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IDENTITY, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY

ABSTRACT

The paper undertakes to discuss the three notions referred to in the title and constituting basic concepts for the intercultural dialogue in the context of the current situation resulting from the increased multicultural encounters within European borders and beyond as well in the context of intercultural dialogue promoted by EU leaders.

Modern human being is confronted with the overwhelming and multiple phenomena of: increasing information flows, migrations, new technologies, acts of violence and terrorism of an unprecedented scale and many other challenges. While trying to take position towards challenges or dangers people try to find tools – facilitators to accommodate to new and potentially dangerous situations. Historically we can find that a few groups or types of such behaviours: struggle – active action against any change (wars); defence – search for minimisation of potential loses (escape, alienation, fundamentalism); accommodation – search for a new intellectual tools and creation of a new quality (creativity). In this context the author proposes to approach the current challenges, refers to existing scientific schools and supports as the solution – dialogue as a source of a new, better, quality for people. Dialogue requires securing conditions among which one seems to be crucial: partners of dialogue should respect mutually their identities. It is particularly important in the case of European culture which – within the multiculturalism policy – hides her identity on the grounds of false conviction that showing her identity disturbs the dialogue.

The title of this paper suggests a certain form of relation between the three phenomena, hiding under the terms *culture*, *identity* and *democracy* and indirectly assumes also a sort of linkage with the issue of intercultural dialogue being the key subject the whole book is devoted to while suggesting that a new approach to this subject would help «to translate» into action the fundamental values the European Construction has been founded on and would result in a peaceful coexistence of different cultures within the EU boundaries and beyond.

Identity and *democracy* guide us to some popular opinions, theories and debates between academicians, publicists and politicians, theoretical assumptions (case of academic works on identity[1] and democracy[2] not to mention the whole wisdom of knowledge on different political systems «aspiring» for being called «democratic» as well as their fundamental values and rights – the major achievement of the Western civilisation) or to the famous and questionable philosophical vision by Francis Fukuyama[3].

With the *culture* we are brought to reference to the oeuvre of anthropology, on whose ground the term of «culture» has been defined in a number of ways and meanings.

In the case of the topic of this paper the most relevant seem to be those trends in anthropology[4], which observe close relation between a culture of a community (together with its patterns) and the personality of an individual rooted in that community. This takes place especially in traditional societies studied by anthropologists, where one, homogeneous culture creates a manner of living of a people. However, if even such a situation is obviously not relevant for modern societies, where «cultural environment» is much differentiated and an individual is more independent in constructing and defining his identity, the relation with a society and culture is still believed as preserved through the interactions with others and feeling to be one of them[5].

Apart that evident linkage between identity, society and culture the term *identity* has a number of different meanings. Consequently, depending on whether we enter the field of psychology, sociology, ethnology or political science, we speak about *individual*, *collective* or *ethnic identity*[6], as well as the identity understood as a doctrine of one or another policy sector of a state.

While debating the intercultural dialogue as a mean the EU would like to use to build a peaceful coexistence of different

cultures within the EU boundaries and beyond, we need to take into account the historic context and the intentions of the European Commission in promoting the idea of «dialogue»[7]. The dramatic incidents which took place in New York, Madrid and London seemed to prove the opinion that a new world war had been forthcoming: as the result of an incurable division of the world into two hostile parts, bound to a «clash»[8].

Would it be possible any other alternative than a confrontation? Is the clash of civilisations really inevitable? If yes, then perhaps we should undertake a military action – a new «crusade» and thus remove the danger – as some prominent politicians proposed?

Calling to mind that unfortunately used slogan of a «crusade» we do not need to justify that, of course, we do not undertake a debate over the appropriateness of any military interventions as for example the one in Iraq. The decisions about those are taken by politicians, military staff, etc. We, in turn, are interested in culture and inter-cultural relations, and to be more correct: between people living in those cultures and finding within them their place and feeling of safety. Such an interest and the way of reflection is even more urgent as the «clash of civilisations» is becoming more and more internal than external problem the EU is facing recently and makes it find a way out – as ethnic conflicts occur inside its borders. It is in this context that the issue of the intercultural dialogue the EU leaders recommend will be analysed: both in the case of the relations of the European Union with the Mediterranean[9] and in its intra-European dimension. That context also makes us reanalyse the concept of the *multiculturalism* – until recently perceived as Europe's richness and the fundamental rule of EU cultural policy in the field of culture (confirmed by Maastricht Treaty) and the foundation of peaceful coexistence of nations, that recently – in the light of terrorist acts – starts to be seen as a mistake and a blind alley[10].

