2017, 1) to make up for the climate change-related losses they experienced. For instance, Siddiqui et al. (2018, 7) show that individuals who migrated and secured a stable source of income of which they send parts back to support their families ('remittances') have greatly reduced vulnerability of the relatives seeking to recover from losses and speed the recovery process.

However, in this complex debate, opinions about migration as an effective adaptation strategy have diverged, with some arguing instead that migration is a mere attempt of survival as it reveals *de facto* "adaptation failure" (Shamsuddoha, 2015, 9). In fact, post-displacement realities of climate-induced IDPs have exposed major limitations in this regard and tendencies of *maladaptation*. According to Berman et al. (2012, 95), long-term maladaptation, defined as "action taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that impacts adversely on, or increases the vulnerability of other systems, sectors or social groups" is an indicator for longer term vulnerability. For example, Vinke et al. argue that "migration does not necessarily lead to increased adaptive capacities for households in all contexts but can also have detrimental consequences, leading to increased impoverishment and deepened vulnerabilities" (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 2). Similarly, Berman et al. (2012, 95) argue that maladaptation is strongly 'path dependent', suggesting that present coping activities, may have unintended effects on the future adaptive capacities of an individual or system that will reproduce past vulnerabilities.

Given the tendency especially in urbanization contexts for vulnerabilities to get exacerbated, academic contributions have therefore increasingly looked at urban consequences of climate-induced migration, including maladaptation, in contrast to the predominant focus on the drivers for migration (i.e. Rana and

Ilina, 2021). In fact, it is argued that urban slums in the nearest city become the first destination for climate-induced displaced persons where they are confronted with very limited access to employment, shelter, water, sanitation, and other basic amenities. In this forced displacement context, physical safety is then traded "for the most basic human rights these people previously enjoyed, namely, the right to live in their own society and culture" (Ahsan 2019, 186f.). Similarly, a study by Jacobson et al. (2019) found that "…in the context of Southeast Asia, there was no improvement in average levels of economic and food security after migrating to a new destination" (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 2). On the contrary, damages and losses suffered by climate migrants - whether economic in nature (e.g. resources, goods and services that are commonly traded in markets, including property, infrastructure, or supply chain disruptions) or non-economic (e.g. losing family members, disappearance of cultures and ways of living, the trauma of being forced to migrate from ancestral homes) (World Resources Institute 2022) - are not only related to the initial displacement, but rather, new ones continue to be triggered after displacement which exacerbate vulnerabilities and further cause non-economic damage at the destination areas, such as new psychological traumas and poverty.

While the 'migration-as-failure' strand has been discarded by many academics due to exposing a 'sedentary bias' that frames migration as a negative phenomenon in order to encourage people to 'stay at home' and thereby avoid their burdens on destination areas (Bakewell, 2009; Lietaer and Duran-Delacre, 2021; Ober, 2014), the 'migration as adaptation' strand has increasingly been recognized by key international development players such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and was subsequently taken up *inter alia* by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC), the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) in Cancun, Mexico, the UK Government's influential 2011 Foresight report on Migration and Global Environmental Change, and the Global Compact on Safe and Orderly Migration (GCM) (Sakdapolrak et al., 2023, 1; Rana and Ilina, 2021, 2). It has also become the preferred conceptualization in the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions where migration is framed as a strategy to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change on local livelihoods. Some academics have even gone as far as proposing migration as a 'fourth durable solution' (Long, 2014; Long, 2021) to complement the three conventional durable solutions originally proposed for refugees but later also applied to IDPs, notably voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. To reconcile this polarized debate, Eriksen et al. (2015) have called for a new way of looking at migration neither as adaptation nor adaptation failure, but rather as "transformational adaptation", which the authors describe "as a sociopolitical process that struggles over authority, knowledges and subjectivities" and which recognizes that the risks rural migrants face when being displaced are often merely replaced by different ones at their destination in precarious urban areas (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 2).

From the need to address these *post*-displacement vulnerabilities in urban areas and help reduce maladaptive migration of climate-induced IDPs, the recognition that concrete and lasting solutions must be found, has taken center-stage. In 2011, the UN Secretary-General published the 'decision on durable solutions' that proposes a novel global approach to "support the delivery of durable solutions for IDPs and

refugees returning to their country of origin" (UNSG, 2011), which set out the concrete responsibilities of international development actors and encouraged the development of various policy frameworks to address internal displacement through durable solutions (IDMC, 2013). 'Durable Solutions' are here understood as the long-term solutions that allow IDPs to exercise their human rights fully and without discrimination related to their displacement. They are achieved "when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement" (IASC, 2010, 5).

One of the policy frameworks that was established to guide the pursuit of durable solutions is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) *Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons* (henceforth 'IASC Framework'). It is based on the famous UN Guiding Principles, which has become the most widely recognized document for internal displacement-related policy-making. It mainstreams a proposed set of three durable solutions, notably a) Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (or simply 'return'), b) Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge (or in short 'local integration'), and c) Sustainable integration in another part of the country (or in short 'resettlement').

Due to the expected increased tendency of climate change-induced events, especially sudden environmental hazards, to permanently remove local homes and livelihoods in the affected areas (i.e. Joarder and Miller, 2013, 1523), the second durable solution - notably 'local integration' - becomes arguably the most relevant of these solutions in the climate change and migration context. However, local integration has been understood very differently across academic literature and certainly across countries' individual approaches to migrant integration with regards to its meaning and what it should be achieving. National policy goals have, for instance, ranged from "next-to-assimilation" to "multiculturalism" approaches (CoE 2010). In academic literature, Penninx and Garcés-Mascarenas (2016) have attempted to come up with a definition for integration, notably referring to it as "'the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration', highlighting the legal-political (rights, legal affairs), socio-economic (labour market, services) and cultural-religious aspects (cultural and religious codes) of integration" (Kahraman and Güngördü, 2022, 307). However, according to Robinson (1998, 118) a unifying definition is unlikely to ever capture the "chaotic" and highly "individualized, contested, and contextual" concept of integration (in Ager and Strang, 2008, 167). Similarly, Castles et al. (2001, 12) hold that "There is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration. The concept continues to be controversial and hotly debated" (in Ager and Strang, 2008, 167).

But not only is it challenging to produce a general universal definition of migrant integration, also the perceptions about what actually constitutes 'successful' integration differ widely. According to the IASC Framework for instance, a durable solution, including local integration, is achieved when IDPs enjoy without discrimination "long-term safety, security, and freedom of movement, an adequate standard of living, including at a minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, health care and basic education, as well as access to employment and livelihoods" (IASC, 2010, A-4). On the other hand, Siddiqui et al. (2018) have considered migration as achieved adaptation if integration has produced 'wellbeing', both material and

subjective, especially referring to a "better quality of life" compared to before migration (9). Sitglitz et al. (2009), Hall et al. (2010) and the OECD report (2013) then view 'better quality of life' in terms of material income and wealth, including the type of housing, the level of economic wealth, access to health and education services (in Siddiqui et al., 2018, 9f.). Whereas still others (Kahn and Juster, 2003; Pollard and Lee, 2003) have measured 'better quality of life' in terms of subjective wellbeing, or individuals', households', or communities' 'happiness' (in Siddiqui et al., 2018, 9f.). This subjective dimension has incorporated measures of perceived cognition (satisfaction) and affects (positive affect) (Cummins, 2000b in Siddiqui et al. 2018, 9f.). Reviewing migrant integration definitions and perceptions surely gives a great starting point for the paper's analysis of achieved integration, however, given the extremely contextual and individual nature of integration experiences, it will be crucial to juxtapose these already existing understandings with the personal understandings of climate migrants and cities themselves to achieve the highest level of representativeness.

Furthermore, although general mobility literature has clearly dealt substantially with the concept of local integration (e.g. Ager and Strang, 2008; Escalona and Black, 1995; Sigona, 2005; in Ortlieb and Knappert, 2023, 1), so far it has predominantly considered the integration of *international refugees* into local communities (e.g. Kahraman and Güngördü, 2022) and especially their labour market integration (e.g. Ortlieb and Knappert, 2023; Bevelander and Lundh, 2007, Lee et al., 2020). Yet, international (or cross-border) refugees and *internally* displaced persons (IDPs) face differentiated realities and vulnerabilities (Churruca Muguruza and García, 2017, 321). The difference becomes particularly evident when it comes to the legal status and international recognition of IDPs. That is, according to Refugees International, while the rights of refugees who are outside their countries of origin or habitual residence are protected by a range of norms, principles, and laws at international, regional, and national levels, those of IDPs are not and no binding international instrument requires State governments to act in a certain way towards IDPs. Similarly, the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) admits in its widely disseminated 'Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons' that "From the perspective of international law, internal displacement is a factual state and unlike in refugee law, there is nothing like a legal 'IDP Status'" (IASC, 2010, 5). Thus, although IDPs make up the largest group of displaced people in the world (ibid.) this lack of recognition arguably results in important protection gaps (Moniruzzaman et al., 2019; Rana and Ilina, 2021, 2).

Lastly, Hovil and Maple (2022) argue that local integration as a policy strategy has tendentially been replaced by *de facto* local integration. That is, "local integration has not only been "forgotten" as a durable solution but has even been "deliberately avoided at a national, regional and international level […] to the point that it has all but vanished from the political arena" (ibid., 238). Displaced communities have then "forged spaces for integration" by themselves, finding alternative ways to "negotiate their own access to communities and labour markets" (ibid., 239). These bottom-up strategies for local integration have arguably been a significant source of resilience for the affected persons and have partly made up for the general disinterest of public institutions to pro-actively support effective local integration of climate migrants in the cities.

However, climate-induced IDPs continue living in dire and protracted situations of displacement and live at the margins of society despite impressive advances made by some governments, including the Bangladeshi government, in terms of developing strategies and plans at national level to tackle internal displacement due to climate change. This can partly be explained by the disconnect between the different levels of decision-making and implementation. More specifically, OECD (2018) argue that "while immigration policy is set at the national level, migrant integration policies are generally implemented at the subnational level" (24). Yet, "existing urban systems in developing countries like Bangladesh, partly due to lack of resources, are often completely unprepared to deal with sudden mass migrations to cities" (Ahsan, 2019, 186). Many academics and practitioners have therefore argued in favor of an increased focus on and capacitation of the local levels, advocating for local governments to become a key part in integrated multi-level governance frameworks aimed at supporting migrant integration (OECD, 2018, 24). For instance, Alexandra Bilak, a member of the Expert Advisory Group for the UNSG's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, argues that "building climate-resilient and migrant-friendly cities across the country [of Bangladesh] will be key to welcoming and integrating those who will inevitably have to move in the coming decade" (Bilak, 2019). Similarly, the localization of integration governance has been a proposed solution in many academic papers (Kleniewski, 2006; Satterthwaite, 2007; Ahsan, 2019; Rana and Ilina, 2021), including in Rana and Ilina (2019) whose authors argue that "successful, well-governed cities greatly reduce climate-related risks for low-income populations; unsuccessful, badly governed cities do not and may greatly increase such risks" (7).

Bangladesh is one of many countries in this world which is already and is projected over the next decades to continue experiencing rapid urbanization due to climate migration, including the forming of increasing numbers of megacities (Rigaud et al., 2018, 97). As the third-largest city in the country, and with an expected population growth rate of 2.31 percent in 2030 predominantly due to incoming coastal migrants, Khulna will be one of those cities whose management capacities will be greatly put to the test in the coming years (World Population Review, 2023). The city has already seen a 20 percent increase in population size "due to migration from nearby climate vulnerable districts" (Rahaman et al., 2018, 43). Studies have found that these climate migrants are predominantly settling in the urban slums of Khulna with extremely limited access to essential urban amenities, including health facilities, clean drinking water, and social services as well as persisting high unemployment (ibid.). Plans to create several economic zones in the south-western cities, including in the surroundings of Khulna, to provide for sufficient employment opportunities benefiting also the many climate migrants who will need to work, are currently being developed at national policy-level (Mirdha, 2022). However, "Khulna region has no comprehensive design for industrial development", according to Khulna City Corporation Panel Mayor Md Ali Akbar Tipu (The Business Standard, 2021). To make things more complex, "relevant public agencies are in conflict, and the role of the private sector is less recognized. The initiatives undertaken so far have limited success especially in granting land tenure security, and the private landowners or local authorities that trespassed public spaces resort to forceful eviction"

(Sikder et al., 2015, 5). All these factors tend to increase rather than decrease the vulnerability levels of climate migrants who come to the city hoping for a better future.

Out of the above literature context, this thesis thus argues that there will be no climate justice for climate IDPs without a pro-active support from local public institutions (cities) to account for the losses and damage that climate migrants have suffered due to climate change induced events. In fact, it will go so far as to argue that *effective* local integration can be one form of addressing loss and damage and thereby ensuring a human rights sensitive approach to climate displacement. That is, while it can provide for both cities and affected climate-IDPs to avoid protracted situations of displacement and urban extreme poverty and alleviating pressures on both sides, it may specifically restore individuals' dignity and humanity in the long run.

Filling the gap in the climate change – migration/displacement – and urbanization literature nexus regarding the overlooking of the post-displacement local integration dimension to climate migration, this thesis will therefore try to bring back the focus to local integration as both an adaptation strategy for the affected persons as well as a durable solution for cities to address the growing numbers of climate IDPs with the proposition of placing both the affected communities as well as the municipalities at center stage of local integration interventions and strategies.

Chapter I – The role of institutions to protect climate-displaced populations

The previous chapter mapped out the somewhat complex relationship between climate change, migration, and urbanization and how local integration may enhance this triple nexus to help understand the potential opportunities for affected vulnerable population groups such as climate-induced internally displaced persons to adapt to the related challenges (see *Fig. 2*).

Fig. 3: Progress made in the Introduction towards unraveling the connection between institutional mandates and local integration realities of climate-displaced populations in Bangladesh



This chapter will now look at the role that institutions play in this complex adaptation process, especially with regards to climate displacement and local integration. It will do so by first attempting to create a theoretical framework for a better understanding of what we mean by 'institutions', including how we may perceive institutions in the context of influencing individual and collective adaptation behaviors and how multi-level governance and policy frameworks may contribute to tackling the impacts of the essentially 'glocal' nature of climate change, including migration and urbanization. The second part of the chapter will then look - through the lens of multi-level governance systems - at the current policy architecture at international, national, and sub-national levels to provide a general overview of climate displacement and integration management frameworks.

1. Institutional mandates and their role in managing climate-induced displacement

Institutions have come to play a fundamental and multifaceted role in society, providing structure, guidance, and stability across various domains. Especially in our era of increasing population movements, they are expected to facilitate the smooth transition and meaningful inclusion of migrants through strong policies, social support systems, education, employment opportunities, cultural exchange spaces, and the general creation of an environment where migrants can not only adapt but also actively contribute to the enrichment of their host societies and vice-versa. This chapter follows the assumption that by examining the multifaceted contributions of institutions, we can gain valuable insights into the key to effective and sustainable migrant integration, fostering diverse and vibrant societies.

But what do we even mean by 'institutions? In everyday conversation, the term is commonly tossed around without being given much thought. In fact, it has almost assumed a synecdoche characteristic by which it is used as figure of speech to refer to 'the system' and to how society as a whole is run. However, deriving a

deeper meaning from the notion 'institution' and its role in society has preoccupied scholars and thinkers since early recorded history. In fact, contributions have ranged from Chinese philosopher Confucius' teachings on the importance of ethical and social institutions in promoting harmony, proper conduct, and good governance (in *The Analects*, ca. 500 B.C.E.), to Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle's concept of constitutions and how they shape the functioning of societies (e.g. in *Politics*, Book III, 350 B.C.E.), to Italian Renaissance thinker Machiavelli's understanding about power and politics in the framework of establishing stable and enduring political institutions in nation-building processes (e.g. in *The Prince*, 1513), to Enlightenment philosophers Locke, Hobbe, and Rousseau's understandings of a social contract between citizens and the sovereign or state for a just society (e.g. in *Two Treatises of Government*, 1690), all the way to economist Smith's work on political economy examining the ways in which institutions such as markets, property rights, and legal systems promote economic growth (e.g. in *The Wealth of Nations*, 1776), and finally Marx and Engels' analyses regarding the role of institutions in relation to class struggle, capitalism, and the transformation of societal structures (e.g. in *Das Kapital,* 1867/1885/1894).

2. Modern understandings of institutions

In recent academic literature, Douglass North has been influential in proposing a standard definition of what institutions constitute. According to him, "institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, 2). From this definition, Acemoglu and Robinson derive three distinct features of institutions, notably that a) they are "humanly devised" and thus under human control in contrast to factors such as geography, b) they are the "rules of the game", may they be laws, social conventions and norms or any other form of rule that constrains human behavior, and c) they function centrally through incentives (ibid.).

The first of these features was similarly adopted by Berman et al. (2012) who define institutions as "the formal legal rules and informal social norms that govern the behavior and shape how individuals and organizations interact (Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990)" (87). While in North's definition the involved actors constitute human beings in general ("humanly devised", "human interaction", in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, 2), Berman et al. (2012) provide a more specific account regarding the actors involved. That is, the rules and norms govern the interactions between "individuals" and "organizations" (87) – 'organizations' being used here to refer to a collective unit governed by laws, rules, and structures in contrast to individuals. Interestingly, this definition also makes a distinction between the 'formal' and the 'informal', hinting at a divide between what may become formalized through complex organizational structures ("organizations") in terms of *de jure* rules and regulations, and the *de facto* informal reality on the ground that is shaped by collectively enforced expectations ("social norms" and values) of a diverse population that may not always correspond to these formalized rules (Berman et al., 2012, 94, 96).

In fact, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) strongly focus on institutions in terms of *de facto* versus *de jure* power structures to understand how prevailing different institutional characteristics shape differences in levels of

poverty across countries. According to the authors, *de jure* political power is then the power allocated by political institutions which are the sum of collective choices (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, 7). That is, political institutions "determine the constraints on and the incentives of the key actors" in society (ibid., 6f.). *De facto* political power, on the other hand, refers to a group of individuals which, despite not having been allocated de jure political power by political institutions, may nonetheless possess important *de facto* influence (for instance using arms, conducting revolts, co-opting military, or protesting to impose the wishes on society, etc.). This type of power results from both being able to solve the collective action problem of a given group and from having substantial economic resources available (ibid., 7). With these two conditions fulfilled, a particular group may then be able to push for economic and political institutions favorable to their interests (ibid.) and thereby influence the evolution of those institutions (ibid.). As the political equilibrium is therefore determined by a combination of *de jure* and *de facto* political powers at play, changing this equilibrium to transition to a potentially better one requires changes in both de jure and de facto power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, 20). That is, direct institutional reform is in itself unlikely to be effective without thinking about the political forces that created or sustain institutions. Or in other words, "dealing with the symptoms other than causes may backfire" (ibid., 14).

3. Institutions' impact on individuals

While these understandings of the nature of institutions, power dynamics, and resulting implications for the level of institutional persistence or continuity and likelihood of reform are indispensable for this paper's case study, a second dimension to institutions must here be considered. Not only do institutions function to reinforce systemic status quos and influence each other across political, legal, economic, and bureaucratic spheres, other scholars have also pointed to the direct impacts of institutions on individuals. For example, they may influence the ways in which individuals respond to stressors, develop capacities to buffer external shocks in the long term (adaptation) and thus determine the likelihood of individuals to become resilient rather than merely cope in the short term with challenges induced by climate change (vulnerability) (Berman et al., 2012, 87). Or in other words, how any one individual within a community is able or unable to respond to a particular event may arguably be determined by the policies and processes introduced by external agents, such as organizations and individuals. Institutions are thus "centrally involved in the transformation of current coping capacity into longer-term adaptive capacity" (ibid.).

Furthermore, Berman et al. (2012) draw an important distinction between 'adapting capacity' and 'coping capacity' which shape the levels of vulnerability and resilience of individuals and communities. Accordingly, the authors define *coping capacity* as "the ability of actors to draw on available skills, resources and experiences as an immediate response to manage adverse stress or shocks brought about by climate variability" (Berman et al., 2012, 91), whereas *adaptive capacity* is qualified as "the ability to prepare in advance for stresses and changes and to adjust, respond and adapt to the effects caused by the stress associated with future climate change" (ibid.). Recalling the introduction, where the paper uses the definition of adaptation, referring to it as "'adjustments' in a system's behavior that reduce vulnerability to climate

variability and change" (see page 6, introduction), the here provided coping-adapting distinction offers the possibility to expand this understanding by including the temporal scale. Coping capacity is then associated with short-term reactions to stressors whereas adapting capacity is considered a longer-term transformation of *vulnerability*[1] into *resilience*[2] (ibid., 91).

This paper has further suggested earlier on that migration may be an adaptation strategy alternative to adaptation at the place of origin (*in-situ*). Accordingly, climate change affected individuals and households migrate to "reduce vulnerability to climate variability and change" (see page 6, introduction) and to create a long-term solution to the continuous climate change stressors they are exposed to and are coping with daily. Under the above temporal and impact imminence viewpoint, however, we may now propose instead that migration is the short-term coping strategy adopted as an immediate reaction to climate change induced stressor events at the place of origin, whereas the actual adaptation only occurs post-displacement through a successful local integration process in the receiving place. In other words, this paper will henceforth consider *ex-situ* local integration as the adaptation strategy, and migration as a mere imminent coping mechanism - a transitive action - that helps to improve the adaptive capacity of an individual and may then eventually allow for adaptation (or local integration) in the receiving place. [3]

Looking at adaptation and coping in this way, local institutions not only have a responsibility then to facilitate a safe and orderly transfer from their places of origin to the receiving cities (as advocated for by the UN 'Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration', UN General Assembly, 2018), but especially to guarantee that these individuals have access to the resources at the receiving place to develop new livelihoods for improved living conditions and levels of environmental security through local integration (Berman et al., 2012, 96). Effective external support interventions by local institutions may then be the determining factor for successful adaptation to climate change (Agrawal, 2008, 2) and a game changer in achieving adaptation rather than maladaptation (see page 6, introduction). Or as Berman et al. (2012) formulate it, "local institutions play a key role in mediating the transformation of coping capacity into adaptive capacity" (86).

4. Reform and institutional adaptive capacity

This role of 'mediating transformation' applies not only to the improvement of adaptive capacity of individuals as described earlier, but indeed for their very own adaptive capacities. That is, some academic literature has examined how, depending on their own adaptive capacity, institutions reorganize, transform, or collapse in response to stresses or shocks and vice-versa (e.g. Berman et al., 2012; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). In turn, institutions' adaptive capacity to respond to stresses may be increased by actively

[1] *Vulnerability* is defined in Berman et al. (2012, 88) as "the extent a system is prone to and unable to cope with [different social, ecological, and political] shocks and stresses".
[2] *Resilience* is defined by Stanley Holling (1973), as "...a measure of the ability of systems to absorb changes of state variables and parameters, and still persist" (in Berman et al., 2012, 88).
[3] Given the focus of this paper on local integration, it will be referred more consistently to 'adaptation' or 'adaptive capacity'.

reorganizing and transforming themselves (Berman et al., 2012, 95f.). According to Berman et al. (2012), adaptive capacity may thus be determined by the level of institutional change (96). It then seems to follow that flexibility and adaptive governance will create a base level of resilience (ibid., 91). However, flexibility requires an openness for reforms and continuous re-challenging of current systems and status quos. But as was described above, this continuous change can only occur through a parallel process of changing both *de facto* and *de jure* political powers (see page 12f.). Therefore, Berman et al.'s (2012) proposition of institutional change seems highly optimistic and somewhat misleading.

For example, although Bangladesh is spearheading regional efforts to mitigate displacement challenges resulting from climate change and has adopted in a very short time a broad series of strategies specifically targeting internal climate-induced displacement and the protection of vulnerable groups, the country is struggling to effectively localize its national efforts. As a result, large numbers of these climate IDPs remain in the limbo of pervasive urban poverty and marginalization. Indicatively, of the 52 percent of the urban population of Bangladesh that lived in informal settlements or other inadequate housing in 2020 (The World Bank (a), 2022), up to 50 percent are estimated to be IDPs who have fled their rural homes due to climate change impacts (IDMC, 2015, 32). The *de jure* institutional changes have therefore not produced the results they were meant to produce at local level. Of course, the insufficient impact on the local communities that has persisted despite the introduced institutional changes, may hint at broader issues at stake, such as inflation, budget constraints, corruption, and generally the long time any country, but especially young countries such as Bangladesh, require to develop industries and effective governance systems. Furthermore, the economic and/or political interests of *de facto* political power-holding local actors may have contravened these *de jure* reforms, or the incentives to invest into real local change have simply been too minimal for the key actors to trigger their political will to seriously implement the proposed changes. Consequently, the derivations cannot be determined by a simplistic unidirectional cause-effect relationship. But even if both *de jure* and *de facto* interests were aligned in this example, this would not *per* sé guarantee that the strategies finally reach the intended beneficiaries, because still, systemic shortcomings, such as ineffective implementation coordination, may be path dependent according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) so that new ways of thinking and doing will simply replace the old and known approaches (20).

5. Types and functions of institutions

Going back to the definitional challenges of the term, three types of institutions are commonly distinguished as being a) public, b) private, and c) civic (Agrawal, 2008, 1). In local governance and adaptation, all three are closely intertwined and mutually conditioned (Berman et al., 2012, 93) and as we have seen already above in Berman et al. (2012, 87), they may exist through *formal* (with elaborate written rules, procedures, instructions, and communications such as constitutions, contracts, forms of governments and structured organizations) (e.g. Pugh et al. 1968, North 1990, 1991; Lowndes 1996; Farrell and Héritier 2003, in Kaufmann, 2018) or *informal* (usually unwritten commonly shared traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs) (e.g. Pejovich, 1999, 166) arrangements. Firstly, local *public* institutions refer to local

governments and agencies such as extension services of higher-level governments that operate at local levels, including educational, cultural, health and social welfare institutions (UNBIS Thesaurus, 2023). Secondly, *private* institutions are understood as non-State service organizations that are not publicly funded, *inter alia* not-for-profit NGOs and charities or for-profit businesses (Agrawal, 2008, 1). And thirdly, *Civic* or *civil society* institutions are in turn voluntary community mobilizations that occur spontaneously or in an organized manner through membership organizations or partnership cooperatives and that aim at advancing some common local interest (Agrawal, 2008, 25). All three types are critical in determining the magnitude and direction of financial, information and technology, as well as social (such as leadership, networking and skills development and capacity-building) resource flows to different social groups (Agrawal, 2008, 1) and are therefore relevant to local adaptation (Berman et al., 2012, 93).

In other words, institutions "act as the means of delivery of external resources to facilitate adaptation, and thus govern access to such resources" (Agrawal, 2008, 2). One of the ways, they do so, is through policies. While this term does not have a clear definition or single meaning, the term 'policy' may be used here as "a broad orientation…, an indication of normal practice…, a specific commitment…, or a statement of values ('honesty is the best policy')" (Colebatch, 2009, 7). In the public sphere, which will be the principle focus of this paper, 'public policy' is understood as a concept to make sense of the process of government (ibid., *Preface*) hinting at "the activity of government" (Colebatch, 2009, 4). In this sphere, 'policy' is used by a wide range of actors (e.g. public officials, elected representatives, activists, experts, journalists, and others) to attempt to shape "the way public life is organized" (ibid., *Preface*). In other words, this chapter will use the term 'public policy' to refer to "the way we are governed" (ibid., 7). This 'way', or more accurately these 'ways', are highly contested and changing, "always in a state of 'becoming'", according to Ball (1993, 10). Similarly, the policy *process* seems to be characterized by conflict, resistance, uncertainty and ambiguity." (Colebatch, 2009, *Preface*). As a result, although policy *statements*, such as made in public strategy papers and action plans, are used as *de jure* tools to guide the conduct of governing, they "may not have much to do with the [actual or *de facto*] way governing is conducted" (Colebatch, 2009, *Preface*), as will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2.

Policies are used at all levels of governance, including the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels and political institutions organized around dedicated jurisdictions may help govern policy-related issues (Di Gregorio, 2019, 66). The role of these institutions in the urban management of climate migration and integration of climate migrants is then best understood in terms of how power, rights and entitlements are structured at multiple levels of governance, ultimately enabling, or instead hampering the adaptive capacities of communities and individuals (Berman et al., 2012, 92). For example, Di Gregorio et al. (2019), in their work on Multi-Level Governance (MLG) systems and the importance of coordination and communication across these various levels of governance, the authors recognize that MLG essentially requires institutional changes through "shifts in power and authority relations". According to Gregorio et al. (2019) these power shifts then lead to the "unravelling of the state" through the power sharing of the central

government with local governments and civil society and a parallel "reduction of state sovereignty" through the participation in international coordination mechanisms (Di Gregorio, 2019, 66). However, this decentralization process, while potentially facilitating learning and achieving benefits across intervention scales, may also prompt mismatches between institutional responses and the responses required in reality, which then bring back challenges to cross-level interactions (ibid.).

To understand how these institutions at all levels influence the ability of individuals and communities to adapt over the longer term to climate change, notably by integrating in the places where they arrive after being displaced, the next part of the chapter will now turn to looking more closely at what policies and institutions have so far been adopted and created to help tackle the climate change-migration-urbanization triple nexus and how effectively they have been incorporated in and implemented through local governance frameworks.

Chapter II – IDP Protection Frameworks at various levels of governance

According to Di Gregorio et al. (2019), "Climate change governance has evolved into a complex polycentric structure that spans from the global to national and sub-national levels, relying on both formal and informal networks and policy channels" (65). That is, on all levels of governance, an array of different state and non-state actors are involved in developing policies and actions to address the challenges associated with climate change. Climate change has been referred to as 'glocal' suggesting that impacts are not only felt at various levels of governance, but also require the involvement of actors at these multiple levels of governance (ibid.). To better understand the relationship between these different levels and the impacts of the integration (or lack thereof) of policies and decision-making processes across those levels of governance, this chapter will therefore explore the institutional dimension through the Multi-Level Governance (MLG) lens. While to date MLG has focused majorly on relations between the national and supranational levels in literature, relations between the national and subnational have received relatively less attention. However, as climate change impacts are essentially felt at the national and especially local levels, this second dimension will take centre stage in this chapter, while still allowing the exploration of the relationship between the international and national dimension. The next section will now delve into the institutional intricacies at international level.

1. The International Dimension of climate displacement management

1.1 Relevant international policy processes and the climate change-urbanization-migration-local integration Nexus

The phenomena of climate change, urbanization, and migration have reached by now the forefront of international political attention as population growth and resource scarcity is continuing to pose critical challenges to modern societies. Rather than separate and local issues, these challenges have increasingly been recognized to have global and cross-border implications that require an international collaborative approach (e.g. IOM, 2018). Consequently, we can observe a vast number of international policy frameworks

and processes that seek to mainstream these developments and propose some guidance and solutions (see *Table 1*). However, in general, it may be argued that the urgency and thematic relevance captured in the nexus between climate change, urbanization, migration, and local integration has come too short if not has even remained in complete obscurity overshadowed by the climate disaster and emergency discourse of displacement and urbanization.

Some of these frameworks take on a restricted uni- or bi-dimensional vision focusing on one or two of the here proposed nexus components (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC, Aarhus Convention, Cancún Adaptation Framework, Nansen Initiative, WIM, Paris Agreement, New York Declaration, GCM, LLA Action Principles). However, others take a more holistic approach connecting at least three nexus components (Guiding Principles, Pinheiro Principles, GCM, GCR, Sphere Standards, GP20 Plan of Action, UNSG Action Agenda).

Among these, although some do explicitly recognize the need to approach the nexus through a 'development-oriented approach' (i.e. UNSG Action Agenda, 2030 Agenda, Principles for Locally Led Adaptation Action), most of these processes have a humanitarian and emergency-relief or short-term oriented approach which neglects the important post-displacement and long-term implications of internal displacement due to climate change (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, Nansen Initiative Agenda, the Sphere Standards, GCM, GCR).

Local integration, which is arguably one of these development-oriented solutions, has mostly only implicitly been referred to through the acknowledgement of the important role that local governments play in eliminating discrimination of vulnerable groups and/or ensuring their participation in terms of social inclusion and empowerment of local communities (e.g. New Urban Agenda, Aarhus Convention, Peninsula Principles). However, where processes and policy frameworks do refer to durable solutions (e.g. IOM Displacement Management Framework, IASC Framework, Guiding Principles, GP20 Plan of Action), local integration or 'reintegration' provisions are proposed.

Only few of these development-oriented frameworks give practicable guidance and action points for the effective localization of these local integration solutions. In fact, the paper's cross-policy check has found only one document that stood out to connect all the above-mentioned nexus components. That is, only the IASC Framework recognizes the four nexus components through a development lens with practicable guidance to address local integration as a durable solution, thereby closing the here proposed climate change-urbanization-migration-local integration nexus.

As it would be impossible for the intended scope of this research project to consider all international policy frameworks that have to date been published, the next section will limit itself to focusing on the widely recognized IASC Framework and scrutinizing in depth the key provisions, solutions, and scope for localization of integration it proposes.

Table 1: Summarizing Overview of international processes relevant to urbanization, climate change, migration/internal displacement, and/or local integration[4]

POLICY/PROCESS/FRAMEWORK	URBANIZATION	CLIMATE CHANGE	MIGRATION/ INTERNAL DISPLACEMNT	LOCAL INTEGRATION
1994 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change ('UNFCCC')		X*	X**	
1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ('Kyoto Protocol')		X		
1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement ('Guiding Principles')		x	X	X
1998 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters ('Aarhus Convention')		X		x
2007 Pinheiro Principles	X	X	x	
2010 Cancún Adaptation Framework		X	x	
2010 IASC Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons ('IASC Framework')	**x**	**x**	**X**	**X**
2011 Nansen Initiative Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change ('Nansen Initiative')		X	X	
2013 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts ('WIM')		X	X	
2013 Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement Within States	x	X	X	X
2015 Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development Goals ('2030 Agenda') (2015-2030)	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030)	X	X		
2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change ('Paris Agreement')		X	x	
2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants ('New York Declaration')			X	X
2016 New Urban Agenda	**X**	**X**	**x**	**X**
2017 IOM Framework for addressing internal displacement ('IOM Displacement Management Framework')	**x**	**X**	**X**	**x**
2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration ('GCM')		X	X	X
2018 Global Compact for Refugees ('GCR')		X	X	X
2018 Sphere Standards (fourth edition)	X	X	X	
2018 GP20 Plan of Action for Advancing Prevention, Protection and Solutions for Internally Displaced People (2018-2020) ('GP20 Plan of Action')	x	x	X	
2021 Principles for Locally Led Adaptation Action ('LLA Action Principles')		X		x
2022 UN Secretary-General's Action Agenda on Internal Displacement ('UNSG Action Agenda')	x	x	X	

* X = explicit reference ** x = implicit reference

[4] This non-exhaustive table summarizes the key international instruments created by the 'international community' to address the governance of urbanization, climate change, migration/internal displacement, and local integration.

1.2 International Legal Provisions and the 'IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons'

According to the IASC Framework, "Displacement is a life-changing event" (IASC, 2010, 1). It risks to indefinitely traumatize affected persons (IASC, 2010, 1) and sometimes leaves them in worse conditions than before ('maladaptation'). Internally displaced persons (IDPs), especially those having been "forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence […] as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of […] natural or human-made disasters […]" (Guiding Principles 1998, 5), risk to remain in "continued" or 'protracted' situations of marginalization after their displacement despite the *de jure* illegality of protracted displacement under international law (e.g. in the Guiding Principles, Principle 6.2: "Displacement shall last no longer than required by the circumstances", UN General Assembly, 1998, 7).

Under international law, human beings in general hold a series of 'inherent' rights which are enumerated by various international human rights conventions and other legal processes, including in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (see *Table 2*). These include, but are not limited to the rights to a legal identity, to freedom of movement and residence, to live free from discrimination, to equality before the law, to justice, to property, to political participation, to work, to education, and to an adequate standard of living (which includes the right to health, food, clothing, housing, medical care, social services, and security) (UN General Assembly, 1948).

