

Democracy, Human Rights and Euromediterranean Citizenship: Has the «Arab Spring» Sparked a New Phase in the Evolution of Intercultural Dialogue?

Pietro de Perini*

1. Introduction

Intercultural dialogue (ICD) is a complex and multi-faceted policy instrument originally introduced by the European Union with the establishment of the Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. Within this context, the fundamental goal of ICD has been identified in bringing the peoples of the Mediterranean basin closer, by fostering exchanges between civil societies¹.

Over the years, however, the scope, strategic objectives and fields of application of intercultural dialogue have been driven by regional challenges and adapted to provide a complementary response to related policy needs, at times undergoing sensible changes.

A significant shift of this kind has occurred in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. In that framework, the EU had to cope with an increased security threat resulting also in exacerbated cultural tensions within and surrounding its borders. As a direct consequence, intercultural dialogue was prompted as a strategic tool to soften the related risks of possible clashes among Euro-mediterranean civilisations and, accordingly, its strategic conception and fields of actions have been revised to a sensible extent, towards security needs.

Similarly to the events following September 11 2001, also the momentous wave of unrest which has been shaking the Middle East and North Africa since December 2010 – what is broadly referred to as the «Arab Spring»² – has had a remarkable impact on regional dynamics, producing plenty of challenges to the relational environment between (and within) the two shores of the Mediterranean sea. Consistent with the considerations above, this article aims at evaluating if and to what extent intercultural dialogue has been affected by the implications sparked by these uprisings.

* MA in Institutions and Policies of Human Rights and Peace, University of Padua; PhD Candidate, Department of International Politics, City University, London.

¹ Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona, 27-28 November 1995.

² Besides «Arab Spring», which is the most popular term used to refer to those events, this article makes use of other alternative denominations, such as «Arab Awakening» and «Arab Uprising».

The argument sustained in this paper is that the Arab Spring has prompted a sensible shift in the overall strategic conception of Euromediterranean intercultural dialogue, characterised, in particular, by an innovative linkage of ICD with democracy and human rights and by an effort to build forms of regional citizenship. However, due to the yet limited diachronic arch of reference and to the dynamism of the current political situation, the empirical confirmation of this change will be only possible in a longer term. This argument is based on three interconnected considerations; each of them will be discussed separately in the three following sections.

First of all, the Arab Awakening has resulted in a paradigm shift in the European Union overall approach to the Mediterranean neighbourhood, which is characterised, in particular, by the promised prioritisation of the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law over stability and security-related interests. The new approach, on the one hand, incentivises and frames the adoption of a number of new strategic objectives for intercultural dialogue and, on the other hand, allows ICD to depart from the securitised scenario which had characterised its development in the post-September 11 Mediterranean.

Secondly, the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) – the main body tasked to drive the intercultural dialogue strategy throughout the region – has showed traces of sensible change in the action plan adopted in March 2012; the plan, which presents the ALF response to the changing social environment for the next three years, unveils a revised strategic approach and a number of new ambitious goals and related projects.

Thirdly, the large and unprecedented mobilisation of civil society in many countries, which represents one of the most significant and irreversible changes within the whole Arab Spring process, constitutes also a concrete «shift factor» in the reconceptualisation and in the prospective implementation of future intercultural dialogue. In particular, some of the persisting problems identified in the development of a Euromediterranean civil society appear reduced by the extent of ground-breaking civil engagement in the Arab world. Accordingly, intercultural interaction can be pushed beyond the already wide number of civil society organisations already interested and involved in dialogic action, striving for affecting broader communities and societies in the region.

As an introductory methodological remark, the article focuses only on those elements that have a direct relevance for the strategic and conceptual dimensions of intercultural dialogue as a Euromediterranean policy instrument. As for its practical implementation, this paper will make only some limited assumptions. As anticipated, the sustainability and application of the renewed ICD strategy depends, to a large extent, on both how the dynamic situation incepted by the Arab Spring in the region will evolve and how the EU will deliver its promises in the long term. At the present moment, as it has been recently put, «the region remains in a state of flux and the only predictable short-term scenario is one of uncertainty»³.

2. The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy and Its Implications for Intercultural Dialogue

The first dual claim to be discussed is that the Arab Spring has resulted in a «paradigm shift» in the European Union overall approach to the Mediterranean neighbourhood and that the new approach, on the one hand, incentivises and frames the adoption of a number of new strategic objectives for intercultural dialogue and, on the other hand, allows ICD to depart from the securitised scenario which had characterised its development in the post-September 11 Mediterranean.

As a consequence, this section aims at assessing if and why the revision of EU policies towards the Mediterranean in light of the Arab Uprising may be considered as a real change – a «paradigm shift» – with regards to the previous approach and, accordingly, at evaluating the implications of policy change on the conception of intercultural dialogue.

In this regard, the early implications of the Arab Spring are to be analysed and framed in what is currently the engine of the broad Euromediterranean policy framework: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), mostly with reference to its southern dimension⁴. Adopted in 2003 to address the challenges of the 2004 EU enlargement and to complement a fading Euromediterranean Partnership⁵, this policy has, in fact, provided the only tools with which the EU has been able to react to the evolving scenario, although with a disputed timing⁶. Accordingly, the events of 2011 showed the inadequacy of pre-

³ R. Balfur, *Changes and Continuities in EU-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring*, in S. Biscop, R. Balfur, M. Emerson (eds.), *An Arab Springboard for EU Foreign Policy?*, «Egmont Paper», n. 54, July 2012, p. 27.

⁴ The European Neighbourhood Policy is proposed to 16 countries in the south and in the east of EU borders. The strategic documents, however, underline the importance of regional cooperation and *de facto* divide ENP into two dimensions: Mediterranean and Eastern.

⁵ The Euromediterranean Partnership has formally ceased to exist with the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, which was intended as an effort to revitalise the Partnership itself.

⁶ A. Echagüe, H. Michou, B. Mikail, *Europe and the Arab Uprisings: EU Vision versus Member State Action*, in «Mediterranean Politics», vol. 16, no. 2, July 2011, p. 329.

existing instruments to cope with the unprecedented challenges in action⁷, European institutions have identified the ENP also as the most suitable context to revise their strategy for the Mediterranean. From then on, the design of that revision has gradually affected all the other EU policy areas and institutions that could have contributed to fulfil the objectives of the new approach.

