Freedom of worship

In its judgment no. 2567 of 18 March 2024, the Council of State, Section II, ruled as unlawful the order issued by the Municipality of Mandas requiring the display of crucifixes in public offices. Although the Regional Administrative Court (TAR) of Sardinia had referenced the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (Lautsi v. Italy, cf. Yearbook 2012, p. 285), the Council of State affirmed the standing of the Union of Atheists and Rationalist Agnostics (UAAR) to obtain a decision on the merits. Furthermore, it determined that the prerequisites for issuing a contingent and urgent order were not satisfied and identified a violation of the principle of State secularism, due to the absence of "reasonable accommodation," consistent with the criteria established by the Civil Cassation (judgment no. 24414 of 9 September 2021, cf. Yearbook 2022, p. 216).

The Criminal Cassation Court, Section III, in its judgment no. 1253 of 11 January 2024, upheld the conviction of a citizen for disruption of religious functions (Article 405 of the Criminal Code) and contempt of religion (Article 403 of the Criminal Code). During a religious procession, the individual had aggressively insulted the bishop, thereby obstructing the continuation of the ceremony. The Court clarified that the offence of disruption of religious functions may also apply when the service is not conducted on a regular basis, and that contempt of religion necessitates only general intent, specifically awareness of the offensive nature of the conduct. In the present case, the expressions employed transcended legitimate, reasoned, and civil criticism of the organizational aspects of a public event and constituted an affront to the religious sentiments of the faithful. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Parliamentary immunity and freedom of expression 

In its judgment of 10 June 2024, no. 104, the Constitutional Court dismissed the conflict of powers raised by the Court of Milan against the Chamber of Deputies, thereby upholding the applicability of parliamentary immunity, pursuant to Article 68, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, to statements made on Facebook in 2018 by then Deputy Carlo Fidanza, who was facing proceedings for aggravated defamation. The Court clarified that parliamentary immunity serves to safeguard both the freedom inherent in the exercise of the parliamentary mandate and the autonomy of the Chambers. Furthermore, it extends to statements made outside institutional settings, provided that they exhibit a functional connection to the exercise of parliamentary duties. In the instant case, the statements were determined to be closely linked to a parliamentary question, thus falling within the representative function of the mandate and consequently rendering them immune from prosecution.

Freedom of expression and fascist demonstrations

The Joint Divisions of the Criminal Cassation Court, in their ruling no. 16153 of 17 April 2024, annulled and remanded a decision of the Milan Court of Appeal. This decision had previously resulted in the conviction of several individuals for their participation in a public commemoration held in Milan in 2016, which featured the “roll call of the fallen” and the “Roman salute”. The Court clarified that Article 5 of Law no. 645/1952 and Article 2 of Decree-Law no. 122/1993 (subsequently converted into Law no. 205/1993, commonly known as the Mancino Law) do not operate under a principle of speciality but rather regulate distinct, yet potentially concurrent, offences. The “Roman salute” constitutes conduct falling under Article 5 of Law no. 645/1952, as a typical manifestation of the dissolved Fascist Party, and is classified as an offence of concrete danger, requiring assessment within its specific contextual framework. Its inclusion within the scope of the Mancino Law is conditional upon the overall circumstances attributing to it a discriminatory meaning linked to organisations, groups, or movements inspired by racial, ethnic, national, or religious hatred. In the specific case adjudicated, the event was determined to be purely commemorative in nature, and no concrete risk of reconstituting the Fascist Party or promoting discriminatory conduct was identified. Consequently, the conduct was subsumed under Article 5 of Law no. 645/1952, thereby excluding the applicability of the Mancino Law.

The First Section of the Criminal Cassation Court, in its judgment no. 25452 of 16 April 2024, upheld the conviction of the president of the DO.RA. association for the offence of glorification of fascism, pursuant to Article 4 of Law no. 645/1952. The Court reaffirmed that glorification constitutes a criminal offence where, within its specific context, it presents a concrete risk of reorganisation of the Fascist Party. These prerequisites were deemed satisfied given the public and repeated utilization of fascist symbols and rhetoric, including the display of banners and distribution of leaflets praising Mussolini during a public event in Azzate, coupled with the association's overtly fascist ideological orientation.

Consistent with this jurisprudential approach, the First Section of the Criminal Cassation Court, in its judgment no. 37859 of 15 October 2024, affirmed a conviction for fascist glorification and propaganda, concurrently underscoring that dissemination via online platforms possesses the potential to amplify the concrete risk of generating adherence and support.