Therefore, the question arises, if that idea and policy of multiculturalism acknowledged so far as a model for multicultural Europe and beyond should be abandoned as not relevant and not guaranteeing peaceful coexistence of peoples living within the EU borders. If yes, we would be authorised either to replace or to redefine it – possibly with an implementation of the properly understood idea of intercultural dialogue.

Having thus roughly identified the key terms and problems this paper is dealing with, I do realise that I have omitted the wide

ground of scholarly and semantic discussions, where each and every opinion can be questioned. Nevertheless, I believe that such an omission could eventually be fruitful and helpful in proceeding towards approaching a proper definition of the character and roots of the problem, which appears as a crucial one: how to guarantee the peaceful coexistence of nations and ethnic minority groups in multicultural Europe and world that the EU leaders and intellectuals believe to attain through the intercultural dialogue.

However, overtaking the conclusions of succeeding parts of this paper I assume that for successful implementation of intercultural dialogue the EU leaders and intellectuals are promoting as a model for the EU internal and external policy both the cultural identities of «partners» must and can be saved and, on other hand, Western democratic values cannot be abandoned.

DIALOGUE AND IDENTITY

The question of identity is usually tackled with by political scientists in terms of collective identity of a nation that, together with its culture, constitutes the reference point for the notion. Recently, at least for some authors, the nations and in particular nation-states appeared to be foregone phenomena, while we have entered the post-nation époque and even the very term *national identity* should be thrown overboard. It would also concern the concept of identity, whose reference point would be a smaller geographic or cultural spaces: as *local* or *regional identities* in front of the globalisation are affecting all the domains of the modern societies' life. All these, in the world in which changeableness of roles, places and situations are so frequent that we have to constantly and instantly find new ways for self-identification. Is it then that the mere term of *identity* would be already a useless and empty notion? Is it true that globalisation processes would diminish the need for auto-identification or rather the reference points and the concept of «identity» are being changed? For example, the globalisation weakens rooting in a given local space as the reference point for local identity. It is a result both of greater than ever possibility of changing the place of living and of the «mobility» intermediated by the media. Again: the rooting in products of various origins, offers us globalisation in the field of commerce[11].

Should then the global space we are living in be perceived in absolute terms as the enemy of any identity?

Answering that question we can observe that the modern man can gain or re-gain his rooting in a new, virtual space created by the media. Tim Edensor argues, that national identity in the global consumer culture does not have to be weakened and it can be even strengthened by, for example, «advertising specific local produce» or by the absorption and «domestication» of foreign cultural patterns within national cultures, which are enabled by globalisation of various cultural strands. This happened also in the past, although, obviously not on such a large scale. Then, national *identity* can be interpreted as a variable phenomenon – permanently creating its meaning[12]. National identity has never been homogeneous and has not necessarily to be conceived as conservative and the globalisation should not to be perceived in absolute terms as its enemy[13]. It is rather supposed to offer to it an opportunity to be more flexible and open. In this case we would be authorised to speak about *inclusive* national identity. Such an opinion does not have anything in common with denying the existence or appropriateness of using the identity notion as such or with committing the *relativity sin* (so that not to use the most popular nowadays and *incriminating* abuse known as *liberalism*), with which the supporters of identity as something permanent and petrified willingly charge the supporters of open inclusive concept of identity. *Inclusiveness* would be a result of modernity linked with the predominance of the market and its constantly enriching offer of material and cultural goods. Culture of supermarket is not still or stationary and no more (hopefully) modelled exclusively by nation (national state). Market offer a forum for dialogue and not necessarily for a «clash».