Table 2: Overview of the relevant human rights spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948)

RIGHTS PROVISION	DESCRIPTION	UDHR SOURCE
Right to a legal identity	*"Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law."*	Art. 6
Right to freedom of movement and residence	*"Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State."*	Art. 13, §1
Right to live free from Discrimination and to Equality before the law	*"All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."*	Art. 7
Right to Justice	*"Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted hum by the constitution or by law"*	Art. 8
Right to Property	*"Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others."*	Art. 17, §1
	"No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property"	Art. 17, §2
Right to Participation	*"Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives"*	Art. 21, §2
Right to Social Services and Social Security	*"Everyone has the right to equal access to public services in his country."*	Art. 21, §2
	"Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality."	Art. 22
Right to Work	*"Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment."*	Art. 23, §1
	"Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work."	Art. 23, §2
	"Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection."	Art. 23, §3
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living	*"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."*	Art. 25, §1
Right to Education	*"Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages, Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."*	Art. 26, §1

However, through displacement and migration-related circumstances, individuals who are forced to migrate face serious human rights challenges that tend to leave many of the affected individuals and communities deprived of the most basic rights outlined above, especially of security, property, housing, education, health, livelihoods, and adequate living standards (IASC, 2010, 7). They may further be affected by development challenges such as losing access to governance structures and the rule of law that would under ideal circumstances ensure their access to these basic human rights (ibid.). This is arguably not only directly impacting on the lives of individuals and communities, but leaving IDPs in continued marginalization may also result in the general weakening of the State and hamper its overall development in that the neglect may produce serious obstacles to long-term peace stability, recovery, and reconstruction (ibid., 1).

As a result of these acute vulnerabilities that IDPs face, in 1998, the landmark international policy document to tackle internal displacement challenges, namely the 'Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement' ('Guiding Principles'), has expanded the above-listed basic human rights to incorporate provisions that recognize and address the specific needs of IDPs. Most importantly, Principle 28, §1 of the 1998 Guiding Principles declares that:

> *"Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their home or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons." (UN General Assembly, 1998, 14).*

Based on this principle the Inter-Agency Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (henceforth 'IASC Framework') emphasizes that "while the often-traumatic experience of displacement cannot be undone, internally displaced persons (IDPs) need to be able to resume a normal life by achieving a *durable solution*" (IASC, 2010, 1). It hence expands the until then valid international general and specific rights-provisions and establishes that "IDPs have a right to a durable solution" (IASC, 2010, 1), thereby calling into effect a policy framework to recover the dignity of IDPs.

The *2010 IASC Framework* offers a guideline for cooperation among government, humanitarian groups, and development agencies in order to meet the long-term needs of IDPs so that sustainable solutions to their displacement are developed. More specifically, it proposes a set of three durable solutions (IASC, 2010, 5):

1. Reintegration at the place of origin ("Return")
2. Local Integration in areas where IDPs take refuge ("Local Integration")
3. Integration in another part of the country ("Resettlement")

In effect, a 'durable solution' is defined by the IASC Framework as a process that allows to restore the rights that IDPs have been deprived of as a direct or indirect consequence of conflict or disaster, such as their inherent right to security, property, adequate housing, education, health, and livelihoods (IASC, 2010, 5). Affected persons must be allowed to choose individually and freely their preferred durable solution, and competent authorities must actively facilitate their achievement (ibid., 7). However, a durable solution according to the Framework goes beyond the mere restoration of rights. In fact, it necessitates a transitional justice approach, that is, measures such as reparations and truth, which account not only for the restoration of rights, but also address the losses and damages that IDPs have suffered as a consequence of their displacement causes (ibid.). A durable solution, whether it is Return, Local Integration, or Resettlement, is understood to be achieved "…when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement" (ibid., 5).

The IASC Framework outlines eight thematic priority areas related to the general and specific human rights IDPs are entitled to and which are supported by relevant internationally established legal principles and examples of good practices that may facilitate the achievement of such a durable solution, notably:

- Long-term safety and security
- Enjoyment of an adequate standard of living without discrimination
- Access to livelihoods and employment
- Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land, and property
- Access to personal and other documentation without discrimination
- Family reunification
- Participation in public affairs without discrimination
- Access to effective remedies and justice

For each of these priority areas, it proposes specific indicators that are crucial to help inform progress monitoring efforts of policy makers and service providers. The relevant indicators for the later empirical analysis of this paper are listed in *Table 3* below.

Facilitating a durable solution across these eight priority areas may help restore the inherent rights of IDPs after their displacement. However, although restoring rights may seem to be a valid objective of a durable solution, it does not automatically equate to a dignified process to reach that end. In fact, achieving a "truly" durable solution is a "gradual and complex process" that has to develop through a human rights-based approach throughout the process (IASC, 2010, 7).

Table 3: The 8 IASC Framework priority areas and selected indicators relevant to the analysis[5]

PRIORITY AREA	RELEVANT INDICATOR
1. Long-term safety and security	*1.1 Safety and security perceptions of IDPs seeking a durable solution*
2. Enjoyment of an adequate standard of living without discrimination	*2.1 Assistance programs in place to provide IDPs with essential food, potable water, basic shelter, and essential health care* *2.2 Percentage of IDPs living in overcrowded housing/shelter, compared to the resident population, the situation before displacement or the national average, as appropriate* *2.3 IDPs do not face specific obstacles to access public services, assistance, or remittances from abroad compared to local residents with comparable needs*
3. Access to livelihoods and employment	*3.1 Types and conditions of employment of the IDP population compared to the non-displaced population, including rates of informal-market employment and access to labor law standards, such as the minimum wage, as appropriate* *3.2 Poverty and/or unemployment levels among IDPs compared to the resident population, the situation before displacement or the national average, as appropriate*
4. Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property	*4.1 Percentage of IDPs remaining without adequate housing, reduction in this percentage over time and comparison with the percentage for the resident population or the national average, as appropriate* *4.2 Existence of effective and accessible mechanisms to resolve housing, land and property disputes relevant to displacement and steps taken to overcome the most common challenges to implementing housing, land and property rights* *4.3 IDPs have access to support programs (including access to credits) to restore or improve housing, land or property on the same basis as the resident population*
5. Access to personal and other documentation without discrimination	*5.1 Percentage of IDPs without birth certificates, national ID cards or other personal documents relevant to the local context compared to the resident population, the situation before displacement or the national average, as appropriate* *5.2 Mechanisms to replace documents are accessible and affordable bearing in mind the local context*
6. Family reunification	*6.1 The number of internally displaced children or other dependent persons who have not yet been reunited with their families*
7. Participation in public affairs without discrimination	*7.1 The percentage of adult IDPs eligible and registered to vote in comparison to the resident population or the national average, as appropriate* *7.2 IDPs face no legal or administrative obstacles that prevent them from voting, being elected or working in public service* *7.3 The percentage of adult IDPs participating in elections held in comparison to the resident population or the national average*
8. Access to effective remedies and justice	*8.1* Existence of accessible mechanisms that have the legal mandate and actual capacity to provide IDPs with effective remedies for violations suffered, including violations committed by non-state actors *8.2 Percentage of IDPs who consider that the violations suffered have been effectively remedied and a sense of justice restored*

To guarantee such a rights-based approach some crucial principles are proposed by the IASC Framework. Firstly, IDPs must be able to participate in the planning and management of the chosen durable solution (IASC, 2010, A-2). This arguably allows them to have their needs and rights considered in recovery and broader development strategies. Secondly, IDPs must have "safe, unimpeded and timely access to all actors supporting the achievement of durable solutions" including non-governmental and development actors (ibid., A-3). Thirdly, IDPs must have access to effective monitoring mechanisms regarding the smooth processes and conditions on the ground (ibid., 15). And

[5] Selected contents retrieved from IASC, 2010, 27-46

fourthly, if IDPs opt for the local integration solution, this choice "must not be regarded as renunciation of the right to return should that choice later become feasible" (IASC, 2010, A-2). Furthermore, the IASC Framework points to the importance to include also host communities in considerations and interventions. That is, "populations and communities that (re-)integrate IDPs and whose needs may be comparable must not be neglected in comparison to the displaced" (ibid., A-3).

1.3 Critical reflections regarding the IASC Framework provisions

The term 'solution' may lead to presuppose that the end to displacement- as well as pre-displacement-related vulnerabilities permits the disengagement with IDP concerns. However, scholars have warned that this conclusion could prompt duty-bearers to justify their lack of involvement in the protection of IDPs after their arrival in cities (e.g. Miron, 2023, 14). As mentioned earlier, the IASC Framework proposes that a durable solution is effectively achieved when IDPs no longer require assistance and protection linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights fully (see page 20). Similarly, the framework refers to the resolution of the immediate cause of displacement constituting a durable solution (IASC, 2010, 5). However, one cannot help but wondering what happens after this durable solution is supposedly 'achieved'. For example, in many places, when IDPs are considered to have achieved local integration, they no longer qualify for specific services and immediate assistance, such as food aid, related to their initial displacement needs despite still having difficulties every day to make ends meet (ibid., 6). Furthermore, considering only the resolution of the displacement cause, which may in that moment allow a person to return home, does not suffice to provide long-term guarantee of security. That is, especially in the context of climate change-related disasters, in contrast to climatic disasters (i.e. volcanic eruptions), immediate causes for displacement (i.e. flooding, typhoons, etc.) are likely to repeat themselves and even aggravate under increasing global warming. Therefore, it may be necessary – although it might not be "in and by itself sufficient" - to create a durable solution (ibid., 5). The cessation of an IDP's acute need for assistance must therefore not be confused by relevant actors to receive a free pass to disengage from their protection duty.

On a second note, the provided definition regarding the 'achievement' of a durable solution is arguably very vague and gives too ample room to be applied by some actors to mere short-term resolution interventions. For example, what happens to those who may have formally 'achieved' local integration but for whom the vulnerabilities changed into non-displacement-related needs and human rights concerns? These then arguably lead to *de facto* protracted situations of displacement and vulnerability perpetuated by the continuous maladaptation of affected individuals. In this case, individuals may have achieved a durable solution but without actual resolution of their precarious living circumstances. This is often the case when IDPs end up settling in urban informal settlements ('slums') where the wider

population faces similar challenges as IDPs such as accessing livelihood opportunities and employment restrictions, or where IDPs cannot participate in elections and other public affairs.

Underscoring this concern, Zetter (2016) points to the limitations of the classical durable solutions in that they are mainly concerned with formally putting an end to mobility and movement. Consequently, they are 'fulfilled' when a "finite physical place" is found and/or when protection and assistance needs are terminated. However, for many of these individuals there will not be a "finite status" so that protracted displacement and vulnerability becomes the norm for many IDPs (ibid.). The IASC Framework even admits this reality by stating that "a solution may become durable only years, or even decades, after the physical movement […] has taken place, or the decision to locally integrate has been made" (IASC, 2010, 7). Similarly, Kälin et al. (2018, *Extract*) show that more than fifty countries reported to have people living in internal displacement situations for ten or more years, whereby protracted internal displacement is generally characterized by dependency on humanitarian assistance, high levels of vulnerability, marginalization, and ultimately the inability to move towards durable solutions to end displacement (ibid.). Zetter then argues that "protracted displacement is thus a key indicator that the three durable solutions are rarely achievable today" (Zetter, 2016).

Although durable solutions in general, and local integration in particular, provide an important starting point to address the specific vulnerabilities related to (climate-induced) internal displacement, Zetter (2016) proposes to look beyond existing finite and fixed modalities. For example, he proposes that the 'solutions' should not be provided by external actors and agencies as is currently common practice, but that these actors should be merely *supporting* the implementation of the solutions. That is, effective long-term solutions should be "led by, and depend on the displaced and affected populations themselves" and therefore aim at self-reliance strategies (ibid.). Furthermore, transcending the "end-of-movement" objective mainstreamed by the IASC Framework, the continuum of needs- and rights-based vulnerabilities of displaced persons should take center-stage in policies and support interventions (ibid.). Zetter (2016) also urges in favor of establishing "metrics for determining how the thresholds of assistance, protection and rights are measured, when they have been reached, and who measures them" (ibid.).

In this regard the same author does recognize the valuable contribution that the IASC Framework makes (ibid). To be fair, the IASC Framework indeed acknowledges the fact that the need for protection does not usually stop with the choosing of one of the proposed durable solutions and that, on the contrary, "whatever the cause of internal displacement, or the option chosen by IDPs for their durable solution, IDPs will commonly continue to have residual needs and human rights concerns linked to their displacement" (IASC, 2010, 6). In the local integration context, this need may refer to not finding a job

or dwelling in informal and low-income settlements because of discrimination against IDPs by the resident population or local authorities (IASC, 2010, 6).

The IASC Framework even adds complementary considerations regarding the non-finite nature of protection needs of IDPs and their association with displacement by proposing some criteria that may help determine "whether the remaining needs or human rights concerns are related to the fact of having been displaced" (ibid.). Those criteria include assessing whether a) "the need or human rights concern is the consequence of events causing displacement or resulting from displacement (for example, until an IDP does not manage to replace her identity documents lost during evacuation, she cannot apply to social public services); b) "the need or human rights concern results from the displaced person's absence from his or her home (for example, an IDP who was displaced to another area is not in the voter registry and therefore cannot participate in the local and broader elections); c) "the need or human rights concern is related to conditions in areas of return, local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country that pose an obstacle to the IDP being able to choose a durable solution" (for example, an IDP is forced to settle in a low-income and informal settlement that is cut off from social service and infrastructure provisions and therefore cannot access adequate livelihood opportunities and living standards); and d) "the need or human rights concern is a consequence of a problem disproportionately affecting IDPs, in particular if the problem results from discrimination" (for example, an IDP tries to integrate locally but cannot find a job despite generally high employment rate among the resident population) (IASC, 2010, 6f.).

While these criteria may help determine the further protection measures to restore affected persons' dignity, it is important to note here that protection measures and the facilitation of a durable solution must not be understood as returning to a previous status-quo before displacement. Rather, the local context needs to be taken into consideration which requires adaptation, both on the side of IDPs as well as the responding field actors, to the specific context of displacement and local environment (IASC, 2010, 3).

1.4 The need to look at the national dimension

Although concrete and vast numbers of provisions have been developed over the past decades at international level, recent years have started to see a decline in interest regarding the protection of IDPs. In fact, according to the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement's report, "internal displacement has largely dropped off the international agenda over the past decade" (UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, 2021, *Foreword ii)*. This is also reflected by the inexistence of legally binding international conventions to protect climate-displaced populations, as mentioned earlier.

The above-mentioned High-Level Panel report calls on the international community to build momentum to help address internal climate-induced displacement but acknowledges that, in the face of absent international legally binding provisions, the crucial actors to bring about practical change for the affected populations remain national and local governments, IDPs themselves and the affected host communities. The 'Nansen Principles' anchored in the Nansen Initiative's Protection Agenda stress that "States have a primary duty to protect their populations and give particular attention to the unique needs of the people most vulnerable to and most affected by climate change and other environmental hazards, including the displaced, hosting communities and those at risk of displacement" (Bangladesh National Strategy on Disaster Management, MoDMR, 2021, *Glossary,*44f.). Similarly, the IASC Framework explicitly echoes the Guiding Principle's declaration of the State, or "national authorities", being the primary duty-bearer to ensure the protection of IDPs (IASC, 2010, A-2). However, it also urges for coordinated multi-stakeholder cooperation, in particular between national and local authorities, as well as humanitarian and development actors (ibid., A-3). In the light of the incapacity of an international community to address national and local displacement challenges, and the above-outlined responsibility of the State anchored in international law to protect climate change-induced IDPs, the next section will now look at the provisions in one specific country, notably Bangladesh, to address the respective climate-induced internal displacement challenges and will assess whether the country has adopted any of the international provisions outlined above.

2. The National Dimension

2.1 Bangladesh: A country in the frontline of climate change

In recent years, Bangladesh, a small India-locked country located in the South Asian Bay of Bengal, has been steadily gaining international recognition and visibility not only in terms of extremely rapid national socioeconomic development (Rigaud et al., 2018, 145), but especially with regards to climate politics as it emerges as a notable player on the global stage. Being at the frontline of countries having to deal with the adverse impacts of intensifying climate change-related events, the country has adopted a strong diplomacy[6] to push the international agenda in favor of emission reductions and the compensation of the losses and damages suffered 'unjustly' by low-income developing nations (Miron, 2023, 38). It is also highly engaged in regional diplomacy, by which the country actively participates in consultative processes related to regional migration governance (e.g. Intergovernmental Asia-Pacific

[6] For example, Bangladesh is a founding member of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), a platform of the 55 most climate-vulnerable countries and an active member of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), while also being a member of the IOM Council (IOM, 2019).

consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Migrants (ACP); The Abu Dhabi Dialogue; The Bali Process; The Budapest Process; The Colombo Process) (IOM, 2019).

The strong interest in climate-related diplomacy can be explained primarily by the strong effects of climate change-related events on its own socioeconomic and political stability. Being ranked by the World Risk Index as the 5th most effected country in the world in terms of natural disasters (Rigaud et al., 2018, 123), Bangladesh's geographical location and geological characteristics make large parts of the country's population highly vulnerable to extreme climate events causing a variety of crosscutting challenges (Ahsan, 2019, 187). More specifically, as a deltaic and coastal country, combined with being the most low-lying country in the whole of the Indian sub-continent with sizable areas laying just above sea level in the Bay of Bengal (*Fig. 4* and *Fig. 5*), Bangladesh is particularly exposed to the interacting effects resulting from river flooding, rising sea levels, river erosion and coastal degradation, as well as increasingly intense tropical cyclones (Rigaud et al., 2018, 146). The World Bank's groundbreaking study on the potential impacts of climate change on human migration (henceforth the 'Groundswell Report') projects that a two-meter rise due to storm surges "would lead to the inundation of nearly 12,150 square kilometers" which constitutes eight percent of Bangladesh's land area (Rigaud et al., 2018, 147). The pessimistic scenario even goes as far as estimating that 18 percent of the country's coastland may remain inundated by 2080 (Khan et al., 2021, 1290).

Bangladesh experienced 219 disasters between 1980 and 2008 causing an estimated 16 billion USD in loss and damage (Khan et al., 2021, 1290). The frequency of cyclones has especially increased by more than five times in comparison with the previous three decades and many thousands of lives have been lost due to recent disasters such as cyclone Sidr (2007) and Cyclone Aila (2009). Torrential rains causing floods in 2017 and 2019 affected more than 436,000 and nearly a million people respectively, many of whom were still trying to recover from previous disasters (ActionAid Bangladesh, 2021). These climate events touch especially the local and already disadvantaged populations as such events render large areas of productive farmlands of highly agriculture-dependent local populations useless, reduce food productions, and thus strongly affect local livelihoods and increase poverty.

Fig. 4: Elevation of Bangladesh compared to the rest of South Asia (Rigaud et al., 2018, 76)



Fig. 5: Elevation levels of Bangladesh (Rigaud et al., 2018, 145)



Climate change-induced disasters also forcibly displace ever increasing numbers of people to nearby cities as they lose their homes, families, or livelihoods (Ahsan, 2019, 187). Although migration has long served as an adaptation strategy in Bangladesh (ibid., 186), the ever more disastrous implications of increased climate variability have started a process by which 'regular' internal migration due to economic or other reasons is gradually being surpassed by climate migration. In fact, the Groundswell Report (Rigaud et al., 2018, 98, 150) projects that under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)'s pessimistic reference scenario (RCP8.5[7]/SSP4[8]), internal climate migrants will have outpaced other internal migrants (*Fig. 7*) and will constitute a 7.53 percent (13.3 million individuals) of the country's total population (*Fig. 6*), both by 2050. These numbers make Bangladesh the most climate migration-affected country in South Asia (Khan et al., 2021, 1290), and climate impacts the "dominant forces driving internal migration in Bangladesh" (Rigaud et al., 2018, 144). Similarly, 4.1 million people (2.5 percent of the population) were already displaced as a result of the flooding disaster in 2019 alone (Khan et al., 2021, 1290) contributing to a current yearly new displacement rate of 915,083 according

[7] RCP, or Representative Concentration Pathway, is one of four greenhouse gas concentration trajectories used in climate modeling and projections by the IPCC. It represents future scenarios in which greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise rapidly throughout the 21st century. RCP8.5 represents the 'worst-case scenario' by which the absence of efforts as a consequence of a 'business-as-usual' attitude to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions results in extreme temperature rise (2.5-4.8 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels), accelerated sea-level rise (0.45 to 0.82 meters by the end of the century), impacts on ecosystems, extreme weather events, ocean acidification, and pronounced social and economic consequences (e.g. disruptions to agriculture, infrastructure, and human settlements) (Rigaud et al., 2018, 53).

[8] SSP, or Shared Socioeconomic Pathway, is one of the climate modeling and research methods to explore different future trajectories of human society and their potential impacts on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. SSP4 is considered the most pessimistic scenario, by which extreme socioeconomic inequalities within and between countries divide societies, disrupt global cooperation, lead to further environmental consequences, and cause adaptation challenges for the most marginalized populations who are expected to lack necessary resources (Rigaud et al., 2018, 54f.).

to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 4). In 2022, an estimated 1,524,000 internal displacements took place as a result of climate change induced events (IDMC, 2022).

Fig. 6: Projected number of internal climate migrants in Bangladesh under three scenarios, 2020-2050, according to the World Bank (Rigaud et al., 2018, 149)



Fig. 7: Projected number of climate migrants in relation to other internal migrants in Bangladesh under three scenarios, 2020-2050, according to the World Bank (Rigaud et al., 2018, 150)



Yet even if the most pessimistic of the scenarios was not to manifest, in any case "the share of climate migrants in total internal migrants is projected to increase in all scenarios by 2050" (Rigaud et al., 2018, 144), with serious implications for urban areas. That is, already now, Bangladesh is one of the fastest urbanizing countries worldwide with an estimated 4 percent in 2015 (Rigaud et al., 2018, 145) and an average annual rate of urbanization of 5.34 since 1974 (Roy et al., 2018, *xii*). Some estimate that by 2050 the country's share of urban population may reach 56 percent compared to 35.8 percent in 2017 (ibid.). Especially the capital city Dhaka experiences large scale urbanization trends with an estimated half a million people moving to the city each year (Khan et al., 2021, 1290f.). Migration of this magnitude and the unevenness of spatial population distributions across the different cities therefore already pose

serious challenges, particularly considering Bangladesh's high population density of ca. 1100/km^2 on its small overall land area of 147,570 km^2 (Khan et al., 2021, 1290f.), which intensifies in urban contexts (e.g. Dhaka's population density was 20,000 people per km^2 in 2015). For example, although overall extreme poverty is rapidly declining in Bangladesh, urban growth has produced persisting challenges for local populations, including *inter alia* infrastructure deficits, food insecurity, and lacking access to financial resources and services such as water and sanitation (Rigaud et al., 2018, 145). Consequently, 7.35 million people (or 21 percent of the total urban population) remained under the poverty line in 2011 (Roy et al., 2018, *xii*).

Rural to urban migration has become the major migration trend in Bangladesh with 222.9 in every 1,000 people coming from these areas compared to 52.6 and 44.4 for rural-rural and urban-urban migration, respectively (Roy et al., 2018, xii). According to Khan et al. (2021), these individuals migrating or being displaced to cities tend to opt for one out of three settlement pathways, notably "autonomous relocation by displaced individuals (without much government support), government-supported temporary settlement, and planned relocation" (1291). He also observes that in Bangladesh, the first of these three options prevails, which is evidenced by the spontaneous and usually chaotic "explosion" of informal settlements ('slums') in the cities of Bangladesh which, coupled with the unpreparedness of urban authorities to adequately support these climate migrants, tends to result in serious shortcomings with regards to basic living and human rights standards (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 1-3). In fact, the national numbers of so-called slums experienced a dramatic increase from the previously recorded numbers in 1997, with a total of 13,935 compared to 2,991, respectively (Roy et al. 2018, xii).

However, in the light of cautiously optimistic projections relating to the fertility decline and slowing population growth that may lead in the upcoming decades to a shifting population distribution with lower dependency ratio and larger working population, scholars are proposing that Bangladesh could benefit from this demographic development if it manages to create institutional structures, effective policies, and productive labor markets that effectively absorb these large working populations in urban areas by ensuring the socioeconomic conditions such as good access to health care, education, and employment (Rigaud et al., 2018, 145).

The next section will therefore turn to the current state of the art of Bangladesh's institutional set-up and policy architecture regarding the protection of climate displaced persons after they are displaced to urban areas and it will evaluate to what extent they are in line with the above-mentioned international provisions and standards.

2.2 The Role of Institutions in Bangladesh

In 2021, Bangladesh marked 50 years since gaining independence, and it has arguably made many notable achievements. For example, the nation has stabilized into a parliamentary democracy with some opportunities for regular and peaceful transfer of power after experiencing sporadic episodes of military, single-party, and democratic governments. Furthermore, Bangladesh's economy has experienced remarkable growth over a protracted period, the prevalence of extreme poverty has declined, and the social safety net has been expanded to include a sizable portion of the population (Huque and Panday, 2020, 127). School enrollments have risen, foreign direct investment has been surging, and the nation has developed a sizable foreign exchange reserve (ibid.). The promotion of Bangladesh from a "low income" to a "lower middle income" nation has become a much referred to achievement of the country (ibid.). In other words, Bangladesh has made significant strides in areas such as poverty reduction and healthcare access. However, while public institutions are surely essential in theory for fostering such development, their effectiveness has gotten under much scrutiny by scholars especially with regards to the protection of climate migrants and hosting communities (i.e. Rahman, 2016; Huque and Panday, 2018).

In her reflection report on her six-year tenure, the previous special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, emphasized the important role that national governments play in the protection of IDPs as it is their primary responsibility to make sure the rights and dignity of affected individuals are protected "by adopting legislative or policy frameworks for accountability regarding their international obligations" (UN OHCHR, 2022). Therefore, the next sub-chapter shall now examine the *de jure* public policy processes related to urban management and climate migration which already exist in Bangladesh and how public institutions in Bangladesh are set up to realize the *de facto* implementation of these policies.

2.2.1 Bangladesh's Policy Architecture for dealing with climate-induced internal displacement

Today, the international community largely agrees that climate-induced displacement worsens pre-existing stressors, *inter alia* poverty, gender inequality, and underdevelopment (Kisinger and Matsui, 2021, 1). Similarly, Bangladesh has recognized the importance of providing support to climate-induced displaced populations as early as the 1970s. Back at the time, a destructive tropical cyclone killed an estimated 500,000 people and many were displaced so that the government decided to carry out actions as part of its poverty reduction and economic development scheme to reduce the high socioeconomic burdens on the affected populations triggered by the event (ibid., 4). Since then, Bangladesh's governments have adopted various policy changes, ranging from an initial focus on

resettlement and providing immediate relief through the provision of houses and cultivatable lands in the 80s and 90s, to *in-situ* risk reduction and rehabilitation of livelihoods in the early 2000s, to a more climate change adaptation and partly development-focused approach of general poverty reduction and social safety net programs for resettled and displaced households from the mid-2000s and especially since 2010 (ibid., 1). Over the past years, many policy documents have emerged which implicitly or explicitly address this obligation, especially in view of the here relevant intersection of climate change, migration, and urbanization (see *Table 4* for a summary of the currently most relevant national policy processes tackling climate change, migration, and/or urbanization).

Table 4: Summary of national policies and processes relevant for the Climate Change-Migration/ Internal Displacement-Urbanization-Local Integration Nexus

ASSOCIATED NEXUS COMPONENT	RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCESSES	YEAR
Climate Change	Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP)	2022
	Bangladesh Country Investment Plan for Environment, Forestry and Climate Change 2016-2021	2016
	Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100	2018
	Climate Change Trust Act	2010
	Disaster Management Act (DMA)/Bangladesh Gazette	2012
	Mujib Climate Prosperity Plan 2030 (MCPP)	2022
	National Adaptation Plan of Bangladesh (NAP)	2022
	National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)	2005
	Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)	2021
	National Disaster Management Policy	2015
	National Plan for Disaster Management 2021-2025	2020
	Plan of Action to Implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030	2018
	Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD 2019)	2019
Migration/ Internal Displacement	Draft Action Plan to Implement the National Strategy on Internal Displacement 2022-2042	2022
	National Strategy on Internal Displacement Management (NSIDM)	2021
Urbanization	National Education Policy	2010
	National Food Policy	2006
	National Health Policy	2011
	National Housing Policy (NHP)	2017
	National Land-Use Policy (still to be approved)	2001
	National Nutrition Policy	2015
	National Urban Policy (still to be approved)	2014
	National Urban Sector Policy (NUSP)	2011
	Urban and Regional Planning Act (still to be approved)	2017
Local Integration/ Inclusion	National Social Security Strategy (NSSS)	2018
	Right to Information Act 2009	2009
Cross-Cutting*	Second Perspective Plan 2021-2041	2021
	Eighth Five Year Plan 2020-2025	2020
	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers	2003, 2010

* 'Cross-cutting' refers to country development issues such as tackling overall poverty or increasing human capacities

Although this table is not exhaustive, it arguably includes the most important national policies and frameworks for the country's development. What is notable at first sight, is that there is a clear imbalance in the distribution of policies and strategies across the different nexus themes. For example, both migration/internal displacement and local integration/inclusion receive comparatively less attention in policymaking, as indicated by the number of relevant policies that exist to tackle these

issues as main focus (2 and 2 documents, respectively). Conversely, Climate Change seems to retain a much higher priority on the political agenda (13 documents), as does urbanization (9 documents). Whereas the relevant cross-cutting policies addressing general developmental issues (such as poverty reduction), are closer to the lower end of this list with three relevant policy documents. The below-illustrated figure (*Fig. 8*) highlights this imbalance. Of course, this is a very simplistic overview of the policies. Many of them, though they have been assigned to the specific thematic categories associated with the nexus components based on their priority and vision, may also thematically overlap with other themes. For example, although the Mujib Climate Prosperity Plan 2030 predominantly thematizes climate change mitigation focusing on developing climate plans, transitioning towards renewables, and creating 'green energy hubs', it also gives strong urban provisions such as infrastructural development and employment of unskilled or poorly skilled workers in urban areas, therefore simultaneously qualifying for the second, third, and fourth nexus theme. However, the proposed categorization may indicatively give an idea about the main thematic focuses of the documents.

Fig. 8: Quantitative distribution of relevant nexus policies



In terms of investments, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has set an important example. That is, to tackle the adverse impacts of climate change, the GoB has focused significantly on climate finance and has allocated important budget funds to the cause. In fact, about 6-7 percent of its yearly budgets for development and non-development activities are being used for projects and activities related to climate change (GED, 2012). Bangladesh also created a fund called the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) to help with projects that deal with climate change at the local level. The government has already spent USD 385 million through the BCCTF. The international community has complemented these efforts by helping Bangladesh to create funds and programs, such as the

Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund, the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, and many other bilateral initiatives, to make the country more resilient (Bangladesh Country Investment Plan, MoEF, 2016, 26).

These investments continue to prioritize disaster preparedness and recovery in terms of early warning systems and climate-proof infrastructures and housing. In terms of social protection, they envision at most the support to and increased resilience of communities at the places of origin where disasters occur ('pre-displacement'). For example, in theme 1 of the 2022 Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP), notably regarding 'Food security, social protection & health security', P8 provides for "Livelihood protection in ecologically fragile areas", referring to the places of origin rather than the places of destination of climate migrants. It also frequently raises the term 'adaptation' which implies the adaptation of local communities to the climate change-induced disasters affecting them (for example P3: Adaptation against drought, salinity; P4: Adaptation in fisheries sector; P5 Adaptation in livestock sector; P6 Adaptation in health sector) (MoEF, 2016, 184).

Similarly to the international policy structure, the *national* investments and climate-related policies have, however, consistently neglected *post*-displacement support for climate change-affected displaced persons and the hosting communities, such as through local integration investments and provisions. For example, not only does the most important climate change-related national policy document, notably the BCCSAP, not even explicitly identify or refer to climate migrants or climate change-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs), it also does not with a word refer to the challenges that arise in the cities where these populations arrive. What the BCCSAP does provide for is the 'Strengthening [of] Institutional capacity for climate change management' (P5) under Theme 6: "Capacity building – institutional and human", as well as "Strengthening human resource capacity" (P3) and "Mainstreaming climate change in national, sectoral and spatial development plans" (P2). However, it remains unclear if these refer to the institutions at the places affected by the climate change-related impacts (places of origin) or at the places that are affected by the arrival of IDPs coming from those areas (places of destination). Furthermore, the Disaster Management Act (2012) did not include durable solutions relevant to post-displacement in cities in its provisions related to disaster management and migration but focuses predominantly on the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) approaches, including to tackle human mobility challenges during displacement (MoDMR, 2021, 3).

As was outlined before, the *post*-displacement approach to climate change management is crucial to protecting the fundamental rights of the affected climate change-induced IDPs arriving in the overcrowded cities. The national policy framework that does recognize and come closest to integrating

post-displacement provisions, is the 2021 'National Strategy on Internal Displacement Management' (NSIDM) and its accompanying Action Plan. This national framework is one of the first world-wide to draw the link between climate change, internal displacement, and urbanization, following the pre-displacement, during-displacement, and post-displacement (durable solutions) cycle logic proposed by the IASC Framework. It also spells out a concrete definition of 'Disaster and Climate-Induced Internally Displaced Persons', or DCIIDPs, which, in the absence of an internationally recognized definition for climate-related displaced persons and/or migrants, is remarkable. Accordingly, the NSIDM defines DCIIDPs as

> *"Persons, groups of persons, households, or an entire community who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence temporarily or permanently or who have been evacuated as a result of disasters caused by sudden and slow-onset climatic events and processes, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border"* (MoDMR, 2021, 7).

The NSIDM especially emphasizes the temporal aspect in this definition, distinguishing between temporary and permanent forms of displacement. That is, IDPs may be either *temporarily* displaced persons who may still have the possibility to return in the short or medium term; *permanently* displaced persons who have no prospect of returning in the long or very long term, or *In-between temporarily and permanently* displaced persons, whereby local integration indicates a permanent displacement of individuals (MoDMR, 2021, 12). It argues that making this distinction would arguably have important practical implications for the policy-level and practitioners' responses to address protection gaps (MoDMR, 2021, 7), but also in terms of the commitment (or lack thereof) of IDPs to locally integrate as a consequence of subjective hopes to stay or eventually return. While NSIDM hints at the increasing unlikelihood of climate-induced IDPs to be able to return with the progressive trend of adverse climate change impacts, it emphasizes the importance of social support frameworks that may become crucial in decreasing the risks associated with returning to the geographically vulnerable places of origin or migrating again.

Though the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh acknowledges the fundamental right to social security by declaring in Article 15 (d) that "the State shall be responsible to attain through planned economic growth, a constant increase of productive forces and a steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of the people, with a view to securing to its citizens … the right to social security, that is to say, to public assistance in cases of undeserved want arising from unemployment, illness or disablement, …" (Rahman et al., 2021, 30), Rahman et al. note that there is no separate law or parliamentary Act that guarantees for social security to Bangladeshi citizens in general, let alone to climate migrants or climate change-induced IDPs (ibid.). When it comes to post-

displacement governance, specific resettlement initiatives have included more consistently a socioeconomic rehabilitation process of affected individuals, such as community development training (e.g. in leadership disaster preparedness, primary health care and sanitation) and economic development promotion (e.g. through access to micro-credits) (Kisinger and Matsui, 2021, 4). However, as mentioned earlier, outside of official government resettlement schemes, displacements and migrations of climate change-affected populations tend to occur spontaneously and to therefore lack comparable social security support so that individuals are usually left to their own fate in their attempts to seek local integration solutions.

