Global migration in 2024: a world in motion amid inequalities and crises

In 2024, according to the United Nations, international migrants accounted for 3.7% of the world’s population, with Europe as the main destination. This represents a significant increase: the total number of international migrants has doubled over the last thirty years. The main drivers of this growth are deep economic inequalities: the Global North is home to 16.9% of the world’s population but concentrates 44.0% of its wealth, whereas the Global South hosts 83.1% of humanity, with an average annual income of 15,800 dollars compared to 62,800 in the North. Added to this are climate and political crises, conflicts and transnational social networks, which further exacerbate these disparities.

Particular concern is raised by the intensification of conflicts, which fuel crises and famines: in 2024, 673 million people suffered from hunger and over 2.3 billion lived in conditions of food insecurity. These contexts generate ever larger forced displacements: an estimated 123.2 million people were forced to flee due to persecution, violence or environmental disasters, most of them internally displaced. A growing category is that of climate-displaced migrants, who in 2024 reached 10 million.

Europe between imbalances and pressured borders

In 2024, irregular crossings into the EU numbered 240,021, a decrease of 37.1% compared to 2023. The most frequently used routes remain those of the central and eastern Mediterranean, while flows towards the Canary Islands and along the eastern borders with Belarus and Russia are increasing. Although the early months of 2025 recorded a further reduction in crossings, this decline is largely the result of tighter controls and containment agreements concluded by the European Union.

The EU, in fact, through arrangements with Türkiye, Egypt and Tunisia, outsources the blocking of departures in exchange for economic support, a strategy that carries serious risks of human rights violations and breaches of the principle of non-refoulement. At the same time, 2024 saw persistently high numbers of unlawful pushbacks, prompting intervention by the European Court of Human Rights, which in the A.R.E. v. Greece judgment acknowledged the systematic use of pushbacks in the Evros region.

A structural problem, often little known, persists at the root: asylum applications, reserved for those fleeing racial, religious or political persecution, or conflicts, may only be submitted once on EU territory. As there are no legal and safe entry channels, this system ends up incentivising human trafficking and, in effect, rendering “irregular” the arrivals of people who would have full entitlement to international protection. In 2024, the European Union received 997,815 applications for international protection, of which 437,910 were granted. However, strong imbalances remain, calling into question the fairness of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Over 75% of applications are concentrated in a few countries: Italy received 158,605 applications, whereas countries such as Malta, Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary registered fewer than 1,000 each. Recognition rates are also highly uneven: from Estonia’s 95.7% to Portugal’s 1.0%, with Italy at 35.9% and Germany at 53.4%.

Despite the adoption of the new Pact on Migration and Asylum (approved in 2024 and to be implemented by June 2026), which provides for accelerated border procedures to be completed ordinarily within 12 weeks, an expanded definition of “safe third country”, and flexible solidarity among Member States through optional relocations or financial contributions, major critical issues remain. By concentrating responsibilities on first-entry countries, including Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus, the Pact risks increasing disparities among States, with potential consequences such as systematic detention in border areas, limited access to fair and individual procedures, and an increase in returns.

Foreign nationals in Italy: growth and demographic role

In 2024, the number of foreign residents in Italy continued to rise, reaching 5,422,426, equal to 9.2% of the total population. Despite the unprecedented demographic crisis that Italy faces, migration continues to play a positive role: around 13.5% of births are to foreign parents (just under 50,000), while 7.8% concern mixed couples. However, births among foreign nationals are also decreasing, in line with the general trend, while naturalisations remain high.

The number of non-EU citizens holding residence permits increased to 3,810,741, up by 203,581 compared with 2023. Most have lived in Italy for more than five years and hold a long-term residence permit (52.8%). Among temporary permits (47.2%), the main reasons are: family (37.0%), work (27.4%) and international protection (26.9%).

The failure of labour immigration in Italy: the shortcomings of the Decreto Flussi

The Decreto Flussi, the main instrument through which Italy regulates the entry of foreign workers, has proved in recent years to be highly inefficient and unable to meet either the needs of the labour market or those of the migrant workers involved. In the 2023-2024 biennium, out of 1,326,980 applications submitted, only 247,597 quotas were actually allocated, confirming a huge gap between demand and real entries.

The causes of this inefficiency are multiple. Firstly, the click day system, which concentrates application submissions into a few minutes, effectively turns the process into a digital lottery that penalises businesses and workers alike. Added to this are delays in visa issuance by consulates, slow administrative procedures in Italy, and abuses by intermediaries and companies that submit applications solely for profit, without then signing any contract.

For workers authorised to enter but unable to obtain a residence permit, the only means of protection is the permit for job-seeking, which, however, in 2024 was issued by only 33.6% of police headquarters.