If one adopts the concept of identity fixed once and for good, consequently probably would agree with already mentioned Amartya Sen that «identity becomes tyranny», while in a world «offered» to us by various breeds of extremists, we live as sheep put in separate enclosures, following some type of classification, made by extremely sharp division according to, for example, eagerly followed by Islamists distinction of religious beliefs. Such an approach definitely reduces an individual into only one dimension. It is quite close to a war from this point as we have both the own breed defined and the strangers known as enemies. Thus, in such a discourse about culture we would enter into a «paramilitary

poetics», in which *ours* play the role of fighters defending our own collective, *the others* playing the role of enemies and the world would be seen as a battlefield. If we agree for such localisation – on two sides of the frontline, we agree for reducing our humanity, as in this way we decline the most essential part of humanity – we decline the need for search of what we should really do – we decline thinking[14].

However, talking about the role of market, which offers the modern forum for dialogue, we must remember that that global forum can be dominated by cultural products provided by «Centres of globalisation» whose influence can evoke a fear of loosing identity and – in consequence – the crisis of local identity and a recourse to fundamentalism[15].

Such a threat for dialogue of cultures, that result in exclusiveness and hostility towards others can also provide ethnic identities, which are acquiring more and more power in contemporary multicultural societies[16]. Ethnicity within process of modernisation and global-isation can strengthen their power turning into «political ethnicity»[17] hostile towards other cultures and identities. It occurs more often, if minorities suffer frustration as the result of the poverty. In that case identity becomes an ideology as in the case of some Islamic communities living in the EU countries.

Therefore, another important element is to be taken into account within our debate on the identity and globalisation process, espe-cially in the case of «peripheral» or minority cultures[18]: the growing poverty in many areas of the globe and some city areas inhabited by ethnic minorities.

DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRACY

Democracy is often understood as an universal commitment[19] that is inevitable on a global scale and – at the same time – understood as a «blessing» offered by the West to the peoples living under dictatorial system. On the other hand however democracy is often perceived as a «diabolic» invention serving as a tool for colonising free nations living in different cultural spheres than Western – read: «American» – culture.

In the context of terrorist acts driven by religious motivations and the conflict between Islamic world and Western civilisation, the

starting point for introducing the question of democracy into the discourse on intercultural dialogue is constituted by two widely acclaimed books *The End of History* by Francis Fukuyama[20] and *The Clash of Civilization* by Samuel P. Huntington[21]. These two publications present two visions of the world that seem contra-dictory as we witness them: according to Fukuyama, the whole world would live in democratic system (liberal democracy) and market economy would prevail when the reasons for conflict perish (the division of the world into two political blocks) and, in the result, the world would enjoy a global prosperity and welfare. In Huntington's vision the world is recently divided into two parts[22] – contradicting in terms of civilisation: the West and the East. If only the West was to be the realm of democracy, the East – as if *genetically* – would be deprived of such a chance, and – surpassingly – would be the source of aggression in the clash of both civilisations foretold by the title. In Fukuyama's view the only potential obstacle to the establishment of this one and only «kingdom» of democracy can be religious fundamentalisms and especially the *Islamic* fundamentalism.

Fukuyama sees the future world as uniform one, Huntington – as divided and antagonistic. In both cases we are provided with more or less a similar, unrealistic vision of the world's order. Fukuyama's *End of History* foresees the triumph of liberalism, capitalism and democracy – as the closely bound and mutually conditioning elements, while introducing free competition, fall of authoritarian regimes and introduction of procedures and institutions of representative democracy would solve the tensions and conflicts existing in the global dimension. Huntington's democracy is also the liberal one.

Elimination of perils and securing peace on the global scale would seem then simple and easy to realise: we need only to introduce all over the world the democratic system and market economy – the methods and time seem less important. Probably, I am overdrawing the opinions of both American authors, but nevertheless it would be neither an «époque discovery» nor too great exaggeration to say that both «visions» are false and illusive. To overcome the threatening world crisis we do not need an antagonistic concept of identity – closed and exclusive – neither the utopian vision of the Western democracy inevitably spreading all over the world[23].