By aligning itself with Bangladesh's broader national Social Development Framework (SDF) umbrella that envisions poverty reduction strategies and strategies on education, health, nutrition, population, sanitation and water supply, financial inclusion, women and gender empowerment, social inclusion of ethnic and religious minorities, persons with disability, the extremely poor and floating populations, environmental protection, climate change management, disaster management, social security and overall sustainable development, the NSIDM links climate displacement with social protection, thereby setting an important example for the post-displacement protection of climate IDPs.

Given its relevance for this paper's focus on IDPs, especially in the context of climate change and urbanization, the next sub-section will now look more in depth at the specific provision of Bangladesh's flagship policy instrument, namely the 'National Strategy on Internal Displacement 2021-2041' (2021) and its accompanying Draft Action Plan (2022).

a) The National Strategy on Internal Displacement Management 2021-2041 and its Draft Action Plan to Implement the National Strategy on Internal Displacement 2022-2042

Bangladesh's National Strategy on Internal Displacement 2021-2041 (NSIDM) is the successor of the previous 'National Strategy on the Management of Disaster and Climate Induced Internal Displacement' (henceforth NSMDCIID), which was published in 2015 by the 'Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit' (RMMRU) but was never approved by the GoB (Siddiqui et al. 2018). The NSIDM is a revised version of the NSMDCIID that was ultimately adopted and published by the Bangladesh Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) in 2021. It officially recognizes the government's role as duty-bearer (MoDMR, 2021, *Glossary,* 44f.) and the responsibility to shift from a traditional relief-oriented to a more proactive and comprehensive displacement management that includes a rights-based approach to protect vulnerable and marginalized groups at disproportionate risk throughout the displacement cycle (MoDMR, 2021, 8). The NSIDM aligns with international human rights standards, drawing on key international policy frameworks and human rights instruments like the Guiding Principles and the Sendai Framework (2015-2030), while also making reference to the Cancun

Adaptation Framework (2010) and the 2018 Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM).

Furthermore, the NSIDM specifically acknowledges two important links of this paper's research nexus: a) The causal link between climate change and internal displacement by explicitly referring to the internationally anchored economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as the rights of climate-induced displaced populations to information and to participation in decision-making processes (MoDMR, 2021, 9).[9] And b) The link between internal displacement and urbanization by referring to displaced persons living in informal settlements of urban areas, which suggests the correlation between climate-induced displacement and urban poverty. Although this paper is cautious of any unjustified induction and generalization, these links may help clarify the realities of climate IDPs in urban areas where data is very scarce. Climate-induced IDPs tendentially turn into urban poor populations when individuals maladapt, which shall provide a proxy for measurement in the attempt to analyze the local integration conditions.

The National Strategy aims at providing a framework to react to climate change-induced displacement through both preventive and adaptive measures. More specifically, it maps out 117 action points across 5 intervention areas spanning the displacement cycle phases:

1. Prevention of displacement (pre-displacement);
2. Protection during displacement (during displacement);
3. Durable Solutions (post-displacement);
4. Institutional arrangements and funding (general accountability);
5. Monitoring & Evaluation (general accountability).

The first three thematic areas aim at ensuring protection across the respective phases of displacement. While the goal of 'Prevention' is to halt displacement by lowering the vulnerability of affected communities at their places of origin and boost their adaptability through the implementation of disaster management infrastructure and climate change adaptation programs, the Protection Phase (during displacement) has an emphasis on improving emergency humanitarian aid and disaster relief systems (MoDMR, 2022, 1). The third thematic area refers to interventions after ('post-') displacement when affected individuals have reached a destination area, often in cities (ibid.). The last two thematic areas are instead related to the strengthening of general systems to ensure that IDPs can tackle the displacement phase-related challenges with dignity. More specifically, the provisions in the third and fourth intervention areas provide for general accountability through the improvement of institutional capacities. Given the focus of this paper on durable solutions, especially local integration, as well as on

[9] The NSIDM is further aligning with important national instruments, notably the Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100, the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA 2005), the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP 2009), the Disaster Management Act (DMA 2012), the Standing Order on Disaster 2019 (SOD 2019), and the GoB's Social Development Framework (SDF).

institutional capacities, we shall look especially at the third and fourth of these intervention areas more in depth. The overall action points assigned to the intervention areas that are associated with each displacement cycle phase are summarized in *Table 5*.

Table 5: Summary of NSIDM's intervention areas and suggested major activities across the 3 Phases of Displacement and general accountability

ACTION CLASSIFICATION	INTERVENTION AREA	INTERVENTIONS (RESPECTIVE VOLUME)
Preventive Action (pre-displacement)	**Prevention of Displacement**	*Major activity fields* (total 41 action points): 1. Understanding the Risk and Decision-Making support (7 action points) 2. Strengthening climate/disaster risk governance (6 action points) 3. Investing in DRR and CCA (20 action points) 4. Creation of Employment through encouraging decentralization of urban growth centers (5 action points) 5. Climate-disaster Risk Responsive Land Use Plan and Programme (6 action points)
Adaptive Action (during displacement)	**Protection during Displacement**	*Major activity fields* (total 31 action points): 1. Strengthening Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance (12 action points) 2. Protecting fundamental rights of DCIIDPs during displacement (16 action points)
Adaptive Action (post-displacement)	**Durable Solutions**	*Major activity fields* (30 action points; previously 28): 1. Voluntary and safe return to original place (8 action points) 2. Local integration (10 action points; previously 9) 3. Resettlement (12 action points; previously 11)
General accountability enforcement	*a) Through the strengthening of institutions* **Institutional Arrangements & Funding**	12 action points (previously 9)
	b) Through effective oversight mechanisms **Monitoring & Evaluation**	5 action points (previously 4)
	Total Action Points	**117 (previously 113)**

The above table reveals that the number of action points allocated to the three relevant intervention areas (Durable Solutions, Institutional Arrangements & Funding, Monitoring & Evaluation) has increased, which hints at a greater awareness at policy-making level that strengthening institutional displacement management capacities and improving post-displacement conditions of displaced populations deserves and requires more overall attention. However, relatively speaking, post-

displacement-related durable solutions still take a backseat in the National Strategy (total 30 action points) compared to pre-displacement and during displacement measures (41 and 31 action points, respectively). This may be a result of expectations regarding the eventual return of migrants to their places of origin, thereby justifying this rather temporary and humanitarian approach to post-displacement protection of climate IDPs.

The focus on preventive action, is targeting an *in-situ* adaptation of local populations so that forced displacement does not even need to occur. However, this may be a short-sighted approach, given the repeatedly outlined likelihood of climate conditions to worsen to the extent that coastal lands may remain uninhabitable despite local adaptation measures. It also neglects the multi-causal relationship with climate-induced migration mentioned in the theoretical framework, notably the fact that many climate migrants in Bangladesh also decide to move to cities due to the combined hardship of poverty and lack of livelihood options at their places of origin.

b) Durable Solutions and Local Integration provisions according to the NSIDM

The NSIDM recognizes that some environmental conditions, such as riverbank erosion and salinity intrusion due to sea-level rise, prohibit affected populations to continue living in those degraded places or to return there in the long-term (MoDMR, 2021, 32). Consequently, "permanently displaced people may need to rebuild their lives in the destination areas where they have moved", a process which is also referred to as 'local integration' (ibid.). To guide the intervention propositions made in the Strategy, the NSIDM draws specifically on the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions outlined earlier under this paper's international policy dimension. In line with the IASC Framework, it echoes the eight elements that provide for a durable solution, notably 1) Safety and security; 2) Adequate standard of living; 3) Access to livelihoods; 4) Restoration of housing, land, and property; 5) Access to essential documents; 6) Family reunification; 7) Participation in public affairs; and 8) Access to effective remedies and justice. A set of 10 action points aim at addressing these criteria and are listed below in *Text Box 1* on page 52.

Furthermore, the specific local integration provisions made in the action points partly adopt a rights-based approach according to the above-mentioned human rights principles (see page 31) that are outlined in the NISDM. For example, participation (mostly social and political) is explicitly provided for in provisions 7 and 10 ('Participation in the new community's social, cultural, and political and public life' and 'the right to participate in elections'). Furthermore, the local integration provisions refer to the necessary access to the private sector and NGO actors in order to ensure security of tenure (provision 2). And lastly, regarding the access to effective monitoring mechanisms, the local integration provisions make indirect reference to this principle through the ensured access to participate in elections, which may be counted as a semi-proxy for monitoring.

However, it does not guarantee political transparency, and also not the access to monitoring and evaluation mechanisms specifically targeting the tracking of processes that are meant to ensure the local integration of IDPs. Similarly, 'registration' of IDPs with the Election Commission (provision 10) may allow authorities to monitor IDPs, but it does not allow IDPs to monitor authorities.

Text Box 1: NSIDM Provisions for the Local Integration of Climate-IDPs*

1. *Ensure that displaced persons living in the informal settlements in urban areas benefit from the provisions detailed in the Draft National Urban Sector Policy, 2014 regarding in-situ upgrading and **improvement of slums**, resettlement of slum dwellers, and ensure tenure security of urban poor.*

2. *Ensure proper rehabilitation of slum dwellers and floating people in case of an eviction. Facilitate **low-cost housing** for such displaced persons in partnership with the private sector and NGOs. Explore options, which grant the displaced person's **security of tenure**, including through usufruct schemes.*

3. *Explore community-based initiatives to led, rent or sell **land** in areas where displaced persons have settled. Encourage **community-based farming** and ensure access to **loan facilities** for such interventions.*

4. *Support local integration through **livelihood projects** and **improvement of services**. Ensure access of the marginalized groups, especially women, persons with disabilities, ethnic and religious minorities, impoverished to the **local job market**. Facilitate short-term international labour migration for selected members of the families to diversify the livelihood of displaced persons. Make special arrangements for the recruitment of displaced persons in the local level job sectors.*

5. *Make members of **host communities** a part of local integration interventions. Expected benefits should also reach the poorer section of local communities to avoid conflict with the locals.*

6. *Make necessary **institutional arrangements** to reconcile any disputes that may arise between displaced persons and local people through local administration and local government institutions.*

7. *Support measures that promote the **participation** of displaced persons in the new community's cultural, social, and political and public life.*

8. *Ensure any relevant **documentation** is restored, thus facilitating unimpeded **access to core services** non-discriminatory for the displaced persons.*

9. *Make provision to facilitate **family reunification**, particularly regarding the situation of dependent members, including children, members with disabilities and older people.*

10. *Take necessary steps to **register** the displaced population with Election Commission. Ensure that displaced persons receive National ID (NID) cards in their new residence. Ensure that the displaced population can exercise their right to **participate in elections** as candidates and as voters like other Bangladeshi citizens.*

* Provisions retrieved from MoDMR, 2021, 32

Thematically, the 10 provisions (Ps) made for the specific local integration solution align with the eight elements outlined above in relation to ensuring general durable solutions, but may here be grouped more comprehensively as follows:

- General slum upgrading (P1)
- Availability of low-cost housing (P2)
- Land tenure security (P2, P3)
- Access to employment and livelihoods (P3, P4)

- Access to micro-credits/loans (P3)
- Access to essential services, incl. public social services (P4, P8)
- Participation (P7, P10)
- Social cohesion and access to social networks (P5, P6, P7, P9)
- Documentation and Registration (P8, P10)

These themes hint at what the Bangladesh's policymakers consider to be the main factors contributing to local integration, and thus leading to 'successful' adaptation to climate change at the place of destination. In other words, the durable solution of local integration is achieved according to the NSIDM through a) material security (land, property, loans, housing, documents) and b) Immaterial security (Social: family reunification, social networks, community social cohesion, social public services, decent slum living conditions; Political: voting; economic: employment, livelihoods; Administrative: registration, institutional capacities).

This understanding of local integration in material and immaterial terms is integrated also in the Action Plan that was drafted to support the implementation and localization of the NSIDM. In fact, the Draft Action Plan (which has to date not been formally adopted), includes a few additional provisions worth looking at to further elaborate the provisions for the local integration of climate-IDPs in urban areas. The next section will therefore give a brief overview of the additional protection provisions.

c) Local Integration according to the Draft Action Plan to Implement the National Strategy on Internal Displacement 2022-2042

The 'Draft Action Plan to Implement the National Strategy on Internal Displacement 2022-2042' (henceforth 'Draft Action Plan'), is a comprehensive strategic plan published by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief in April 2022 and is based entirely on the displacement management framework proposed in the NSIDM. Its purpose is to transform the National Strategy into an implementable scheme that helps prevent displacement and protect affected persons before, during and after displacement by delineating the roles and responsibilities of specific stakeholders associated with displacement management over the next 20 years. While the NSIDM limits itself to proposing key intervention areas and respective activities, the Draft Action Plan transforms these intervention areas into 'key targets' and their respective 'Proposed Activities' It indicates the specific public institutions that will be held responsible for the accomplishment of these targets and activities by assigning a 'Lead Agency' and 'Supporting Agency/ies'. To ensure monitoring of the targets, the Draft Action Plan has established indicators for each proposed activity and a 'Time Frame' (in years) during which the targets are expected to be reached. As it is based on the NSIDM, the Draft Action Plan uses the same three broad intervention areas, notably 'Prevention of Displacement', 'Protection during Displacement', and 'Durable Solutions'.

Out of 30 key targets and 81 proposed activities allocated to the Durable Solutions intervention area (post-displacement), local integration receives a total of 10 key targets and 20 actionable activities. The 10 targets are mostly equal to the 10 provisions made in the NSIDM, whereas the proposed activities are more specific actions to reach the targets. The proposed activities are outlined in *Text Box 2* below (page 55).

The Draft Action Plan also proposes indicators to monitor the progress of successful implementation of the above-outlined actions. These indicators are very focused on developing adequate policies or adjusting existing ones. Furthermore, many of the indicators foresee the quantitative count of developed programs and participating individuals. However, the question arises whether this focus of the indicators on quantity rather than quality, is appropriate to truly capture the realities and correctly identify progress of individuals who are targeted under these activities. More specifically, it is questioned here, whether the mere increase of programs and policies, which are already abundantly available, would actually translate into improved capacities of individuals to access and fully enjoy their human rights implicated in these interventions. For example, increasing the number of projects related to the activity 'Provide loan assistance and training for displaced persons according to their needs and skills', does not necessarily increase the chances of individuals to receive loans to access lands if discrimination against low-income applicants continues to pose barriers. They also do not improve the skills of participants if not conducted in a meaningful way. Furthermore, their participation in trainings guarantees neither receiving a loan nor a better job. Especially women in Bangladesh who tend to face high culturally embedded obstacles to access employment and property, let alone to receive loans, do not necessarily benefit from mere participation in such projects. Therefore, the indicator 'Number of Projects' or 'Number of participants' in those projects is arguably insufficient to meaningfully capture the progress in this key target. Similarly, it is not guaranteed that only because another policy is adopted or changed, this will ultimately translate into an improved reality for the individuals on the ground. That is, according to Droege (2021), "[…] the real challenge [that] remains [is] respect for, rather than development of, the law" (9). In other words, the policies need to be put into effective practice by the most local implementation organs and respected by all involved authorities. Furthermore, even in the best case in which policies are translated into the establishment of local structures and services that allow for actionable transformation of theory into practice, developing and implementing a policy or law at local level does not mean that the individuals who are meant to benefit from them, are actually aware and have the means to access these implemented structures resulting from the policies.

Therefore, to have an actual impact on the lives of affected individuals, it arguably requires a more holistic approach that embeds not only quantitative indicators, but especially indicators that capture the quality of measures. This includes also affective monitoring systems that the dedicated authorities

Text Box 2: Selected local integration provisions outlined in the Draft Action Plan in terms of Key Targets and respective Activities (contents retrieved from MoDMR, 2022, 81-87)

KEY TARGETS	PROPOSED ACTIVITIES
4.2.1 *Ensure that displaced persons living in the informal settlements in urban areas benefit from the provisions detailed in the Draft National Urban Sector Policy, 2014 regarding in-situ upgrading and improvement of slums, resettlement of slum dwellers, and ensure tenure security of urban poor.*	1) Immediate adoption and implementation of the National Urban Policy 2014 by including the rights of the displaced 2) Inclusion of accommodation facilities for displaced persons in the master plan of Upazila and municipality level 3) Formulate sensitive land use plans in cities and suburbs 4) Improving the quality of life of slum dwellers by using the experience of Bangladesh Fire Service and Civil Defense
4.2.2 *Ensure proper rehabilitation of slum dwellers and floating people in case of an eviction. Facilitate low-cost housing for such displaced persons in partnership with the private sector and NGOs. Explore options, which grant the displaced person's security of tenure, including through usufruct schemes.*	1) Construct low-cost multi-storied public housing in urban areas to offer low-rent housing to the displaced 2) Engage agents from private sector or NGOs in the management of low-rent public housing projects
4.2.3 *Explore community-based initiatives to led, rent, or sell land in areas where displaced persons have settled. Encourage community-based farming and ensure access to loan facilities for such interventions.*	1) Verify the possibility of area-wise joint project through field research. Collect information regarding land lease 2) Provide loan assistance training for displaced persons according to their needs and skills 3) Advocacy to identify different khas lands and preserve 20% of its use for the displaced
4.2.4 *Support local integration through livelihood projects and improvement of services. Ensure access of the marginalized groups, especially women, persons with disabilities, ethnic and religious minorities, impoverished to the local job market. Facilitate short-term international labour migration for selected members of the families to diversify the livelihood of displaced persons. Make special arrangements for the recruitment of displaced persons in the local level job sectors.*	1) Undertake economic, social and cultural projects with the local population in the areas where displaced people have resettled in the post-disaster period. Establish growth centers
4.2.5 *Make members of host communities a part of local integration interventions. Expected benefits should also reach the poorer section of local communities to avoid conflict with the locals.*	1) Same as above 2) Same as above
4.2.6 *Make necessary institutional arrangements to reconcile any disputes that may arise between displaced persons and local people through local administration and local government institutions.*	1) Form Dispute Resolution Committee 2) Include displaced persons in the grievance redressal system
4.2.7 Support measures that promote the participation of displaced persons in the cultural, social, and political and public life of the new community.	1) Teaching dance, song, recitation through various cultural events (dance, song, poetry, recitation, painting, and local cultural academies) for children of displaced low-income families 2) Ensure the participation of people living in other areas in various social and cultural events such as International Mother Language Day, Pohela Boishakh, Independence Day and religious ceremonies
4.2.8 Ensure any relevant documentation is restored, thus facilitating unimpeded access to core services on a non-discriminatory basis.	1) Relaxation of document requirements related to the provision of services in various governmental and non-governmental organizations by showing displacement certificate
4.2.9 Make provision to facilitate family reunification, having particular regard to the situation of dependent relatives, including children, relatives with disability and elderly people.	1) Monitor if anyone goes missing based on the data of the displaced after any disaster 2) Announce in local/national dailies, local satellite TV, television, and radio if any person goes missing 3) Take initiative to find the missing person through TV or radio programs
4.2.10 Take necessary steps to register the displaced population with Election Commission. Ensure that displaced persons received National ID (NID) card in their new residence. Mak sure that displaced population can exercise their right to participate in election as candidates and their right to vote in their new locations.	1) Meeting between the MoDMR and the EC 2) Re-registration in the current area by canceling the previous registration.

adhere to. In contrast to the NSIDM, the Draft Action Plan did not incorporate a dedicated section that relates to the general accountability enforcement of the fourth and fifth intervention areas in the NSIDM, notably a) Institutional arrangements & Funding, and b) Monitoring & Evaluation. Although it could be said that the enumeration of indicators, the appointment of responsible institutions, and the allocation of time frames already serves somewhat indicatively as monitoring scheme, a stronger focus on these two provisions would have been important to link the theoretical targets with their actual implementation and policy enforcement. That is, by disregarding some important provisions under these respective two intervention areas, for example omitting the provisions regarding the establishment of key oversight and monitoring committees, the Draft Action Plan arguably strips away the possibility of tracking implementation progress and affective localization of the NSIDM.

The provisions made both in the Draft Action Plan as well as in the NSIDM align with many of the international standards, such as the previously outlined IASC Framework and the rights provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). However, some substantial gaps persist which may arguably hamper progress in important aspects that could otherwise allow for dignified integration conditions and improved living standards of climate-IDPs. These gaps arguably leave too ample room for authorities to circumvent some of their responsibilities as duty bearers. The next sub-chapter will have a look at these gaps as well as the positive contributions of the NSIDM in relation to the two major international policy standards outlined above, to critically reflect on the opportunities and shortcomings of the NSIDM.

d) The NSIDM in relation to international human rights standards and provisions

To begin with, the NSIDM outlines concrete fields of action that address important local integration challenges faced by climate-IDPs in Bangladesh and that are comparable with the international IASC Framework and UDHR (summarized in *Table 6* below).

In terms of immaterial and less tangible losses that IDPs suffer, the NSIDM makes substantial provisions that largely overlap with the IASC Framework and the UDHR. In fact, the social, political, and economic provisions made for the local integration of IDPs in NSIDM find correspondence in four IASC Framework provisions, namely 2. Enjoyment of an adequate standard of living without discrimination; 3. Access to livelihoods and employment; 6. Family reunification; and 7. Participation in public affairs without discrimination, as well as in four of the UDHR rights provisions. NSIDM even goes beyond both international provisions, in that it adds the administrative component. More specifically, while there are no administrative and institutional provisions in the IASC Framework and UDHR rights framework, the NSIDM explicitly ensures the administrative registration and institutional capacities that are meant to trace and effectively support IDPs. Furthermore, NSIDM mentions the importance to include the host

community in protection frameworks to ensure that expected benefits for IDPs also reach the local communities in order to avoid social conflict and tensions between the new arrivals and the long-term residents. This provision is in line with the IASC Framework, which explicitly emphasizes that "populations and communities that (re-)integrate IDPs and whose needs are comparable must not be neglected in comparison to the displaced" (IASC, 2010, A-3). This is an additional provision compared with the UDHR.

Table 6: NSIDM local integration provisions in relation to international standards for climate-IDPs

'Successful' Local Integration Parameter	NSIDM Provisions*	Correspondence with IASC Framework	Correspondence with UDHR
Material Security	Land	*Priority Area: 4:* Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land, and property	No specific provision.
	Property	*Priority Area 4:* Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land, and property	*Art. 17, §1:* Right to Property
	Loans	*Priority Area 1:* Long-term safety and security	No specific provision.
	Housing	*Priority Area 4:* Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land, and property	*Art. 25, §1:* Right to an Adequate Standard of Living
	Documentation	*Priority Area 5:* Access to personal and other documentation without discrimination	*Art. 6:* Right to a legal identity
Immaterial Security	Social (family reunification, social networks, community social cohesion, social public services, decent slum living conditions)	*Priority Area 6:* Family Reunification *Priority Area 2:* Enjoyment of an adequate standard of living without discrimination	*Art. 22:* Right to Social Services and Social Security *Art. 25, §1:* Right to an Adequate Standard of Living
	Political (voting)	*Priority Area 7:* Participation in public affairs without discrimination	*Art. 21, §2:* Right to Participation
	Administrative (registration, institutional capacities)	No specific provision.	No specific provision.
	Economic (employment, livelihoods)	*Priority Area 3:* Access to livelihoods and employment	*Art. 23, §1:* Right to Work

**Equivalent with the 'Key Targets' in the Draft Action Plan*

While these additions in the NSIDM deserve to be applauded, they arguably remain secondary to the gaps that can be identified when comparing to international standards. More specifically, some essential provisions made in the UDHR and IASC Framework, especially those for food, health, and education, have not or only partly, been taken up in the provisions for local integration in the NSIDM. Furthermore, though generic provisions to ensure adequate living standards in immaterial terms, notably through the access to social security and other social services, are present in the NSIDM, it does not specifically elaborate what these 'living standards' include. The IASC Framework and the UDHR explicitly address the right to justice and effective remedies (Priority Area 8 and Art. 8, respectively), which is not mentioned with a word in the NSIDM.

It needs to be acknowledged, however, that both NSIDM and the Draft Action Plan have made significant strides in enhancing accountability in the management of internal displacement. This

progress is evident in the allocation of responsibilities to specific public institutions, a crucial aspect that may help ensure the practical adherence to the outlined theoretical provisions. Furthermore, this development holds positive implications for the possibility of penalization of responsible actors, as duty bearers can be held accountable should they fail to meet their responsibilities. Beyond these institutional frameworks, ensuring stable funding, along with the implementation of robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, is undeniably vital for enhancing both accountability and sustainability. As the NSIDM is to date the only formally approved policy framework in Bangladesh, the next sub-chapter will mainly refer back to the NSIDM when comparing national *de jure* provisions with the actual institutional arrangements currently present in Bangladesh. It hereby needs to be noted, that the NSIDM - as its name suggests - is not legally-binding and therefore limits itself to outlining standards and principles that are broadly in line with overall national goals and international standards. However, as a non-binding strategy, NSIDM is not a guarantee for the actionable localization of these principles into city protection frameworks or more specific national implementation activities. Therefore, it is essential that the pending Draft Action Plan gets formal approval to ensure that the NSIDM does not remain a 'de jure-*not*-de facto' type of instrument.

2.2.2 Bangladesh's institutional set-up to deal with climate-induced internal displacement

Building upon our exploration of key national policies and provisions in the preceding sub-chapter, this section delves into the institutional fabric of Bangladesh by critically analyzing the administrative geography and institutional framework driving policy implementation. Recognizing that public institutions play a pivotal role in translating policies into practicable measures, the next section aims at unravelling the practical mechanisms and challenges that shape the realization (or lack thereof) of these policies on the ground.

a) Bangladesh's general administrative geography

Bangladesh's public administrative system has gone through many changes since it originated in the sixteenth century under the Mughal rule of the time. Although since then the British colonized the Indian subcontinent, and the Pakistanis subsequently replaced the British colonial rule in 1947, the political and administrative arrangements of Bangladesh are still today majorly influenced by the bureaucratic system introduced by the British to serve as a tool of governance. On the other hand, it is said that the hierarchical power politics anchored in the country's administrative set-up is strongly inspired by the Pakistani traditions (Panday, 2019, 215). In any case, though Bangladesh became independent in 1971, colonial imprints are woven into the country's political and administrative fabric so that even today, after many post-colonial reform attempts, Bangladesh is still impacted by the power dynamics and jurisdictional exclusivity imposed by previous systems (ibid.). In 1991, after being ruled

by military and quasi-military regimes for sixteen years post-independence, a constitutional amendment re-established a parliamentary form of government.

Today, Bangladesh is a unitary state made up of a central government which is administered through a two-tier system (ibid., 217) and local governments governed through a three-tier system. As this chapter is dealing with the national level, we are now looking into the central government structure of administration which largely determines the extent to which local governments can effectively implement the policies determined at the central level. The two-tier system of the central government is composed of the central secretariat and the field administration units (see *Fig. 9* on page 60). The central secretariat consists of the ministries, representing the highest level of administration situated at the national level, and the line departments and directorates that are attached to the ministries and divisions, representing the second level of administration at sub-national level. The divisions of the central secretariat, notably the ministries, provide policies and function as clearhouses (ibid.), whereas the second sub-national level administrative field units take care of general administration, service delivery to citizens, and implementation of development programs.

Already within the central government's *secretariat*, the ministries are organized in a hierarchical manner where each ministry is headed by a minister to lead the political aspects and the secretary or additional secretary to lead the administrative or executive aspects of public governance (ibid.). Apart from advising the minister on matters relating to policy and administrative issues, the administrative head also ensures the supervision of routine operations, the overseeing of staff and organizational processes, and therefore arguably becomes an important piece in the accountability and quality oversight of governance and policy decisions. Policies are also overseen by the vast array of bureaucratic organizations that form part of the unicameral legislature. Ministerial divisions contain various wings led by a joint secretary, which is authorized to submit cases directly to the respective minister. But generally, these cases tend to go through the secretary or additional secretary before reaching the minister (ibid., 217). The line departments attached to each ministry, but still operating at national level, are responsible for the preparation of a master plan to implement decisions made by a ministry, and also assist in providing technical information and advice regarding policy decisions.

The central government's *field units* of administration work throughout the country and are organized in 8 divisions, 64 districts ('Zilas'), and 496 sub-districts ('Upazilas'), which are divided into 12 City Corporations and the 330 smaller Municipalities (Bangladesh National Information Bureau, BNIB (a), (b), (c), 2023). *Divisions* function as guide and supervision of the district administration ensuring the effective coordination of activities that are carried out at district level and receive appeals related to revenue (Panday, 2019, 217f.). *Districts* serve as extended arms of the state administration carrying out

core functions including the collection of land revenues, the maintenance of law and order, the stimulation of economic development, the coordination of governmental 'nation-building' activities. They also serve as middle-agents collaborating with local government initiatives (Panday, 2019, 218). Lastly, the *Upazilas* function in similar ways as the districts, but on a lower field administration level.

Though this set-up summarized in *Fig. 9* indicates some extent of decentralization, governance - defined as "the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them" (Huque and Panday, 2018, 127f.) - cannot be "explained or assessed in isolation from the performance of the key national institutions in the political system [of Bangladesh]" (ibid., 2018, 128). The NSIDM specifically names the key national institutions that are meant to take up the main responsibility for dealing with the challenges of climate-induced internal displacement and coordinate respective efforts, notably the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) and its line-department, notably the Department of Disaster Management (DDM) (NSIDM Provision 5.8, MoDMR, 2021). To better understand how climate-induced internal displacement is managed by these institutions and assess their performance in terms of effectiveness, the next sub-section will therefore look more closely at the provisions made by NSIDM regarding the institutional arrangements for the protection of climate-IDPs and specifically the mandate of MoDMR and DDM and their role in shaping local integration outcomes of climate-IDPs.

Fig. 9: Bangladesh's administrative geography (modified from Panday, 2019, 218; Data extracted from Bangladesh National Information Bureau, BNIB (a), (b), (c), 2023)



b) Who deals with the management of climate-induced internal displacement at national level?

We have seen in the previous sub-chapter how Bangladesh's hierarchical central government structure is organized to distribute tasks across a range of central and field administration units. The vast array of these units leads to the question which public institution is most suited to deal with the climate-induced internal displacement challenges, and more specifically with ensuring post-displacement solutions in the cities.

According to the NSIDM, this most suited public institution is the *Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief* (MoDMR) and its line department, namely the Department of Disaster Management (DDM), as declared under NSIDM Provision 5.8 (MoDMR, 2021, 36). The NSIDM also provides for the creation of a *Technical Advisory Committee* (TAC) under the same ministry (Provision 5.4, MoDMR, 2021, 37) and stipulates the creation of a new sub-department associated with MoDMR for the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the National Strategy, which is envisioned to include an oversight/evaluation committee (Provision 6.1, MoDMR, 2021, 40). The MoDMR coordinates the national disaster management efforts of the National Disaster Management Council (NDMC), the supreme body for providing overall direction (CFE-DMHA, 2020, 12).

According to the service delivery commitment declared by the MoDMR in its Citizen Charter, the Ministry's vision is to "Reduce the harmful effects of natural, climatic and man-made disasters to a tolerable level for vulnerable populations" (MoDMR (a), 2023, 1). It intends to do so through its mission to "strengthen the overall capacity of disaster management, reducing the risk to the people, especially the poor and vulnerable groups and establishing an efficient emergency response system capable of dealing with disasters" (ibid.). MoDMR has three major implementation areas: 1. Disaster Management, 2. Social Security, and 3. Humanitarian Aid (MoDMR (b), 2023). In the first implementation area, the MoDMR deals with the general management of disasters, especially aiming at reducing risk and increasing disaster preparedness by coordinating the disaster management processes and mobilizing relevant actors at all levels. It also acts to conduct advocacy for and the raising of awareness about approaches that can help increase resilience of citizens preventatively, but also guide citizens in how to react immediately when hit by specific disasters (e.g. earthquake, lightning, flooding) (ibid.). In short, in this intervention area, MoDMR ensures the implementation of Bangladesh's Disaster Management Framework, which composes a range of regulatory frameworks[10] and actors. Secondly, the Social Security intervention area envisions activities related to providing social safety net securities, especially

[10] Especially the Disaster Management Act (2012), the National Disaster management Policy (2015), National Disaster Management Plans, Standing Orders on Disaster, and Guidelines for Government at all Levels (Best Practice Models) (MoDMR (b), 2021)

through the 'Construction of Disaster Resilient Housing for Homeless' and the 'Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest (EGPP)' schemes. The latter aims at providing short-term employment during off-season to poor individuals (with a monthly income that is less than 4,000BDT) and who are landless (MoDMR (b), 2023; MoDMR, 2016). Since 2010, the World Bank has shipped in to support this program with a committed $767 million to Bangladesh to help provide a daily wage of minimum 200BDT (=$2.5) to over 0.9 million beneficiaries (The World Bank, 2019). The third intervention area includes various humanitarian assistance and relief measures such as the 'Test Relief', Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)', 'Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)', 'Food for Work' (FfW)/'Work for Money' (WfM), 'Cash Assistance', and 'Winter Assistance' projects under the broader 'Humanitarian Assistance Programme' (MoDMR (c), 2023, 73). The program mainly targets "ultra-poor households", "occupational poor communities", "underprivileged", and "distressed" individuals and families ('Humanitarian Assistance Programme Implementation Guidelines 2012-13', MoDMR, 2012, 1). The FfW/WfM and Test Relief schemes are mutual exchange schemes for which individuals help build and repair local infrastructures, while generating either food or salary returns through their employment and at the same time reducing disaster and climate change risk majorly worsened by food insecurity (The World Bank, 2019). It needs to be noted that this program is meant to provide immediate relief in the aftermath of a disaster for beneficiaries who are facing temporary food shortages and unemployment (ibid.). Therefore, the focus is clearly not on the longer-term socioeconomic security of individuals, let alone post-displacement integration measures for climate-induced displaced populations.

c) Shortcomings in the institutional set-up for the management of climate-induced internal displacement

As outlined above, the NSIDM makes clear provisions appointing the MoDMR to predominantly lead the coordination of climate displacement-related programs (Provision 5.8 in MoDMR, 2021) and the implementation of the disaster management strategy under the 2019 Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD) (NSIDM Provision 5.12, MoDMR, 2021). However, there are several issues with assigning a predominantly disaster-relief specialized institution to the protection of IDPs who settle in cities. In line with the previous statement that disaster management still tends to be oriented towards humanitarian and short-term relief interventions, neither the SOD 2019, nor the National Plan for Disaster Management 2021-2025 currently include post-displacement durable solutions, let alone local integration provisions. Furthermore, the mandate of MoDMR, while admittedly expanding to include also some social security provisions, is still majorly focused on carrying out immediate disaster relief and preparedness activities. Therefore, another ministry, such as the Ministry of Social Welfare, which has a stronger focus on increasing resilience of vulnerable population groups by improving socioeconomic inclusion, social protection, and welfare, may potentially be better suited.

Moreover, with regards to the institutional financing of the climate-induced internal displacement management, though the NSIDM does make provisions for funding arrangements, specifically under Provision 5.10. "Create a 'Displacement Trust Fund' to sustainably finance the implementation of the Strategy from the national budget. Additionally, it may draw funds from the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) […]" (MoDMR, 2021, 39), and under Provision 5.11. "Explore more funding options through the international process-led opportunities such as loss-and-damage, Adaptation Funds, Green Climate Fund, etc. […]" (ibid.), no concrete public institution is named who should be responsible for this.

Overall, although MoDMR might be mainly responsible for climate-induced internal displacement management, there are a variety of different ministries and sub-committees and councils that are stipulated by the NSIDM. In practice, it has been argued by many authors (*inter alia* Miron, 2023; Kisinger and Matsui, 2019; Jamil et al., 2019; Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Rudra and Sardesai, 2009), that the coordination of activities and funding between these different institutions is not aligned, and that also other ministries overlap with the jurisdiction of MoDMR (for example the above-mentioned MoSW, which takes up important responsibilities to support vulnerable populations in general, including climate-IDPs). Similarly, according to Kisinger and Matsui (2019), "There has been some disconnect among responsible administrations in governing disaster displacement issues" (11). The authors further elaborate that "Although this jurisdictional compartmentalization and overlap are nothing strange in other countries, [in Bangladesh,] a lack of coordination among government stakeholders has led to the delay in decision-making and disaster responses […]", with serious implications for the protection of climate-IDPs (ibid.).

