The Chinese white paper on arms control in the “new era”
On November 27, the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) published a specific white paper on arms control “in the new era of Xi Jinping,” the third after those of Jiang Zemin (November 1995) and Hu Jintao (September 2005). The new white paper is also the first statement on Chinese nuclear policies since the public revelation of the rapid expansion of their nuclear forces. In a global climate of acute nuclear unease, growing competition between the major powers, and erosion of the arms control regime, the publication aims to “comprehensively present China's policies and practices on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.”
The most significant development in the three white papers is the expansion of the subject areas. The 1995 document focused on traditional domains, namely principles of global disarmament, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction regimes, and reductions in conventional forces; the 2005 white paper added to these themes separate sections on missiles and the arms race in outer space, expanding the conventional dimension to include landmines and small arms.
The 2025 white paper marks a qualitative leap. It introduces a chapter on “leading international security governance in emerging fields,” covering outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence (AI), and technology control. In this new framework, arms control becomes a multi-domain project, and the PRC explicitly articulates its ambition to shape norms and rules in these areas, reflecting its broader drive to assume a leadership role in global governance.
The document is divided into a preface, five chapters (I. Harsh Realities, International Security, and Arms Control; II. Position and Policies, China's Arms Control in the New Era; III. Playing a Constructive Role in International Arms Control; IV. Leading International Security Governance in Emerging Fields; V. Strengthening International Cooperation on Non-Proliferation and the Peaceful Uses of Science and Technology), a conclusion, and two appendices: a list of treaties on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation to which China has acceded; and China's laws and regulations related to non-proliferation and export controls.
The “New Era”
The three white papers also differ significantly in their descriptions of the international environment. Characterized by cautious optimism, the 1995 white paper acknowledged the challenges but mainly highlighted the opportunities created by the end of the Cold War, while the 2005 document saw arms control issues as having reached a “crucial crossroads” and pointed to emerging threats.
In contrast, the 2025 white paper portrays a world in deep systemic crisis: “hegemony, power politics, and unilateralism pose a serious threat to the international order; geopolitical rivalry is intensifying; regional conflicts and instability are becoming more frequent; while we are witnessing the acceleration of the arms race in multiple domains.” At the same time, issues related to international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation “are becoming more complex and multidimensional.”
The introduction to the document attributes this deterioration solely to the actions of “a certain country,” a formulation that refers to the United States, whose strategic behavior is repeatedly challenged in various chapters. In contrast, "the Chinese nation has always valued peace and harmony among nations, upheld justice, and opposed the abuse of the weak by the strong and the excessive use of force. And since 1949, the PRC has pursued a path of peaceful development and a defensive national defense policy, and has firmly opposed all forms of hegemony, aggression, expansion, and arms races."
However, the document does not explain the PRC's ongoing expansion in the South China Sea and East China Sea with the occupation of islands to the detriment of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, nor does it clarify the consistency of the statement with China's extensive and accelerated rearmament programs in all sectors, apart from the statement that “a stronger Chinese military strengthens the peaceful powers of the world.”
Nuclear weapons
The document essentially restates China's well-known positions, avoids greater transparency on the size of its nuclear arsenal and actual military doctrine, reiterating that the opacity of its forces and strategy is a crucial element of deterrence itself. Chinese reticence remains one of the central concerns in contemporary debates on arms control.
To justify the nuclear acquisition, it is stated that "China was forced to make the strategic choice to develop nuclear weapons at a particular moment in history to address nuclear threats and blackmail, break the existing nuclear monopoly, and prevent nuclear wars. China's nuclear weapons are not intended to threaten other countries, but for defense and self-protection. China has always been committed to its policy of ‘no first use’ (NFU) of nuclear weapons, has firmly upheld a nuclear strategy of self-defense, and has promoted the modernization of its nuclear forces to safeguard its own strategic security and overall global strategic stability."
In the absence of precise operational details regarding its actual implementation, the NFU is unverifiable and remains a mere unilateral political statement that is deliberately opaque and left to the interpretation of the declarant. The current process of modernizing China's nuclear forces to “improve capabilities in strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, and rapid response” suggests to observers that China is actually developing a launch-under-attack or launch-on-alert posture, which would go beyond an NFU doctrine.
The document states China's aspiration for nuclear disarmament, but this "should be a fair and reasonable process of gradual reduction toward a downward balance that maintains global strategic stability and undiminished security for all, and should proceed in a gradual manner. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should make drastic and substantial reductions in their forces in a verifiable, irreversible, and legally binding manner, so as to create the conditions for complete and total nuclear disarmament. When conditions are ripe, all nuclear-weapon states should participate in the multilateral negotiation process on nuclear disarmament."