The situation was rightly diagnosed by Benjamin Barber in his book *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy*[24]. The author argues that the Americans often forgetting their own history and the gradual development of American democracy do not only confine themselves to encouraging others to introduce democracy in their systems quickly, nicely and easily. They promote the *American way* as if the Americanisation and democracy would be the same and by that the United States would be equipped with exclusive right and the patent for typical democratic process.

Obviously, the universal ideas do exist[25], the ones to which all those fighting for freedom refer but democracy takes on as many different forms as the pursuit for it and as much differing as the cultures that drive for it. These various and differentiated forms and shapes of democracy are equally difficult to make reality as all noble human aspirations. Even within the provincial, Western canon of democracy there exist as many different solutions as differentiated the cultures that gave birth to democracies of Europe and North America are. For example, Switzerland created the communitarian, collectivist concept of public freedoms and rights so different from Anglo-American model concentrating on individual's freedoms. In Switzerland the community interest were always more important than the individual rights. This accent on collective rights and interests gave the Swiss political institutions the communitarian nature so different from American individualistic model. If we were to refer to the oldest European democratic tradition of ancient Greece, this «communitarian» model of democracy would be closer to the Swiss standards.

APPROACHING CONCLUSIONS

After the above, obviously short and draft analysis and interpretation of the key terms let us turn to concept of *dialogue* asking some basic questions. Firstly, into what direction the search for solving the potential conflicts should go to (not only ideological but those real, bringing about the victims)? Secondly, are there any immanent and necessary conditions for dialogue to be observed within the concept of democracy, what kind of democracy do we mean and how it could be introduced? Thirdly, what should be a preferable concept of policy *vis-à-vis* different cultures and identities?

While answering those questions we must, first of all note that *dialogue of culture* is used as a metaphor. Secondly, the participants of a dialogue are people not cultures and some (whatever they could be) relevant institutions should create for the people friendly environment for dialoguing.

On the other hand, however, the contacts and dialogue between the peoples are being performed through the intermediation of culture with all its elements: language, electronic media, art, but also through gestures and attitudes showed in everyday life – not only in the life of higher classes and high-brow culture, but also, or even more effectively, with intermediation of popular and trivial culture offered on the global market – offering different references for people's identity and dialogue's fora.

Talking about intercultural dialogue we also assume that if we want to make it feasible we must create a forum for free contacts and exchanges between the representative of various cultures to get to know each other, that preconditions their mutual acceptance. What is also important is the equality of opportunities, equality of possibilities and positions, which become imbalanced if one of the cultures becomes privileged – by language, economic potential of technology, or strengthened by a political power provided by a state or ethnic minorities groups, and last but not least the Western people should not see themselves and behave as the only «depositories» and «missionaries» of democratic values[26].

When it comes to methods of introducing democratic systems we need to remember that, if democratic system is a destiny for the world or not, it develops slowly[27]. This was true about all the systems and everywhere. The local people need to fight for it, democracy needs cultivation of the civic institutions and also careful fostering of civic spirit mainly by education. The democratic process are lengthy. Dialogue requires perseverance in the quest for understanding the partner's culture specificity and the partner's system of values.

It seems also to be here the most natural reference to a very expressive diagnosis of today's Western democratisation «mission», which identifies it as a kind of hidden secularisation, the Trojan horse, inside which the whole army of *consumerism* salesmen are hidden.

After the statements made above, I would like to follow the argumentation by Samuel Huntington and ask a provocative

questions: 1) do we need to proliferate democracy all over the world?; 2) should we continue policy of multiculturalism performed so far? If the answer is negative, how we should behave *vis-à-vis others* within the intercultural dialogue promoted recently as the mean to overpass the conflicts resulting from turning ethnic minorities into political powers?

Huntington advices to give up believing the universal character of the Western civilisation. It would be «immoral» to worship the conviction that Western values and copies of Western institutions should be accepted by all the societies all over the world[28]. At the same time, aiming at the preservation of peace the peoples should look for common traits and virtues[29].

If we compare the objectives and conditions for intercultural dialogue listed above, we would agree in general with Huntington's opinion on the policy regarding the third countries the EU could perform. But what kind of internal policy the EU should perform *vis-à-vis* its ethnic and cultural minorities – especially those which turned into political powers and being stronger and more aggressive?

WHAT ABOUT MULTICULTURALISM?