These gaps in the institutional set-up for the management of climate-induced internal displacement may seem minor, but are arguably important shortcomings as they may lead to increased obstacles for affected climate-IDPs to turn to a clearly responsible authority and claim their rights. As previously mentioned, assigning responsibilities to specific stakeholders is crucial to create, on the one hand, a sense of ownership over the resolution of a specific issue (e.g. for the assigned stakeholder) and allow for transparency and accountability of processes on the other hand (e.g. for affected individuals). Both are necessary to produce trust and cooperation between public institutions and the affected populations, and thereby produce effective solutions benefiting all.

d) Bangladesh's paradoxical relationship between progressive policies and ineffective institutions

As we have seen in this sub-chapter, Bangladesh has a wide array of great-looking policies and a notable range of institutions, especially at national level. However, it has been argued that, in Bangladesh, the

quantity does not per sé translate into good quality of governance, transparency, and accountability within the country's responsible public institutions (Rahman, 2016; Huque and Panday, 2018). In fact, the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) of developing countries ranks Bangladesh 23rd in mean percentile rank[11] (0 to 100) only after Nigeria (*Fig. 10*), with deteriorating tendency since 2011 in terms of participation ('Voice') and accountability, and regulatory quality.

Fig. 10: Selected Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of developing countries (2017) (modified from Filho et al., 2019, 1187)

WGI country	Govt. effectiveness	Regulatory quality	Rule of law	Control of corruption	Mean percentile rank
Percentile Rank (0—100)					
Guyana	41	38	43	38	40
Uruguay	68	74	72	88	76
Peru	49	67	33	39	47
Nigeria	16	17	19	13	16
Kenya	41	44	38	15	35
Togo	13	22	25	26	22
Malaysia	76	75	65	58	69
Bangladesh	22	21	28	21	23
China	68	49	36	46	50

The country has only barely noticeably improved in terms of Rule of Law. Relatively notable improvements have only been made in two of the data categories, namely government effectiveness and control of corruption, although both still rank very low, with 22 and 21 respectively (*Fig. 11*). The first improvement category, namely government effectiveness, does not come as a big surprise as governments reducing the spaces for political participation and accountability, tend to also have room to follow through more effectively and with less resistance to implement their specific agendas.

Fig. 11: Selected WGI Indicators of Bangladesh in 2011, 2016, and 2021 (Modified from The World Bank (b), 2022)



[11] Percentile Rank indicates the rank of a country among all countries in the world. 0 corresponds to the lowest rank and 100 corresponds to the highest rank.

e) Decentralization of governance in Bangladesh: Trickling down or trickling within?

While there have been some attempts since Bangladesh's independence in 1971 to reform the centralized governance system of the country, it has been argued by many scholars that governance in Bangladesh remains in the hands of central elites with little political will and incentive or capacities of local governments to push through the necessary policy and institutional changes that would benefit vulnerable urban populations in general, and climate migrants in particular.

Contrary to the optimistic expectations that urban centers would take the lead in driving reform and innovative solutions, Bangladesh has witnessed decentralization measures that have been accompanied by a gradual erosion of local government authority. The figure provided below (*Fig. 12*) illustrates the scope of services offered by various levels of governance, shedding light on the limited jurisdictional power granted to local governments. This constraint significantly hampers their ability to provide vital services crucial to addressing the needs of climate-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs) at the grassroot-level. Services such as housing, social security, environmental protection, access to electricity and water utilities, and local economic development and promotion remain largely beyond the reach of local authorities, underscoring the pressing need for reevaluating and enhancing the decentralized governance framework.

Furthermore, policies are plentifully available in Bangladesh, as we have seen in the previous sub-chapters, but do they really capture the essence of what climate migrants and their hosting communities need? If so, why is the country teeming with international and national non-governmental organizations trying to fill any protection gaps? To answer these questions, we need to look at the sub-national level of governance where the practical implementation of policies is arguably most associated with local integration outcomes (or lack thereof) of the individuals which are ultimately targeted by these policies. The next chapter will therefore go deeper into the sub-national case study of Khulna, a coastal city in Bangladesh that has become a hotspot for climate migrants. It will do so by scrutinizing the *de jure* institutional and policy provisions at city level, as well as the *de facto* realities. The realities shall be assessed in terms of both institutional capacities and shortcomings derived from previous research and own conducted interviews with city representatives (meso-level analysis), as well as the real challenges faced by climate migrants to adapt to Khulna and effectively integrate in their communities (micro-level analysis).

Fig. 12: Summary of service provisions in different spheres of government in Bangladesh (CLGF, 2023)

Services	Delivering authority					Remarks
	National government	Zila parishads	Upazila parishads	Union parishads	City corporations and municipalities	
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION						
Police	■			■	■	
Fire protection	■					
Civil protection	■					
Criminal justice	■			■		
Civil status register				■		
Statistical office	■					
Electoral register	■					
EDUCATION						
Pre-school (kindergarten and nursery)		■	■	■	■	
Primary	■	■	■	■		
Secondary	■	■				
Vocational and technical	■					
Higher education	■					
Adult education	■	■	■	■	■	
SOCIAL WELFARE						
Family welfare services	■	■	■	■	■	
Welfare homes	■					
Social security	■					
PUBLIC HEALTH						
Primary care	■	■	■	■	■	
Hospitals	■	■			■	
Health protection		■	■	■	■	
HOUSING AND TOWN PLANNING						
Housing	■					
Town planning	■				■	
Regional planning	■					
TRANSPORT						
Roads	■	■	■	■	■	
Transport	■	■	■	■	■	
Urban roads	■					
Urban rail	■					
Ports	■					
Airports	■					
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SANITATION						
Water and sanitation	■	■	■	■	■	
Refuse collection and disposal		■	■	■	■	
Cemeteries and crematoria					■	
Slaughterhouses					■	
Environmental protection	■	■	■	■		
Consumer protection	■	■				
CULTURE, LEISURE AND SPORTS						
Theatres and concerts	■	■	■	■	■	
Museums and libraries	■	■	■	■	■	
Parks and open spaces	■	■	■	■	■	
Sports and leisure facilities	■	■	■	■	■	
Religious facilities	■	■	■	■	■	
UTILITIES						
Gas services	■					
District heating						
Water supply	■	■	■	■		
Electricity	■					
ECONOMIC						
Agriculture, forests and fisheries	■	■	■	■		
Local economic development/promotion	■	■	■	■		
Trade and industry	■					
Tourism	■	■	■	■	■	

■ *sole responsibility service* ■ *joint responsibility service* ■ *discretionary service*

3. The Subnational Dimension

3.1 Khulna: Land of opportunities or Satan's Salon?
The urban management of climate-induced internal displacement at subnational level

In this chapter, our attention shifts to the urban landscape of Khulna, a city that serves as a microcosm of the challenges posed by climate-induced internal displacement in Bangladesh. Nestled in the southwestern coastal region of the country, Khulna stands as an urban center attracting large numbers of climate migrants and IDPs, while at the same time facing itself challenges related to adverse climate change impacts. As we delve into the urban management dynamics within Khulna, we navigate through the distinctive features and contextual nuances that define this city's response to climate-induced internal displacement and especially its approaches to accommodating climate-IDPs. The next section will now especially focus on the city's geographical landscape that attracts many climate-IDPs every year.

3.2 Khulna's Geographical Profile and Magnetic Features in Migration Dynamics

Fig. 13: Geographical location of Khulna city, Bangladesh (generated through Google Earth)

Fig. 14: Administrative location of Khulna city, Bangladesh (Source: Maps of Bangladesh, 2010)



The densely populated south coast of Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal currently accommodates approximately 35 million inhabitants, living at a density of 738 people per square kilometer. This population is projected to grow to between 40 and 50 million by 2050 (Ahsan, 2019, 187). Coastal communities in this area largely dependent on subsistence agriculture and fishing along the fertile plains along rivers and the coast and are especially vulnerable to extreme climate events. The impacts

of changing temperatures, precipitation levels, extreme weather events, and the impacts of rising sea levels are already being felt, with the expectation of more intense floods, droughts, and storms in the future and the increased intrusion of salinity in ground waters (Ahsan, 2019, 187). Especially increased saline water intrusion from sea water into soil and ground water due to the low elevation of coastal areas already negatively impact on agricultural outputs and the availability of fresh drinking water, leading to serious health implications and to food insecurity (ibid.).

In light of these projections, Bangladesh, like many countries, is already experiencing and expected to undergo further rapid rural-to-urban migration in the coming decades causing the formation of more megacities, with urban populations already outpacing rural populations (*Fig. 15*). Khulna, a metropolitan city located in south-western Bangladesh and the third largest city of the country in terms of its population size with a current annual growth rate of 0.57 percent, is emerging as a relevant case study in this context (World Population Review, 2023). It has experienced recent population growth reaching a current urban population of 955,100 inhabitants (district-wide a total of 2,334,28 according to GoB, 2023) and is expected to grow even more rapidly, with a projected population of 1,212,517 by 2035 (ibid.) (*Fig. 16*). These estimates encompass the urban agglomeration of Khulna, including not only the city itself but also its adjacent suburban areas.

Fig. 15: Urban and rural population distributions in Bangladesh between 1950 and 2050



Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018

Fig. 16: Khulna Population in 2023



Source: World Population Review, 2023

The redirection of migration flows from Dhaka to other parts of the country is part of the government's strategy to address extreme housing scarcity in the capital (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 5). This approach, characterized by an inter-sectoral development strategy, places secondary cities at the forefront of national industrialization planning. Khulna's geographical location and physical attributes make it a focal point for various factors affecting migration. It is a coastal city in close proximity to areas highly

susceptible to climate change-induced events. Given the above-observed tendency of migrants to relocate to nearby cities and the increasing frequency of climate change-induced events in coastal areas, Khulna has become a primary destination for climate-induced displaced persons. The south-western zones of Bangladesh, including the larger division of Khulna has therefore been included in governmental plans for the construction of large-scale economic zones to divert migration flows away from mega-city industrial hotspots, notably Dhaka and Chittagong (ibid.). While Dhaka and Chittagong currently attract the highest total number of climate migrants, the planned economic zones in Khulna's vicinity are expected to create increased job opportunities. This shift may act as a strong additional pull-factor for climate-induced displaced persons seeking socioeconomic stability after losing their sources of income and livelihoods due to climate change.

In sum, the above-outlined aspects make Khulna an interesting case study to examine potential urban planning and preparedness strategies in relation to absorbing and integrating current and prospective influxes of climate-IDPs, especially in light of broader national protection frameworks such as the NSIDM. The next sub-chapter will proceed with contextualizing urban planning processes in Bangladesh which arguably influenced the ways in which Khulna tackles the ever-increasing challenges related to the influx of climate-IDPs.

3.3 Mapping Khulna's institutional framework to deal with climate-induced internal displacement and local integration of climate-IDPs

Following the analysis on how national public institutions are involved in managing climate-induced internal displacement processes and after having shown that decentralization plays an important role in this management process, the next section shall now look in more detail at the role that public institutions play at the subnational level. It will look specifically into the institutional set-up and key policy frameworks developed in urban areas, notably in Khulna, and scrutinize to what extent these frameworks are contributing to the integration of climate displaced populations. Importantly, it shall evaluate whether these policy considerations have been *de facto* strategic in nature, respecting the needs of marginalized population groups, including climate migrants, in line with the *de jure* national policy frameworks identified earlier.

a) The role of public institutions at sub-national level

As explained in the introductory chapter of this paper, local public institutions are governments and agencies (e.g. extension services of higher-level government) operating at the city and neighborhood levels. Recalling the same chapter, Berman et al. (2012) argued that "local institutions play a key role in mediating the transformation of coping capacity into adaptive capacity" (86) where coping is associated in this thesis with the migration or displacement away from slow- or sudden-onset climate change-

induced threats and towards the nearby urban areas, and adapting is associated with finding a durable solution at the place of destination (through local integration). This paper has previously introduced the observation that local public institutions, or Local Governmental Institutions (LGIs), are crucial in how and to what extent social groups are able to access assets and resources in the cities they arrive in (Agrawal, 2008, 2). In fact, Agrawal (2008), identifies three functions through which local institutions shape adaptation outcomes. Firstly, they "structure impacts and vulnerability" (ibid., 2), setting the context for adaptation efforts. Secondly, "they mediate between individual and collective responses, influencing the outcomes of adaptation strategies" (ibid.). And lastly, local institutions serve as "means of delivery of external resources to facilitate adaptation", thus governing access to such resources that support adaptation processes (ibid.).

Inadequately managed urbanization, especially in the context of already increasing climate-induced migration to urban areas in Bangladesh, fosters instead situations of heightened vulnerability for climate migrants, exacerbating socioeconomic disparities and urban poverty (Ahsan, 2019, 186). In fact, generally, urban systems in Bangladesh are often completely unprepared to deal with "sudden mass migrations" to cities (ibid.). Alverio et al. (2023) relate shortcomings in the management of urbanization and especially the absorption of and integration of climate-IDPs to the degree of power centralization in administrative and political structures. That is, the authors draw a relationship between "cooperative cities" versus "sidelined cities" and how urban migrants will experience integration differently depending on the respective city type they settle in. In other words, "where power is highly centralized and personalized and where municipal authorities have limited resources and political power, public authorities may deliberately remain in the dark about the scale of the issues faced by urban migrants as well as informal residents" (12). Conversely, "…in urban areas where cooperative relationships between civil society and municipal and public authorities have been allowed to take root, cities are more likely to innovate and develop locally appropriate approaches to addressing dire problems of infrastructure and service provision" (ibid., 13).

Article 11 of Bangladesh's constitution sets the key principles of decentralization stating that "The Republic shall be a democracy in which effective participation by the people through their elected representatives in administration at all levels shall be ensured" (Rudra and Sardesai, 2009, 2f.). The constitution further legitimizes the role of local governments by stating in article 59 that the "local government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be entrusted to bodies composed of persons elected in accordance with law" (Panday, 2019, 219). Similarly, article 60 stipulates that the "Parliament shall, by law, confer powers on the local government bodies referred to in that article including power to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budgets and to maintain funds" (ibid.).

However, in a unitary state such as Bangladesh, local governments' ability to influence decision-making and policy-making is constrained (Huque and Panday, 2018, 128). Though they can support the provision of a (restricted) range of public services, promote local development, and even formulate and implement some policies to articulate and respond to the needs of citizens, they have limited jurisdiction and authority to substantially contribute towards governance (ibid.). However, Huque and Panday (2018) also argue that some progress towards "good governance" at local levels in Bangladesh has been made, especially with regards to citizen participation and awareness among the broader public (ibid.). For example, in Khulna City Corporation, local citizen participation has gradually increased through the creation Community Development Committees (CDCs) which take up an increasingly important role in representing the voices of communities in local decision-making and are ever more involved in Khulna's development processes (Hossain and Rahman, 2021, 131).

As we navigate the complexities of urbanization challenges and the local management of climate displacement, the following sub-chapter shall now zero in on the institutional framework within Khulna city for effectively managing climate-induced internal displacement and especially the local integration of climate-IDPs in Khulna. It will start by outlining the policies and plans developed at subnational level in Khulna city to contribute to sustainable urban development and analyze to what extent these policies address socioeconomically vulnerable populations, particularly climate-IDPs. It will then move on to scrutinizing the administrative structures in Khulna and identify what local institutions deal with the integration of marginalized populations, especially climate-IDPs.

b) Khulna's policy architecture for the protection of climate-IDPs in Khulna

Cities are associated with rapid change and therefore urban planning processes have become crucial to counter challenges associated with constantly changing urban complexities. Especially after World War II, a special need arose in Western European countries regarding the physical and social reconstruction of urban area (Rahman, 2016, 1). The British rational town planning legislations of controlled urban growth and modernization that were developed as a response, became a model for many cities and countries across the world, including for South Asian cities, where the British 'masterplan' urban planning approach was introduced in the 1950s (ibid., 2). This approach was based on physical forecasting, analysis, and land-use allocation, and also found its way into the first masterplans of Bangladesh, which were introduced in 1960 in Bangladesh's capital Dhaka and in Khulna City (ibid.). The initial rigid masterplan model for Bangladeshi cities, ill-suited to the challenges posed by then-increasing industrialization and urbanization which were ever more contested by resource constraints of a densifying population, was abandoned within a decade. It was replaced by a strategic planning model influenced by Lindblom (1959) and Davidoff (1965), emphasizing advocacy planning

and a participatory approach (ibid., 4). In the 1980s, Bangladesh embraced a more open-ended and participatory strategic policy framework, departing from the earlier rational planning approach. This shift aimed to guide decision-makers through adaptable planning, fostering collaborative governance and serving as a tool to manage future uncertainties and changes (ibid., 2). However, as Rahman (2016, 2) points out, without proper institutionalization of this planning approach by the meaningful participation and collaboration of the key stakeholders, including the affected citizens themselves, this strategic tool risks to perpetuate power dynamics and to remain an elite framework detached from local realities – indeed a "threat" to social justice and sustainable urban development (ibid., 4).

In the urban planning context of Khulna city, the urban local policies and strategies are delineated through a multi-tiered planning approach. Khulna published its first *strategic* masterplan ('strategic' compared to its more rational counterpart from 1961) in 2001 and an updated version is currently underway. Funding for the masterplan preparation process as well as content guidelines come from the national-level Planning Commission and development partners. However, concerns about inclusivity in this process arise due to the lack of pre-consultation with the public. Guidelines from these entities significantly influence urban-level strategies. The Khulna Development Authority (KDA) involves academics and practitioners as consultants for expert-led decisions. Consultation meetings with public departments and the Khulna City Corporation (KCC) allow for adjustments to planning proposals in case of conflicts with other public bodies' interests.

The 2001 masterplan consists of three key plans, which were added and partly updated since the masterplan was first published, to strategically steer the structuring of future urban growth, pinpointing spatial improvements for various sectors over the subsequent ten years. These three tiers consist of: the Urban Strategy ('Strategic Plan'), the Structure Plan, and the Detailed Area Plans (Rahman, 2016, 4) and are visualized below in *Fig. 17* (page 73). To begin with, the 20-year Strategic Plan serves as the foundational tier, articulating nine key strategies to guide Khulna's planning and development (see next page). Subsequently, the 20-year Structure Plan focuses on sector-specific spatial strategies presenting composite maps at a 1:10,000 scale to illustrate spatial planning areas and city-level proposals. In parallel, Detailed Area Plans at the statutory level are crafted based on uniform physical characteristics, functions, or issues. These Detailed Area Plans designate 14 development and planning zones, highlighting priority areas for redevelopment, slum, or squatter rehabilitation in one of the informal settlement areas, and the revitalization of Railway Land for civic and commercial purposes (Sowgat, 2012, 136).

Fig. 17: Khulna's Urban Planning Framework



As summarized in Sowgat (2012, 137), the Strategic Plan lists 9 priority strategies to tackle Khulna's urban development through:

1. Development of a strategic infrastructure including a new bridge, port, airport, and industries to revitalize the overall economy of the city
2. **Creation of employment opportunities through new investments, improvements to law and order and the provision of better utility services.**
3. To increase the density of the existing urban areas rather than urban expansion to reduce the associated cost and to effectively utilize the existing capacity of the city.
4. Lateral physical growth for a compact shape rather than the present linear development.
5. **Poverty alleviation and promotion of spatial equity through encouraging small initiatives in the informal sectors and through ensuring low-cost housing, slum resettlement, etc.**
6. Regional integration of Khulna with other regions of the country to foster economic growth.
7. Rural-urban linkages to minimize the gap between them and to promote more integrated development.
8. **Better provision of public utilities and services.**
9. Growth management rather than growth restriction.

While acknowledging macro-strategies stipulated in Bangladesh's fifth five-year plan, the plan includes three strategies (marked in bold) - notably '2. Creation of employment opportunities', '5. Poverty alleviation and promotion of spatial equity', and '8. Better provision of public utilities and services' - that are particularly relevant, at least indirectly, to the wellbeing and thus the better integration of climate-IDPs. By including these three strategies, it recognizes the importance of stimulating the city's economy and generating employment opportunities, of providing improved services and facilities for urban populations, and of alleviating urban poverty (Sowgat, 2012, 136f.). However, the strategic plan primarily centres on macro-economic progress in alignment with national-level urban strategies, placing a higher priority on economic growth than poverty reduction. Accordingly, economic growth

takes centre stage not only in the Strategic Plan, but generally in the urban planning framework of Khulna city to respond to the tendentially stagnant economy and insufficient employment opportunities to accommodate a growing urban population (ibid.). Furthermore, although poverty alleviation is included in the Strategic Plan through provisions recognizing the importance of the informal sector in creating employment and by envisioning the provision of low-cost housing and slum resettlement, it is emphasized in the plan that these poverty alleviation efforts can only be successfully addressed as part of an effort "of national scale" (ibid.), thereby implicitly shifting the responsibility.

On the other hand, the Structure Plan which is based on the urban strategies outlined in the Strategic Plan, proposes strategies that are based on projections and assumptions echoing the conventional rational planning system, rather than a strategic and participatory planning approach advocated for since the 1980s. The strategies are divided into thirteen main sectors of intervention, as summarized by Sowgat (2012, 138):

1. Demography
2. Economy
3. Transport
4. Land and housing
5. Physical infrastructure and utility services
6. Community facilities
7. Open space and recreation
8. Environment
9. Industry
10. Conservation of urban heritage
11. Institutional arrangements and their strengthening
12. Resource mobilization and financing urban development agencies
13. Legal Aspects.

These thirteen sectors may be broadly grouped into a. 'the economy and employment-related proposals' (e.g. sectors 2 and 9), b. 'housing, services and facilities-related proposals' including water supply, social services, sanitation and drainage, and public open spaces (e.g. sectors 4, 5, 6, 7), and c. 'urban management proposals' (e.g. sectors 3, 8, 11, 13) (ibid.). The Structure Plan is even less focused on providing poverty relief and support to socioeconomically vulnerable populations, let alone climate-IDPs, compared to the Strategic Plan. All these sectors remain very broad and as mentioned before, are purely based on statistical predictions derived from quantitative information on urban services, housing, and the general population (ibid.). Furthermore, similarly to the Strategic Plan, the Structure Plan does not conduct consultations with "ordinary people" (ibid., 142), despite stating that "People of all income groups should be involved in planning and development activities" (ibid.). Even those stakeholders who are included in the planning process, such as some public departments, NGOs, and some selected ward councillors, have no real possibility to contribute to the strategies as their

contributions are meant only for providing information, rather than for cultivating a knowledge-sharing process and discussion of different opinions (ibid.).

These policies developed at city-level, while partly mentioning provisions to support poor populations through a focus on economic activities, they fail to include targeted solutions respecting the existing human and social conditions of the poor (ibid., 210). Furthermore, generally, the policies refer to the broader socioeconomically vulnerable populations, without explicitly mentioning climate-IDPs. That is, no single provision currently mentions climate-displacement or includes measures to relieve the specific challenges faced by climate-IDPs who settle in the city. This may be due to a structural gap in planning processes related to the lack of involvement of directly affected local populations. The inexistence of provisions for the inclusion of climate-IDPs may also be simply due to the outdatedness of the masterplan, given its publication twenty-two years ago. However, there is hope that, with the increased attention that climate change and climate-induced internal displacement have gradually received internationally - but also especially in Bangladesh over the past decade - the new masterplan, which is currently being updated, will include some relevant provisions in this regard. Moreover, there is no indication of an existing local action plan on Khulna city's main local planning institutions' websites or in secondary documents[12]. However, these city-specific action plans are stipulated by the NSIDM to ensure the implementation of the National Strategy for the management of climate-induced internal displacement at subnational level.

Overall, when it comes to policy-making in Khulna city and the subsequent implementation of relevant policies and initiatives, the existence of various actors shaping decisions tend to lead to a disconnect between the international, national, and sub-national levels (ibid., 157). That is, national-level agencies align their efforts with national strategies, while local organizations adhere to locally defined urban strategies. Similarly, NGOs working in the city to provide essential services to vulnerable populations primarily focus on international agendas. Consequently, each institute envisions the protection of socioeconomically vulnerable populations and urban development from its very distinct strategic viewpoint (ibid.). This actor divergence and disparities in the agendas for local development, as well as the little focus that is currently given in subnational planning to the specific needs of climate-IDPs, hamper the prospects of a coordinated approach to protect climate-IDPs. The institutional weakness of planning agencies in Khulna further compounds the challenge of realizing social, economic, and spatial objectives for poverty reduction (ibid.). But to better understand this network of different actors present in the administration of the city and especially the implementation of development projects to

[12] The website of KDA and related sources provided no indications on the existence of a specific action plan regarding the implementation of the NSIDM at local level. The only action plan found was the National Sanitation Strategy Action Plan for Office/Organization 2012-2023 (Action Plan for Khulna 2023-2024) (Accessible at কর্মপরিকল্পনা-ও-বাস্তবায়ন- (kda.gov.bd))

protect vulnerable populations, the next sub-chapter shall now move on to identifying Khulna's administrative set-up and the key actors that deal with the urban management of climate-induced internal displacement in the absence of specific provisions for the integration of climate-IDPs in Khulna's urban planning policies.

c) Khulna's administrative set-up

In urban areas, the administrative structure comprises development authorities, City Corporations (12 in total, Rahman et al., 2019, 207), municipalities (327 in number, ibid.), and smaller units such as wards and *Mohallas* (Sowgat, 2012, 130). This system operates somewhat independently from the national regulatory framework, which aims at governing autonomous city corporations and the smaller-size municipalities. Urban local governments are categorized either as 'City Corporations' or 'Municipalities', depending on their population size. City Corporations, governed by mayors and linked to the national administration through the Local Government Division (LGD), consist of wards, each further divided into neighborhood clusters known as *Mohallas*, with elected representatives ('Ward councilors') elected by local voters. The Urban Council within the City Corporation is headed by the mayor and the respective councilors of each ward, all of which are directly elected every five years (CLGF, 2023).

Khulna, the administrative center of the larger Khulna division and the lower-level Khulna district ('*zila'*), is one out of 12 metropolitan City Corporations and its main administrative unit is called 'Khulna City Corporation' (KCC). This local government unit is placed under the jurisdiction of the national Department of Local Government, which in turn is tasked with ensuring effective local governance with public participation by strengthening the local government system, for example to improve infrastructure of villages and cities, and improve the life quality of the residents through the implementation of socio-economic activities. It distributes the funds for development projects and assistance to City Corporations (Department of Local Government, 2023). In parallel with the KCC, Khulna also has a unitary development authority, aka 'Khulna Development Authority' (KDA), which is governed by government-appointed chairmen who enjoy full autonomy (Sowgat, 2012, 131). While generally, City Corporations (such as KCC) are responsible for the planning and management of a city, including for producing urban planning strategies, development authorities (such as KDA) prepare plans for the city and play implementation roles.

On top of the two-fold local government set-up through KCC and KDA, a variety of other actors are also involved in the administration and management of the city. Khulna comprises central government agencies and ministerial field units (see page 60) for service and infrastructure development (Sowgat, 2012, 131). These include for example the Public Works Department (PWD) mainly responsible for

Housing-related infrastructure, the Roads and Highways Department (RHD) responsible for road infrastructures, the Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) for water supply and sanitation, the National Housing Authority (NHA) for housing provided to low- and middle-income groups, the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) for general physical infrastructures, the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC), the Department of the Environment (DoE) for environmental issues, the Department of Social Services (DSS) for the provision of social security and information services, the Department of Disaster Management (DDM), and the Planning Commission (ibid.). They are responsible for the regulation, monitoring, and implementation of national-level and local-level urban policies, including the localization of the above-outlined 'National Plan for Disaster Management 2021-2025' and the NSIDM (both implemented by DDM). While PWD, NHA, and RHD are limited to carrying out urban infrastructure development in Khulna, notably the construction of roads, houses, drainage systems, and public buildings, DPHE and LGED additionally deal with the upgrading of informal settlements and the implementation of poverty reduction programs in coordination with the City Corporation (ibid., 132). Within the upgrading of informal settlements field of action, DPHE takes largely care of better sanitation, whereas the LGED works closely together with international organizations to implement upgrading programs (ibid., 133). To this complex network of actors are further added non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international development organizations, which provide direct support to vulnerable population groups, for example through slum improvements, solid waste management, sanitation and health services, education, and provision of micro-credits (Sowgat, 2012, 132).

d) Who deals with the urban impacts of climate-induced internal displacement and the local integration of climate-IDPs in Khulna?

The above-analyzed NSIDM stipulates in provision 5.6 that the integration of displacement in the agendas of the local level institutions, as well as representation shall be ensured (MoDMR (a), 2021, 38). These 'local level institutions' are tasked to "provide the guidelines, maintain statistics, and monitor any displacement in or out of their respective locality" (ibid.). Provision 5.7 further stipulates to "Prepare an action plan at the local level by incorporating the displacement agenda in the regular meetings of unions, *upazila*, and district level committees. Take required steps to implement the action plan." (ibid.). As cities' main administrative units are generally the City Corporations and Development Authorities (here KCC and KDA, respectively), KCC and KDA are implicitly expected to take on the primary duty-bearer role in terms of coordinating the preparation of such localized action plans and manage issues related to supporting the residents in their jurisdictions, especially the vulnerable poor populations, among which tend to also live the climate-displaced populations.

As a first step, the next section will therefore look at the mandates especially of KCC and KDA and scrutinize whether these mandates include specific protection provisions for climate-IDPs, either explicitly, through the development of specific climate displacement-related projects, or implicitly through the implementation of relief schemes for the urban poor and vulnerable populations, especially in informal settlements.

The mandates of Khulna City Corporation (KCC) and Khulna Development Authority (KDA)

Khulna City Corporation (KCC) and Khulna Development Authority (KDA) are stipulated to be instrumental institutions of the local government in addressing the needs of city residents. KCC, as the principle local government body in Khulna, undertakes diverse functions ranging from civil works and solid waste management to slum development and urban planning. Its functions are broadly summarized in the figure below:

Fig. 18: KCC's Key Functions (modified from Sowgat, 2012, 133)

KCC is divided into six departments fulfilling the above-outlined functions, notably the departments of civil works, health, gardens and parks, roads and lights, revenue, and solid waste (Sowgat, 2012, 134). Though no specific department is dedicated to slum development or social welfare activities, functions related to supporting generally vulnerable populations in informal settlements such as through

livelihood improvement or vocational training activities or related to the implementation of general social welfare activities do exist under the civil works department (Sowgat, 2012, 134).

On the other hand, KDA, responsible for the planning and control of city development activities, plays a crucial role in the crafting of masterplans and in giving permissions for the construction of buildings. It is a largely autonomous body and is therefore also authorized to carry out the implementation of the strategic plans "without any further institutional support or resources" (Sowgat, 2012, 134). Furthermore, its functions include infrastructural development such as the construction of roads, public markets, buildings, and residential areas (ibid.) and the monitoring of building schemes, for example overseeing the compliance of buildings with the national building construction act and land use regulations (ibid.). One of the current self-funded projects implemented by KDA includes the construction of a new modern market, which may be relevant to urban poor populations including climate-IDPs, as it could potentially provide some employment opportunities. Indeed, in a published document listing all development activities (implemented and ongoing) by KDA since 2009, the official website states that the new modern market aims "to create employment opportunities and help in poverty alleviation" (KDA (a), 2023). KDA's functions can be summarized as follows:

Fig. 19: KDA's Key Functions (modified from Sowgat, 2012, 134)



The Future Action Plan published on KDA's official governmental website reveals various planned projects under approval process, among which the construction of an inter-district bus terminal with modern facilities, the construction of an IT village/park/recreation center on abandoned land of a previous textile mill, the development of three satellite towns, and the construction of a multistoried office building for KDA (KDA Future Action Plan 2023, KDA (b), 2023). Arguably, none of these are in any way relevant to providing vulnerable populations, especially climate-IDPs, with essential services. Instead, these activities clearly target a population stratum that can afford to participate in technological progress and recreational activities, acquire houses or flats, and that has the possibility

to be mobile - luxuries which 'ultra-poor' climate-IDPs in informal settlements are generally deprived of. Furthermore, from the Citizen Charter available on KDA's official website it can also be derived that KDA takes up the responsibility of collecting money for the allotment of plots or flats, provides the spaces for shops, counters, or workshops, and issues land permits (KDA (c), 2023). The reality, however, is that most climate-IDPs are too poor to buy or even rent their own houses or shops in the short and even long term after their arrival in Khulna (Sowgat, 2012, 155). Furthermore, the Citizen Charter also permits KDA to "Remove unauthorized/illegal installations" and to "take legal action" in relevant cases (KDA (c), 2023). This provision arguably holds serious implications for potential human rights violations with regards to the justification of evictions of the poor populations residing in the informal settlements.

Key institutional shortcomings in KCC's and KDA's mandates

Generally, while KCC and KDA do have some relevant functions indirectly related to providing general services to climate-IDPs who are residents of Khulna city, there are some serious gaps in their mandates. The next section will expose some of the most critical shortcomings with regards to providing adequate protection to climate-IDPs. That is, overall, both the KCC and KDA local government institutions exhibit shortcomings in responding to the socioeconomic challenges faced by climate-IDPs. KCC's limited role in housing, economic growth, and development control hinders its ability to address the multifaceted needs of vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, KDA's focus on planning and project implementation leaves gaps in providing essential services. Coordination challenges between KCC and KDA may further impede the seamless execution of protective measures for vulnerable climate migrants, necessitating a more integrated and collaborative approach to ensure comprehensive protection and support (ibid.).

With particular regards to KCC, despite its broad responsibilities, KCC faces limitations, notably in informal settlement development, social welfare, and the implementation of comprehensive urban plans. More specifically, KCC is responsible, in theory, to provide pro-poor housing, but in practice the institution plays an extremely marginal role in this issue. This is largely because the so-called 'squatter settlements' where climate-IDPs tend to settle, are built on government property and are therefore regarded as illegal (Sowgat, 2012, 134). This illegality of the slums is used in many regards to justify the neglect of the duty to support poor households in these areas, including climate-IDPs. It also tends to serve as justification to commit serious human rights violations such as slum evictions, where residents in the informal settlements are expelled from the government lands - homes that climate-IDPs have built for themselves sometimes over decades. The reasoning behind this neglect is simple: Informality, whether in terms of land entitlements or in terms of employment, contribute very minimally to the taxes collected by KCC. By living in informal settlements, poor households live outside the legal

mechanisms for regular municipal taxation. Similarly, by *working* in the informal sector, individuals do not pay income taxes to the government. Therefore, poor households, including climate-IDPs, contribute less to the general availability of money for urban services and since these are costly, the provision of the services goes preferably to those who can pay for them (Sowgat, 2012, 158). Most poor arguably choose to live in these informal settlements precisely because it allows them to reduce urban living costs (ibid.). In fact, many would not be able to afford living outside these areas without risking their lives.

To fill the service gap left by the neglect of KCC, NGOs have taken up an active role in the informal settlements and the local governments rely heavily on them to manage the informal settlements. However, paradoxically, while KCC purports to have an interest in the continuation of NGO support in these areas, slum evictions and eviction threats from the local government remain a serious issue. In fact, they also push to critically evaluate the sustainability of development cooperation as the immense financial investments in these slum areas and the creation of support and protection structures, which generally span many years risk to come undone in an instant of perpetrated slum eviction by local governments. Furthermore, although according to constitutional law, City Corporations are tasked with both the planning and management of a city, in practice, they do not produce long-term spatial plans (Sowgat, 2012, 131). This is no different in the case of KCC, which would be responsible, in theory, to implement any development plans developed by KDA. However, as Sowgat (2012) argues, "KCC does not go beyond its conventional functions [and] has a limited role in relation to issues including housing, economic growth, industrialization, or development control" (134). In fact, KCC limits itself to providing municipal services to its (formal) citizens (ibid., 131), rather than taking up its duty to develop effective solutions to implementing provisions for the protection of (mostly informal) climate-IDPs.