An example of this pattern comes from the response of the other major regional initiative, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). To be sure, the UfM did not have any real chance to intervene during the first uprisings: following two years of deadlock caused mainly by worsened relations between Arabs and Israelis⁸, the project was deprived of any political guidance and it was certainly unable to gather all the 43 Euromediterranean heads of state in a period of regime change and dictators' ousting. However, the ENP revision, triggered by the Arab Spring, has also resulted in a recovery of the Union for the Mediterranean, as a complementary tool of the new strategic approach. Thus, the UfM has launched a number of programmes and projects – one, for instance, aims at supporting women's empowerment in Mediterranean universities – with the goal of responding to incoming challenges and contributing coherently to the path outlined in the renewed neighbourhood policy.

Consistent with this example, also other policy initiatives with a Mediterranean dimension have aligned their contributions, competence and resources to the objectives laid out in the revised ENP. Intercultural dialogue, as a EU policy instrument in the Mediterranean, could not be exception to that trend. For instance, in the aftermath of the uprisings, there have been meetings and cooperation agreements between the European Commission and the Anna Lindh Foundation and the definition of significant general objectives for some regional ICD programmes⁹. Moreover, as better discussed in the next section, the operational response of the Foundation to the uprisings shows coherence and complementarity to the goals of the revised approach. In this regard, therefore, the new policy vision constitutes both an incentive and a frame for the definition of new and more ambitious objectives for intercultural dialogue. More significantly, the nature of change occurred in the Neighbourhood Policy has implied also a prospective shift in the overall strategic orientation of ICD. In order to understand

⁷ On this issue, see E. Lannon, *The Responses of the European Union to the Changes in Its Neighbourhood*, in IEMed, *Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors (2011)*, Barcelona, IEMed, 2012, p. 128.

⁸ R. Hollis, *The UfM and the Middle East «Peace Process»: An Unhappy Symbiosis*, in «Mediterranean Politics», vol. 16, no. 1, March 2011, pp. 97-114.

⁹ Reference is here made, respectively, to the Meeting of the High Level Advisory Group for a Renewed Strategy of Intercultural Dialogue in the Emerging Mediterranean and to the objective of the new phase (2010-2013) of the Euromed Youth Programme (see below).

this transformation, however, it is necessary to analyse the real elements of originality that can be found in the new policy framework.

The present European vision for its southern neighbourhood has been laid out in two consecutive and complementary joint communications by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The first one, proposing the establishment of a new *Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*¹⁰, was adopted in March 2011. The document calls for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the EU and its neighbours. This headway has to be based on a strong support to the processes of democratisation and institution-building under way, more resources to empower civil society active participation in those processes and an increased commitment to sustainable growth and economic development. The new «partnership» has to be committed to shared values and to be «more focused, innovative and ambitious, addressing the needs of the people and the realities on the ground»¹¹. The second joint communication, adopted on 25 May 2011, has been entitled *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*¹². The document, which extends the new vision also to eastern neighbour countries, complements the strategy outlined in the previous communication, defines with more precision the new objectives and fields of intervention and provides the mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver those targets in the short and medium term.

However, beyond the specific goals and the related actions set forth in these documents, the innovation of the revised ENP has been claimed to lie on three contextual principles: «differentiation», «conditionality» (or «more for more») and «mutual accountability». The first means that the EU will adopt a tailor-made support according to the needs and the degree of commitment of each partner country; the second principle implies that greater support from the EU (more money, more market access and more mobility) will depend on the progress made by partners toward reforms in fields such as democracy building, human rights protection, fight against corruption and judicial reforms. The third principle, instead, points out that both the EU and its neighbour countries will be equally accountable for fulfilling their respective commitments in the outlined framework.

¹⁰ Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*, 8 March 2011, COM(2011) 200 final.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*, 25 May 2011, COM(2011) 303.

As a general consideration, the new approach does not appear sensibly innovative in terms of objectives and principles. The crucial position of human rights and democratic reforms has been put at the core of political and security dialogue between the EU and its partners since 1995, when multidimensional regional relations were established through the Euromediterranean Partnership¹³. Similarly, the importance of civil society interactions to foster bottom-up participation in Euromediterranean dynamics has been repeatedly acknowledged, and their empowerment encouraged, throughout the various phases of regional cooperation.

To be honest, in the two strategic documents insistent reference is made to the need of building «deep democracies». This new term is employed to describe substantial, comprehensive and long-lasting democratic systems where human rights, the independence of the judicial and the accountability of police and army forces is granted. However, recognising a commitment of that kind as a novelty risks to be counterproductive for the credibility of the overall revision of EU Mediterranean policies, as a sort of implicit admission of guilt: what human rights and democracy have the European institutions promoted so far in the region if a commitment to a «deep» democracy is to be intended as a remarkable innovation?

With regards to the principles, moreover, even the insistence on conditionality, being it positive or negative, and the refusal of the «one-size-fits-all» approach embodied by the «differentiation» principle are not entirely innovative. In fact, similar principles were already among the fresh elements distinguishing the ENP from the EMP, when the former was launched in 2003¹⁴.

Conversely, what appear to be the most meaningful innovations within the new approach are, on the one hand, the significant increase in the amount of human and financial resources allocated to support previous programmes and new initiatives and, on the other hand, the formal introduction of the principle of mutual accountability, after having considered its necessity in a previous communication of 2007¹⁵. Since the article is mainly focused on the conceptual dimension of the debate, the second point becomes the most crucial.

Indeed, this paper considers the principle of mutual accountability as the main tool that allows considering what has been so far described as a sort of re-focused and more resourced revival

¹³ A thorough analysis of the Euromediterranean Partnership is provided in S.C. Calleya, *Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2005.

¹⁴ R. Balfur, *Changes and Continuities...*, cit., p. 30; also D. Kochenov, *The ENP Conditionality: Pre-Accession Mistakes Repeated*, in L. Delcour, E. Tulmets (eds.), *Pioneer Europe? Testing EU Foreign Policy in The Neighbourhood*, Baden, Nomos, 2008.