While answering that last question we can have a look at the case of the Great Britain[30]. Its internal policy *vis-à-vis* ethnic minorities was being based so far on *The Report of the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* from 2000, prepared by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain presided over by Lord Bhikhu Parekh. The Report enumerated six fundamental rules of policy of multi-culturalism:

1. All individuals are equal irrespective of colour of skin, gender, ethnic origin, religion, age, and sexual orientation;

2. Great Britain is a community of communities religious, ethnic, regional and cultural;

3. If the citizens are equal, equal opportunity needs acceptance of all their differences avoiding any discrimination;

4. The society should find its own way towards shaping the division in the manner privileging the common feeling of belonging and creation of those different identities;

5. The society must respect moral differences between its culture

and values and those of ethnic minorities and must look for the means to resolve inevitable conflicts;

6. Racism can be founded on culture, nationality, way of living and even on under-stressing equality[31].

It was assumed that such political rules *vis-à-vis* ethnic minorities would result in their integration into the British culture and society[3].

The British policy *vis-à-vis* ethnic minorities seems to be an extreme example of multiculturalism. It resulted into the divisions of the British society and *ghettoisation* of some ethnic groups. The tolerance has been wrongly identified with the hiding and even negation of the British identity: just not to hurt «the other»[33]. Apart from those quoted above rules of the British multiculturalism, the problem is that the British identity, as also the European one becomes more and more of an empty concept and relativism is replacing the traditional European hierarchy of values. Contacts between different cultures do not result in building inclusive identities but in closing or loosing them[34].

In that case what the internal cultural policy should be like? Should and could we carry on intercultural dialogue we are talking about? It could be assumed then that today promotion of the idea of «coexistence» or «tolerance» is not sufficient. The scale and intensification of intercultural contacts – direct or via different media – require something more. It means something that would encourage cooperation between societies – for the sake of their development, as well as the development in the global scale. And at the same time it would be something maintaining the fundamental condition, that is peaceful coexistence, the one free of superstitions on regional and global scale cooperation between societies. However, while promoting this dialogue, seen as a remedy against those threats, the question is still open, whether this is the right remedy, or perhaps rather only a temporary fashion, resulting from superficial understanding of realities and problems of today's world. To answer that question we should try to pose some supplementary questions: how to understand in this particular context the notions of «dialogue» and «dialogue of cultures»? What conditions should be met so that such a dialogue could be proceeded? Is culture (or its particular sphere) capable to face the currently occurring dangers, and consequently – to support building up a reality, in which societies and individuals could leave in peace – preserving at the same time their distinctiveness and identity?

It is also to stress that both partners of dialogue should know and respect their identities and Europe cannot hide its identity and give up the fundamental values which are of its heritage – it means the human rights – without any will to play the role of insolent missionary *vis-à-vis* different societies and cultures. As professor Papisca stated «[...] human rights paradigm can be assumed as a powerful trans-cultural facilitator to move from the increasingly conflicting stage of multi-culturality to the dialogic stage of inter-culturality»[35].

Then, European cultural identity should be perceived as a project needed and carried out, the one that is beneficial for the process of integration of Europe, understood as a means of integration of its peoples. The success of this venture has its foundations in the common cultural heritage understood in particular as community of values. Secondly, Europe is less endangered by the emergence of other systems of values than by the disintegration and fall of its own system of values. This situation however is linked to the general state of culture: fragmentation, relativism and widespread individualism. It seems to be an objective phenomenon, present in Europe and in other regions as well. It is possible – as maintained by some authors – to see the source of it in the changing concept of culture itself, which – since the 19th century – defines culture in descriptive and not normative terms. As a result all cultures are treated equally, without any attempt to evaluate them on any hierarchic scale. In the 19th century as well a tendency appeared to define the national identity in connection with culture. Thirdly, European culture has its common roots and at the same time is characterised by diversity. This diversity however cannot be a starting point for nationalisms and xenophobia. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Europe should abandon its own identity. This is where the role of the prospective European cultural policy lies: on the one hand it should provide for safeguarding this diversity and on the other hand it should contribute to the development of measures aimed at crossing the existing mental barriers in favour of building the Community of Europe's peoples.