With regards to constraints in KDA's mandate, this second local government institution in Khulna is significantly limited by resource constraints, therefore focusing its interventions primarily on updating the masterplans, development control, and specific infrastructure projects like roads and markets (Sowgat, 2012, 155). Despite its popularity for profitable site and service schemes, KDA falls short in implementing schemes to improve basic urban services for vulnerable population groups, especially climate-IDPs (ibid.). Furthermore, the current administrative system impedes the KDA to coordinate development activities in Khulna city.

Overall, although local governments in Bangladesh have the potential of creating important change at the local level thanks to their relative autonomy from national-level administrations, KCC and KDA - partly due to budget constraints and partly due to other factors such as a lack of ownership and coordination - tend to be little effective in implementing durable solutions for socioeconomically

vulnerable populations, and even less so for climate-IDPs. Furthermore, Panday (2019) also notes that local government units such as KCC and KDA have been restricted in the field of development-related administration and are not actually fully independent in selecting development projects (220f.), which amplifies the role of development actors.

Therefore, in light of public institutional shortcomings in the local government which shall be further discussed in the next chapter, the contributions of development actors and other government agencies specialized for example in the provision of social services, arguably become vital for climate-IDPs' protection. The next section will therefore briefly discuss the role that other actors have played in Khulna to provide necessary services to the neglected climate-displaced populations.

The role of other actors in supporting local integration processes of climate-IDPs

In Khulna's intricate web of governance and beyond the stipulated roles played by KCC and KDA, several other actors contribute significantly to the local integration processes and protection of climate-IDPs.

Firstly, different agencies of the national central government are involved in providing specific services associated with their thematic jurisdiction, such as family welfare, education, public health, social welfare, etc. Although also the Departments of Women Affairs (DoW), of Youth Development (DYD), and of Disaster Management (DDM) provide some social protection, the main actor in supporting the socioeconomically vulnerable populations, of which most climate-IDPs are part, is the previously mentioned Department of Social Services (DSS). As explained above, it assumes a crucial role in providing essential social safety net services to vulnerable population groups, including welfare assistance, educational training, and public health linkages. It also provides information about the availability of social allowances, such as the old age allowance and disabled allowance, and respective application procedures, as well as skill training courses (DSS Skill Development Training Center Khulna). More specifically, the DSS Skill Development Training Centre located in Farajipara, Khulna, provides professional skill development trainings of 360 hours lasting three months in the field of computer office application, graphics design and multimedia, freelancing, tailoring, electrician, block batik (clothing), amidship, and beautification.[13]

Secondly, international development organizations, such as the German development agency *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) or the United National Development Programme (UNDP), are very present in Khulna and play a pivotal role in making up for institutional protection gaps. For example, initiatives such as the DSS Information Hub and a KCC affiliated 'registration booth' for climate-IDPs, which is piloting since July 2023 in one of the climate in-migration hotspots of Khulna (in

[13] Information retrieved from a field visit to the DSS office in Khulna in July 2023.

Ward 31), were implemented by GIZ and are now mainstreamed by local government institutions. Overall, these international development organizations focus largely on the improvement of livelihoods of urban poor households through initiatives to improve employability and access to social services. Furthermore, UNDP is running a project known as the 'Livelihoods Improvement of the Urban Poor Communities' (LIUPC), which aims at improving the livelihoods and general living conditions of urban slum residents. The 'Urban Management of Internal Migration due to Climate Change' or 'Urban Management of Migration and Livelihoods' (UMIMCC/UMML) project implemented by GIZ, is the only development project currently directly targeting climate-IDPs along with their host communities. However, also the LIUPC project seeks to improve the living conditions of "climate-vulnerable people" in urban areas through "community-driven adaptation initiatives" and "adaptive livelihoods initiatives", among others (UNDP, 2023). The development approaches to reduce poverty in Khulna tend to be similar in that most organizations focus on providing skills training and employment generation support, strengthen community initiatives, and improve the living conditions in the slums. The LIUPC project then adds specific infrastructure improvements, whereas UMIMCC/UMML adds the component of improving access to public social services. International development organizations usually work through local NGOs who implement the projects. These, together with larger Bangladeshi NGOs such as Brac, compose a diverse network of development support partners. This large network of development actors coupled with a frequent lack of communication and coordination between them have often been criticized to lead to duplication, whereby the same individuals benefit from multiple services and others never receive any benefits at all (Sowgat, 2012; Wasnik, 2019, 274).

Thirdly, civic organizations, particularly the informal Community Development Committees (CDCs), emerge as important grassroot entities that actively engage in representing the voices of local communities through CDC leaders for each settlement. Their role extends beyond traditional governance structures, acting as intermediaries between the community and formal decision-making processes, so to say as "gatekeepers" who decide where and when the urban slum communities will receive benefits depending on the availability dictated by higher levels of service providers (Hossain and Rahman, 2022). These organizations, driven by local agency, participate in identifying and addressing pressing local problems, thereby influencing the local integration landscape. CDCs also implement comparatively advanced community-driven slum upgrading schemes and organize collective savings, which have shown to increase community resilience and create "enabling environments" (ibid.). Grassroot initiatives are also supported by some development projects implemented by international development actors through local NGOs. For example, through Caritas Bangladesh, the UMIMCC/UMML project achieved some notable results in terms of improving living conditions in the slums where climate-IDPs live thanks to the so-called 'Community Social Lab' initiative.

This initiative gathers slum representatives and CDC leaders in collaboration with local government representatives and other experts, to identify the most pressing every-day challenges and find implementable solutions to these challenges (GIZ, 2023).

Thus, in this complex local network, diverse actors shape the environment for climate-IDPs in Khulna. However, while these 'other' actors have arguable been vital in the protection of climate-IDPs' rights, at least indirectly, it may be argued that the "Involvement of multilevel and multiple institutes make coordinated development a difficult task for Khulna city" (Sowgat, 2012, 157).

4. Chapter Conclusion

In conclusion, the chapter underscored the complex landscape of policies and the role of public institutions and actors at various levels of governance - from the international, to the national, to the subnational - in addressing climate-induced internal displacement, with a specific focus on the case of Bangladesh and Khulna city.

The analysis which was based in this chapter on desk research of primary and secondary documents, reveals the first findings regarding critical challenges that hinder effective responses to managing climate-induced internal displacement. One significant issue is the disconnect between levels of governance, particularly the inadequate implementation of decentralization in Bangladesh. For example, the mismatch between higher-level policy provisions and institutional responses poses challenges to effective cross-level interactions. Local city authorities, though potentially powerful agents for adaptive change, currently lack the capacities and authority required to create impactful solutions at the local level. More specifically, on the one hand, weak institutional capacities at the local level, especially in terms of lacking skills and knowledge, and inadequate or insufficient personnel, hampers the effective functioning of local institutions. Whereas on the other hand, the lack of financial resources at subnational levels hinders the formulation and execution of robust climate-induced displacement policies. Ineffective policies, either too detached or too sparse, and a lack of fluid cross-level policy and implementation management – in short, the inadequate localization of policies, whereby national policies are not translated into practicable local measures - adds to the complexity.

Moreover, the last chapter revealed the presence of multiple actors at the local level, which often overlap with and weaken the central role of the local government, notably of KCC. The absence of a coherent legal framework defining the functional responsibilities of different local institutions contributes to inefficiencies in project implementation. Scholars have also pointed to the low prioritization of and general lack of recognition for human rights as a factor contributing to the inadequate efforts in addressing climate-related displacement (Miron, 2023, 37).

In light of these challenges, it is crucial to emphasize the necessity for comprehensive, context-specific policies that consider the local realities. Effective climate-induced displacement responses require a delicate balance between top-down and bottom-up considerations. Initiatives should arguably focus on empowering local institutions, bridging the gap between policies and implementation, and fostering collaboration among various actors to address the diverse challenges of climate-induced internal displacement in Bangladesh and beyond.

As we transition to the next chapter, it is crucial to shift our focus from the theoretical analysis and institutional perspectives to the lived realities of those directly affected by climate-induced internal displacement. While the preceding discussion highlighted the challenges and inadequacies in policies and governance structures, the forthcoming chapter delves into the everyday experiences of climate-induced displaced persons as well as the perceptions of involved city representatives. These personal narratives bring a human dimension to the discourse, shedding light on the profound impact that inadequate policies and governance have on the lives of individuals and communities. By grounding our exploration in the real and often harsh experiences lived by climate-induced internally displaced persons, this paper aims to bridge the gap between theory and the actualities faced on the ground. This transition seeks to underscore the urgency of crafting policies that resonate with the daily struggles, resilience, and aspirations of those navigating the complexities related to internal displacement due to climate change.

Chapter III - Revealing local integration realities: Challenges faced by climate-IDPs and Khulna's local government authorities

The preceding chapter scrutinized the policies governing climate-induced internal displacement and delved into the role of public institutions at various levels of governance (*Fig. 20*). By analyzing the disconnects, weaknesses, and challenges within these frameworks, the groundwork was laid for understanding the broader context in which climate-induced internal displacement is managed or, in many cases, inadequately addressed.

Fig. 20: Progress made in Chapter II towards unraveling the connection between institutional mandates and local integration realities of climate-displaced populations in Bangladesh



The second chapter shall now look at the personal experiences of climate-IDPs themselves (micro-perspective) and city representatives (meso-perspective) to determine what the *de facto* realities are on the ground. This bottom-up approach aims at testing the theoretical findings of the first chapter against field realities. As academic research tends to seek generalizable answers and solutions to global problems, the human face of those global problems and the individual experiences of local communities often get sidelined. But as Berman et al. (2012) argue, "This focus on the local community is vital if we are to ensure adaptation planning does not unintentionally contribute towards unsustainable development within these communities", including maladaptation practices among climate-IDPs (96).

To give meaning to this most local dimension of climate-induced internal displacement, this chapter will be structured as follows: First, it will outline the methodology used by the author to collect and process the available field data. It will then briefly map the field site locations' and subsequently the here participating climate migrants' general profiles. The following section shall then engage with the data by visualizing patterns among climate migrants' and city representatives' experiences and thereby revealing key challenges in the local integration processes in Khulna. This chapter shall prepare the grounds for an informed discussion of the overall research findings in the subsequent final chapter of this paper. Let's now move on to the next section where the methodology of the empirical research component of this paper shall be introduced.

1. Methodology

The objective of this empirical chapter is to explore the lived experiences of climate migrants and key stakeholders of Khulna, Bangladesh, to identify *de facto* realities that may or may not match with the overall *de jure* policy provisions and institutional framework outlined in Chapter II. Two distinct informal settlements of Khulna city were selected for this analysis, notably Rayer Mahal and Greenland, to scrutinize whether differing spatial, administrative, and socioeconomic slum conditions may potentially result in different integration outcomes. A mixed-method approach was employed for this purpose, combining mainly qualitative research with some quantitative elements. The empirical research is divided into two components: a structured survey with 30 climate migrants ('Climate Migrant Survey', CMS) and semi-structured interviews with 3 Key Informants ('Key Informant Interviews', KII) from relevant public institutions. The author also gathered complementary data on each of the two data collection sites from the respective CDC leaders in those settlements. This data shall serve to give a general overview of the settlement conditions where the climate migrants live. The author applied the following steps to collect and process the data:

1.1 Data collection

To collect the field data regarding the lived experiences of climate migrants through the CMS, the author used methodological and data triangulation across two phases of data collection, which are described below.

a) Inception Phase:

During the Inception Phase, the geographical location and target group were determined. To select the climate migrants for the survey, three steps were taken to determine the relevant sampling units.

Firstly, the author embarked on selecting a city case study in Bangladesh based on desk research and the review of literature. Khulna city was chosen based on two criteria: a) its geographical location as important city in the coastal belt from where outmigration happens from rural areas to nearby urban areas, and b) its population size. As much research was already conducted on the two most important megacities in Bangladesh that attract most migrants, notably Dhaka and Chittagong, and due to the government's recent priority to shift the attention to secondary cities in order to divert migration flows away from these already over-crowded in-migration hotspots, Khulna as third-largest city in Bangladesh was chosen.

In a second step, the author conducted hotspot mapping to identify two informal settlements ('slums') in Khulna through non-probability purposive sampling, where the survey with climate migrants was to be carried out. The slums were selected based on two criteria: a) Prevalence of local government

support (1 slum with much support and 1 slum without much support), and b) number of climate migrants. Through consultations with UNDP and GIZ, the informal settlements Rayer Mahal (in Ward 14) and Greenland (in Ward 21) were eventually chosen as most appropriate. However, given the inexistence of registration systems in place to track the residence and movement of climate-IDPs into and out of the slums, the choice had to be based on the experiences and knowledge of these development organizations who closely work with residents in the slums, rather than on factual data. Given the lack of publicly available documentation on the settlement conditions (e.g. available services and facilities), especially in Rayer Mahal, the respective CDC leaders of each informal settlement had to be consulted to provide information based on their knowledge deriving from being themselves residents of the respective settlements.

In a third step, the author conducted social mapping to determine the characteristics of the respondents and select 30 climate migrants. For that end, two main criteria were applied: a) individuals who left their places of origins mainly due to environmental stressors, and b) the duration of residence in Khulna (both long-term residents and new arrivals were to be included in the selection). A cap was applied to the number of respondents to be selected, notably 15 participants in each of the two slums. A combination of probability and non-probability sampling was then applied to select the survey participants based on lists of climate migrants living in the two selected slums which were collected from development actors (e.g. GIZ and UNDP). From these lists, 15 candidates were randomly selected for each slum through probability simple random sampling.

Thus, to determine the climate migrant 'target group', the author used multistage sampling whereby the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) is represented by Khulna city, the Secondary Sampling Unit (SSU) constitutes 2 slums (Rayer Mahal and Greenland), and the Ultimate Sampling Unit (USU) is represented by 30 total climate migrants (15 per slum).

To select the Key Informants for the semi-structured expert interviews, the selection process was more constrained due to limited availability of high-level officials. As a consequence, the author had to resort to convenience sampling. More specifically, through consultations with the Khulna city coordinator of GIZ's UMIMCC/UMML project, three contacts could be established with city representatives from three institutions, notably Khulna City Corporation (KCC), Khulna Development Authority (KDA), and the Department of Social Services (DSS).

- Chief Town Planner, KCC
- Assistant Town Planner, KDA
- Social Services Officer, DSS

During the inception phase and after selecting the Key Informants and Climate Migrant target group, the author prepared two questionnaires (see Annexures 2. and 3. on pages 161 and 164, respectively), one to carry out the survey with the climate migrants and one to guide the semi-structured interviews with city representatives. These questionnaires were subject to various feedback rounds and thereby underwent an optimization process before reaching its final form.

b) Implementation Phase:

During the implementation phase, the author used two sub-questions to help guide the survey and KIIs.

- What are the integration outcomes of climate migrants in two slums of Khulna? (CMS)
- What institutional capacities does Khulna have (or not have) to integrate climate migrants? (KIIs)

The CMS took place spanning a total of three weeks during which the author carried out 30 on-site structured oral interviews with the respondents, ranging between 30 and 50 minutes each. The in-person survey approach was justified by the lack of access the respondents had to virtual technologies and the high illiteracy levels among the target group. The traditional pen and paper method was applied to document the answers along with recordings that were taken upon written consent by the respondents. As the climate migrants did not speak English, a translator was consulted to conduct the interviews alongside the author by using the previously translated questionnaire and making on-the-spot English remarks on paper while mediating between the author and respondents in case of follow-up questions by the author. The recordings were subsequently translated from Bangla to English in the form of transcripts.

The three KIIs could be carried out within two days' time and the same techniques as for the CMS were applied in terms of technologies (recordings, pen and paper) and resources (translator). Although the level of English was higher among the key informants, in order to avoid language barriers and to encourage full range of response motion, the interviews were nonetheless conducted mainly in Bangla, sometimes mixing in English.

1.2 Data Processing and Analysis

To process the data collected during the Implementation Phase, the author applied qualitative and quantitative analysis methods. The qualitative method, mainly thematic analysis approach, was used to identify key themes and patterns in the responses of the climate migrants and key informants based on the available transcripts that may hint at generalizable realities of climate migrant integration and institutional challenges. To visualize the results, the author used quantitative statistical tools, notably

MS Excel and Stata: Version 14. The results shall be revealed in this chapter through descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis.

2. General profiles of the two selected survey sites ('Secondary Sampling Units', SSUs)

KCC is divided into 31 administrative wards each of which has an elected ward councillor and most settlements located in the respective wards have their dedicated CDC leader who lives among the settlement population. According to an unpublished housing census of 2011 by the Urban Partnerships for Poverty Reduction Project (UPPRP), there were 5080 poor settlements in the KCC area containing 57,048 informal settlements with 98,121 households living in those areas (Rahman and Ley 2020, 194). Among them are also the two selected Rayer Mahal and Greenland slums. These two slums, along with the general increase of urban slums over the past three decades in Bangladesh, have developed over many decades but the increased movement of climate-affected individuals from the coastal belt to Khulna has accelerated the densification process in the settlements mainly since cyclones Sidre (2007) and Aila (2009), some 15 years ago. In fact, most of the residents in urban slums of Khulna are composed of climate migrants who, upon arrival in the city, usually cannot meet the high urban expenses such as adequate accommodation and consequently start settling in these informal settlements, where living expenses tend to be much lower (Rahaman et al., 2018, 43).

Fig. 21: KCC Ward Boundaries (modified from Hossain et al., 2014, 3)



2.1 Rayer Mahal (in Ward 14)

Fig. 22: Detailed Area Plan (DAP) of Ward No. 14 of KCC (modified from KDA (a), 2022)



Rayer Mahal, is one of the two selected field research sites and is situated within ward no. 14 of KCC. This informal settlement, located on private land, has slowly taken shape over the course of three decades. It is now home to approximately 1,200 families, of which an estimated 500 are climate migrants.[14] Thus, climate migrants are in a slight minority in Rayer Mahal. The population distribution of Rayer Mahal is visualized below in *Fig. 23.* Upon visiting the site, it was observed that Rayer Mahal has a spatial layout, characterized by scattered living arrangements with open spaces in between. Smaller clusters of homes tend to be disconnected and at further walking distance from each other.

Fig. 23: Proportions of climate migrants compared to non-migrants in Rayer Mahal (Source: Rayer Mahal's CDC leader)



While certain areas within the settlement receive some limited support, especially from development organizations, the overall level of support to the slum residents from local governments or NGOs is extremely limited. Essential amenities, such as water pumps are largely absent. Furthermore, in the absence of playgrounds, children find solace in areas filled with sand for their recreational activities. There are no public toilets or showers in the settlement and only some few families built their own. Rayer Mahal does have a range of social facilities, for example one primary and one secondary school, alongside a

[14] Data retrieved from Rayer Mahal's CDC leader during the field visit in July 2023.

Madrasah and an orphanage. Health care is also relatively accessible through a hospital at a distance of less than half a kilometre. The community has access to four mosques and one church for the Christian minority.

2.2 Greenland (in Ward 21)

Fig. 24: Detailed Area Plan (DAP) of Ward no. 21 of KCC (modified from KDA (b), 2022)



Greenland (formerly 'Railway Slum') is the second of the two selected field research sites. It started developing around 1978 but was restructured in 2001.[15] It developed on the public land of Khulna Railway Authority. In contrast to Rayer Mahal, it is one of the most densely populated slums in the city with overall approximately 4,556 residents, translating into about 1,248 impoverished urban households (Rahman and Ley, 2020, 193) on a surface of approximately 338.43 acres (GoB, 2011, 16). The specific site where the research was conducted comprises approximately 2178 families, of which an estimated 1500 families are considered climate migrants, according to the community's CDC leader. In contrast to Rayer Mahal, climate migrants therefore make up the majority of the selected population with nearly 70 percent. The population distribution is visualized below in *Fig. 25*. The settlement is nestled alongside the Bhairav River and falls under the administrative ward no. 21 of KCC (Alam, 2018, 2). Despite its favourable location with close proximity to the city's Central Business District, the community living in Greenland faces significant challenges regarding adequate living conditions and access to essential basic services. According to KCC's Ordinance of 1984, the responsibility for some of these services, for example sanitation, falls on KCC (Alam and Mondal, 2019, 7), however, in practice, most basic services are provided by a range of NGOs and development organizations working in the settlement. The socio-economic fabric of this community is characterized by informal employment,

[15] Data retrieved from Greenland's CDC leader during the field visit in July 2023.

low-income families, substandard housing conditions, individuals squatting on public land, and informal urban services (Rahman and Ley, 2020, 193). In contrast to Rayer Mahal, Greenland has historically received a lot of attention and support from development organizations and NGOs. This is also reflected in the various academic articles which have used Greenland as a case study. The comparatively higher level of support provided to residents has resulted in several sanitation facilities and services that are now present in the slum. For example, according to Greenland's CDC leader, the residents have access to eight water pumps for clean drinking water, five public showers each shared by ten to fifteen families, and thirty-five public toilets each shared by sixteen to twenty-five families.

However, Rahman and Ley (2020, 193) note that Greenland has overall extremely inadequate sanitation facilities, where 7 percent of the population still remains without access to sanitation, and 35 percent use non-sanitary toilet facilities (Alam and Mondal, 2019, 2). There is only one primary school and no medical clinic within the community. The next hospital, namely Sadar hospital, is very far for residents to reach. However, very selected health care services are provided for example by a nun who visits the community every 15 days to provide tuberculosis vaccines and basic health provision.

Fig. 25: Proportions of climate migrants compared to non-migrants in Greenland (Source: Greenland's CDC leader)



Overall, the two selected settlements have very different demographic, socioeconomic, and infrastructural characteristics, as well as different degrees of visibility and support from non-governmental organizations (see *Table 7*). The sites were purposively chosen for their distinct features in order to assess whether differences in living conditions would result in different levels of local integration.

Table 7: Summarized settlement features of Greenland and Rayer Mahal (information collected from the respective CDC leaders)

FEATURE	GREENLAND	RAYER MAHAL
Year of creation	Around 1978, but restructured in 2001	Approximately 30 Years ago
Owner	Public land: Khulna Railway Authority	Private land: Late. Oadud Faruki, Md. Nur Hossain, Rezaul Karim, Md. Kabir Hossain, Ayesha Hossain, Md. Abdul Karim Khan
General population size (number of total residents)	2178 families	1200 families
Number of climate migrants living in the slum	Approximately 1500 families	Approximately 500 families
Access to water	Through tube wells, Submersible pumps (provided by different NGOs)	Through tube wells
Number of available water pumps with access to clean drinking water	8 water pumps	No water pump
Available facilities for slum residents	Roads, Market, Primary School, Satellite, basic primary health care	No information
Number of schools and child facilities	1 Primary School	1 Primary School, 1 Secondary School, 1 Madrasah, 1 Orphanage
Number of medical clinics	There is no medical clinic within the direct reach of the community, there is only one Sadar Hospital which is far away from here	1 Hospital located within less than half a kilometer distance
Available religious/spiritual sites for slum residents	7 Mosques 2 Hindu temples	4 Mosques, 1 Church for Christians
Recreational facilities	1 School Field	By filling the low land with sand, the children play there otherwise no playground
Number of available public showers	5 public showers; Each shower is shared by 10-15 families	No public shower; 2-3 Families use their own built showers
Number of public toilets	35 public toilets; Each toilet is shared by 16-25 families	No public toilet

3. General profiles of the CMS respondents ('Ultimate Sampling Unit', USU)

Fig. 26: Gender distribution of respondents



The survey engaged a total of 30 respondents, with 26 (86.7 percent) being female and 4 (13.3 percent) being male, as visualized in *Fig. 26*. This gender imbalance resulted from the unavailability of originally selected male participants. Due to husbands remaining the principal income earners in the families living in informal low-income settlements in Bangladesh, the author mainly corresponded with the wives of those selected male participants who were out working during the survey interviews. In general, responses will be counted as 'household' responses to generalize the displacement experiences, which most often affected both partners in the relationship. The average age of the participants is around 40 years, although it must be noted here that age is not always correctly documented, and respondents tend to provide an age that is lower than in reality. On average, respondents had spent approximately 28 years living in their respective places of origin in contrast to an average 11.8 years living in Khulna city. The respondent having arrived most recently, had arrived in Khulna six months ago, whereas the longest-standing resident had already lived in Khulna for 50 years when the survey was conducted. Most respondents moved to Khulna from coastal areas (see *Fig. 27*), notably from the districts Barisal (8 respondents), Satkhira (5 respondents), Bagerhat (4 respondents), Pirojpur (2 respondents), Patuakhali (1 respondent), and the surrounding Khulna district (1 respondent). Two respondents moved from more internal districts, namely Narail (1 respondent) and Faridpur (1 respondent), whereas one person arrived from the farther north situated Rajshahi district (1 respondent).

Fig. 27: Geographical distribution of respondents' places of origin



In the specific context of Greenland, the survey included 15 respondents, with 14 (93.3 percent) being female and 1 (6.6 percent) male. Their average age is around 41 years. On average, respondents had lived in their respective places of origin for 25.3 years, compared to an average of 15.9 years in Khulna city. The most recent arrival was six months ago, while one respondent had been living in Khulna already for 50 years. In Rayer Mahal, the survey involved 15 participants, with 12 (80 percent) being female and 3 (20 percent) being male. The average age of respondents was approximately 38 years. Respondents had lived in their respective hometowns for an average 30.6, therefore exceeding the average years respondents from Greenland had lived in their places of origin. Their average duration lived in Khulna city was less than in Greenland with 7.7 years. The most recent arrival in Rayer Mahal settled in Khulna already seven years ago, whereas the respondent having lived longest in Rayer Mahal arrived 16 years ago. Therefore, overall, it can be said that, in Rayer Mahal the distribution of respondents across age and residence duration is much less heterogeneous than in Greenland, where the respondents are much more scattered across age and duration of residence.

Fig. 28: General profile of respondents: Time spent in place of origin vs. in Khulna



5. How did climate change affect respondents' decisions to move to Khulna?

a) General Findings

As discussed in the introductory chapter of the paper, the relative impact of environmental factors driving internal displacement is a highly controversial concern in climate-mobility literature.

Fig. 29: Distribution of answers regarding the type of environmental challenges faced back home



As per the survey findings of this research, the decisions of the respondents to move to Khulna are deeply intertwined with a web of environmental challenges. These challenges include the significant impact of cyclones, experienced by 36.6 percent of the respondents, alongside riverbank erosion affecting 24.6 percent, floods impacting 14.4 percent, salinity affecting 12.28 percent, sea-level rise faced by 7.02 percent, and soil erosion affecting 3.5 percent. It is evident that a diverse range of environmental adversities has driven these individuals from their places of origin. In fact, 80 percent of the respondents attributed their displacement primarily to environmental challenges, emphasizing the severe and sustained impact of climate-related issues on their lives and thus arguably confirming the 'environmental determinist strand' in the above-elaborated debate. Most of these individuals had already tried at least one or more measures to adapt *in-situ,* so before their displacement, to climate change impacts. More specifically, 15 out of 30 respondents had tried measures such as rebuilding destroyed or damaged houses and even using different, more resilient materials such as bamboo for the constructions. Another 4 out of 30 respondents had seriously considered alternative adaptation measures but found migration and subsequent *ex-situ* local integration a more valid option.

Fig. 30: Aspirations of respondents before moving to Khulna



However, of the 30 respondents, 20 percent cited other non-environmental factors principally motivating their displacement, including employment opportunities and a general aspiration for a better life. In fact, even those respondents in the survey who had claimed that their principal motivation was related to environmental challenges had had aspirations for their new lives in Khulna which were not necessarily related to better environmental conditions (see *Fig. 30).* Rather, the majority had hoped for better job opportunities (11 respondents) in the place of destination and generally a 'better life' (5 respondents). Another 3 persons stated a non-environmental aspiration, notably a social network that can support them (2 respondents), and better education for their children (1 respondent). Other aspirations included a general loss of any hope which drove their decision to go away without any specific aspirations (7 respondents). Only two respondents explicitly stated that their main hope had been related to 'Better environmental conditions' at the place of destination. However, given that most respondents had faced submerged properties (e.g. crops and houses) and destroyed houses or crops as direct consequences of environmental hazards, also 'Food security' and 'Own stable house' may arguably qualify as an aspiration implicitly related to the environmental drivers of displacement. Therefore, a total of 5 respondents can be counted as having had aspirations directly related with the environmental challenges they had faced back home. All of them, however, indicated these aspirations along with other aspirations, therefore confirming the 'multicausality strand' of the debate regarding climate displacement drivers. In fact, the majority of respondents (19) had already faced at least two of the above identified environmental challenges before deciding to move to Khulna. Thus, despite the majority 80 percent of respondents stating that environmental factors had been the main drivers for their displacement, the multifaceted interplay of environmental and socio-economic factors outlined here, underlines the complexities of climate-induced displacement and actually confirms the 'multicausality strand' of the academic debate regarding the relative impact of environmental factors on displacement decisions, rather than the 'environmental determinist' strand.

Furthermore, recalling the terminological discussion regarding whether the affected individuals are to be referred to as 'displaced' or 'migrating' populations, the survey allows to make an important observation regarding the acuteness of mobility among the respondents. More specifically, in the introductory chapter it has been explained that climate-induced mobility is placed on a general continuum from voluntary migration to more forced instances of displacement (see page 14). In this context, sudden-onset events are tendentially associated with more forced instances of *displacement* after acute destruction of properties and livelihoods, while slow-onset events are generally being associated with more 'voluntary' forms of *migration*. It is notable that the environmental challenges faced by the respondents, have a strong tendency towards displacement due to sudden-onset hazards. In fact, 'cyclones' and 'floods', examples of sudden-onset hazards, were found to affect more than half the respondents compared to the four combined slow-onset events stated by respondents, notably 'Riverbank erosion', 'Salinity', 'Sea-level rise', and 'Soil erosion, which together affected the respondents at a prevalence of only 47.4 percent. However, it also needs to be recognized that most of the respondents had endured already several environmental stressors, usually both sudden- and slow-onset events, before moving to Khulna, which shows the urgency in their decisions and the little voluntariness that is behind a migration decision. Therefore, displacement remains the major form of mobility among the respondents, which is representative of the lack of remaining alternative options respondents had left when they moved to Khulna. 'Migration' or 'migrant' is nonetheless used as a general umbrella term to refer to the movement of individuals from one place to another.

b) Differences between the Rayer Mahal and Greenland residents

The survey did not identify significant differences between respondents residing in Rayer Mahal compared to respondents residing in Greenland in relation to the relative impact of environmental factors on the decision to move away from their homes. It may thus be deducted that there is no correlation between the type of hazard or environmental challenge and the type of settlement climate-IDPs opt for. Therefore, it was more interesting to assess whether the specific places of origin may be to some extent related to the choice of neighbourhood that individuals would settle in at their destination. For example, assessing whether respondents followed acquaintances or even family members who had lived in the same place of origin and who had also moved to settle in Khulna, could indicate the desire to facilitate their integration process at the place of destination through an already-known social network. However, such correlation could not be established through the survey.

6. Challenges in the local integration of climate-induced internally displaced populations in Khulna

6.1 From the institutional perspective (meso-level)

This section examines institutional challenges identified through key informant interviews with KCC and KDA, shedding light on the difficulties these local governmental entities encounter in addressing issues related to the integration of climate-IDPs. The analysis draws a first link between meso-level statements of city representatives and observations from secondary literature on the issues raised by the interviewees. The interviews revealed four main categories of challenges: 1. Institutional, 2. Employment/Financial, 3. Land/Housing, 4. Awareness. For each of these four categories, various key challenges were identified as listed in *Fig. 31,* which shall be analyzed in more detail below.

Fig. 31: Summarized Challenges from the interviews with KCC and KDA representatives

CATEGORY	SUMMARIZED KEY CHALLENGES
Institutional	▪ Financial constraints (lack of budget and funding) ▪ Lack of institutional capacities ▪ Insufficient involvement of local government authorities and a lacking sense of ownership ▪ Lack of/inadequate monitoring provisions ▪ Lack of/inadequate policies ▪ Lack of inclusive planning ▪ Lack of transparency/accountability
Employment/ Financial	▪ Unpreparedness of IDPs for the urban labour market ▪ Constraints for IDPs to access the local labour market ▪ Constraints for IDPs to access financial linkages
Land/Housing	▪ Lack of formal spaces to accommodate IDPs ▪ Lack of legal land tenure provisions ▪ Lack of compensation for evicted IDPs
Awareness	▪ Lack of awareness among IDPs about available services

6.1.1 Institutional Challenges

a) Financial constraints

The interviews conducted with local authorities, including representatives from KDA and KCC, reveal significant financial constraints in addressing climate-related displacement issues and durable solutions. As explained by the KCC representative, the budget for such measures would primarily originate from a central gazette authority, however, *de facto*, no funds are allocated from the central government to KCC for climate displacement or slum development as per interview with the interviewee. Instead, he elaborated that, the allocation of funds is limited to address general basic

services for poor citizens, such as sanitation ("No, the central government does not give anything like that, what the central government gives is given to the sanitation purpose sector or to the foundation of the slums, these budgets are given by the central government", KCC interviewee).

This constraint arguably has a significant impact on the local institutions' autonomy to implement some of the components in the previously mentioned city masterplan, especially for the implementation of strategy number 5 of Khulna's strategic plan, notably 'Poverty alleviation and promotion of spatial equity through encouraging small initiatives in the informal sectors and through ensuring low-cost housing, slum resettlement, etc.'. Furthermore, these financial limitations hamper the provision of basic services, which impacts on strategy number 8 of Khulna's Strategic Plan, notably 'Better provision of public utilities and services', especially in the context of climate-IDPs, which are not specifically considered in the poor settlements. These constraints seem to be present despite the money allocations from the national budget and donors through the climate change trust fund which are made to ministries responsible for climate adaptation and capacity-building programs, as is explained by Kisinger and Matsui (2021, 6). The same author notes that, those budgets linked to the climate change trust fund are, however, mainly addressing disaster risk reduction, direct relief, resettlement, and immediate social protection after hazards (ibid.).

Furthermore, the KCC representative explained that usually, a contribution by KCC of 20 percent is expected from development partners for the implementation of development projects that could help provide some relief for climate-IDPs and other socioeconomically vulnerable populations ("…the donor said that the city corporation needs to pay 20 percent to do this work…", KCC interviewee). However, as there are no funds available in KCC to pay for this margin due to the little financial support from the central government (according to KCC representative), and as the urban poor, including the climate-IDPs who live in the informal settlements, do not contribute to the urban management budget available to KCC and KDA (as explained by Sowgat, 2012, 158), this 20 percent is difficult to allocate, according to the interviewee. Moreover, as the budget is insufficient, the KDA representative notes that "You cannot implement all of the things which are included in the masterplan" and that therefore, priorities have to be made which are generally given to infrastructural works, especially roads and connectivity ("So, we try to implement those things which value the most like a road network for improving regional connectivity.", KDA interviewee).

Overall, these responses from KDA and KCC correspond with academic observations regarding the fact that "Although they [local institutions] receive development and revenue grants from the central government, the amount is barely adequate for meeting the expenditure for performing their tasks." (Huque and Panday, 2018, 131). As a result, Sowgat (2012) observe that "…because of the budget

constraints of the local public sector and local city council in meeting the growing demands" (135), other actors take up important roles, for example the private sector.

b) Lack of institutional capacities

The interviews conducted with representatives from KCC and KDA further reveal significant challenges related to the lack of institutional capacities to deal with climate displacement and the integration of climate-IDPs into Khulna. Most importantly, both KCC and KDA acknowledge that their current staff lack the expertise required to affectively address the complex challenges associated with climate-induced displacement management and slum development. On the one hand, the interview with the KCC representative reveals a scarcity of skilled urban planners within the local institution, which arguably hampers the institution's ability to develop comprehensive and tailored plans for accommodating and integrating climate-IDPs ("Various NGOs or urban planners are needed to do this kind of work [climate displacement management and slum development], but no city corporation has them", KCC interviewee). On the other hand, the KDA representative generally criticizes that neither KCC nor KDA are able to provide basic services ("I think, our local government organization, let's say Khulna City Corporation, is not capable enough to provide the basic services. I mean, they are not capable enough as KDA is also not capable at all.", KDA interviewee). However, the inability to provide adequate basic services is partly attributed to the climate-IDPs themselves as the KDA representative notes that "…when people come to Khulna city, they try to live in a slum. It is not our property, that is why we cannot provide any kind of the services and facilities in those particular places", thereby shifting away the responsibility from the local government authorities.