¹⁵ Communication from the Commission, *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy*, 5 December, 2007, COM(2007) 774 final.

of a pre-existing policy, as a «paradigm shift», as called for by the European Parliament in a resolution on the subject¹⁶. There are two reasons to sustain this claim.

First of all, the principle implies that, for the first time, the EU has accepted to set the evaluation of its seriousness before its partners on its own capacity and commitment to deliver its promises. Conversely, until recently, the ENP has been often criticised for using double standards and for showing a big distance between its rhetoric statements and promises and their practical implementation on the ground, especially with regards to the promotion of values and norms in the Mediterranean¹⁷. Similarly, the EU has never officially claimed its accountability over the reluctance in applying «negative conditionality» (that is, in essence, the suspension of economic benefits) to protect violated human rights in neighbour countries, especially with regards to its relations with Israel¹⁸. In this context, the quick establishment and implementation of a number of new and well resourced programmes¹⁹ to support, among others, the democratic participation of civil society and other social actors in transition processes can be read as an early evidence in support of a major shift in that direction.

Secondly, the formal introduction of the principle of mutual accountability can be further observed as the implicit acknowledgement by European institutions of the mistakes committed over years with regards to the their partners. This sort of *mea culpa* is even more evident in the words of Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy; in a speech in front of the European Parliament, held on 14 June 2011, he has acknowledged that, in fact, Europe has often been focused on stability at the expense of the objectives and values it claimed to promote towards their neighbourhood, underlining the pressing necessity of aligning EU interests with its values²⁰.

These two implications of the principle of mutual accountability bring about a very significant change in the overall EU approach to the region. On the admission of European institutions themselves²¹, there is the acceptance of the need to move from a stability-based and interest-oriented management of Euromediterranean relations to an approach that puts democracy, human rights, inclusive growth at the top and, accordingly, considers stability as either a complementary commitment or a

¹⁶ European Parliament, Resolution of 7 July 2011 on EU external policies in favour of democratisation (P7_TA(2011)0334).

¹⁷ S. Panebianco, *The Constraints on EU Action as a «Norm Exporter» in the Mediterranean*, in O. Elgström, M. Smith (eds.), *The European Union's Roles in International Politics Concepts and Analysis*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2006, pp. 136-154.

¹⁸ N. Tocci, *The Conflict and EU-Israeli Relations*, in E. Bulut Aymat (ed.), *European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, «Chaillot Papers», December 2010, pp. 55-63.

¹⁹ On 27 September 2011, the European Commission has adopted a package of four programmes to support the following goals of the new Neighbourhood Policy: democracy, growth, job creation, microfinance and higher education, allocating a total budget of more than € 450 million.

²⁰ Š. Füle, *Revolutionising the European Neighbourhood Policy in Response to Tougher Mediterranean Revolutions*, round table discussion organised by Members of the European Parliament, 14 June 2011 (SPEECH/11/436).

²¹ Besides the quoted speech, a similar acknowledgement is included in the already mentioned resolution of the European Parliament of 7 July 2011.

direct consequence of this choice. Therefore, these are the real motivations that allow reckoning the recent revision of the EU Mediterranean policy framework as a «paradigm shift» and not as a cheap adjustment of past trends. At the same time, however, the substance and sustainability of this significant change will have to be confirmed by a EU transparent commitment in that direction, even in light of prospective undesired political outcomes within the countries involved in transitions or revolts. What argued so far is also crucial for the development of intercultural dialogue. In fact, as briefly anticipated in the introduction, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the overall approach of the European Union in the Mediterranean area has been mainly focused on how to cope with a magnified number of imminent security threats for the region. Those threats, which have not been overcome yet, included international terrorism, irregular migration flows, the increase of racism and xenophobia in European societies and the consequences of the failure of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, just to mention a few. Among their consequences, those challenges resulted also in increased cultural tensions and stereotypes especially between «Western» and Christian Europeans and Arab and Muslim populations²².

With regards to intercultural dialogue, the European strategic response has been that of increasing the visibility and the resources dedicated to this instrument which, by operating for dialogue and mutual knowledge through exchanges between civil societies, was expected to play a key role both to invert the negative polarisation among peoples between and within the two shores of the Mediterranean sea and to build up a sense of common belonging²³. As a consequence, on the one hand, ICD has resulted significantly empowered by the new strategic orientation called for by European institutions; on the other hand, the urgent and strategic interest acquired by ICD in the new securitised²⁴ scenario have inevitably resulted in tighter governmental control and monitoring as well as in a reduction of the influence of non-governmental groups in the definition of intercultural dialogue goals, methods and priority fields²⁵. For some observers, that shift of ICD towards security interests has also compromised the original ideals on which it is based²⁶. Whether the evolution undergone by intercultural dialogue has compromised its ideal or just increased its visibility and

²² S. Stetter, *The Politics of De-Paradoxification in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Semantic and Structures of «Cultural Dialogue»*, in M. Pace, T. Schumacher (eds.), *Conceptualising Cultural and Social Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Area. A European Perspective*, Oxon, Routledge, 2007, pp. 53-70.

²³ The seminal document for this phase of intercultural dialogue is the Report of the High-Level Advisory Group established at the initiative of the President of the European Commission, *Dialogue Between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area*, Brussels, October 2003.

²⁴ An issue can be said to be «securitised» when it is constructed into a security threat; see B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. De Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder-London, Lynne Rienner, 1998.

²⁵ For instance, with regards to the Anna Lindh Foundation, the heads of the networks of civil society in some countries have been chosen among governmental bodies or quasi-governmental organisations.

²⁶ H. Malmvig, *Security through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures*, in M. Pace, T. Schumacher (eds.), *Conceptualising Cultural and Social Dialogue...*, cit., pp. 71-86.

opportunities, it is undeniable that, also in this case, stability interests have been prioritised at the expense of the claimed commitment to bring people closer in order to promote understanding between them and improve their perception of each other²⁷. Accordingly, the implications inferred from the analysis of the principle of mutual accountability constitute also a claim in support of the argument of this paper: the prioritisation of values over stability and security-interests promised by the European institutions allows intercultural dialogue to change again its strategic conception, yet maintaining the visibility, expertise and resources acquired in more than 15 years of implementation. It is significant, in this regard, that a first strong statement in favour of shared responsibility in the Mediterranean was called for 10 years before, in the final declaration of the scientific committee of the first symposium on intercultural dialogue organised by the European Commission in 2002²⁸.