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[1] A. Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, London, Allen Lane, 2006; Z. Bokszanski, *Tozsamosc, integrakcja, grupa* (Identity, Interaction, Group), Lodz, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego, 1989; *Tozsamosci zbiorowe* (Collective Identities), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2006; A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society*

in the Late Modern Age, London, Blackwell Publishers, 1991; S. Hall and P. du Gay (eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity*, Sage, London 1996; T. Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*, Oxford, Berg, 2002; Polish edition: *Tozsamosc narodowa, kultura popularna i zycie codzienne*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, Krakow 2004.

[2] See G. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, London, Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1987.

[3] The vision of the world dominated by liberal democracy system: Francis Fukuyama, *The End of the History and the Last Man*, New York, Free Press, 1992.

[4] Namely American School of «Culture and Personality»: D. Olszewska, *Czlowiek-Kultura-Osobowsc. Wstep do klasycznej antropologii kulturowej* (Man-Culture-Personality. Introduction to the Classical Cultural Anthropology), Wroclaw, Atla 2, 2003, pp. 195-217.

[5] G. Mathews, *Global Culture/Individual Identity. Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket*, London, Routledge, 2000; Polish edition: *Supermarket kultury*, Warszawa, Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 2005, p. 36.

[6] Z. Bokszanski, *Tozsamosc, integrakcja, grupa*, cit.

[7] «The European Union – and especially the Commission – recognised the importance of intercultural dialogue well before 11 September. Constant responsiveness to the cultural dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations has always been an integral part of the partnership launched in Barcelona in 1995. We are all aware of that project's weaknesses and shorcomings. That is why, at a time when the Union is preparing for enlargement, our objective is to develop a special relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean, as part of our policy towards neighbouring countries, using all the instruments available [...]. Observers of events in the Middle East can testify that the fundamentalist movements on both sides, Israel and Palestine, have turned to extremism with the failure of the peace process and the ever-greater distitution of the Palestinian people. In this and other situations of conflict, Europe must use all the political and economic resources it has, and all its imagination, to create a prospect for dialogue», *Why Dialogue Is Important*, Introductory Speech by Romano Prodi at the Conference «Intercultural Dialogue/Dialogue interculturel», Brussels, 20 and 21 March 2002, Luxembourg, European Commission, Directorate-General for Education and Culture, Jean Monnet Project, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, pp. 44-46.

Also: «Aujourd'hui, nous nous retrouvons dans un contexte politique difficile, et l'urgence du dialogue apparaît chaque jour plus évidente. Le blocage de la situation entre l'État d'Israël et l'Autorité palestinienne avec l'extrème violence à laquelle nous assistons de part et d'autre, les tensions ethniques récentes au sud-est de l'Europe, les attentats de Madrid et de Casablanca, l'absence à terme prèvisible d'une vraie stabilité pour l'Iraque et ses voisins: tous ces faits nous obligent à travailler vite et bien pour identifier quelles pistes concrètes d'action peuvent non seulement renforcer la compréhension entre les peuples de l'Union et des pays de la Mèditerranée, mais aussi améliorer la vie des hommes et des femmes des deux rives de la Méditerranée», V. Reding, Introductory address, *Dialogue des peuples et des culture: les acteurs du dialogue*, Bruxelles, 24 et 25 mai 2004, Luxembourg, Commission européenne - Direction génerale de l'éducation et de la culture, Action Jean Monnet, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005.

[8] S.P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*; Polish edition: *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy ksztalt ladu spolecznego*, Warszawa, Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza S.A., 2005. Amartya Sen argues that the «hard version» of Huntington's opinion is willingly adopted by Islamic Djihadists, who justify their actions in this very way. That is why the Huntington's opinion could be interpreted as an example of self-executing prognosis or rather a result of accurate observation of facts, which would be performed consciously in the frame of battle against the Western civilisation.: Interview with Amartya Sen by M. Nowicki, *Zyjemy w czasach tyranii wspolnot* (We Live in the Time of Tyranny of Communities), in «Dziennik/Europa», n. 122, 2006.