Therefore, the PRC is currently not available for negotiations in any format aimed at agreed reductions in nuclear forces and maintains its rejection of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, supported by the countries of the global South and ignored, without comment, in the white paper.
Perhaps also in response to American and Russian statements about rumored nuclear tests, "China firmly supports the aims and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. As one of the first countries to sign the Treaty, China has always honored its commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing, supported the early entry into force of the Treaty, and promoted national preparatory work for its implementation"; however, no reason is given for the failure to ratify the treaty itself.
“Firmly opposing double standards on nuclear non-proliferation,” China considers cooperation on nuclear submarines between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to be contrary to the object and purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and seriously undermining the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
A new criticism is levelled against “this particular country,” which “in pursuing absolute security, has promoted the Golden Dome global missile defense system without restraint and ... promoted the advanced deployment of medium-range missile systems in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe ... undermining global strategic balance and stability.” Instead, “China's development of missile technologies and missile defense capabilities is motivated solely by self-defense and is not directed against any country or region.”
In reality, while American intermediate-range missiles are not yet operational, China has already deployed a variety of such missiles. Also significant are China's anti-missile programs, currently considered analogous to the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), with developments for an attack capability even in the intermediate flight phase.
Arms control
The document presents in a meticulous and detailed manner China's positive and proactive position in all the various treaties, conventions, and international arms control regimes, firmly supporting the status and authority of the United Nations. It states that it wants to “support a more inclusive governance framework, more effective multilateral mechanisms, and more proactive international cooperation.”
In particular, to address global biosecurity challenges, China promotes the establishment of a global agency dedicated to biological weapons control and biosecurity. The need for a specific international institution to support the Biological Weapons Convention is one of the crucial points for a robust regime of disarmament and non-proliferation of such weapons, but the international community has not yet managed to resolve this issue positively and faces opposition from the United States.
The PRC supports comprehensive, objective, and impartial investigations, in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, into incidents that may involve the use of chemical weapons, “to reach conclusions that respect the facts and stand the test of time.” The document laments Japan's delay in destroying chemical weapons abandoned in China during World War II.
With regard to space, the white paper reiterates the PRC's support for the UN in playing a key role in strengthening outer space security, although it offers no details on how this role might be fulfilled.
The section on cybersecurity reiterates the PRC's principle of national cyber sovereignty with the right of individual countries to “exercise jurisdiction over information and communication infrastructure, resources, data, and activities within their territories, and to protect their information systems and important data from threats, interference, attacks, theft, and destruction.” The document suggests four principles in cyberspace for global internet governance reform: “respect for cyber sovereignty, maintenance of peace and security, promotion of transparency and cooperation, and formulation of a good order.”
Regarding military applications of AI, the PRC calls on all countries to “take a prudent and responsible approach in the development and use of AI technology in the military sector”; it reiterates its position that AI systems “must always remain under human control.” The white paper also calls for an international governance framework for the military application of AI and highlights the PRC's contributions to the development of a related UN framework.
The document notes that “developing countries are still subject to restrictions on the peaceful uses of science and technology. China promotes international cooperation on the peaceful uses of science and technology and facilitates the improvement of global non-proliferation governance.”
Some observations
Compared to the two previous white papers, the latest version redefines the PRC from a reactive defender of the status quo to a proactive proponent of “global security governance,” with a more active role in future arms control negotiations, while safeguarding its own modernization goals and avoiding constraints on its own behavior.
PRC white papers always serve a promotional and messaging function, both domestically and internationally. The 2025 white paper's emphasis on fairness, technological equity, and the rights of developing countries suggests a deliberate appeal to audiences in the global South, who feel marginalized in current export control and governance regimes. But the proliferation of Chinese-made weapons in ongoing African conflicts, for example, could undermine the official rhetoric coming out of Beijing.
The document repeatedly and strongly emphasizes that “China supports the indispensable role of the UN in global governance” and upholds the authority and functionality of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
This Chinese position is all the more significant in light of the American position expressed in the principles of the recent National Security Strategy, which does not recognize any role for arms control in national security and where the UN and international control agencies appear only in a negative light: "The United States will unapologetically protect its sovereignty. This includes preventing its erosion by transnational and international organizations. The United States will chart its own course in the world and determine its own destiny, free from outside interference."