3. The Anna Lindh Foundation and Its New Action Plan: Continuity and Innovations

The second consideration, to be discussed in this section, is that the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) has responded to the dynamic situation in the region by adopting a new work plan that unveils a revised strategic approach and a number of new ambitious goals for intercultural dialogue.

Before discussing the innovative elements of the recently adopted plan, however, a preliminary analysis of the position of the ALF in the broad Euromediterranean intercultural dialogue strategy is provided. In fact, the Foundation is not the only initiative prompting ICD in the area. Rather, the latter is to be conceived as a sum of overlapping layers which are contemporaneously promoted throughout the region. The ALF is the latest, in chronological order, among those layers.

The Anna Lindh Foundation was established in Alexandria, Egypt, in summer 2005. Its creation was decided by Euro-mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the basis of the recommendations contained in a report prepared by a Group of High-Level Experts (*Groupe des Sages*). The latter had been tasked by the then President of the European Commission to study a comprehensive and effective regional strategy for

²⁷ Barcelona Declaration (1995), cit.

²⁸ European Commission (DG Education), Declaration of the Scientific Committee of the Symposium «Intercultural Dialogue», Bruxelles, 20-21 March 2002.

the development of intercultural dialogue throughout the Mediterranean area, in a post-September 11 scenario. According to the report, adopted in 2003, the ALF was to be conceived as the only joint institutional body in which turning the theoretical principles of dialogue presented by the experts into feasible action²⁹.

Differently, before the Foundation was established, intercultural dialogue was mainly implemented through regional thematic programmes, such as Euromed Heritage (started in 1996), Euromed Audiovisual (1997), Euromed Youth (2000). These were initially promoted in the framework of the human and cultural dimension of the Euromediterranean Partnership³⁰ and then, with the faltering of that initiative, they were gradually embedded in the Neighbourhood Policy framework as part of broader regional cooperation³¹. The strategic orientations of these programmes, all of which have been recently renewed, were decided at the EU level under general guidelines established by Ministers in Euromediterranean conferences. Therefore, till the establishment of the Foundation, there was a generalised effort to promote scattered forms of dialogue between cultures, without a common strategy on which effectively building up this commitment.

With the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation, however, this gap was only partially reduced. The activity promoted by the ALF has remained, in fact, parallel and complementary to enduring thematic programmes; in some cases, the fields of activities of the Foundation are even overlapping with the mandates of other initiatives³². There are, however, a number of significant differences between these two broad components of ICD.

Firstly, the activities promoted by the Foundation have a stronger political mandate than regional programmes: as seen, the establishment of the ALF results from a strategic initiative of the President of the European Commission, while old programmes tend to be focused on the technical aspects of intercultural cooperation. Secondly, the Foundation can choose the most suitable fields of action to respond to the needs of ICD, while the other programmes are inevitably bound to a specific theme or target group. Thirdly, the Foundation is more representative: in 2008, its work has been associated to that of the Union for the Mediterranean³³ which is composed by 43 partner states of the

²⁹ Report of the High-Level Advisory Group (2003), cit., p. 23.

³⁰ The Euromediterranean Partnership was structured over three interconnected dimensions or «baskets»: a political and security partnership, an economic and financial partnership and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. All culture-related initiatives were to be developed within the third basket.

³¹ European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and regional indicative programme (2007-2010) for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2007.

³² For instance, the promotion of exchanges among youth people of the region is an objective of both «Euromed Youth» and of many projects promoted by the Foundation.

³³ Union for the Mediterranean, Final Statement, Marseilles, 3-4 November 2008.

Euromediterranean area (27 EU + 16 partners); conversely, the previous regional programmes are currently extended only to the 8 countries affected by the southern dimension of the ENP³⁴.

At the same time, however, there is also a substantial financial gap between the two components: the overall indicative budget for the Foundation for the new 3-year work plan is about €16 million (10 million from the European Commission) while, for instance, the Commission has allocated €11 million only for the 2009-2012 phase of Euromed Audiovisual. From this point of view, the overall promotion of intercultural dialogue appears much more substantial through regional programmes than through the ALF, especially if one considers that the latter covers a larger number of themes and target groups and serves more countries.

Having said this, if, on the one hand, the allocation of funds suggests a considerable weight of previous regional programmes in the implementation of intercultural dialogue, on the other hand, the other differences motivate the choice of considering the Foundation as a suitable subject to evaluate the strategic implications of the challenges brought by the Arab Spring on ICD. Accordingly, the findings illustrated in the next paragraphs with regards to the ALF recent action must be observed by keeping in mind that they just refer to the half of a bigger picture.

The action plan for the period 2012-2014, adopted in March 2012, opens the third phase of the Anna Lindh Foundation; other programmes were prepared for the following periods: 2005-2007, 2008-2011. The fact that the new programme has been adopted in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, however, is not in itself a guarantee that all new activities and strategic elements presented in it are an implicit consequence of the uprisings: generally speaking, all initiatives must periodically present innovations, from phase to phase, in order to improve the effectiveness of their subjects and receive new funding. Therefore, prospective «novelty factors» of the plan will be tested both with previous work plans and with the contents of recent strategic drafts presented before the wave of the Arab Awakening started.

The official work plan (2012-2014) presents the Foundation as the most suitable institution to perceive and understand the transformations taking place in the societies of the region

³⁴ As a consequence of the current political situation in the country, cooperation with Syria under ENP has been suspended.

as well as to respond to these challenges by adapting its action and structures to the new context³⁵. Indeed, beyond a certain continuity with the ALF previous achievements, general goals, functions and formats of action, there are several new ideas within both the new strategic framework, its specific objectives as well as the single projects proposed to implement the plan.