These auto-declared shortcomings from Khulna's local government representatives confirm Huque and Panday's (2018) observation regarding the lack of skills and knowledge of local government officials (130). That is, according to the authors, "Despite efforts by donors, non-governmental organizations and the government, the level of knowledge and skills of the officials of local institutions remain inadequate. They appear to have no understanding about the complicated tasks of planning, budgeting, and management of resources… Therefore, lack of capacity of officials is a major obstacle to the effective functioning of local institutions" (Huque and Panday, 2018, 130).

This shortcoming in the institutional capacities of the local governments does not necessarily come as a surprise looking at central governmental budget allocations. For example, although Bangladesh's Fiscal Year Budget of 2020-21 for climate financing in Bangladesh allocated 41.25 percent to food security, social protection, and health (though mainly allocated to instant relief measures, recovery after hazards, and in-situ rehabilitation measures), capacity-building and institutional strengthening only received 5.2 percent of the budget allocations (Kisinger and Matsui, 2021, 9f.).

c) Insufficient involvement in climate displacement-related issues and a lacking sense of ownership

The interviews conducted with representatives from KCC and KDA further reveal some challenges related to the insufficient involvement of local government authorities in addressing climate-displacement issues and the lack of ownership among the two main local government authorities. This challenge is indicated by the inexistence of any focal person or dedicated body within KDA or KCC to deal with specific climate-displacement issues. More specifically, when asking the question 'Do you have a dedicated person who is hired to look after climate migrants', the KCC representative responded "No, there is no such dedicated person." Similarly, upon asking how the KDA is involved in climate displacement or urban integration of vulnerable poor in Khulna, the representative of KDA responded by stating that "We are not much involved with climate migrants…". Indeed, the KDA does not at all work on climate change issues but rather focuses on land use planning. According to the interviewee, "When we prepare land use planning, we must consider the people who are coming from outside Khulna." However, apart from providing some "space or land for lower income groups in Khulna city", the KDA is not directly involved in climate change, climate-displacement, or specific climate-IDP's integration-related measures.

Furthermore, the interviewee at the KDA justified this gap by stating that "If the City Corporation [KCC] can take an initiative then the Khulna Development Authority [KDA] can plan for climate migrants", implying that KDA will not likely increase their involvement for climate-IDPs without KCC's initiative. Similarly, when asking which organization should play the major role to take care of related issues, the KDA representative pointed to KCC to be the institution that should take up the principal duty-bearer role for better integration of climate-IDPs, which is reflected in the statement "City Corporations are the perfect actors to solve the problem because the City Corporation is providing the basic services and facilities for them." Conversely, the KCC representative comments that the KDA is the actual institution which prepares the masterplan and KCC is 'only' the "implementation agency". As a result, according to KCC representative "there is a gap between the plan preparation and the climate migrants' accommodation because the plan is prepared by the Khulna Development Authority and Khulna Development Authority is overlooking the climate migrant issue."

While arguably there is little sense of ownership over the issue both among KDA and KCC representatives, Sowgat (2012) notes that generally, KCC has much more interaction with socioeconomically vulnerable households than KDA. More specifically, he states that the poor "do not have regular access to the KDA or its planning department. The KCC has better interaction with the citizens and the poor…" (143). However, during the interview, the responsibility to protect climate-IDPs tended to turn into a hot potato when the KCC representative partly shifted the responsibility away

from KCC by commenting that "If the project is funded by any international agency, then we try to do something", referring to the above-described financial constraints.

Lack of ownership and involvement in addressing climate-induced displacement issues and the integration of climate-IDPs thus remains an issue at local governance level, where the different authorities are reluctant to take on full responsibility for tackling the challenge.

d) Lack of or inadequate monitoring provisions

According to the IASC Framework, "In some places, IDPs are registered for the purpose of providing them with assistance (e.g. food aid)" (IASC, 2010, 5). In fact, provision 10 of Bangladesh's NSIDM on local integration solutions stipulates to "take necessary steps to register the displaced population with the Election Commission." (MoDMR, 2021, 33). Indeed, registering IDPs may be useful to allocate specific assistance to affected individuals and to give them access to political participation through voting rights. That is, according to Sowgat (2012), "…the poor become an influential part of the local electoral system after their registration as voters" (162). As indicated in the previous chapter, one of KCC's functions includes the registration of all births and deaths within the area of the city, but not the specific registration of new arrivals, let alone spontaneous climate-IDPs. In fact, according to the KCC representative, KCC does not formally trace where climate-IDPs settle and live or what services they are accessing or not accessing. Instead, they stay informally informed through locals regarding any new arrivals in the area and accordingly react when the need arises to plan more shelters.

> *"No, we don't, but we understand what kind of people live in that area. There are people at Sea Beach who inform us about how many new people are entering the area. After they informed us, we extended the service in that area and provided the house."* – KCA Interviewee

However, this informal mechanism may be problematic as it not only limits the city's ability to include climate migration influxes and related city needs and constraints into strategic planning processes, but it also limits the possibility to provide formal services that allow climate-IDPs to recover official documents. In fact, the KDA interviewee indirectly recognizes the urgency of this issue by stating: "The problem is we don't have any proper documentation of the climate migrants… We don't know who is coming and who is going back". Therefore, in order to track the development of informal settlements and provide better protection systems for climate-IDPs, it is arguably pivotal to have an effective registration and monitoring system in place for climate displaced populations.

The KCA representative does, however, note that a registration booth is currently piloting in Ward 31 of Khulna city through GIZ's UMIMCC/UMML project initiative, which aims at tracing new arrivals to the slum by having them register at the ward councilor's office. This could arguably be a start for monitoring

the flows of climate migrants into and out of the different slums and the city (in case of multiple displacements).

e) Lack of or inadequate policies

As explained in the previous chapter, "policies can be formulated and implemented to respond to the needs of citizens through effective local institutions that can contribute to quality of public services and promote local development" (Huque and Panday, 2018, 128). However, according to Huque and Panday (2018), "local institutions have limited authority and jurisdiction that do not allow them to make substantial contributions toward governance" (ibid.). This reality is confirmed by the responses from KCC and KDA representatives. On the one hand, the main city development plan, notably the masterplan, "only shows where the residential places will be and where the commercial places will be in the future… So, it is a land use plan" (KDA interviewee). And even the land that is administered through KDA's masterplan "is being developed without any plan", according to the KCC representative. On the other hand, climate displacement and the integration of potentially increasing influxes of climate-displaced populations in Khulna has not at all been taken into consideration so far. That is, according to the KDA interviewee, "Till now we do not have any specific plan for them [climate-IDPs]", while simultaneously diffusing the statement by vaguely adding that "…but definitely will have some policies for it [in the future]". He elaborates that "When we prepare next year's new plan, we have to consider these issues very carefully. Because now in our country cyclones, floods are happening very frequently." In fact, he reiterated that "as we are in the coastal region, we need to take different strategies for the climate migrants." However, when following up on the plans to include climate displacement management issues in future plans, the KDA interviewee backpedaled on this statement and explained that this inclusion of climate-IDPs in the masterplan would still only remain within the realms of infrastructural changes, such as providing apartments and low-cost housing for climate-IDPs, as any other provisions would be beyond the spatial scope of the masterplan. Therefore, current local policies do not recognize, or address issues related to accommodating and integrating climate-IDPs.

Furthermore, even with the aspirations of more adequate policies, planning and processes to approve and implement new or adjusted policies, tend to be complex and long, passing through various levels of governance. That is, when asking the interviewee whether policies shall come from the national level or the local level to include climate management issues, the KDA representative responded: "We [KDA] will prepare the policy, then we will need the approval of the government from the national level. Then the government will give some observations of our policies, then we will correct those policies based on the observation and we will send it to the government again." This statement points to a second issue in the planning process, notably the detachedness of policies from the affected populations

themselves. The next section will therefore shed light on the challenge raised by the city representatives regarding the 'lack of inclusive planning'.

f) Lack of inclusive planning

The previous chapter referred to urban planning being politically sustainable if participation of marginalized individuals in decision-making is ensured. Indeed, participation has been reiterated in both the introductory chapter and the first chapter to be one of the key factors for 'successful' local integration. However, so far, the paper has mainly made reference to political participation, especially in terms of the right to vote. Rahman (2016) points out that, without proper institutionalization of a *planning* approach that includes affected citizens themselves, a 'strategic plan' risks to perpetuate power dynamics and to remain an "elite framework detached from local realities" – indeed a "threat to social justice and sustainable urban development" (2-4). This has arguably become true in Khulna. That is, the interview with the KDA representative revealed that climate migrants are not at all involved in consultations, which is explicated in the statement "… actually, we don't involve the climate migrants directly" (KDA interviewee). The interviewee also referred to the CDC leaders as not being included in urban development planning processes ("We do not include the CDC leaders").

However, even if climate-IDPs are not directly involved in planning, the representative of KDA insisted that "We do [however] include the 'natural leaders' who already live in that particular place and know in detail about that particular place." More specifically, according to the interviewee, KDA involves their "…local level representatives to prepare the [master]plan. When we prepare the plan, we arrange a workshop at the community level. Then they give their input. After analyzing their input, we try to include those in our plan." Nonetheless, the *de facto* reality seems to be somewhat different. That is, according to Rahman (2016), this 'participation' is "restricted to a process of generating a wish list from the representatives of privileged communities" (6). Similarly, planning and consultation remain expert-led (Sowgat, 2012, 153f.) as plans by KDA are generally prepared in collaboration with other public departments and reviewed through a complex feedback loop with the higher-level central government as explained by KDA representative (see previous section).

Furthermore, although people may be encouraged and are "free to provide their opinions" through consultations, most often, the reality is that "there are no set rules or guidelines about how these opinions should be included in decision-making" (Sowgat, 2012, 155). Similarly, and as referred to earlier under the sub-chapter 'c. Insufficient involvement in climate displacement-related issues and a lacking sense of ownership', "while there are provisions that any individual can raise an objection about any proposal, the poor are unable to do this because they do not have regular access to the KDA or its planning department" (Sowgat, 2012, 143). As a result, urban planning processes in Khulna "fail to

address the issues of the urban poor" (Rahman 2016, 6). In fact, Sowgat (2012) points out that "there are no formal mechanisms for introducing the opinions of the poor [let alone poor climate-IDPs] into the mainstream of the decision-making process" (155). Informal and exclusionary processes, thus continue dominating the planning processes and policies, raising the concern about the lack of transparency and accountability of local government institutions (see next section).

g) Lack of transparency/accountability

The interview with the KDA representative revealed that "…all the initiatives are taken informally. To do it formally, you need a lot of money to implement different policies for them [the climate-IDPs] in those slum areas", referring to the provisions of some services outside the formal realms.

This informality is also confirmed by secondary literature at least with regards to the planning processes.

> *"The KCC does not produce any masterplan for the city, but often improves or builds infrastructures. In these cases, the KCC communicates with the local poor through the elected ward commissioners who arrange meetings with the local people. However, these meetings are informal; ward commissioners listen to the needs and proposal of the poor and non-poor because their political constituency is dependent on the satisfaction of the poor. The poor discuss their issues with the ward commissioner and put forward their proposals before the commissioner pass these opinions to the decision-makers in the KCC"* (Sowgat, 2012, 142f.).

This statement reveals various *de facto* issues. On the one hand, it hints at the problem of tokenism, whereby "a person or organization does something that seems to support or help a group of people who are treated unfairly in society, … but which is not meant to make changes that would help that group of people in a lasting way" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023). More specifically, consultations with the poor are implied to be carried out purely for political purposes to gain votes from the poor, not to actually listen to them to include pressing needs in planning processes. On the other hand, the statement implies a lack of transparency in such processes, which in turn has serious implication also for the accountability of decision-makers and policy processes, whereby the socioeconomically vulnerable populations, including the climate-IDPS, have no possibility to formally claim their contributions during the consultations in the subsequent development of decisions and policies.

6.1.2 Employment/Financial

a) Unpreparedness of IDPs for the urban labour market/ Constraints for IDPs to access the local labour market/ Constraints for IDPs to access financial linkages

Miron (2023) raises the concern that "insufficient education and skills … create barriers to finding employment in urban areas" (14), especially for climate migrants who "embark on the rural-urban migration pathway with no resources, skills or social networks at their destination" (ibid., 13). In fact,

most climate-IDPs arriving in the cities semi-skilled or unskilled agricultural or industrial workers (Murtaza, 2000, 140). During the interview, the KCC representative explained that climate-IDPs coming to Khulna city "are not used to the environment of the city area. So, when they first arrive in Khulna city, they cannot drive the rickshaw properly, they cannot use different kinds of services and facilities, they cannot use mobiles or toilets properly" (KCC interviewee).

This may especially pose problems in terms of finding employment in the beginning stages of settlement and integration. With the limited options they have due to unmatched skills in urban settings, most of the climate-IDPs are then forced to take on inadequate and informal jobs for which no previous qualifications are needed, but which are characterized by substandard working conditions. As they settle for a longer period in Khulna, "gradually they [the climate-IDPs] try to become skilled so that they can get different work opportunities. Then they become used to the city environment", notes the KCC interviewee. However, in reality, 'adaptation' to the urban labour market demands tends not to go as smoothly as the KCC representative portrayed it. In fact, 'maladaptation' is a reality among most climate-IDPs, who arrive in the cities taking on any day labour jobs they can get. Of course, over a longer period of time they do adapt their skills to the labour market demands and learn the skills for the acquired jobs, however, these jobs remain substandard and many of the climate-IDPs do not have the means to undertake trainings that would qualify them to take on more secure and dignified employments (Berman et al. 2012, 88). Representatively, the KCC interviewee does recognize that "Apart from driving a van, driving a rickshaw, and driving an easy bike ['tuk tuk'], there are currently no other jobs in Khulna that any migrant can do."

Furthermore, this research has found that many climate-IDPs resort to taking out loans in order to eventually pay for small properties or to finance self-employed activities, such as maintaining small 'one-stop-shops' in their communities. However, the KDA representative asserts that "…everyone is going to take their loans from different NGOs or micro-credit systems with high interest. …it is an informal process, but it is difficult for them. And they are unable to pay for it", therefore hinting at the debts that climate-IDPs tend to accumulate by taking out those loans and the persistence of informality that links individuals to financial institutions. Thus, the challenge here consists in providing climate-IDPs low- or zero interest loans or even specific grants that they can use to settle in the city and integrate.

6.1.3 Land/Housing

a) Lack of formal spaces to accommodate IDPs

Sowgat (2012) points out that "The poor in Khulna city do not have access to decent housing" (147), further pointing to the responsibility that planning agencies have to provide those spaces. In fact, the author explains that "Planning agencies' main planning practice is to supply land under sites and service

schemes for low- and middle-income groups. Under different schemes, a public authority develops residential areas where they provide housing plots, basic services, and facilities [for those groups]" (Sowgat, 2012, 147). However, when asking the interviewee working for this responsible planning agency, notably KDA, whether it will be a challenge for Khulna city to give space to the climate-IDPs in light of increasing disasters, the interviewee confirmed explaining that "you need to provide them the basic services as well but if you are not capable of providing basic services, their [climate-IDPs'] life will be very hard" (KDA interviewee). Services can be provided; housing schemes exist in Khulna and continue being expanded as stated by the KDA interviewee ("…in a residential area we keep some space for lower- and middle-income groups of people so that they can come here and buy some space and land here") and outlined in the previous chapter regarding KDA's functions. However, Sowgat (2012) criticizes that, in reality, these schemes "do not reach the urban poor because the developed plots sell at a high cost primarily to people in higher income groups" (147).

Therefore, the actual challenge is not that the authorities "are not capable of providing basic services", as stated by the KDA interviewee, but rather, that insufficient attention is given to develop those provisions and services also for the low-income groups, of which climate-IDPs are generally part of. Or as the KCC interviewee formulates it: "There is a gap between the plan preparation and the climate migrants' accommodation" (KCC interviewee). Although, according to the KDA interviewee, a development project has recently been submitted to the Ministry of Housing and Public Works for low-cost housing in Khulna, the fact is that "Till today, not a single pro-poor housing project has been implemented in Khulna city by any government organization" (Rahman 2016, 5).

b) Lack of legal land tenure provisions/ Lack of compensation for evicted IDPs

According to the KDA interviewee, "when people come to Khulna, they occupy the government land. The government cannot say that you can stay there. They stay there illegally." This statement encompasses a core problem in providing adequate protection to climate-IDPs, as the illegality, which was already elaborated on in the previous chapter, allows institutions to justify their inability or unwillingness to provide adequate services to them. According to the KCA representative, "90 percent of slums have developed illegally on government land, so that when the government requires this land, it resorts to evictions of the residents." Consequently, permanent structures and slum upgrading schemes are not allowed to be implemented on these lands "because anytime, we may need the land for further development" (KCC interviewee), implying the forced evictions that would have to take place when this land is needed. Rana and Ilina (2021), note that "Climate migrants do not have any legal rights on their occupied land" (7), resulting in people having to live in a constant fear of being evicted. This is a serious problem that is also anchored in the Guiding Principles under provision 6(2), which stipulates

that it is prohibited to displace arbitrarily, including displacements "in cases of large-scale development projects" (UN General Assembly, 1998, 4).

However, rather than acknowledging this lack of land tenure for climate-IDPs as a major problem, the interviewees seem to consider the informal settlements a bother and resorting to evictions a logical consequence. In fact, the KDA interviewee noted that

> *"…recently we had a project to build a road. We needed to go through a slum and they also needed to occupy some land to construct that road, but we were unable to do that because of the people who were living in that slum, living for many years."*

Furthermore, when asking them about measures they were considering to address the issue, neither the KDA nor the KCC representatives were able to provide satisfactory responses regarding access to land tenure rights in those settlements. In addition, no compensation is given or envisioned for situations in which the settlement residents have to be evicted, according to the KDA interviewee ("… the government also doesn't have any compensation for them"). Instead, the KCC interviewee proposed a stronger focus on improved access to services and facilities ("So, they are human beings, and we need to provide them with services and facilities."), which arguably neglects the core problem of lacking land tenure security for affected populations. Furthermore, the interviewee stated that "We don't have any specific relocation plan for those climate migrants … because our government doesn't have much money to implement such a big project to implement a relocation plan" (KCC interviewee).

However, the question arises what the true motivations behind this inability or unwillingness to provide adequate measures are. More specifically, rather than unavailable funds, as stated by KCC interviewee, Rahman (2016) suggests that the "negligence towards marginalized people" (5) may rather be due to the unwillingness to lose the favour from higher income strata of the local society. This suggestion is also reflected in a statement written in Khulna's Structure Plan: "In zone-2, a sweeper colony in the area is perceived as a problem by upper income people living in this zone that has to be addressed" (ibid.). Therefore, the challenge here regards not only the provision of land tenure rights, but especially the politicization and conflict of interest between local governments, upper-class societies, commercial groups, and the affected climate-IDPs and socioeconomically vulnerable populations on the contested land.

6.1.4 Lack of Awareness among IDPs about services

a) *Lack of awareness among IDPs about available services*

A last challenge that the interview with the KCC representative revealed is the lack of awareness among climate-IDPs about the services that KCC offers. When asking the KCC interviewee about how awareness could be improved for those who arrive and know nothing about the services, the

interviewee stated that orientations would be beneficial for them especially accompanying a registration process ("Our news can be conveyed to them through an orientation where they actually get some kind of opportunity, it will be very beneficial for them").

6.2 From the IDP perspective (micro-level)

The challenges faced by climate-induced IDPs upon their arrival in Khulna, Bangladesh, and the obstacles to their long-term integration span two distinct temporal parameters. The initial phase 'Upon Arrival' reflects the immediate difficulties that climate-IDPs encounter as they transition to their new environment. Whereas the section 'Obstacles to Long-term Integration' delves into the complexities that climate-IDPs face in their ongoing efforts to be integrated into their new communities. This domain categorizes the challenges into four critical areas: Living Standards, Employment and Livelihoods, Safety and Security, and Support Systems, exposing the multifaceted hurdles that hinder climate-IDPs' local integration and well-being. Together, these temporal parameters provide a comprehensive view of the myriad issues faced by climate-IDPs in Khulna.

6.2.1 Challenges Upon Arrival

The survey revealed that the respondents face a number of general challenges when they arrive in Khulna. These include having lost their social network (6 respondents), lack of job/income opportunities or unemployment (7 respondents), unstable employment (1 respondent), no information (1 respondent), no savings (1 respondent), inability to fulfil basic needs (3 respondents), bad living conditions (7 respondents), no land tenure rights (2 respondents), eviction threats or fear of eviction (8 respondents), conflict with local residents (1 respondent), no government support (1 respondent) (see *Fig. 32*). As will be analysed below, most of these challenges, with the partial exception of 'no social network' and 'no information', tend to persist throughout the longer-term integration process.

Fig. 32: Type of integration challenges faced upon arrival



Fig. 33: Main support actors upon arrival



Furthermore, the survey respondents reported to have primarily received support from their own relatives, acquaintances, or neighbours, indicating that integration support predominantly derives from personal social networks rather than being institutionalized. In fact, half the respondents relied on relatives who had already migrated to Khulna before them, and 13 percent said to have mainly received help from previous neighbours back in their places of origin (*Fig. 33*). The immediate support they received was largely related to being sheltered during their initial stay in Khulna (12 respondents), to adapting to the local context (9 respondents) by being taught some skills they could use to earn money or by being connected to a local social network, to finding a job (8 respondents), or to receiving food (8 respondents).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also contribute to improving general living conditions and livelihoods in the settlements, which arguably facilitate integration. That is, as the figure below shows (*Fig. 34*) the type of support that respondents received from NGOs and development actors ranges from different trainings (e.g. bag-making, chicken-rearing, goat-rearing, entrepreneurship, training on improving living environment and health, local savings advice), to immediate relief support during covid (e.g. covid-19 relief packages, food supplies, cash grants), to the provision of sanitary products and start-up capital, and infrastructural works (e.g. installation of public sanitation facilities, road improvements).

Fig. 34: Type of support services received by respondents from NGOs and other development actors

However, these services do not offer specific support to climate-IDPs, let alone during their beginning stages of settlement. Rather they are targeted at the general slum community and climate-IDPs have usually already settled for a while in the community before they receive information about these services. Furthermore, only 14 out 30 respondents reported to have benefited from these services. The majority said that they did not receive any support from NGOs or other development actors.

The reliance on personal social networks and NGOs highlights the absence of an institutionalized reception system for climate-IDPs in Khulna. This lack of a reception and registration system is a significant concern with regards to tracing the demographic development of city residents in the face of increasing climate change impacts on migration patterns and it limits the possibilities to provide adequate support to the displaced populations. For example, the survey indicated that 40 percent of the respondents remain unregistered, either due to a lack of knowledge about the registration process or an absence of awareness regarding the potential benefits of registration. The remaining 60 percent of the respondents may be registered residents, however, only through the voter registry. In fact, apart from the registration booth piloting project in Ward 31, no specific institutionalized registration system is in place which is dedicated to collecting demographic information on climate-IDPs, for example through a specific population group registry for climate-IDPs.

6.2.2 Obstacles to long-term local integration

In the context of long-term local integration, climate-IDPs continue facing significant obstacles as time goes by. These challenges are categorized into four obstacle domains: Inadequate standards of living, lack of access to employment and livelihoods, safety and security risks, and lack of institutionalized support systems. The next sections shall now look in more details at the personal integration obstacles the survey respondents tend to experience over a protracted period.

a) Inadequate standards of living

As shown in the previous *Fig. 32*, 11 respondents reported 'bad living conditions' as one of the major challenges to satisfactory local integration. Respondents generally reported substandard living conditions in the settlements, with many expressing a desire to relocate if they had the opportunity to do so. For example, one respondent noted that "If we have or will have somewhere else to live, we'll move there because we're not good at all here. […] It is very problematic for ordinary people to stay." Another lamented that "We are absolutely forced to stay here as we have nowhere else to go and if we had any place to stay, we would have left anytime." These statements indicate that respondents feel 'trapped' where they are, despite having taken hardships to migrate to Khulna.

Fig. 36: Type of housing the respondents live in



Indicatively of the above statements regarding substandard living conditions is the fact that a high number of respondents lack access to proper housing. In fact, the majority (70 percent) of respondents lives in small tin shed houses that fail to provide protection against various weather conditions, resulting in waterlogging, flooding, and leaky roofs, other issues. Furthermore, most accommodations are extremely small, leaving entire families crowded together to share a single room as is the case for 33 percent of the respondents. Generally, the respondents report to face various housing problems, including flooding (12 respondents), leaky roofs (12 respondents), waterlogging (7 respondents), muddy grounds (2 respondents), saline drinking water (2 respondents), no electricity (2 respondents), too small of a living space (2 respondents), bad streets conditions (1 respondent), mosquitos and Dengue transmission (1 respondent), and problems with the landlord (1 respondent) (*Fig. 35*).

Fig. 35: Housing problems faced by the respondents



Furthermore, access to basic services is mainly inadequate, with concerns about clean drinking water, sanitation facilities, and medical services. More specifically, two respondents report saline drinking water and those, who do have access to clean drinking water report that they have to walk far to reach it ("We have to bring drinking water from far away"). For example, one respondent goes to the mosque to tab clean water from there. Moreover, only half of the respondents (15) have their own shower and

toilet. Out of the remaining 15 respondents who do not have their own, 13 have access to public showers and toilets, which leaves two respondents to not have access to any of those. And although 28 out of 30 respondents do have access to a shower and toilet, the number of facilities available for the 13 respondents who share the facilities are much too scarce. That is, on average, 9 families share one toilet and shower (two respondents report to share a toilet and shower with 15 other families). And lastly, many of the respondents report to be struggling with health issues for which they cannot afford the medical treatment. For example, one respondent said that "Sometimes I see a doctor. I can't see a good doctor because of lack of money. […] I have to do x-ray, but I can't." Only 5 out of 30 respondents say that they have access to a nearby health clinic. These indecent living conditions affect the overall well-being and quality of life of the respondents and hamper an affective and dignified local integration into the new settlements.

b) Lack of access to employment and livelihoods

As revealed in the above figure regarding the general integration challenges faced by respondents (*Fig. 32*), many respondents mention severe employment challenges ranging from a lack of job/income opportunities (7 respondents), unstable employment due to seasonal weather (4 respondents), and high unemployment due to a mismatch between local labour market demands and the respondents' skills (12 respondents).

More specifically, Unemployment is very high, with 40 percent of the respondents reporting to be disoccupied, mostly due to a lack of skills adapted to the local labour market demands. For example, one of the respondents stated that "I used to go to the forest to catch fish. I wanted to come to Khulna to do business, but I can't do anything." Furthermore, among the 60 percent that do work, most respondents earn meager daily wages that are just above the extreme poverty line. That is, 7 respondents reported to earn a monthly wage of 0-1000 BDT (approx. 0-8.50 EUR). Breaking this down to a daily wage, results in an average of 3.30 BDT (approx. 2.80 EUR) among these seven respondents, which is just above the extreme poverty line of 2.15 USD per day (The World Bank (c), 2022). One of the respondents reports that her husband earns a mere 2-2.5 BDT (approx. 1.70-2.10 EUR) per day ("My husband's hand-operated rickshaw is so low in income that he earns around two to two and a half taka a day."). Furthermore, the majority of respondents work more than 10 hours per day to reach this income and even then, they state that the money remains insufficient to sustain their families, which are composed of an average 5 family members. More specifically, 7 out of 30 respondents work more than 10 hours per day, 6 respondents work more than 14 hours and 4 respondents reported to work 17 or even 18 hours each day (*Fig. 38*).

Fig. 38: Daily working hours reported by respondents



The survey further reveals the predominance of informal jobs and jobs that pose health risks. In fact, all respondents reported to work as day-laborers where the wage depends on the hours of work per day. 60 percent of the respondents work as self-employed informal workers, mostly as vendors. The other respondents work in catering, construction, or as housemaids, all of which are informal jobs that do not provide security. Moreover, many respondents face serious health issues that either incapacitate them to work all together (unemployment) or create obstacles to working the number of hours that would allow them to reach a sufficient wage. In fact, 40 percent of the respondents report to have contracted or experienced worsening of (pre-existing) health issues. For example, one respondent said that her husband broke his leg while working as rikshaw-puller, while another respondent reported that breathing problems worsened due to the work he was doing. A third respondent reported that "He [her husband] does not get work during rainy season, besides he has hip problems, eye problems and becomes weak." The informal nature of the jobs that the respondents carry out results in them having to still work at a high age when their bodies are no longer physically capable to carry out the demanding tasks.

Fig. 37: Distribution of Respondents who have taken a loan



However, most respondents except for three, report that they do not have insurances that would provide financial assistance when the individuals are no longer capable of working. Instead, almost half of the respondents (14) diversify the risk by taking out high-interest loans (*Fig. 38*) to make up for the financial deficit caused by health issues and manage the high living expenses, which further leads to indebtedness among

the respondents. All in all, informality creates barriers to financial stability for respondents and further impede affective and dignified local integration.

Overall, most respondents (63 percent) reported that their income did not cover the high living expenses, including rent and utilities, groceries, and medical treatment. That is, although respondents already save ordinary costs by settling in informal settlements, the amount they earn still does not match the daily expenses they have. According to the survey responses, these main expenses include utilities (37.9 percent), rent (17.2 percent), groceries (17.2 percent), clothing (13.8 percent), medical treatment (6.9 percent), and educational fees (6.9 percent). Other costs are added on top, for example some report to pay waste collection, which costs some 80 BDT (approx. 0.70 EUR). More specifically, despite living on public government lands, 11 respondents report to pay an average rent of 1881.8 BDT (ca. 16 EUR). In relation to the average income among these respondents of 3863.3 BDT (approx. 33 EUR) seems affordable. However, the expenses seem to outweigh the income in that some costs, such as medicines and medical treatment take a high toll on the wallets of the respondents. For example, one respondent said that "When my mother is sick, she needs 50 to 60 taka [approx. 0.40-0.50 EUR] a day for medicine, we have a lot of trouble to manage this money." Overall, with all accumulated expenses, 63.3 percent of the respondents report that the money just does not suffice to sustain their families.

c) Safety and security risks

The survey respondents reported security risks due to a lack of land tenure rights which puts them into a constant fear of eviction. More specifically, only 44 percent either rent a house or have their own property. The other 56 percent of the respondents reported to live on government owned land, which leaves them subject to being evicted whenever the government decides to claim back the land (*Fig. 39*). Some respondents report to have been explicitly and sometimes violently threatened to be evicted. For example, one respondent said that "When the police came, they wanted to break it [the house] and then left after some time. We are very afraid." Overall, 8 respondents display fear of being evicted due to living on government owned land, which causes high psychological strains. For example, another respondent said: "What if we are asked to go away? I am always in panic."

Fig. 39: Respondents' land tenure status



Furthermore, two respondents remarked that due to the lack of land tenure rights, they do not feel home in the settlement, which arguably contributes to a feeling of remaining in a limbo without the possibility to actually integrate in the long-term. For example, one respondent said:

"No, it doesn't feel like home. Because it's the government's place, you have to leave when the government tells you to leave."

Similarly, another respondent stated that,

"We live here in other people's place. If the government makes us permanent residents of this place, then we would have no fear. I could live a good life."

Safety is further compromised due to crime, particularly drug and alcohol abuse in the community. That is, some respondents raised the concern that they do not feel safe in their community due to alcohol and drugs being consumed. For example, one respondent stated that, "This place is basically a drunken fighting place. […] There are many such problems in our area and this area is very dangerous, there are many drug addicts, and many bad things happen here. We are always in a lot of fear."

d) Lack of institutionalized support systems

Survey respondents reported to receive limited support from city authorities. Although 10 respondents had received KCC support, these were primarily temporary in-kind relief packages, usually in response to the adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on poor populations. One exception is a respondent who had received an ID card and birth registration certificate from KCC. Only four respondents reported to receive public social services such as allowances (2 old age allowances, 1 widow allowance, and 1 disabled allowance), whereas two respondents said that they had applied to or consulted information regarding public social services, yet, they had not been selected or helped despite being eligible. This hints at two greater issues at stake: On the one hand, the selectivity of social services due to caps that are imposed by central governmental budgets and for which only a specific number of allowances are offered per division. And on the other hand, it hints at the inefficiency or even absence of information systems that provide climate-IDPs appropriate guidance as to how they can apply to such services, making these populations especially vulnerable to political leaders' indifference.

Furthermore, although most respondents (26) do have at least the national ID card ('NID'), four still remain without any documents because they had been lost or destroyed by the climatic events that displaced them. For example, one respondent said that "No, don't have birth registration, could not bring voter card. The photocopy was taken by the river." Two respondents assured that their documents were processing, however, given the extended period they have been already living in Khulna for, notably three and six years respectively, two derivations may come into consideration: Either the authorities take too long to process documentations, leaving affected individuals unable to proceed with any planned procedures to apply for public social services or participate politically in elections. Or respondents themselves have difficulties understanding the procedures to the extent that they manage to submit all necessary information to the authorities for them to finalize the documents.

In the latter case, however, information systems must be set up in a way that also allows individuals with low education levels to acquire proper documentation.

Moreover, the lack of documents may lead to another related issues, notably to not being able to register properly in the city – though the survey reveals that also some of the respondents who do have all their necessary documents are not registered in Khulna. More specifically, 8 out of 30 respondents report not to be registered in Khulna. As a result, people do not have access to public social services. Furthermore, not being registered has implications for their acknowledgement before political decision-makers. That is, political leaders tend to be less willing to cater to the needs of individuals and population groups who are not voting for them. One of the respondents brings this issue to the point by stating that "If we are no voters there, they will not give support." Another respondent confirmed that he did not receive any support from KCC due to not being a registered voter. More specifically, he stated that "No, I have not received any help from the city corporation. I don't have a voter ID card so I didn't get help even during Corona."

To sum up, climate-IDPs arriving in Khulna are generally confronted with immediate challenges related to social networks, employment, basic needs, and housing issues. Many of these challenges arguably arise due to the absence of an institutionalized reception and registration system, whereas their long-term integration challenges continue to be characterized by marginalization. The long-term obstacles to integration center around substandard living conditions, the lack of employment opportunities and indecent working conditions, safety and security risks due to the refusal of authorities to grant land tenure rights, and a lack of access to institutionalized support systems. While these general observations reflect the experiences for all 30 respondents, the challenges do somewhat vary depending on the specific community climate-IDPs settle in. The next section shall therefore scrutinize the differences between Rayer Mahal and Greenland to assess whether specific characteristics of a community may lead to different integration outcomes.

6.2.3 Key differences between the Rayer Mahal and Greenland respondents

The comparison of empirical outcomes between respondents living in Greenland and Rayer Mahal provides valuable insights into the distinct integration challenges faced by climate-IDPs residing in these two different settlements in Khulna, Bangladesh. Notably, these differences are primarily observed in the areas of safety and security, as well as living conditions (Fig. 40 below).

Fig. 40: Prevalence of integration challenges in Rayer Mahal and Greenland



In Greenland, where residents live on government land, concerns about eviction threats or fear of eviction loom large as the major challenge to integration. Given the uncertainty of land tenure rights on government-owned land, it is unsurprising that this issue would take center stage among Greenland's respondents. The fear of eviction also translates into a higher percentage (73.3 percent) of Greenland respondents emphasizing the importance of having an 'own house' as a key element of successful integration, compared to Rayer Mahal residents, where only 42.9 percent expressed the same sentiment (*Fig. 41*).