In light of these elements, it is clear that the current mechanism, instead of promoting regular immigration, severely undermines its functioning.

Italy and the right to asylum: increasingly restrictive policies

Italy occupies a strategic — but at the same time extremely risky — position in access routes to Europe. The central Mediterranean route continues to be the most lethal: over the past ten years there have been at least 24,585 deaths or disappearances, including 1,810 in 2024 alone. In the same year, sea arrivals numbered 66,317, a 57.9% decrease compared to 2023.

The Italy-Libya Memorandum continues to support the Libyan Coast Guard, responsible for sending at least 22,000 people back to detention centres marked by inhumane conditions, while the political climate has become increasingly hostile towards humanitarian ships engaged in rescue operations.

According to Eurostat, in 2024 Italy registered 158,605 asylum applications, including 7,485 repeated applications, with a recognition rate of 35.9%, well below the EU average of 51.4%. At the end of the year there were still 207,285 pending applications (compared with 147,000 in 2023): a figure that highlights not only the growing pressure on the system but, above all, the chronic inability of the administrative apparatus to ensure adequate processing times.

Despite this, the political path towards greater externalisation of procedures continued. On 23 February 2024, the law ratifying and implementing the Italy-Albania Protocol entered into force. Although its main objective is the transfer to Albania of people rescued who apply for asylum in Italy, the Protocol currently also provides for the transfer to Italian-run centres in Albania of migrants destined for expulsion or refoulement, already detained in CPRs (repatriation centres). This form of administrative detention, embedded in a system already marked by deep structural issues, risks being further exacerbated through externalisation to a third country.

The Spiral of Vulnerability: Poverty, Exclusion, and Structural Inequalities in the Lives of Foreign Nationals in Italy

In 2024, according to analyses based on Istat data, 37.5% of foreign residents in Italy were living in conditions of risk of poverty or social exclusion. This share rises even further when considering minors, among whom the figure reaches 43.6%. The comparison with the Italian population makes the gap even more evident: among Italian citizens, the same conditions affect 21.2% of the overall population and 23.6% of minors, respectively.

Although the Inclusion Allowance (Assegno di Inclusione) was designed as a tool to provide economic support and promote social and labour-market inclusion, in practice only one foreign national out of fourteen among those at risk of poverty or social exclusion is able to access it. Access to other anti-poverty measures is also often hindered by requirements that, in many cases, prove to be unlawful or discriminatory.

A genuine spiral of vulnerability thus emerges: low incomes and unstable employment make access to both the rental market and home ownership increasingly difficult. These structural barriers are compounded by widespread prejudice and discrimination in the housing market, which push many foreign residents into inadequate housing and lead them to concentrate mainly in the outskirts of large urban centres (35.1%) or in suburban municipalities (57.2%).

Yet a significant fact is often overlooked: according to the Istituto Scenari Immobiliari, there are around one million potential foreign homebuyers in Italy with economic conditions sufficient to take out a mortgage. However, many of them lack the savings needed to cover initial costs or are unable to meet the strict guarantees required by banks. As a result, the majority of foreign nationals live in rented accommodation (64.5%); a significant share live at their workplace (7.8%), as in the case of domestic workers and caregivers, while a further 6.8% live in shared housing with relatives or compatriots, often in conditions of overcrowding and housing stress.

Social difficulties are also reflected in the educational paths of young foreign nationals. In the 2023/2024 school year, 931,323 students of foreign citizenship were enrolled, of whom 607,168 were born in Italy. However, the school dropout rate among these students is more than three times higher than that of their Italian peers: 26.9% compared to 9%. This gap has long-term effects, significantly affecting educational continuation. Unsurprisingly, the presence of foreign students decreases as the level of education rises, to the point that in the 2023/2024 academic year they accounted for only 6.7% of university enrolments.

These dynamics translate into persistent disadvantages in the labour market, particularly affecting foreign women. They account for only 41.5% of employed foreign nationals, yet represent 50.3% of the unemployed, with an unemployment rate almost double that of Italian women (12.1% versus 6.8%). Social mobility is therefore severely constrained: only 9.1% of foreign nationals hold a qualified profession, compared with 39.6% of Italians, while more than three out of five are employed in unskilled or manual occupations, often under precarious contracts and with greater exposure to occupational risks. Average annual earnings are also 30.4% lower than those of Italian workers.

Yet, despite often being perceived as a burden on the system, foreign nationals make a significant contribution to Italy’s economic and social development: through the creation of self-employed businesses and with a net fiscal contribution to public finances amounting to €4.6 billion in 2023. This is a fundamental contribution that continues to be made despite stigma, inequalities, and the structural barriers that still shape their path toward full integration.