A slightly different consideration can be made with regards to the priority fields of action and target groups. Both of them have been reduced compared with the previous phase. More specifically, the fields of action have become four (they were six in 2008-2011); however, the areas covered are in continuity with the strategy pursued so far by the Foundation to operate on those spaces where the mutual perceptions are forged: «culture and creativity», «education and intercultural learning», «urban spaces and citizenship» and «media and public opinion»³⁶. The target groups, instead, have been reduced to two: «youth» and «women», while «migrants» have been removed from this category in the new phase. In general, out of the comparison, the chosen fields and target groups are extremely coherent with the situation they are called to address; for instance, youth and women have been largely identified in the world press as the two social groups who made the uprisings possible to such extent³⁷. At the same time, however, there are not precise explanations supporting the choice for reduction. That decision, therefore, might be interpreted as an effort to focus all the (limited) resources where the social impact of the Arab Spring had already effectively impacted. If intended in this way, the reduction of fields of action and target groups may be observed as one of the changes brought by the events in the Middle East and North Africa. However, this is a reflection that tells more about the prospective implementation of intercultural dialogue rather than about its new strategic conception.

With regards to the latter, three issues in particular appear both new and a consequence of the Arab Spring: the introduction of «democracy» among the pillars of the new strategy, the reference to the enjoyment of human rights among its aims, and the commitment to create a sense of Euromediterranean citizenship among the specific objectives of the Foundation for the current phase.

In order to analyse the first issue, it is necessary to introduce the so-called «4D» strategy at the basis of the new work plan:

³⁵ Anna Lindh Foundation, *Work Programme 2012-2014*, 2012, pp. 8-9.

³⁶ The two missing fields of action are: «peace and coexistence» and «region and spirituality».

³⁷ See, for instance, M. Martin, *The Arab Spring: Youth, Freedom and the Tools of Technology in Al-Arabia News*, 6 April 2012, online at <http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/04/06/205837.html> (retrieved on 3 September 2012); L. Bohn, *Women and the Arab Uprisings: 8 «Agents of Change» to Follow*, CNN, 3 February 2012, online at <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/03/world/africa/women-arab-uprisings/index.html> (retrieved on 2 September 2012).

according to the document, quoted here loosely, the response to the changes caused by the Arab Spring in the region currently passes through four issues: dialogue, diversity, democracy and development. The core actors in this strategy are regional civil societies which are encouraged to increase exchanges in order to promote social participation in building open and plural society and fostering human development and fundamental rights³⁸.

As anticipated, the third «D» of this four-headed strategy is the most relevant element for analysis with regards to the argument of this article, for two reasons. First of all, its introduction appears as an evident response to the unprecedented demand for democratisation and human rights coming from the southern shore of the Mediterranean since December 2010. In this context, the Foundation shows also considerable coherence and complementarity with the pillars of the new broader Euromediterranean policy approach, as discussed in the previous section. Secondly, the nexus between intercultural dialogue and democracy was not even taken into consideration before the Arab Spring started. For instance, if the 4Ds are compared with the draft programme presented in October 2010 by the ALF Executive Director to the Foundation Board of Governors, any reference to «democracy» is missing. In that document, the Director had rather presented a «3D» strategy, since he identified a meaningful point to advance the effectiveness of intercultural dialogue in the relation between sustainable development, diversity and dialogue³⁹. In other words, referring to democracy within the new action plan is both a fresh element in the ALF conception of ICD and a direct response to the outcome of the uprisings.

The second issue is the introduction of human rights among the aims of the new intercultural dialogue strategy. To be honest, however, this is not really a novelty factor. In fact, looking at previous plans and strategic documents it emerges that the issue of the relation between intercultural dialogue and human rights has been a semi-hidden topic in the evolution of this concept, at least since the establishment of the Foundation. For instance, the 2005-2008 work plan included human rights within the general list of fields of action for the new-born body. Moreover, the already mentioned 2010 draft strategy dedicated a considerable reflection to the relevance of the relation between human rights and cultural diversity, even in light of a very rich academic

³⁸ Anna Lindh Foundation, *Work Programme 2012-2014*, cit., p. 9.

³⁹ ALF Strategy and Programme for Phase III (2011-2014), *Living Together, Sharing the Future. A Common Institution for Intercultural Dialogue in the Euromed Region*, draft presented at the 30th Board of Governors of the Anna Lindh Foundation, Dubrovnik, 20 October 2010.

debate in this regard⁴⁰. According to the quoted document, human rights have to be recognised as a precondition to enhance dialogue, while, in the same way ICD has to be considered a strong point towards their protection⁴¹.

This analysis reveals that the inclusion of human rights in the new strategy is, in fact, neither a new element in the overall conception of intercultural dialogue, nor a direct consequence of the Arab Spring. In this regard, the «novelty factor» seems rather to be looked for in a combination of events. Despite being seldom referred to in past programmes, human rights have not been yet the distinctive objective of any major initiative launched in the framework of intercultural dialogue. One could easily observe that this void is mainly explicable with the existence, in several south Mediterranean countries, of a number of regimes which were not so keen on promoting and respecting fundamental rights. In this context, the reference to human rights included in the goals of the new plan, coordinated with the renewed commitment to the promotion of «deep democracy» by European institutions and with the ousting of some of those regimes, marks a gap with the previous phases of intercultural dialogue. In other words, before these events, human rights were only whispered while, in the new work plan, they are claimed among ICD goals and can, prospectively, count on a much more supportive political environment. However, as for any other innovative element discussed in this section, an effective empowerment of human rights via intercultural dialogue will depend, substantially, by both the development of the uncertain and fluid situation in transition countries and by the related seriousness of European institutions in delivering its promises.

The last point to be discussed is the introduction of the theme of Euromediterranean citizenship among the specific objectives of the new strategy.

Differently from the other two points analysed above – democracy and human rights – which are also goals of the strengthened Neighbourhood Policy, the focus on citizenship is peculiar to the nature of ICD, for it is built on the active involvement of civil society. Indeed, despite all the conceptual shifts undergone by intercultural dialogue along its history, its core has remained rooted in exchanges among individuals and stakeholders within civil society. Accordingly, only thanks to its deep relation with

⁴⁰ A reference book in this domain is L. Bekemans et al. (eds.), *Intercultural Dialogue and Citizenship. Translating Values into Actions. A Common Project for Europeans and Their Partners*, Venezia, Marsilio Editori, 2007; especially its part D on «Intercultural Dialogue and Human Rights, Civil Society and World Order Issues».