Defamation

Defamation in the press
The Civil Cassation Court, Section I, in its judgment of 11 July 2024, no. 19028, affirmed the liability of the press agency ANSA and its editor for defamation stemming from two press releases issued in 2017. These releases contained inaccurate information concerning a suspect’s legal status and purported subversive affiliations following an arrest. The Court reiterated that the legitimate exercise of the right to report necessitates truth (including putative truth), continence in expression, and relevance of the information disseminated. Furthermore, the Court precluded the existence of any privileged status for specific sources, mandating that information, even when originating from investigative authorities, must be meticulously verified. In the instant case, the reliance on an anonymous and unofficial police e-mail did not absolve the agency of its duty of verification. Subsequent clarifications were deemed irrelevant, as the veracity of the information must be evaluated at the time of publication.

By its judgment of 19 November 2024, no. 42449, the Criminal Cassation Court, Section V, sustained the acquittal of an editor indicted for aggravated defamation in relation to two articles published in 2020 regarding the spread of Covid-19 in Sicily. The Court elucidated that journalistic criticism, even when articulated in severe language, is lawful when predicated upon putative truth, serves the public interest, and adheres to expressive restraint. In the matter at hand, the information was based on reasonably trustworthy sources, specifically a hospital, and the company's subsequent denial was neither known nor reasonably knowable at the time of publication.

The paramount nature of the truth requirement was further underscored in order no. 33294 of 27 November 2024, issued by the Civil Cassation Court, Section III. The Court clarified that the right to criticism, while permitting subjective evaluations and even forceful terminology, can never obviate a truthful factual underpinning. The alteration or embellishment of facts, even when intended to substantiate a particular viewpoint, vitiates the legitimacy of the exercise of freedom of expression and constitutes defamation.

Aggravated defamation in the digital sphere 
In 2024, case law further confirmed that defamation is no longer confined to the traditional press but increasingly occurs through digital media and online platforms. 

In particular, the Criminal Cassation Court, Section V, in its judgment of 8 April 2024, no. 14345 held that the dissemination of offensive statements via Facebook constitutes aggravated defamation under Article 595(3) of the Criminal Code, as an offence committed by “any other means of publicity”. This applies even where the injured party is not expressly named, provided that they are identifiable, for instance, through a photograph, as in the case under consideration. 

Likewise, in judgment of 26 November 2024, no. 43089 the same Section V of the Criminal Cassation Court confirmed that online defamation may give rise to the aggravating circumstance of publicity where the message is disseminated through social networks accessible to the public. The Court stressed that it is not necessary to ascertain how many individuals actually viewed the content; what is decisive is the medium’s potential to reach an indeterminate number of recipients. By contrast, messages exchanged in private chats do not fall within the aggravating circumstance, owing to their confidential nature. 

Consistently, in judgment of 21 November 2024, no. 42783, Section I of the Criminal Cassation had excluded the aggravating circumstance of publicity in a case involving defamatory messages circulated within a WhatsApp group. The Court observed that the essentially private nature of instant messaging, even when addressed to numerous participants, cannot be equated with the wide and indeterminate reach of publicly accessible social networks.

Aggravated threat

The Criminal Cassation Court, Section V, in its judgment of 24 January 2024, no. 3115, reaffirmed that aggravated threat constitutes an offence of concrete danger, the assessment of which is predicated upon the conduct’s objective capacity to induce psychological distress in the victim. This evaluation necessitates consideration of the manner of the act, the instruments employed, and the specific contextual circumstances. The Court further reiterated that the offence remains prosecutable ex officio, clarifying that this procedural regime does not contravene constitutional precepts or the principle of reasonableness, inasmuch as the trial judge retains the competence to evaluate the seriousness of the threat, including in light of the victim’s perception.

In its judgment of 27 March 2024, no. 12729, Section V of the Criminal Cassation Court declared inadmissible the appeal lodged by Te.Ma. against his conviction for aggravated threat directed against his mother. During a domestic dispute, he had menaced her with a stone, proclaiming his intent to “smash her head until her brains came out”. The Court underscored that the existence of actual fear on the part of the victim is not a requisite element; it is sufficient that the conduct possesses the objective capability of impairing the victim’s moral freedom. This assessment must encompass the context, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the gravity of the conduct, including any use of weaponry.

Consistent with this jurisprudential approach, in the judgment of 3 July 2024, no. 26112, the Criminal Cassation Court, Section V, upheld a conviction for aggravated threat where the defendant had threatened his former spouse and discharged shots at her window utilizing an air rifle. The Court emphasized that the determinative evaluation must focus on the substance of the threats, the means utilized, and the surrounding circumstances, while antecedent conflicts between the parties do not serve to preclude the existence of the offence.