Fig. 411: Responses to the question "What does 'successful' integration mean to you?"



Conversely, respondents in Rayer Mahal more frequently cite 'bad living conditions' as the biggest obstacle to their integration (*Fig. 40*). This is somewhat unexpected, given the lower population density in Rayer Mahal compared to Greenland. While more space might suggest better accommodation, it is essential to consider the uneven distribution of resources and support from NGOs and development organizations. Greenland has historically received more attention and assistance, which could account

for relatively better living conditions in specific areas of concern. Indeed *Fig. 42* shows this unequal distribution as only 5 Greenland respondents reported to have received no NGO services compared 11 Rayer Mahal residents. Nonetheless, it needs to be emphasized that, despite these nuances, living conditions remain substandard in both settlements.

Fig. 42: NGO services received by respondents in



Regarding social networks and support systems, the survey data does not confirm the initial expectation that the spatial structure of a settlement would significantly affect the role of social networks in integration processes (*Fig. 43*). In fact, despite the higher population density in Greenland, Rayer Mahal residents surprisingly report a higher average number of connections they engage with regularly compared to Greenland residents. However, the quality of relationships appears to be somewhat better among Greenland respondents and their host communities. That is, while more Rayer Mahal residents report limited support from their neighbors compared to Greenland residents (5 and 2, respectively), two Greenland respondents expressed receiving no support at all or express reduced trust levels towards their neighbors.

Fig. 433: Relationship between respondents and host community



Furthermore, with regards to the employment and livelihood challenges, no significant differences could be found regarding accessing employment and livelihood opportunities. That is, both Greenland and Rayer Mahal respondents almost equally struggle with lack of job or income opportunities and unemployment (reported by 4 and 3 respondents, respectively).

In summary, the comparative analysis shows that the challenges faced by climate-IDPs can vary significantly between different settlements, and a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing these challenges may not be suitable. In fact, the varying data makes it difficult to draw a generalizable correlation between spatial structure of a settlement and the type of relationship incoming climate-IDPs have with their host community. The nature of integration challenges is influenced by various factors such as land tenure, external resource allocation, and community dynamics, and these differences need to be considered when designing effective support and intervention strategies.

7. So, how 'successfully' are climate-IDPs locally integrating in Khulna?

The assessment of whether climate-IDPs in Khulna have 'successfully' integrated is a complex task that involves considering various dimensions of integration. If we recall the theoretical framework drawn at the beginning of this paper, there are various ways to measure the level of 'successful' local integration.

Firstly, when assessing integration in terms of generally improved quality of life or wellbeing compared to before displacement as proposed by Siddiqui et al. (2018) (see page 18f.), it becomes evident that a significant proportion of the respondents are staying in Khulna not necessarily because they have experienced a general betterment of life, which is notably true for 30.4 percent of respondents, but because they lack the resources or alternatives to relocate. For example, one respondent said that "After coming to Khulna, our life has not improved much. We are only surviving by eating." Though a majority of respondents stated their hopes for a better life in Khulna were fulfilled (66.7 percent), a sizeable portion arrived with arguably low expectations making it 'easy' to reach relative satisfaction. That is, 34 percent of the respondents reported to have come to Khulna without any hopes at all. The desire to stay in Khulna is therefore largely driven by the lack of options rather than significant life improvements.

Secondly, looking at integration from a material perspective in line with Sitglitz et al. (2009)'s, Hall et al. (2010)'s, and the OECD report (2013)'s proposition of a 'better quality of life' in terms of improved material income and wealth (see page 19), including adequate housing, the level of economic wealth, access to health and education services, some positive trends can be identified. The respondents do report that their income has increased after their displacement, notably from an average monthly 1750 BDT (approx. 14.90 EUR) to an average monthly 5540 BDT (approx. 47 EUR) income after settling in Khulna. Similarly, respondents have arguably improved their housing situations. That is, one of the key push-factors for many of the respondents was the high exposure to disaster-induced destruction of or damage to their houses at the places of origin. Thus, the fact that respondents do have relatively stable housing now, arguably indicates an overall improvement in their housing situation. However, as we have seen in the previous section the current housing infrastructures remain extremely problematic.

Similarly, although one of the push-factors among respondents was the lack of income sources and financial stability, among the seven respondents who had broadly referred to this push-factor, two said that their expectations had not been met and one said they had been partly met. Furthermore, in terms of education, one respondent said that their expectations before moving to Khulna was to find better education opportunities for the children. However, when asking her whether this hope had been fulfilled, the answer was no. Therefore, a clear distinction must be made in terms of comparative and relative improvements. More specifically, in comparative terms, the post-displacement material status of respondents has arguably improved compared to before being displaced, which is partly reflected in the predominant desire of respondents to remain in Khulna. This might suggest that migration may still be a valid strategy to improve living conditions, and local integration a justified adaptation strategy. However, in relative terms, the life quality remains problematically low in that the living conditions are inadequate for a dignified human life, as outlined in the previous section.

Thirdly, looking at integration in terms of subjective wellbeing, or the communities' "happiness" which Kahn and Juster (2003) and Pollard and Lee (2003) propose to measure through an assessment of satisfaction and positive affect (see page 19), surprisingly, climate-IDPs in Khulna express relatively high levels of satisfaction with their current living conditions, community conditions, and relationship with the local residents. More specifically, the survey reveals that 20 respondents are either very satisfied (10 respondents) or rather satisfied (10 respondents) with the level of material wellbeing they have reached. Conversely, only 4 respondents reported to be rather unsatisfied, and 6 respondents said they were very unsatisfied. Similarly, when assessing the respondents' level of satisfaction regarding specific living conditions, such as their experience with local residents, and the community living conditions, the survey results suggest that respondents are generally rather satisfied (18 respondents) or even very satisfied (23 respondents), respectively. It is only when we look at the levels of satisfaction regarding the housing conditions that we have more ambiguous results. That is, 14 respondents stated that they were either very unsatisfied (5 respondents) or rather unsatisfied (9 respondents) compared to 15 respondents who in contrast reported to be rather satisfied (13 respondents) or very satisfied (2 respondents).

Fourthly, while the above analysis according to academic literature would tend to lead to a rather positive assessment regarding the level of local integration reached by climate-IDPs, assessing integration outcomes according to what the respondents themselves deem most important to successfully integrate may shine a different light on the outcomes. In fact, the respondents place high importance on employment (36 percent) as key criterion for successful integration, followed by access to basic services (25 percent), financial stability (15 percent), access to education (8.5 percent), and an own property (8.5 percent).

With regards to 'employment' and 'financial stability', it becomes evident that while income levels have risen as previously shown, the employment situation for climate-IDPs remains precarious, with a significant portion (40 percent) remaining unemployed. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, respondents report that the type of job the respondents took on in Khulna, did not eventually differ significantly from the jobs they used to carry out back home. That is, 46.6 percent of the respondents reported no change in the type of job compared to before displacement, whereas 43.3 percent did change jobs. 10 percent did not answer the question. However, given the fact that many respondents reported to have moved to Khulna to start a new life and have better job opportunities, it may be argued that in this regard, no notable improvement has been made. In fact, all respondents are still carrying out informal jobs, which may arguably allow them to gain more than in the unskilled formal labour market, yet it deprives them of any employment security and decent working conditions. Thus overall, the respondents seem to be somewhat stuck in a situation of stagnation despite previous employment aspirations. With regards to financial stability, we have seen that the average income has indeed increased compared to before being displaced. However, given the job instability reported by some respondents due to seasonal weather conditions that impact on the ability to carry out the job consistently, the outcome is arguably not an improvement in 'financial stability', but rather indicates a mere improvement in their overall income levels.

With regards to 'access to basic services', the limited reach of development projects and public provision leads to only a minority benefiting from these services. More specifically, Rayer Mahal and especially Greenland have attracted an array of NGOs and development actors working to improve general living conditions in the slums, as shown in *Table 8*. However, though these services are all vital for providing relief in everyday challenges faced on a daily basis by climate-IDPs, apart from the ones offered by GIZ's UMIMCC/UMML project, none of the above services specifically target climate-IDPs. Furthermore, development projects and public provisions always impose a limit on the number of beneficiaries that will receive these services. The selection procedures tend to be biased and unequal as they are based either on a 'first-come-first-serve' approach or depend on the goodwill of the ward councilors or CDC leaders, who are often tasked to select the beneficiaries. Thus, despite most of the respondents being eligible for many public and private support services, only the fewest actually get selected to benefit from them.

With regards to 'own property', when asked what hopes respondents hold for the future, more than half the respondents (55.7 percent) answered that they would want to buy their own land and 89.6 percent answered that they would want to live in a permanent settlement. This desire is derived from current shortcomings in their property status and the lacking security they perceive. That is, only 7 percent report to be living in their own property whereas the majority either lives on government land

(56 percent) or rents a house (37.7 percent). The desire to own their own property is an understandable sentiment in the context of a constantly looming threat of eviction. As explained in the previous section, the constant fear of being evicted from their current homes has a big impact on the mental wellbeing of respondents and creates important barriers to developing a home feeling which arguably reduces the level of 'successful' local integration.

Table 8: Development services offered by NGOs in Greenland and Rayer Mahal (Source: respective CDC leaders)

INFORMAL SETTLEMENT	ORGANISATION	YEAR OF INCEPTION	INITIATIVE(S)
Greenland	Brac	Long ago (no specific year given)	Infrastructures; Socioeconomic support; Loan provision; Maternal health improvement programs
	Nobolok	2018	WASH facilities; Hygiene awareness and supply; Livelihood trainings
	UNDP	2004	Socioeconomic support (focus on education & health); Infrastructures (e.g. ponds, toilets); Livelihood development programs for marginalized persons
	Caritas	Long ago (No specific indication)	Socioeconomic support (focus on education); Infrastructures; Livelihood development programs; Climate change related projects
	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) / UMIMCC Project	2020	Entrepreneurship Skills Trainings; Provision of business starting capital; Infrastructures (e.g. roads)
	Jagrata Juba Shangha (JJS)	2018	Child protection programs
	Asha	n/a	Provision of savings credits, microfinancing loans
Rayer Mahal	Wave Foundation	2020	Livestock support (e.g. goat, poultry)
	Green Nari Kollyan Foundation	2023	Entrepreneurship Training for women
	Brac	2000	Microfinancing loans
	Brac	2015	Crop & seed cultivation support
	Brac	2007 (-2017)	Eye treatment support
	Jagorani Chakra Foundation	2015	Business start-up support
	Asha	2005	Microfinancing loans
	BURO Bangladesh	2013	Microfinancing loans

Overall, the assessment of whether climate-IDPs have 'successfully' integrated in Khulna raises questions about the holistic improvement of their lives. While there have been some positive changes in material aspects like income and housing, and certainly in subjective levels of satisfaction, other factors such as employment, access to education, and basic services remain major challenges. Many climate-IDPs are constrained by limited options and a lack of resources, which forces them to stay in Khulna. Furthermore, the inability of service providers to effectively reach and support a significant portion of the displaced population raises concerns about discrimination and unequal access to support. For a summarized overview of the arguments evaluating whether local integration of respondents has been 'successful', see the below *Table 9.* In light of these challenges, it is difficult to conclude that climate-IDPs have achieved successful local integration, as significant human rights violations and dignified living conditions persist.

Table 9: Summarized arguments for an assessment of 'successful' local integration

	ASSESSMENT PARAMETER	ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF 'SUCCESSFUL' LOCAL INTEGRATION	ARGUMENTS AGAINST 'SUCCESSFUL' LOCAL INTEGRATION
1.	**General betterment of life/wellbeing** (Siddiqui et al., 2018)	▪ 30.4 percent report a betterment of life ▪ 66.7 percent report that their hopes had been fulfilled by moving to Khulna	▪ 'Trapped': 65 percent report to have no personal belongings/resources to move elsewhere; lack of alternatives
2.	**Material Wellbeing** (Sitglitz et al., 2009)	*In comparative terms:* ▪ Improved income ▪ Improved housing	*In relative terms:* ▪ Important shortcomings in access to decent housing, health, and education ▪ Life in slums with inadequate living conditions ▪ No access to insurance schemes
3.	**Subjective Wellbeing** (Kahn and Juster, 2003; Pollard and Lee, 2003)	▪ Relatively high levels of satisfaction regarding material wellbeing, community living conditions, and relation with host community	▪ Nearly half the respondents remain very unsatisfied or rather unsatisfied with the housing conditions ▪ Lack of home feeling
4.	**Climate-IDPs' own integration priorities** (Quirós 2023)	▪ Improvement in overall income levels	▪ *High unemployment*: 40 percent of the respondents remain unemployed ▪ *Limited access to basic services* ▪ *Lack of financial stability* ▪ *No own property*: The majority 93.7 percent report to live on government-owned land or rent a house. ▪ *Lack of improved education*

8. Field observations and challenges

During the field work that was conducted to collect the above-analyzed data, some interesting observations were made, and challenges encountered.

Firstly, the field work revealed a gap between more conventional understandings of local integration and the personal understandings of climate-IDPs. That is, for many surveyed climate-IDPs, the process of local integration is not a conscious, strategic adaptation to improve living conditions. Instead, it often manifests as an automatic process of assimilation into host communities and urban living conditions. The observation that climate-IDPs may not actively consider local integration as a priority is understandable given their primary preoccupations for survival and meeting basic needs. However, active enabling of local integration, encompassing not only social integration but also the improvement of employment and livelihoods, should be considered for a holistic approach. Such an approach fosters an informal support network while also creating enabling conditions for climate-IDPs to survive and thrive. Encouraging local employment opportunities, particularly for self-employed shopkeepers, can indeed expedite integration, as especially local community shops serve as a social hotspot where community residents gather and spend their days collectively.

Another noteworthy observation is the protracted nature of climate-induced displacement which supports the argument that local integration should be mainstreamed as an active strategy for climate-IDPs and a relevant policy intervention area. That is, the survey shows that the length of time individuals are spending on integrating into host communities varies significantly, spanning from recent arrivals of

half a year to those who have lived in the communities for five decades. Contrary to expectations, this divergence indicates that time alone is insufficient for overcoming the experienced challenges. That is, protracted vulnerabilities exist even after such long years, which emphasizes the need for proactive efforts to facilitate local integration.

Secondly, a series of obstacles may impact on the quality and reliability of the collected data. First and foremost, the author faced difficulties in accessing the pre-selected survey participants. The initial plan for random selection of interviewees proved to be challenging, as many individuals had already relocated to other cities or could not be found in the slums. Consequently, the research had to rely on snowball and convenience sampling methods, whereby the initial interviewees indicated other climate-IDPs living in the community or the CDC leaders led us to the sheds of climate-IDPs they knew were living in the community. However, these selective methods may introduce bias based on the respondents' personal preferences or geographical proximity. This 'non-probabilistic' sampling also reduces the representativeness of the data, as not all climate-IDPs had an equal chance of being selected. Furthermore, regarding the quality of survey responses, the author had difficulties receiving reliable answers. Respondents often struggled to understand the questions even in their own language and even with extensive explanations. Additional guidance to help them understand the purpose of the question, sometimes resulted in directed answers, reducing the authenticity of responses. The use of proxy questions was often necessary to obtain representative information, but this posed challenges in acquiring precise data.

Overall, the research exposed significant challenges related to data scarcity, not only in this empirical chapter, but more generally. For example, accurately quantifying the number of climate-IDPs in Bangladesh is an inherently difficult task due to the fluid and untraceable nature of migration and the absence of formal registration processes. While CDC leaders helped provide local data, caution needs to be applied interpreting this data, as many climate-IDPs move between cities without leaving bureaucratic traces. Moreover, accessing information from government websites proved to be challenging, as on the one hand, language barriers made it difficult to locate and analyze primary data sources, with most of these (including official government websites and official documents) being written in Bangla language and language tools to translate them proved to be inadequate. On the other hand, official websites often lacked essential information, and many links led to non-existent or inaccessible content, exacerbating data collection challenges.

9. Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, we delved into the experiences and challenges faced by climate-IDPs in Khulna, Bangladesh and revealed the perspectives of city representatives regarding the most pressing challenges to integrate climate-IDPs. Our exploration has provided insights into the multifaceted nature of climate-induced displacement and the intricate dynamics that unfold in urban settings like Khulna.

First and foremost, our examination of climate migrants' experiences "upon arrival" highlights the stark reality they confront. These individuals grapple with a variety of challenges, including unstable employment, inadequate living conditions, eviction threats, and limited access to basic services. These challenges are notably not solely economic but also social, as climate-IDPs often lack social networks and must rely on informal support systems. One recurring theme throughout our analysis is the lack of institutionalized support and structures for climate-IDPs. Despite their significant presence in Khulna, these individuals face a lack of dedicated assistance, both from local government authorities and broader institutional city planning frameworks. The absence of a comprehensive reception and registration system leaves many climate migrants unregistered, further exacerbating their vulnerability.

The chapter also highlights disparities between different settlement areas in Khulna, with Greenland slum residents experiencing heightened fears of eviction due to the government-owned land on which they reside. Rayer Mahal residents, despite having more space, are faced with issues of inadequate living conditions, challenging the notion that space guarantees better living standards. Additionally, our analysis shows that the quantity of social connections does not always translate into better integration, challenging assumptions about the relationship between spatial structure and community interactions. Moreover, climate migrants express varied expectations of successful integration. While some indicate positive changes in their lives since their displacement, for others, their desires to stay in Khulna derive from a lack of alternatives rather than tangible improvements. In terms of material wellbeing, there have been notable increases in income and, to limited extents, in housing conditions. However, when it comes to employment, climate-IDPs' aspirations for better opportunities in Khulna have not always been fulfilled, as many remain unemployed or engaged in low-income informal work. Access to education services remains a challenge, with respondents indicating their expectations have not been met. Furthermore, the limitations of accessing basic services due to unequal selection procedures reveal the difficulties climate migrants face in securing essential support.

This chapter illuminates the persistence of significant human rights violations and challenges to dignified living conditions among climate-IDPs in Khulna. The complex interplay of economic, social, and institutional factors underscores the need for comprehensive interventions to address their plight. The findings presented in this chapter provide a crucial foundation for the subsequent discussions. In

the following chapter, we will explore opportunities, policy recommendations, and potential solutions to address the challenges outlined here. By bridging the gap between the experiences of climate migrants and the perceptions of city representatives, we aim to contribute to the ongoing dialogue about the multifaceted issue of climate-induced displacement and the urgent need for action at the local, national, and international levels.

Fig. 44: Progress made towards unraveling the connection between institutional mandates and local integration in Bangladesh



In the preceding chapters, we examined on the one hand, the *de jure* institutional frameworks at various levels of governance and explored, on the other hand, the *de facto* experiences of city representatives and climate-IDPs themselves. As we move forward into the discussion chapter, the paper aims at bridging the insights gained from these chapters by discussing the interplay between institutional mandates (chapter II) and the lived realities of climate-displaced populations (chapter III), thereby constructing a comprehensive understanding of the complex issues at hand and, more importantly, setting the stage for addressing the pressing challenges that climate-IDPs may face also in other urban centers facing similar challenges.

1. De jure provisions versus de facto realities

Examining the core policy frameworks established for the protection of climate-IDPs, this paper finds that the *de facto* situation tends to fall short of the *de jure* provisions. The frameworks for protecting climate-IDPs, while in theory existent and in the context of Bangladesh very elaborated, face various challenges in implementation, ranging from bureaucratic hurdles to socio-political complexities. Going back to the provisions made in the IASC Framework and the NSIDM and putting them into the context of the paper's empirical findings, several conclusions can be drawn following the previously outlined structure of the IASC Framework's 8 priority areas:

a) Long-term Safety and Security

IASC Indicator 1.1: "Safety and security perceptions of IDPs seeking a durable solution"

Despite policy intentions, the lived experiences of the respondents in Khulna demonstrate ongoing challenges for climate-IDPs in urban areas, particularly concerning eviction threats and the pervasive fear that accompanies them. Many respondents had reported to feel 'trapped' in their settlements. A lack of alternative options and resources emerges as a primary factor contributing to this phenomenon. This observation corresponds with research in other studies, indicating an increasing precarity over

time for climate-related migrants, which holds implications for the risk of protracted displacement. More specifically, according to Adger et al. (2021), the longer a climate migrant or IDP gets 'trapped' in a slum, the higher the extents of human insecurity (in Miron, 2023, 14). That is, "Repeated exposure to environmental hazards coupled with the mental and emotional toll of prolonged socioeconomic uncertainty had contributed to ever-worsening human insecurity" (ibid., 34). Similarly, two other studies referred to "climate IDPs and migrants who had become "newly trapped" – unable to leave the urban slums in which they had resettled" (ibid.). Overall, the critical safety and security perceptions of climate-IDPs indicate that there is a long way ahead for reaching a truly durable solution for the affected populations.

b) Enjoyment of an adequate standard of living without discrimination

IASC Indicator 2.1: "Assistance programs in place to provide IDPs with essential food, potable water, basic shelter and essential health care"

IASC Indicator 2.2: "IDPs do not face specific obstacles to access public services, assistance or remittances from abroad compared to local residents with comparable needs"

IASC Indicator 2.3: "Percentage of IDPs living in overcrowded housing/shelter, compared to the resident population, the situation before displacement or the national average, as appropriate"

While programs exist to provide essential services in Bangladesh and Khulna, especially available from NGOs and local government departments, many climate-IDPs face obstacles, including a lack of awareness about the procedures, biased chances of receiving these services due to budget constraints and arguably a lack of political will anchored in institutions. Therefore, while the first indicator may be partly confirmed, the second remains a key challenge in improving the de facto conditions for climate-IDPs. The third indicator could not be systematically assessed as it was out of this paper's scope to collect comparative data regarding the climate-IDPs and local residents, or climate-affected populations before and after displacement, and due to a lack of national data on climate-IDPs. However, indicatively, it was noted in the first chapter that generally, there seems to be a strong tendency of slums being made up by climate-IDPs in Bangladesh. That is, up to 50 percent of the urban populations in Bangladesh are estimated to be "IDPs who have fled their rural homes due to climate change impacts." It is also notable that slums seem to be "expanding after every occasion of natural disasters" according to some studies (Rana and Ilina, 2021, 3). Therefore, the proportion of climate-IDPs living in overcrowded housing/shelter compared to the resident population would tend to be relatively high.

c) Access to livelihoods and employment

IASC Indicator 3.1: "Types and conditions of employment of the IDP population compared to the non-displaced population, including rates of informal-market employment and access to labor law standards, such as the minimum wage, as appropriate"

IASC Indicator 3.2: "Poverty and/or unemployment levels among IDPs compared to the resident population, the situation before displacement, or the national average, as appropriate"

As was shown in the first chapter, Bangladesh has made substantial progress in the overall reduction of poverty, whereby the national poverty rate fell to 24.3 percent in 2016 from 48.9 percent in 2000 (Rigaud et al., 2018, 145). However, in light of the high urban population growth rate estimated at 4 percent in 2015 (ibid.), some urban populations are being 'left behind'. As shown in the previous empirical chapter, economic security remains elusive for many climate-IDPs in Khulna. High levels of unemployment and the prevalence of informal, low-wage employment illustrate the gap between policy objectives and lived realities. A minimum wage does not exist, especially not for informal workers. Furthermore, poverty looms big among the internally displaced populations as they struggle to make ends meet with the low wages they earn. Having lost everything back home, including houses, documents, homesteads and agricultural lands, and social networks, climate-IDPs arrive to the cities facing difficulties to build livelihoods again, especially given their lack of specialized skills for the urban labour market which forces them to remain in the informal employment sector.

d) Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land, and property

IASC Indicator 4.1: "Percentage of IDPs remaining without adequate housing, reduction in this percentage over time and comparison with the percentage for the resident population or the national average, as appropriate"

IASC Indicator 4.2: "Existence of effective and accessible mechanisms to resolve housing, land and property disputes relevant to displacement and steps taken to overcome the most common challenges to implementing housing, land and property rights"

IASC Indicator 4.3: "IDPs have access to support programs (including access to credits) to restore or improve housing, land or property on the same basis as the resident population"

Land tenure issues represent a significant challenge for climate-IDPs. That is, the previous chapter has shown that land tenure is a 'hot potato' for city representatives and a persistent barrier to access proper housing, land, and property. Low-cost housing schemes are being developed and Khulna even plans to build three 'climate-migrant colonies' where climate-IDPs are planned to be resettled to according to KCC interviewee. However, these schemes, while arguably interesting for new arrivals in the future, they neglect the needs of already settled climate-IDPs, who have by now been living in the settlements for years, sometimes even decades. These individuals have already developed community social networks which arguably constitute important informal security nets and local support systems when it comes to dealing with precarity every day. Instead, for the already settled climate-displaced populations, slum upgrading schemes would be an important step towards better integration and a reduced gap between the informal settlement conditions and other neighborhoods. However, political complexities in the form of conflicting interests obstruct the establishment of such schemes and the

development of effective mechanisms to provide property and land, which continues posing a considerable barrier to the *de facto* local integration of climate-IDPs.

e) Access to personal and other documentation without discrimination

IASC Indicator 5.1: "Percentage of IDPs without birth certificates, national ID cards or other personal documents relevant to the local context compared to the resident population, the situation before displacement or the national average, as appropriate"

IASC Indicator 5.2: "Mechanisms to replace documents are accessible and affordable bearing in mind the local context"

Despite the presence of provisions for obtaining identification documents, practical issues often hinder climate-IDPs from being registered in their new settlements as shown in the previous chapter, impeding their access to social benefits and political participation. However, an important step has been recently taken to improve this reality. More specifically, as briefly stated in the second chapter, GIZ is currently implementing a pilot project in one of the informal settlements of Khulna, notably in Ward 31, where climate-IDPs get identified through citizenship verification. This process allows them to be registered in a database that is then shared with KCC. This so-called 'Registration Booth' also provides information about services offered by various departments (notably the Department of Social Services, the Department of Women Affairs, the Department of Youth Development, the Election Commission, KCC, Bureau of Manpower and Employment, and the Livestock Office) and provides assistance in obtaining these services, for example by helping to fill out online forms. This is arguably an important step not only towards helping climate-IDPs access a dignified life in urban areas, but also to track data and measure progress that can then be used to provide more targeted urban services to these populations. As the pilot project continues developing itself, it is important to include in the registration booth's jurisdiction also the issuance of ID documents or help climate-IDPs in accessing them while lowering the bureaucratic hurdles for climate-IDPs to receive such documentation. While currently the registration booth is only available in one ward, there are plans to expand the service to other neighborhoods in case of overall positive results.

f) Family Reunification

IASC Indicator 6.1: "The number of internally displaced children or other dependent person who have not yet been reunited with their families"

While migration has historically served as a common economic coping or survival strategy for households worldwide as it may provide families and their children with better opportunities, it can arguably also make them more vulnerable (ILO, 2010). The previous chapter suggests that many female respondents moved to Khulna after their husbands had left their places of origin. Most importantly, these respondents said that their husbands had been vital upon arrival to help them settle. This time

shift in displacement between partners does call for more research on the challenges regarding catching up with separated family members and support systems that can help the ones that were left behind to be protected during this separation. However, it was out of this paper's scope to delve deeper into the *de jure* and *de facto* dimensions of this IASC indicator.

g) Participation in public affairs without discrimination

IASC Indicator 7.1: "The percentage of adult IDPs eligible and registered to vote in comparison to the resident population or the national average, as appropriate"

IASC Indicator 7.2: "IDPs face no legal or administrative obstacles that prevent them from voting, being elected or working in public services"

IASC Indicator 7.3: "The percentage of adult IDPs participating in elections held in comparison to the resident population or the national average"

Priority areas 5 and 7 are arguably interrelated as documentation and registration procedures usually go hand in hand and both are required to participate in public affairs, such as elections. As shown in the previous chapter, climate-IDPs do not always register in their new settlement, either because they are unaware of the procedures or because they choose not to register. Therefore, regarding the first IASC Indicator, many are excluded from voting. Regarding the second and third IASC Indicators, it was shown in the previous chapter that climate-IDPs often lack the necessary information to access services, documentation is not always present, and bureaucratic processes often take a long time to provide the final documentation. Without ID documentation, a person has no legal identity for which participation in public affairs becomes almost impossible. Furthermore, climate-IDPs often lack the educational background for active political participation, especially to carry out tasks as an elected representative in public services. That is, many climate-IDPs come from extremely humble backgrounds in rural areas where they might not have finished secondary schooling. Consequently, illiteracy levels are high among these populations and the capacity to comprehend complex urban systems, which they would work to improve, is often rather underdeveloped. *De jure* provisions for participation in public and political life and the realities of climate-IDPs therefore tend to diverge substantially. Consequently, it would be an important step towards the inclusion and local integration of climate-displaced populations not only to provide them with institutionalized schooling schemes upon arrival, but additionally, it could be an asset if more IDPs were to become CDC leaders. Even if their political influence would arguably remain restrictive at a broader level, it would increase the visibility of climate-displaced populations and give the participating individuals at least at community-level a participative influence that could be used to push for more targeted solutions for climate-IDPs.

h) Access to effective remedies and justice

IASC Indicator 8.1: "Existence of accessible mechanisms that have the legal mandate and actual capacity to provide IDPs with effective remedies for violations suffered, including violations committed by non-state actors"

IASC Indicator 8.2: "Percentage of IDPs who consider that the violations suffered have been effectively remedied and a sense of justice restored"

The loss and damages incurred on climate-IDPs by climate-induced events, especially concerning property and land, pose significant challenges to *de facto* local integration. More specifically, the collected data suggest that climate-IDPs usually lose their houses and land to disasters, with some even reporting that they had become victims of land grabbing, whereby after climatic events such as floodings, other residents would come and take possession of the property. These losses and damages cause climate-IDPs to be displaced and enter in a downward spiral of poverty at their places of destination. However, as the previous chapter suggests, current mechanisms for justice and restitution are currently either non-existent or inaccessible for many due to their limited financial and educational resources to claim their rights. This is arguably an important shortcoming in terms of protecting IDPs from long-term marginalization due to climate-induced disasters. Furthermore, receiving justice has been argued to be key in moving on with one's life and to be able to take control again over future decisions. According to the UN Secretary-General, addressing the issue of loss and damage is therefore a "moral imperative" and the "prolonged delaying of improving financial, governance and institutional arrangements to address loss and damage will only result in those that are already most vulnerable and experiencing loss and damage facing ever increasing levels of negative impacts of climate change" (Thomas, 2022). In light of inexistent or ineffective judicial systems to deal with addressing losses and damage, Robinson and Carlson (2021) therefore proposed a non-judicial approach, namely restorative justice, which focuses on the inclusion of the victim and their vulnerabilities and needs (1386). Others have proposed to strengthen the social safety net systems and even to consider social protection as a 'fourth durable solution' (Montenegro, 2016). However, given the lack of political will and systems to even incorporate the current needs of climate-IDPs, it is may seem unlikely that previous losses and damage would be institutionally addressed in Bangladesh. More research would surely help to illuminate this potential enabler of local integration, but for now, it remains outside the scope of this paper.

2. Adaptation, Maladaptation, or Transformational Adaptation?

Having assessed the *de jure* provisions, *de facto* experiences, and the relationship between the two in the context of Bangladesh, it is now time to ask ourselves whether the argued short-term coping strategy of migration in case of voluntary mobility or displacement in case of more unvoluntary mobility,

actually allows to successfully adapt at the destination areas through local integration or not. The paper has revealed a complex interplay of adaptation, maladaptation, and transformational adaptation processes which help to disentangle this question and to draw some policy-relevant conclusions.

When we look at successful adaptation factors, this paper suggests that employment, access to basic services and integration with the local community may be pivotal enablers to adapt to their new environments, especially in the beginning stages of settlement. Successful adaptation for climate-IDPs hinges on their access to these three factors which may increase the likelihood of 'successful' local integration as they are more likely to access livelihood opportunities, participate in local decision-making and develop a sense of belonging. Conversely, inadequate urban slum conditions and economic insecurity are suggested to produce outcomes of maladaptation and protracted vulnerability, as climate-IDPs experience worsening living conditions. Indeed, this research has found that climate-IDPs are not - or only partly – able to enjoy the most basic human rights stipulated in the UDHR, such as the above-outlined rights to a legal identity, to freedom of residence, to live free from discrimination and to equality before the law, to justice, to property, to participation, to social services and social security, to work, to an adequate standard of living, and to education. In the absence or ineffectiveness of external support systems such as through resources or public social services injected by development actors and local public institutions, the urban context, particularly in slum areas, has shown to exacerbate vulnerabilities and therefore to lead to transformational adaptation of climate-IDPs, where previous vulnerabilities at the place of origin characterized by environmental risk are traded for new vulnerabilities at the places of destination characterized by marginalization and poverty.

The previous chapters also show that external support may contribute to a betterment of living conditions, for example through development projects that improve slum conditions or introduce systemic features that may potentially have an impact on longer-term integration outcomes (such as the registration booth). However, these external support mechanisms arguably only take sustainable effect if integrated into local public institutional urban planning schemes. In fact, effective external support interventions could potentially become a game changer in steering climate-IDPs towards successful adaptation if more attention is paid to the cause of climate-IDPs. However, so far, this attention has only been minimal and requires better institutionalization.

Fig. 45: Overall progress made throughout all chapters towards unraveling the connection between institutional mandates and local integration realities of climate-displaced populations in Bangladesh



3. Summarized results

3.1 Adaptation through local integration rather than migration

This research underscores the need for holistic approaches that address systemic vulnerability and root causes to climate vulnerability. It highlights the significance of local integration to end protracted displacement and the importance of strengthening city capacities to accommodate future climate-induced migrants. More specifically, the study's key findings support the notion that adaptation through local integration is vital for addressing climate-induced displacement effectively. The research highlights the risk of prolonged displacement vulnerabilities when climate-induced displaced persons experience only minimal improvements in their living standards after their displacement with many instead maladapting or exchanging past vulnerabilities with new vulnerabilities, thus substantiating the concept of protracted displacement. This study further calls for the systematic integration of livelihood support through measures such as sustained education and land rights concessions within urban development strategies, shifting the focus from short-term humanitarian responses to long-term developmental solutions. Moreover, the study emphasizes the need to redirect policies towards strengthening cities and enhancing their resilience to accommodate incoming climate-displaced populations. It recognizes that displacement prevention is increasingly challenging, and cities must therefore be fortified to manage the pressures of future climate-induced migration.

3.2 Divide between de jure and de facto local integration

While States hold the primary responsibility under international human rights law to safeguard the rights of all individuals within their borders, including climate-displaced populations, a significant gap exists between the *de jure* commitments and the *de facto* realization of this responsibility. The research reveals that while policy statements do consider local integration as a durable solution, their practical implementation often falls short which is evidenced by the substandard living conditions climate-IDPs are exposed to every day. That is, this survey identified the specific challenges faced by climate-IDPs

which are largely related to the indecent living conditions, lack of employment and income opportunities, public socioeconomic support, and information, as well as the lack of education to understand bureaucratic processes. The research also reveals that the services, either from NGOs or ministerial departments, are in theory available but only rarely reach the eligible climate-IDPs, leaving the vast majority without any support. Furthermore, Urban planning policies do not effectively address the complex realities of climate-induced displacement even when domestic laws and policy frameworks exist for it, which highlights the mismatches between different levels of governance and the remaining lack of visibility of climate displacement-related issues. One key reason for the *de jure-de facto* divide is arguably the neglect of the local context. Policies are often developed based on international or national standards, without considering the specific needs and challenges of local communities and without taking into consideration the network of local actors.

3.3 Vertical mismatches between different levels of governance and horizontal mismatches between local stakeholders

The study finds that one of the prominent issues contributing to the disparities between policy and practice is the mismatch between different levels of governance. That is, overall, while sub-national governance actors are more closely connected among themselves, they possess less power in national climate change policy decisions. City jurisdictions are too powerless to create adaptive change for individuals, a situation stemming from the inadequately implemented decentralization process. The mismatches between different levels of governance and institutions plays out in the form of organizational silos, lack of political will, obstacles to local governance reform, weak local institutional capacity and resources, and a multiplicity of actors.