⁴¹ ALF Strategy and Programme for Phase III (2011-2014), *Living Together, Sharing the Future...*, cit., p. 12.

thousands of Euromediterranean civil society organisations, the Anna Lindh Foundation can expect results from efforts to create a sense of belonging to a common space with shared values, as regional citizenship is explained in its work plan. Moreover, as the ALF itself acknowledges, citizenship is much more than a specific objective for the current phase, since supporting civil society for inclusion and citizenship is expected to play a key-role in its overall intercultural strategy⁴².

The importance of the issue of citizenship among the current priorities of the Foundation is enshrined also in the inclusion of «urban spaces and citizenship» among the priority fields of action and in the relevance of the «Believe in Dialogue, Act for Citizenship» initiative. The latter has been launched in the immediate aftermath of unrest in Tunisia and Egypt in order to, among other goals, exchange good practices and debate about citizenship and democracy and explore the link between citizenship and intercultural dialogue among Euromediterranean civil society representatives⁴³.

The idea at the basis of the introduction of regional citizenship among ICD objectives, however, does not necessarily appear as a direct result of the Arab Spring. The roots, or at least, the incentive for this commitment is rather to be found in the findings of a major survey on intercultural trends in the Mediterranean, funded and published in a report by the Foundation in 2010⁴⁴. This report, which is one of the ALF flagship initiatives, has highlighted a number of «revelations» which constitute necessary building blocks in any effort to create a sense of belonging to a common space. In particular, the survey has revealed that there is much more in common than what expected with regards to the cultural and social values between the people living on the two shores of the Mediterranean sea. On the contrary, the part of the survey regarding the attribution of values to the «other» has showed that the proved existence of common values is not supported by an equivalent perception⁴⁵. The deriving «clash of [reciprocal] ignorance»⁴⁶ emerging from the analysis of those data suggests that much of the perception gap between the two shores could be narrowed in the long term through education and increased civil society interactions. Accordingly, much emphasis in the new work plan is dedicated to formal and non-formal education and intercultural learning projects, involving both teachers and civil society representatives. These are the

⁴² Anna Lindh Foundation, *Work Programme 2012-2014*, cit., p. 8.

⁴³ Anna Lindh Foundation, *Annual Work Plan 3 (November 2010 - November 2011) for Phase II (2009-2011)*, 2010.

⁴⁴ Anna Lindh Foundation, *Euromed Intercultural Trends 2010. The Anna Lindh Report*, 2010, online at <http://www.euromedalex.org/trends/report/2010/main> (retrieved on 30 August 2012).

⁴⁵ R. Manchin, *Inside the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll*, in Anna Lindh Foundation, *Annual Work Plan 3...*, cit., pp. 18-33.

⁴⁶ G. Aubarell, *Euro-Med Intercultural Trends and Major Challenges for the Civil Society Dialogue*, in L. Bekemans (ed.), *Intercultural Dialogue and Multi-level Governance in Europe. A Human Rights Based Approach*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2012, p. 516.

main tools proposed by the Foundation to support the creation of a sense of regional citizenship, based on the already existing common Mediterranean values identified by the survey.

Therefore, the possibilities of achieving this objective depends mostly on the ability to actively involve, mobilise and «educate» to dialogue, both directly and indirectly, larger sectors of civil society than ever in both shores of the Mediterranean sea. As a consequence, its implementation appears less dependent on the outcome of current political processes than other strategic goals, such as human rights. In this regard, the lesson of active citizenship taught by millions of people during demonstrations in North Africa and in the Middle East becomes, as better discussed in the next section, a cornerstone of change for intercultural dialogue, both for the activities promoted through the Anna Lindh Foundation and for those implemented through regional thematic programmes.

Summing up, the analysis of the new ALF work plan shows that there has been indeed a sensible shift in the Foundation strategic conception of ICD as a consequence of the Arab Spring. The most significant elements characterising this shift are the introduction of democracy, human rights and regional citizenship within the new strategic vision. However, although not all the elements of change are necessarily attributable to direct consequences of unrest in the southern shore of the Mediterranean, the extent of the overall change occurred in the region has provided the necessary determination to increase the ambitions of who is mandated to promote ICD in the region, at least at the strategic level. The achievements of the work plan in the next three years will demonstrate if the new strategy is indeed applicable to the political and social scenario emerging in the region.

4. Mobilisation in the Arab World as a Step Toward a More Homogenous Euromediterranean Civil Society

So far, the two discussions on, respectively, the revised European Neighbourhood Policy and the new work plan of the Anna Lindh Foundation have brought adequate evidence in support of the argument sustained in this article. However, as seen, many claims appear prospectively limited by the uncertain

situation currently characterising the region. In this context, the last consideration to be discussed in this paper provides an amount of substance to the overall analysis of the evolution of intercultural dialogue. The ground-breaking civil engagement emerged in the Arab world – the basis of the last claim – is indeed an incontrovertible fact and, because of the centrality of civil society in ICD, constitutes a concrete «shifting factor» for both its conceptualisation and implementation.

As anticipated in the introduction, this last consideration argues that some of the persisting problems identified in the development of a Euromediterranean civil society appear reduced by the consequences of the large and unprecedented mobilisation in many Arab countries; accordingly, intercultural dialogue has increased its opportunities to strive for affecting broader communities and societies in the region. In order to discuss this statement, the section opens with a brief outline of the dual role of civil society in intercultural dialogue, then it identifies three major issues in the debate about the weakness of civil society in the region and, finally, it evaluates how the lesson of civic engagement taught by the Arab Spring has affected those three issues and what are the implications for ICD.