[9] Z. Bokszanski, *Tozsamosc, integrakcja, grupa*, cit.

[10] B. Szlachta, *Brytyjska wielokulturowosc?* (The British Multiculturalism), in K. Golemo, T. Paleczny and E. Wiacek (eds.), *Wzory wielokuturowosci we wspolczesnym swiecie* (Patterns of Multiculturalism in the Contemporary World), Krakow, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu

Jagiellonskiego, 2006.

[11] G. Mathews, *Global Culture/Individual Identity…*, cit., pp. 13-52.

[12] A. Sen, *Identity and Violence…*, cit.

[13] T. Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*, cit., pp. 46-47.

[14] A. Sen, *Identity and Violence…*, cit.

[15] E. Wnuk-Lipinski, *Swiat miedzyepoki* (The Inter-Epoque World), Krakow, Wydawnictwo Znak, 2003, p. 273.

[16] G. Mathews, *Global Culture/Individual Identity…*, cit., p. 24; Z. Bokszanski, *Tozsamosc, interakcja, grupa*, cit., pp. 73-100

[17] Z. Bokszanski, *Tozsamosc, interakcja, grupa*, cit.

[18] «Homogenization results mainly from the center-to-periphery flow of commoditized culture. Consequently, the coming homogeneous world culture culture according to this view will by and large be a version of contemporary Western culture, and the loss of local culture would show itself most distinctively at the periphery», U. Hannerz, *Scenarios for Peripherial Cultures*, in A.D. King, *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*, London, Macmillan 1991, p. VIII.

[19] A. Sen, *Democracy as a Universal Value*, in «Journal of Democracy», n. 10.3, 1999, pp. 3-17.

[20] F. Fukuyama, *The End of History…*, cit.

[21] S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations…*, cit.

[22] Sooner or later the parts will be three or more.

[23] A. Sen, *Democracy as a Universal Value*, cit.

[24] B. Barber, *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy*, Polish edition: *Imperium strachu. Wojna, terroryzm i demokracja*, Warszawa, MUZA S.A., 2005, p. 204.

[25] The idea of democracy as a universal commitment is quite new, and it is quintessentially a product of the 20th century. The rebels who forced restraint on the king of England through the Magna Carta saw the need as an entirely local one. In contrast, the American fighters for independence and the revolutionaries in France contributed greatly to an understanding of the need for democracy as a general system. Yet the focus of their practical demands remained quite local – confined, in effect, to the two sides of the North Atlantic, and founded on the special economic, social, and political history of the region: A. Sen, *Democracy as a Universal Value*, cit.

[26] *Ibidem*.

[27] F. Fukuyama, *The «End of History» Revisited*, available at www.opendemocracy-fukuyama/fukuyama_3852.jsp; B. Barber, *Fear's Empire…*, cit.

[28] S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations…*, cit., pp. 547-548.

[29] *Ibidem*, p. 566.

[30] B. Szlachta, *Brytyjska wielokulturowosc*, cit.

[31] *Ibidem*, pp. 50-51.

[32] «It is a mistake, therefore, to describe polyethnic rights as promoting "gettoization" or "balkanization". Some people fear that polyethnic rights impede the integration of immigrants by creating a confusing half-way house between their old nation and citizenship in the new one, reminding immigrants "of their different origins rather than their shared symbols, society and future" (Citizen's Forum 1991, p. 128). But these worries seem empirically unfounded, The experience to date suggests that first – and second – generation immigrants who remain proud of their heritage are also among the most patriotic citizens of their new countries (Whitaker 1992, p. 255). Morover, their strong affiliation with their new country seems to be based in large part on its willingness not just to tolerate, but to welcome, cultural difference», W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 1995, p. 178.

[33] M. Nowicki, *Antyrasizm stal się obłędem Europejczyków* (Antiracism Became a Madness of Europeans), interview with Alain Finkielkraut, in «Dziennik», 9 december 2006.

[34] Amartya Sen does not reject the British policy of multiculturalism and he sees the source of the recent terroristic incident in the confusion raised by Al-Kaida: M. Nowicki, *Antyrasizm stal się obłędem Europejczyków*, cit., p. 6.

[35] See the Introduction to this volume.

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