More specifically, the presence of organizational silos and competing priorities within both the national government and decentralized institutional structures are leading to the peripheral treatment of displacement and post-displacement local integration in addressing climate change vulnerability. Climate-IDPs are generally considered part of the broader socioeconomically vulnerable populations which are targeted through poverty reduction schemes; however, climate-IDPs' specialized needs and vulnerabilities are generally neglected. Furthermore, lack of political will and a sense of ownership further exacerbates the situation. Bangladesh currently lacks a central ministerial focus on internal displacement and the related issues, and no single agency is responsible for collecting and reporting on disaster displacement and local integration outcomes. This discrepancy results for example in inconsistent or lack of data to provide targeted protection. With no actor taking ownership it is difficult to achieve a unified system that can provide effective services. Or as Sowgat et al. (2012) formulate it, "Collaboration is difficult to achieve without an effective collaborator." Addressing systemic failures, such as weak local governance, rule of law, and social protection systems, necessitates government

ownership and leadership. A 'whole-of-government' approach that involves all levels of government and cross-sectoral line ministries is therefore imperative.

The research has further revealed weak institutional capacity, coupled with a lack of financial resources allocated to climate displacement related issues and especially post-displacement durable solutions, challenging the ability to address local integration of climate-displaced populations. Additionally, a shortage of skilled personnel at local institutions, an inadequate number of personnel, and the lack of dedicated departments or focal persons hinder the effective implementation of inclusive urban planning schemes.

And lastly, the presence of numerous actors at the local level, many of whom overlap and administer functions within the jurisdiction of local government authorities, weakens the central role of local government. That is, local government institutions such as KCC and KDA in Khulna have to work alongside with central government field offices but often hold comparatively less authority to play a strong coordination role. A lack of clear guidelines for the functional responsibilities of different local institutions exacerbates this problem.

3.4 The further a policy has to trickle down, the less it does

A significant finding of the study is that availability and effectiveness of policies tends to diminish as they trickle down through different levels of governance in the multi-level policy context. That is, the study showed that while the international policy architecture provides a wealth of provisions and guidelines, the further these standards are supposed to reach, the less practically applicable they become. Regional and national levels still adopt and integrate these international standards to some extent, as evidenced by the numerous policy documents in Bangladesh that explicitly reference higher-level frameworks, but already to a quantitatively lesser extent than the international level.

The local level rarely integrates or effectively implements those proposed international and national frameworks as indicated by the near lack of city action plans and strategies in Khulna to implement the national strategies, either due to being too far removed from the local context and therefore becoming impracticable, or due to lack of financial resources allocated to the sub-national levels, or due to political will and a parallel lack of integrated systems that would enforce the adherence to the broader measures. In fact, although local governments are meant to ensure the implementation for example of the National Strategy for Internal Displacement Management (NSIDM) through the preparation of local action plans, this has to date been neglected in Khulna city. Instead, city plans continue focusing predominantly on infrastructures and spatial urban development that does not respect the growing demands of socioeconomically vulnerable climate migrants arriving in the city. Therefore, against the expectations that cities could function as a laboratory of local solutions and innovations, the study has

found that local institutions have in practice no scope to develop effective governance frameworks in the shadows of the dominant central government and with the lack of resources to make an actual difference. Thus, ineffective localization of policies, whereby international and national policies are meant to be translated into local policies and actionable measures taking into account the specific local context, is so far legging behind.

Overall, to achieve the effective integration and implementation of climate displacement-related policies in multi-level governance systems it requires an effective decentralization system. However, weak advocacy for reform and a lack of clear advocates both within civil society and among policy-making circles at the central level obstruct any progress in making systemic changes. Additionally, political resistance to decentralization reforms due to concerns about the potential weakening of established powers and the present status quo has been argued to stall reform efforts (e.g. Rudra and Sardesai, 2009).

4. Final Recommendations

The study on climate-induced internal displacement in Bangladesh has revealed significant challenges which necessitate comprehensive solutions. To effectively protect and assist climate-induced internally displaced populations, the following recommendations should therefore be considered for managing displacement due to climate change:

Text Box 3: Key Policy Recommendations to improve the management of climate-displacement and local integration of climate-displaced populations

1. Climate Change Adaptation through local integration

1.1. Prioritize measures reducing the post-displacement socioeconomic vulnerabilities of climate-displaced populations alongside with their host communities
1.2. Tackle the root causes of vulnerability through redistributive measures and the reduction of inequality
1.3. Use a developmental approach to ensure that the human rights of climate-IDPs are ensured in the long term

2. Bridging the gap between de jure policy intents and de facto local implementation

2.1. Integrate local integration into urban development planning
2.2. Ensure the participation of climate displacement-affected populations in urban planning and decision-making processes
2.3. Increase the political will of officials by involving them into climate displacement-related activities and by setting up multi-stakeholder collective discussion forums
2.4. Assign a dedicated climate-displacement focal person and/or a local integration sub-department under the disaster management department in the local government structures

3. Reducing vertical mismatches between different levels of governance and horizontal mismatches between local stakeholders

3.1. Reduce mismatches by creating a domain-specific cross-level institution dealing with climate-displacement and local integration of climate-IDPs, including to provide oversight and guidance for the localization of national and international strategies
3.2. Foster accountability at all levels
3.3. Involve local governments in international and national processes
3.4. Ensure the adequate distribution of resources and increase budget allocations to local governments to address the local integration of climate-displaced populations
3.5. Foster coordination and partnership between the different local stakeholders

4. Making policies trickle down through their effective localization

4.1. Enhance the localization of policies and strategies by taking into consideration the local fabric of actors, vulnerabilities, capacities, and resources
4.2. Strengthen the authority of local government institutions, especially KCC and KDA, through statutory laws and build their institutional capacity
4.3. Consider merging KCC and KDA under the same coordinating committee to make urban planning more effective
4.4. Improve coordination between the multiplicity of different local actors to avoid duplication of services and increase effective service provision
4.5. Leverage the practical knowledge and connectedness of development actors to integrate institutionalized urban solutions
4.6. Set up systems that allow the monitoring of climate-displacement, including urban registration systems and a shared 'Master-Database' where all involved stakeholders insert up-to-date data. KCC should be in charge of such systems and coordinate knowledge sharing
4.7. Encourage local governments to experiment with creative solutions and participative innovations to develop effective local approaches to integrating displaced populations
4.8. Include informal citizen networks such as the CDC clusters to represent climate-IDPs in local decision-making

Conclusion: Critical Reflection and Ways Forward

This thesis delved into the complex and multifaceted issues of climate-induced internal displacement, focusing on Bangladesh as a national case study with Khulna serving as a subnational case study to assess the local challenges for climate-IDPs. The paper's journey commenced by establishing the theoretical framework that outlines the functioning of public institutions and their rather insignificant role in safeguarding the rights of climate-IDPs. Subsequently, the paper embarked on a two-fold analysis, first scrutinizing the *de jure* dimension by identifying international, national, and subnational policies and institutional structures, followed by an investigation of the *de facto* dimension involving challenges encountered by city representatives and climate-IDPs in their daily experiences as part of the empirical contribution of the paper.

The research unveiled a stark divergence between the *de jure* provisions set forth especially in international and national policies and the *de facto* experiences of climate-IDPs. While there exist well-articulated policy frameworks aimed at protecting these climate-induced internally displaced populations, individuals continue facing high barriers to local integration as evidenced by their persistent high socioeconomic vulnerabilities. This dissonance between the theoretical underpinnings and the realities faced by climate-IDPs is arguably rooted in various factors, including institutional weaknesses, a lack of political will, mismatches across different levels of governance, as well as overlapping jurisdictions that intersect local public institutions, higher level ministerial departments, and development actors.

However, attributing the blame solely to institutional failure would oversimplify the situation. At the individual level, city representatives have demonstrated awareness of the challenges posed by climate-induced displacement and have expressed genuine concern and political will to improve the situation for affected populations. Conversely, certain services provided by local public institutions could reach individuals more effectively if climate-IDPs themselves took more proactive steps to register in their destination cities. Nevertheless, both scenarios face significant systemic obstacles that hinder positive outcomes. For example, individual local officers find themselves entangled in a larger bureaucratic and political machine that perpetuates systemic inequality and centralizes power, limiting their ability to instigate local changes and implement necessary reforms. On the other hand, climate-IDPs experience spontaneous displacement without the existence of a well-established system to guide their relocation to new cities and support the process of local integration. Consequently, many climate-IDPs lack awareness of essential procedures, such as registration in their destination city. In summary, addressing the root causes of vulnerability across society and developing inclusive bureaucratic systems tailored to the specific needs and challenges of these populations remains essential.

The study also shed light on the intricate nature of integration. Local integration appears to be more of an automatic process rather than a conscious strategy. More specifically, climate-IDPs do not actively seek integration into host communities but naturally assimilate into them. This intricacy underscores the importance of further research to assess the efficacy of implementing active local integration measures to facilitate the transformation of climate-IDPs' maladaptation into adaptation. This study provides valuable suggestions on how to streamline this facilitated process for affected populations, but it is beyond the scope of this research to definitely determine the impact of these suggestions.

Moreover, while this thesis has predominantly examined the role of public institutions in protecting climate-IDPs, there is room for further exploration of the contributions of non-state actors in fostering the resilience of climate-IDPs within urban settings. It has been argued before, that development actors, rather than contributing to resilience, may actually have the opposite effect of making individuals aid dependent. It would therefore be interesting to investigate how the institutionalization of solutions introduced by development actors (such as the registration booth mentioned above), holds the potential to create long-term, tangible impacts on the lives of those displaced by climate change.

Furthermore, although climate-induced internal displacement looms as a critical issue with far-reaching implications for urban areas and demographic shifts, it is vital to recognize that other populations might be neglected in this discussion. For example, 'trapped populations' and immobility represent equally significant facets of the broader climate change literature and policy response dimensions. That is, often the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are those who cannot relocate, and *in-situ* solutions must be part of a holistic strategy to build resilient societies. True resilience therefore entails not only the ability to migrate, but also the capacity to withstand and adapt to climate-induced *in-situ* challenges within existing communities.

Overall, this thesis demonstrated the importance of rendering institutional mandates more effective by enhancing inclusive and creative urban planning and intertwining these mandates with local integration realities to advance climate adaptation traditions and foster community resilience. The approximation of *de jure* intents and *de facto* realities may offer a pathway towards a more sustainable future in urban areas, not only for climate-IDPs in Bangladesh, but also in other parts of the world where cities struggle to accommodate ever increasing climate-displaced populations.

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Annexures

I. Field Research: Photo Archive

Monsoon rain rushing down on Greenland

Greenland residents taking a bath in the adjacent river

Greenland housing sheds

A local garbage dump in Greenland

Water tapping station in Greenland

Submersible pump for clean drinking water in Greenland

Example of a 'one-stop-shop' in Greenland

A Greenland resident collecting waste with a carriage donated by development actors (Brac, KfW, Caritas)

Pot Song Community Awareness activity about climate change and the registration booth for climate-IDPs in Ward 31 of Khulna (by the UMIMCC project, implemented through ESOLVE NGO)

Registration Booth and Database book in Ward 31



Information Hub at the DSS office in Khulna

Rayer Mahal survey participants waiting for their turn to be interviewed

II. Tool used to conduct the Key Informant Interviews (KII)

The following questionnaire was developed to guide the Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with selected city representatives from Khulna City Corporation (KCC), Khulna Development Authority (KDA), and the Department of Social Services (DSS).

Guideline on conducting the KIIs regarding the integration of climate migrants in Khulna city

Area/District	:	**Khulna** (Ward xxx, Settlement xxx)
Anticipated number of respondents	:	**2 - 3**
Mode of response	:	**On-paper or oral (semi-structured interview)**
Mode of Contact:	:	**In-person**
Questionnaire developed by	:	**Laurien Quirós**
Survey Conducted by:	:	**Laurien Quirós, with support of translator**
Period	:	**From 15th July till 31st July 2023**

1. Introduction:

Upon arrival in Khulna, many Climate Migrants struggle to adapt to the urban context and face high poverty and difficult living conditions in urban informal settlements. To understand their specific challenges and potential pathways for their successful local integration, the survey is interested in better understanding the bottlenecks and opportunities at institutional level. The research team will therefore conduct key informant interviews (KIIs) with officials of the Khulna City Corporation (KCC) in order to capture the meso-level perspective on effective local integration to make migration a viable adaptation strategy in the long run.

2. Purpose/Objectives of the study and questionnaire:

The study aims to identify the drivers and barriers that climate migrants face to successfully integrate into the city of Khulna. Thereby, this study hopes to contribute to a greater understanding regarding how to render Khulna and similar hotspot cities a home to those individuals who have to migrate due to climate change.

The questionnaire at hand seeks to guide the interviews with city representatives.
The main objectives of this survey are to gain a broader systemic understanding of critical factors that need to be addressed to increase the social, economic, and political empowerment of these climate displaced persons.

Other objectives include:

- To understand bottlenecks, challenges but also potential opportunities of Khulna to effectively integrate climate migrants
- To understand the legal and policy framework(s) that are currently being adopted at Khulna city level
- To understand the level of cooperation between national and city levels, as well as within the city of Khulna between different city actors
- To understand what current level of awareness and urgency is felt by Khulna city regarding the climate migrant integration issue
- To identify the appropriate support measures needed by the cities to help ultimately ease the barriers faced by climate migrants

3. Interview Questionnaire

Basic Information	**Questionnaire Identification Number:**
(First Name, Last Name): …… Gender: □ female □ male □ non-binary Current position at KCC: …… How long have you been working in this position?…… How are you involved in climate migration and/or urban integration of vulnerable poor at KCC? ….. …… Contact information: ……	

Sl	Questions
General understandings of climate migration and integration	
1.	Who do you consider a climate migrant in Bangladesh, or in Khulna specifically?
2.	From Khulna city's perspective, what would you consider 'successful/achieved' integration of climate migrants in your city?
3.	According to your professional experience, did you observe that climate migrants face different challenges to integrate in the city than non-climate related migrants? a) If so, what are their specific challenges when arriving in Khulna?
4.	What Opportunities or Benefits do you see for incorporating climate migrants in urban management frameworks?
Institutional context	
5.	What **strategies or plans** is KCC currently adopting, developing, or planning to adopt to address the challenges of climate migrant integration?
6.	What **Institutional Measures** is your organization currently already taking to facilitate the integration of climate migrants into your city? (or to effectively address climate migration) a) *Reception* and *registration system*? (who is/would be in charge of it?) b) *Tracking* and following up on climate migrants after their arrival in Khulna? (how?) c) Is there a *Monitoring & Evaluation* system in place to ensure support to CMs? d) Is there a dedicated *Focal Person* in place overseeing the integration process?
7.	What **Challenges** does your institution face to receive and support climate migrants in their integration process?
8.	What do you think could help your institution to resolve these challenges? What type of **support** would KCC need to better address these issues and more effectively integrate climate migrants?
9.	Which other institutions apart from yours do you know work on climate-induced displacement and integration of vulnerable poor migrants in Khulna? a) Is there regular exchange between your institution and the ones you mentioned? – Why/Why not?
10.	Among all the institutions working on this issue in Khulna, who is mainly responsible for decision-making and coordination of climate-induced displacement and the reception/registration or integration of vulnerable poor climate migrants (for instance with

	regards to registration, access to public social services, employment support, etc.)? a) Which institution do you think '*should*' be responsible for this?
11.	Do you know of any community initiatives that support climate migrants? For instance, are you aware of any mobilization among climate migrants themselves or the slum communities to help climate migrants integrate?
Cooperation context between national and city levels	
12.	In your personal opinion, how effectively are national strategies for climate displacement implemented at local level? (for example, the National Strategy on Internal Displacement Management 2021 and its Action Plan)
13.	How do you qualify the exchange between national policy-making and the local level urban management of climate migration in Khulna: a) Is there communication and support from the central government to address climate migration in Khulna? b) How high is the budget from the central government for Khulna to address climate migration? c) What are institutional constraints to prioritize this issue in Khulna?
Bottleneck issues and potential durable solutions	
14.	In your view, how can marginalized groups in informal settlements, including climate migrants and IDPs, be more effectively connected to the **public social and infrastructural** city network to facilitate their integration?
15.	In your personal opinion, what options are there to resolve the issue of **property rights** for slum residents, including climate migrants? Are there any plans to address this issue at city-level? a) For example, do you think resettlement to formal sites could be a solution?
16.	To what extent do you believe the planned **economic zones** could help the economic integration of climate migrants?
17.	What other **durable solutions** do you think could help prevent climate migrants to get stuck in prolonged displacement and help them better integrate in Khulna? (For example, decentralization of urban growth centers, including urban slums?)

III. Tool used to conduct the Climate Migrant Survey (CMS)

Guideline on conducting the survey regarding the integration of climate migrants in Khulna city

Area/District	:	**Khulna** (Ward xxx, Settlement xxx)
Anticipated number of participants	:	**30**
Mode of response	:	**Written or Oral (structured interview)**
Mode of Contact:	:	**In-person**
Guideline Developed by	:	**Laurien Quirós**
Survey Conducted by:	:	**Laurien Quirós, supported by translator**
Duration	:	**From 15th July till 31st July 2023**

1. Introduction:

Upon arrival in Khulna, many Climate Migrants struggle to adapt to the urban context and face high poverty and undignified living conditions in the slums of the city. To understand their specific challenges, the conditions, and expectations for successful integration, the survey will ask a number of questions to the climate migrants in order to capture the micro-level perspective on effective integration to make migration a viable adaptation strategy.

2. Purpose/Objectives of the Survey guideline and study:

The study aims to identify the drivers and barriers that climate migrants face to successfully integrate into the city of Khulna. Thereby, this study hopes to contribute to a greater understanding regarding how to render Khulna and similar hotspot cities a home to individuals who have to migrate due to climate change.

The guideline at hand seeks to provide a simple and clear overview of the proper process, methods, and steps of the planned study. It also includes the final questionnaire to be used for the survey.
The main objectives of this survey are to gain a broader systemic understanding of critical factors that need to be addressed to increase the social, economic, and political empowerment of these climate displaced persons.

Other objectives include:

- To understand original expectations and motivations of climate migrants before coming to Khulna;
- To understand climate migrants' current status and situation regarding the difficulties/challenges/ barriers for effective integration in Khulna;
- To identify the appropriate support measures needed by climate migrants;
- To help ease the challenges/ barriers faced by climate migrants by identifying key recommendations for policymakers

3. Methodology and Sampling

The survey will be documented using the following methods;

- Observation of slum realities (Inception Phase)
- Identification of Climate Migrants in Slums of Khulna (Hotspot Mapping, Social Mapping)
- Stratified random sampling of climate migrants in 2 hotspot slums
- Dissemination of Questionnaire

- If required, oral structured interviews with those who cannot fill out the questionnaire

The survey will employ a mixture of qualitative and quantitative questions. The qualitative open-ended questions will address the issues that require further insight in an exploratory nature. In addition, the questionnaire will employ closed-ended questions such as image statements, basic habits, etc.

4. Time for each respondent:

Maximum 30-40 Minutes per respondent

- Identify the preferred modality of individuals to answer the questions (written/oral)

5. Flow chart for conducting the alternative oral structured interview:



6. Survey Questionnaire

Basic Information	**Questionnaire Identification Number:**

(First Name, Last Name): ……

Current place of residence: ……

Contact information:
……

Age: ……

Gender: □ female □ male □ non-binary

Religious Denomination: □ Islam □ Hinduism □ Christianism □ Buddhism □ Other:
……..

Place of origin:
……

How long did you live at place of origin?
……

How long have you lived in Khulna since you first arrived?
……..

What is your family status?

□ Currently married (or in a marital-like relationship) & living together in Khulna
□ Currently married (or in a marital-like relationship), but NOT living together in Khulna (involuntarily)
□ Never married & never lived with someone in a marital-like relationship
□ Voluntarily separated or divorced
□ Widowed
□ I have …… children

Sl	Question
1. Survey questions focused on Climate Displacement	
1.1	What environmental challenges did you face at place of origin? a) □ soil erosion □ salinity □ cyclones □ drought □ typhoons □ floods □ sea level rise □ Heavy Rains □ Other: …… b) □ cyclone Sidr (2007) □ cyclone Aila (2009) □ Other specific events: ……
1.2	Were these environmental challenges the main reason for you to migrate? □ Yes □ No a) If no, what other factors contributed to your decision to migrate? ……

1.3	Did you consider or even try alternative mitigation or adaptation measures to solve the challenges before leaving home? (e.g. shared household livelihood, etc.) □ No □ Considered □ Tried a) What measures did you consider/try?..... ……
	Do you have left-behind family members who you support with material or financial contributions? (e.g. remittances)? □ Yes □ No
1.4	What did you have to leave behind/sacrifice by moving away from your home? (What were the losses and damages: e.g. cultivations, homesteads, family members, property, assets, documents?) …… ……
1.5	What were/are the benefits/gains for you to move away from your place of origin? …… ……
1.6	Is it the first time you migrate? □ Yes, first time □ No, I have migrated before a) If no, how often did you migrate before coming to Khulna? ……times
1.7	Are you planning to move again to a different city or village? □ Yes □ No □ Maybe a) If yes, which one? …… b) If no, why do you stay? ……
1.8	Are you planning to return home? □ Yes □ No □ Maybe a) If yes, why? …… b) If no, why not?
1.9	Did you come to Khulna all by yourself? □ Yes □ No a) If no, who came with you?.....

1.10	Why did you choose to come specifically to Khulna (and not another city or village)? Why did you choose this specific part of the city? …… ……
1.11	What were your expectations/hopes before coming to Khulna? …… ……
1.12	Were your expectations fulfilled since you arrived in Khulna? □ Yes □ No a) How? Or Why not? …… …… ……
2. Survey questions focused on Integration	
Personal understandings of 'integration' and a 'home' (subjective wellbeing)	
2.1	What does 'successful' integration mean to you? …… ……
2.2	What type of integration do you find most important (choose 3) □ political participation □ social network (friends/family/religious community) □ financial stability □ employment □ own property (house, land, animals,…) □ access to education □ access to health services □ recreational activities (sports, music, social clubs, etc.)
2.3	How satisfied are you with the level of integration you have reached compared to when you just arrived in Khulna? □ Very satisfied □ Rather satisfied □ Rather unsatisfied □ Very Unsatisfied
2.4	Would you say that your life has improved since you migrated to Khulna? □ Yes □ No □ Partly a) If yes/partly, how did it improve? ……

2.5	What makes you feel home somewhere? …… ……
2.6	Do you feel home in Khulna/your current residence? □ Yes □ No □ Partly a) Why? Or why not? …… ……. b) How are you planning to or did already adapt to your (new) home? …… ……
2.7	How happy are you with your current life? □ Very happy □ Rather happy □ Rather unhappy □ Very Unhappy
2.8	What are your current life priorities? …… ….. ….. a) Have your priorities changed compared to when you just arrived in Khulna? □ Yes □ No b) What were your priorities before coming to Khulna? …… ……
2.9	What hopes do you have for the future? ……

	…… …… …… ……
Means and Markers (material wellbeing)	
2.10	How satisfied are you with your current level of material wellbeing? □ Very satisfied □ Rather satisfied □ Rather unsatisfied □ Very Unsatisfied
2.11	Do you work? □ Yes □ No a) If yes, what type of work do you do?..... b) Is your job different from before migrating? □ Yes □ No c) How many hours do you work per day? ……hours d) How much did you earn before? per month: ……taka per day: ……taka e) How much do you earn now? per month: ……taka per day: ……taka f) What do you use your income for? …… …… ……. g) Is the money you earn enough to sustain yourself and your family? □ Yes □ No h) How many family members do you have to sustain? …… i) Did you take out any loan from a bank? □ Yes □ No j) Do you have any type of insurance (health, social security,…)? □ Yes □ No k) What obstacles are you facing regarding employment? …… …….. …… ……..

2.12	a) What type of housing do you live in? i. □ own house (private property) □ rental house ii. □ with own garden/land □ with own toilet/shower □ with own kitchen iii. □ multiple rooms □ single room iv. □ brick house □ tin shed □ mud/bamboo shed v. □ shared with others □ not shared b) Do you pay rent? □ Yes □ No c) If yes, how much rent do you pay every month? ……taka d) To whom do you pay the rent? …… e) Do you have a rental contract? …… f) Who lives with you? ……. g) How many people sleep in one room or bed? ……persons h) How satisfied are you with the living conditions of your house? □ Very satisfied □ Rather satisfied □ Rather unsatisfied □ Very Unsatisfied i) How satisfied are you with the living conditions of your community settlement? □ Very satisfied □ Rather satisfied □ Rather unsatisfied □ Very Unsatisfied j) What services do you have access to in your community? □ drainage □ electricity □ waste collection □ clean drinking water □ private toilet □ shared toilets □ private shower □ shared showers □ own house □ brick house □ nearby school/childcare □ nearby health clinic k) What difficulties do you face regarding your housing conditions? …… …….
Support systems for Integration	
2.13	Are you officially registered in Khulna? □ Yes □ No a) Why or why not? …… b) Are you registered elsewhere? □ Yes □ No c) If yes, where are you registered? □ place of origin □ Other: …….

2.14	Do you have all necessary Identification Papers (ID-card, ….) to receive public social services? □ Yes □ No a) If not, why not? ..... b) Which Identification Papers do you possess? ……
2.15	When you arrived in Khulna, did you have help to integrate in the city? □ Yes □ No a) If yes, what kind of support did you receive? …… …… ……. …… ……. b) Who helped you when you arrived in Khulna? …… …… …….
2.16	Did you receive or are you receiving any kind of support services by Khulna City Corporation (KCC)? □ Yes □ No a) If yes, what kind of support or service did you receive? …….. …… ……. …… ……. b) If yes, how did you know about the support? …… …… …….
2.17	Have you made use of any of the following services by DSS or KCC? *(tick all boxes that apply)* □ Information Hub □ Registration booth □ Public social services (e.g. widow allowance, etc.) □ Other? *Specify:* ……..
2.18	Did you receive or are you receiving support from community projects/initiatives in your settlement? □ Yes □ No

	a) If yes, what community project(s) (and by whom)? ……. …… ……. …… ……. b) If yes, how are you supported by them? …….. …… ……. c) If yes, how did you know about the project(s)? ……..
2.19	Do/Did you participate in local activities organized by NGOs or other residents? □ Yes □ No a) If so, which ones? …….. …… ……. b) If no, why not? ……
2.20	What (other) organizations or projects do you know exist in your community to support the residents? …… ……
2.21	How many close friends do you have in your current place of residence? (meaning people that you feel at ease with, can talk to about private matters, and can call on for help) □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 6 □ 7 or more How many of these friends do you see or talk to at least once every 2 weeks? □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 6 □ 7 or more
2.22	How many of your neighbors do you visit or talk to at least once every 2 weeks? □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 6 □ 7 or more
2.23	Do you belong to a church, temple, or other religious group? □ Yes □ No a) If yes: How many members of your religious group do you talk to at least once every 2 weeks? □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 6 □ 7 or more
2.24	Are you currently involved in regular volunteer work? □ Yes □ No

	a) If yes, how many people involved in this volunteer work do you talk to about volunteering-related issues at least once every 2 weeks? □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 6 □ 7 or more
2.25	Do you attend any classes (school, university, technical or vocational training, adult education, etc.) on a regular basis? □ Yes □ No a) How many fellow students or teachers do you talk to at least once every 2 weeks? (this includes in-class meetings) □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 6 □ 7 or more b) Does one or more of your children attend any of the above classes on a regular basis? □ Yes □ No □ I do not have children
2.26	What is your experience with local residents in your community? (Have they been supportive to you?) …… ……
2.27	What are the challenges you face to integrate? …… …… ……
2.28	What type of support do you need to better integrate? And from whom? …… …… ……

Thank you for your time! 😊

IV. Summarizing table of the challenges and opportunities to manage climate displacement from an institutional perspective

The table below shows the identified some themes that emerged during the interviews with KCC and KDA and some primary source referencing key challenges and solutions proposed by the interviewees. The table served personal purposes of the author to structure the interview contents and is not to be regarded as exhaustive table recapitulating all interview contents. The table provided the basis for *Fig.31* on page 100.

Category	Thematical Shortcomings	KCC		KDA	
		Description of Challenges	Proposed Solutions	Description of Challenges	Proposed Solutions
Institutional	Funding constraints	No funds from the central government allocated to KCC for climate migration or slum development (only for general basic services such as sanitation)	Increase the central government's budget allocations to City Corporations to deal with climate migration issues in the cities	"First of all, the budget comes from the national level from a gazette authority. … You cannot implement all of the things which are included in the master plan."	"So, we try to implement those things which value the most like a road network for improving regional connectivity."
		Usually, a contribution by KCC of 20% is expected by development partners (i.e. international organizations) for the implementation of development projects. However, no funds are available in KCC to pay for this margin due to little financial support from central government.			
	Lack of institutional capacities	Not enough skilled urban planners in KCC to tackle slum development	No solution given.	Both KCC and KDA are not capable enough to provide basic services to ever increasing climate migrant populations in Khulna. "I think our local government organization, let's say Khulna City Corporation, is not capable enough to provide the basic services. I mean, they are	No solution given.

				not capable enough as KDA is also not capable at all."	
				To provide direct services to Climate-IDPs: "…when people come to Khulna city, they try to live in a slum. It is not our property that is why we cannot provide any kind of the services and facilities in those particular places."	No solution given.
	Lack of involvement in climate migration issues	*Do you have a dedicated person who is hired to look after such people [climate migrants]?* "No, there is no such dedicated person."	Establish a dedicated department in KCC for "Slum Development", with a focal person appointed to deal specifically with climate migrants (currently only the Planning Department of the City Corporation is dealing with some issues related to spatial planning and accommodation) "A slum development wing should be opened and a dedicated person should be appointed there. Having a department that works with climate migrated people will be of great benefit to them."	"We are not much involved with climate migrants."[16] KDA can only include the climate migrant issues in planning if KCC takes initiative to propose relevant ideas.	But "recently we have taken other initiatives for targeting the lower income group of people in Khulna City. It is not about the Climate Migrants but for the lower income group of people."

[16] According to Sowgat (2012, 143), KCC has much more interaction with socioeconomically vulnerable households than KDA:
"While there are provisions that any individual can raise an objection about any planning proposals, the poor are unable to do this because they do not have regular access to the KDA or its planning department. **The KCC has better interaction with the citizens and the poor** but, under current mechanisms, it remains outside the plan-making process. Consequently, there is an enormous gap between the public and the plan-making authority."

	Lack of/inadequate monitoring provisions:	There is no monitoring systems in place for Climate migrants. Those coming to Khulna are not traced to understand where they settle or what employment they acquire. Also, no database exists to track progress in trainings provided to some of them from KCC.	Mainstream an effective system to register and trace arriving climate migrants (a registration booth is already being piloted in one slum (Ward 31), by GIZ.	"The problem is we don't have any proper documentation of the climate migrants… We don't know who is coming and who is going back."	No solution given.
				"…we have only 5 building monitoring inspectors that is not enough for monitoring."	"We are trying to develop a software so that we can monitor the development digitally."
	Lack of/inadequate policies	"First problem is the land where everything is being developed without any plan"	No solution given.	"Till now we do not have any specific plan for them [climate migrants] but definitely will have some policies for it."	"We will prepare the policy [at local level] then will need the approval of the government from the national level. Then the government will give some observations of our policies then we will correct those policies based on the observations and we will send it to the government again."
				"…the masterplan only shows where the residential places will be and where the commercial places will be in the future. […] So, it is a land use plan."	"…it also needs to provide the social services site in the master plan." "We … fixed some land for social services such as an elderly home or mental hospital."

				"…now in our country cyclones, floods are happening very frequently."	"As we are in the coastal region, we need to take different strategies for the climate migrants."
	Lack of inclusive planning (participation of climate migrants, inclusion of climate migration issue)			"No actually we don't involve the climate migrants directly…" "We do not include the CDC leaders."	"…but we involve our local level representatives to prepare the plan. When we prepare the plan, we arrange a workshop at the community level. Then they give their input. After analyzing their input, we try to include those in our plan." "We do include the "natural leaders" who already live in that particular place and know in detail about that particular place."
	Lack of transparency/accountability			"…all the initiatives are taken informally. To do it formally, you need a lot of money to implement different policies for them [climate migrants] in those slum areas."[17]	
Employment/Financial	Lack of preparedness for the urban labour market	Climate migrants coming to Khulna City "are not used to the	Climate migrants need to "adapt to the city		

[17] This informality is confirmed at least with regards to planning by Sowgat 2012, 142f.:
"The KCC does not produce any master plan for the city, but often improves or builds infrastructures. In these cases, the KCC communicates with the local poor through the elected ward commissioners who arrange meetings with the local people. However, **these meetings are informal**; ward commissioners listen to the needs and proposals of the poor and non-poor because their political constituency is dependent on the satisfaction of the poor. The poor discuss their issues with the ward commissioner and put forward their proposals before the commissioners pass these opinions to the decision makers in the KCC."

		environment of the city area. So, when they first arrive in Khulna City, they cannot drive the rickshaw properly, they cannot use different kinds of services and facilities, they cannot use mobile or toilets properly."	environment" to "change their standard of living"		
	Constraints in accessing the local labour market	"There are currently no other jobs in Khulna that any migrant can do."	Create job opportunities in Khulna by increasing the city's economic and industrial development	Constraints in accessing the labour market	"…if the government can create economic zones, it will provide many job opportunities for people. So, the climate migrants can go there for their income opportunity and they can improve their livelihood quality."
		The skills of climate migrants are not adapted to the available employment opportunities in the city.	Prepare climate migrants to work in the economic zones and other urban employment sectors through professional trainings (currently offered mainly by NGOs)		
	Constraints in accessing financial linkages			"…everyone is going to take their loans from different NGOs or micro-credit systems with high interest. …it is an informal process but it is difficult for them. And they are unable to pay for it."	To create formal crediting initiatives, "…the government can provide some loans to them so that they can recover their life. If the government provides interest free loans, it will be beneficial for them. But it is not happening."
Land/Housing	Lack of adequate spaces to accommodate climate-IDPs	"There is a gap between the plan preparation and the climate migrants' accommodation."	Three climate migrant colonies are proposed by the mayor to make up for the housing issue. The criteria for admission will be determined by landlessness and no income opportunities.	It will be a challenge for Khulna city to give space for those climate migrants in light of increasing disasters.	"…in a residential area we keep some space for lower- and middle-income groups of people so that they can come here and buy some space and land here."

					A development project has recently been submitted to the ministry of housing and public works for low-cost housing in Khulna.
	Lack of legal land tenure provisions	90% of slums have developed illegally on government land, so that when the government requires this land, it resorts to evictions of the residents. ▪ Permanent structures are not allowed on these lands as the government needs to be able to access the lands any time. Slum upgrading possibilities are therefore extremely limited. ▪ No relocation plans (only if international agencies offer their funds for this)	Instead of providing them with permanent structures (not allowed), IDs should be provided so that they can access the services and facilities provided by KCC.	"Actually, when people come to Khulna, they occupy the government land. The government cannot say that you can stay there. They stay there illegally."	No solution given.
	Lack of compensation for evicted IDPs			"…the government doesn't have any compensation for them" in case they have to evict slum residents.	"…the involvement of the Khulna City Corporation's Mayor has solved it. Because the Mayor is supporting them in many ways."
Awareness	Lack of awareness about available services	When arriving to Khulna city, climate migrants do not know about KCC's services	Offer an orientation program upon arrival of climate migrants (when registering at the new pilot registration booth)		

			Mobilize news channels to report about the services available to Climate Migrants and raise general awareness about challenges and opportunities of climate migrants "…job awareness system will be used and we will have to talk to big news media."		

V. Overview of key policy frameworks at various levels of governance and related to the climate change-urbanization-migration/displacement-local integration nexus (EXTERNAL APPENDIX: please contact the author)