The centrality of «civil society» in the context of intercultural dialogue is both conceptual and practical. It is conceptual because the very idea at the basis of any intercultural dialogue strategy revolves around the fact that civil society is the most suitable level of human interaction to spread the results of intercultural encounters and a culture of dialogue throughout the region. In this regard, the typology of actors to be included or not under this notion is very wide ranging⁴⁷. At the same time, this centrality has a practical motivation, because, as confirmed by a number of experts, civil society organisations are at the forefront of intercultural action and operate as its main driving forces⁴⁸. In fact, the majority of actors who promote dialogue and participate in ICD projects, under both the Anna Lindh Foundation and the other regional thematic programmes, are NGOs, academic institutions, mass media, cultural foundations, school departments and individuals. In this context, it is also worth mentioning that the active participation of civil society organisations through networks and fora has been praised as one of the most interesting features of overall regional relations since the EMP was established in 1995⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ A very comprehensive definition is provided in: Plate-forme non-gouvernementale pour le forum civil EuroMed, *Réorganiser le forum civil euroméditerranéen. Renforcer la coopération de la société civile dans le processus de Barcelone*, February 2003.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, M. Manonelles, *Civil Society Participation in Intercultural Dialogue*, in «Pace Diritti Umani/Peace Human Rights», no. 2, 2010, pp. 131-141; and ERICarts (European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research), *Sharing Diversity. National Approaches to Intercultural Dialogue in Europe. Study for the European Commission*, March 2008, p. VIII.

⁴⁹ M. Mascia, *La società civile nell'Unione Europea. Nuovo orizzonte democratico*, Padova, Cedam, 2004, pp. 189-225.

Consistent with this dual role, the impact of intercultural dialogue on the life of Euromediterranean people will be as successful as it will manage to effectively spread its values and principles to the widest range of people in the region. However, although more and more organisations are participating in Euromediterranean transnational activities, the share of the whole society affected, directly or indirectly, by ICD initiatives is not yet considered enough satisfactory to obtain the desired resonance. As acknowledged by ALF officials, the exchanges between civil societies in the Mediterranean region have developed in a contradictory way. On the one hand, they have increased at the elite level (NGOs, universities, artists) while, on the other, at the level of public opinion and people in general, «there are persisting difficulties in the capacity to know each other, overcome stereotypes, understand each other and accept differences even when these are compatible with human rights»⁵⁰. Therefore, in order to invert this contradictory trend, it is necessary to understand the most problematic aspects at the basis of Euromediterranean civil society interaction and participation.

The point about the weakness of a region-wide civil society has been made by several authors. In particular, three issues seem to better outline the causes for persistent difficulties in reaching wide shares of civil society.

The first issue regards resources: the funds allocated for the programmes and initiatives aimed at empowering civil society, including the resources to manage the Anna Lindh Foundation as a network of 43 national networks of civil society, are meagre, especially with regards to the huge share of people that those programmes are expected to reach⁵¹.

The second issue refers to a generalised disparity of views and objectives between European and south Mediterranean civil society organisations. To this end, it has been suggested that, on the one hand, civil society in Europe tends to be more committed to prioritise dialogue, cooperation among societies, fundamental freedoms, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, while, on the other hand, civil society in Arab countries is more focused with development issues, such as education, rural development, fight against poverty and illiteracy⁵². Although, evidently, this is not the general rule at the micro level, at the macro level generalised differences of this kind might thwart

⁵⁰ ALF Strategy and Programme for Phase III (2011-2014), *Living Together, Sharing the Future...*, cit., p. 4.

⁵¹ Institut de la Méditerranée, Report of the expert group convened by the Mediterranean Institute on the Mediterranean Union project, October 2007.

⁵² A. Attia, *Les sociétés civiles et le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen: l'heure des réformes*, in «Réalités», no. 1003, 17 March 2005, quoted in N. Akrimi, *Placer les sociétés civiles au cœur du Partenariat renouvelé des défis et des pistes pour l'avenir*, in L. Bekemans et al. (eds.), *Intercultural Dialogue and Citizenship...*, cit., p. 280.

efforts to develop a common strategy for effectively building-up a more homogeneous Euromediterranean civil society.

The third issue, finally, calls into question the very existence of a «south Mediterranean civil society» to complement European one in the creation of the regional whole. This point is claimed on the basis of the very restricted representation of Arab civil society in region-wide initiatives. In fact, especially before the Anna Lindh Foundation was established, the general attendance of NGOs from the southern shore of the Mediterranean to periodic meetings (such as the annual civil fora) was limited. At times, their participation has been prevented by national governments, at times, by lack of resources, travel restrictions and other technical hindrances⁵³. Put in a nutshell, according to this view, the «difficulties with civil society and intercultural dialogue have been so far mostly imputable to difficulties within civil society itself in several Mediterranean countries»⁵⁴. It is therefore interesting to try to ask the following question: has the Arab Spring produced any modification to this framework? The answer proposed in this article is affirmative, although, as for the rest of issues discussed so far, it acknowledges that part of the following considerations will remain conjectures until the situation emerging from the ongoing transition processes will provide empirical evidence in its support. However, even if current difficulties and setbacks in those processes might turn «Spring into Winter», as some observers argue⁵⁵, the empowerment and mobilisation of people will remain an irreversible fact and the most momentous change in the whole process⁵⁶. In this context, the unprecedented civic engagement in the Arab world challenges, at least partly, the three critical issues discussed above.

With regards to the first issue, that is the amount of resources, besides the periodic funds allocated for the ALF and the other regional ICD programmes, the empowerment of civil society in the southern neighbourhood is sustained by a number of new initiatives. Among them, a significant increase of scholarships for the mobility of students and academic staff from the south within the Erasmus Mundus programme (€30 million in 2011) and the launch of the Civil Society Facility (€26.4 million in 2011, for both eastern and southern neighbours). Moreover, in November 2011 the European Commission and the Anna Lindh Foundation signed a three-year cooperation

⁵³ See L. Feliu, *Global Civil Society Across the Mediterranean: The Case of Human Rights*, in M. Pace, T. Schumacher (eds.), *Conceptualising Cultural and Social Dialogue...*, cit., pp. 97-100; and A. Jünemann, *The EuroMed Civil Forum: Critical «Watchdog» and Intercultural Mediator*, in S. Panebianco (ed.), *A New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity*, London, Frank Cass, 2003, p. 91.

⁵⁴ P.G. Xuereb, *Intercultural Dialogue in Europe and the Mediterranean in the Context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, in L. Bekemans et al. (eds.), *Intercultural Dialogue and Citizenship...*, cit., p. 238.

⁵⁵ For instance, see the debate on *Arab Spring or Islamist Winter?* published in «World Affairs», January/February 2012.

⁵⁶ R. Balfur, *Changes and Continuities...*, cit., p. 27; L. Anderson, *Demystifying the Arab Spring Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya*, in «Foreign Affairs», vol. 90, no. 3, May-June 2011, p. 1.

agreement, complementary to the work plan 2012-2014, aimed at improving the capacity of NGOs in the south Mediterranean region to actively participate in democratic transition and in the processes of reform provided for in the new partnership for democracy and prosperity.

With reference to the second issue, that is the generalised disparity of views between north and south, the demand for democracy, human rights and justice cried by millions of people during demonstrations witnesses a certain convergence of objectives among all components of Euromediterranean civil society. In this regard, the new work plan of the Anna Lindh Foundation has showed traces of this achievement by including issues as human rights, democracy and citizenship within a new and commonly shared strategy.

With regards to the third issue, regarding the difficulties of participation of southern civil society representatives, the evaluation of the effect of the Arab Spring is more complex. A stronger (qualitative and quantitative) participation of southern civil society in region-wide initiatives had been already prompted by the Anna Lindh Foundation⁵⁷; even the choice of setting its headquarters in an Arab country, acquires a specific relevance in this domain. Moreover, the extensive growth of the Internet and other communication technologies had already allowed people, and particularly youth people, to start crossing state borders and virtually gather around the same values, interests and claims. In this context, the uprisings have rather showed, beyond doubt, that this process was already in action and that it had huge potentialities. Furthermore, the uprisings have caused the fall of regimes that were preventing the construction of both national and transnational layers of organised civil society among their citizens. In this regard, however, the commitment of newly elected governments to facilitate that process is yet to be tested. In brief, the mobilisations which gave the soul to the Arab Awakening has strengthened the process of empowering regional civil society by raising awareness on the existence and on the potentiality of a strong and active civil society in the Arab world. This has opened new opportunities for south-south and north-south exchanges and confrontation and, accordingly, for the success of the new strategic design of intercultural dialogue. The expectation of the Foundation in this regard are very clear, as it aims, through its new programme, to positively affect a wider

⁵⁷ By the end of 2011, the number of civil society organisations participating in the ALF networks was around 3,900 and 28,535 civil society leaders and practitioners had been involved in activities organised by the ALF and its networks; source: *The Anna Lindh Review 2005-2011*, online at <http://www.euromedalex.org/about/review> (retrieved on 23 August 2012).

range of people of the Euro-Mediterranean societies, to involve their communities in the implementation of civil society's initiatives, including organisations and social groups which do not normally interact and cooperate between each other⁵⁸.

5. Conclusions

Each of the considerations discussed in this article has presented important building blocks to evaluate the extent of the change undertaken by intercultural dialogue as a consequence of the Arab Spring. First of all, the strong and innovative commitment claimed by the EU to responsibly prioritise democracy, human rights and inclusive growth over its stability interests allows intercultural dialogue to both develop new strategic goals within a supportive political framework and to depart from a security-oriented conception of its potentialities, towards new trajectories. Secondly, the new ALF action plan shows that the ambitions pursued by who is politically in charge of the development of intercultural dialogue have sensibly grown and are consistent with the features of the revised EU policy approach in the region. In this specific context, the programme adopted by the Anna Lindh Foundation goes even further than the goals of the revised European vision for the region, striving for building, on the Euromediterranean peoples' common values, a sense of common belonging to the same regional citizenship. Thirdly, the emergence of a compact layer of civil society in many Arab countries – active, determined and aware of its potential – constitutes an essential prerequisite to move the long term ambitions of intercultural dialogue ahead, towards the involvement of wider parts of communities and societies throughout the region.

Taken together, these three sets of considerations argues for a sensible change in the overall strategic conception of Euro-mediterranean intercultural dialogue. However, this conclusion is broadly based on the analysis of a number of strategic documents adopted in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening as well as on the comparison of those document with previous ones. In light of the fluid and uncertain development of the situation in the region, it is therefore impossible to claim that the promises and ambitions that have been identified so far will be implemented in full.

⁵⁸ Anna Lindh Foundation, *Work Programme 2012-2014*, cit., p. 10.

However, what has been observed, together with the unprecedented mobilisation in the Arab world, shows that more and more people are converging on the common values of human rights and democracy and that, apparently, institutions are committed to satisfy their demands. Whether the outcome of the political transitions in the countries involved and the related reaction by European institutions, this convergence remains an incontrovertible factor for the regional dynamics and a landmark for future development of ICD. Certainly, time and facts will be needed to provide a concrete confirmation of what has been identified as a sensible shift in the strategic orientation of intercultural dialogue.

If the findings of this article are confirmed by their coherent implementation in the medium and long term, it will be possible to argue that, as a consequence of the Arab Spring, Euro-mediterranean intercultural dialogue has entered a third phase. The first phase (1995-2001) was characterised by limited political visibility and moderate resources as well as by the goal of bringing the people of the Mediterranean in closer relations, in order to know each other; the second phase (2001-2010) was defined by a much stronger political interest, more resources and the strategic goal of contributing to reduce the security risks brought by increasing tensions among Mediterranean «civilisations»; the third phase, instead, will maintain political commitment and enjoy increased resources and will be, hopefully, characterised by an action-oriented promotion of intercultural dialogue in tight relation with democracy, citizenship, human rights and, possibly, multilevel governance, consistent with the rich academic debate under way in this regard⁵⁹. What discussed so far in this article appears a significant step toward that direction.

⁵⁹ See, for instance, L. Bekemans et al. (eds.), *Intercultural Dialogue and Citizenship...*, cit.; P. de Perini, *Intercultural Dialogue and Human Rights: Prospects for a Euromediterranean Citizenship*, in «International Journal of Euromediterranean Studies», vol. 3, no. 2, 2010, pp. 163-181; L. Bekemans (ed.), *Intercultural Dialogue and Multi-level Governance in Europe...*, cit., p. 516.