Italian citizenship legislation has been at the centre of recent political debate, including referendum initiatives and proposals for legislative reform. Most recently, however, it has also been the subject of a Constitutional Court ruling concerning individuals with disabilities.

In its judgment of 7 March 2025, No. 25, the Constitutional Court declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 9, paragraph 1, of Law No. 91 of 5 February 1992 ("New Rules on Citizenship"), insofar as it fails to exempt applicants with severe language learning impairments—resulting from age, medical conditions, or disabilities—from the Italian language proficiency test, where such limitations are certified by a public health authority.

The question of constitutionality was raised by the Regional Administrative Court of Emilia-Romagna, which questioned the legitimacy of the citizenship law—as amended by Decree-Law No. 113 of 2018—on the grounds that it imposes a linguistic requirement even on individuals who, due to an inability to learn Italian as a result of severe disabilities and certified cognitive impairments, are unable to demonstrate knowledge of the language.

A woman who certified that she was objectively unable to acquire linguistic competence due to cognitive impairments—arising from multiple medical conditions as well as advanced age—challenged before the administrative court the prefectural decision declaring her application for Italian citizenship inadmissible. In essence, she contested the constitutionality of the provision requiring language certification, which formed the basis of the unfavourable administrative act.

The Constitutional Court observed that Article 9, paragraph 1, of Law No. 91 of 1992 requires verification of linguistic proficiency at B1 level, without establishing a provision that, by narrowing its personal scope, exempts individuals who are objectively unable to learn the Italian language due to physical or mental infirmity or impairment. This stands in contrast to the exemptions granted to foreigners required to sign the integration agreement or to those applying for EU long-term residence permits.

The Constitutional Court found a violation of the principle of equality under Article 3 of the Constitution, as the contested provision unjustifiably and unreasonably treats distinct situations in the same manner. The rule imposes a uniform requirement—the demonstration of linguistic competence—even on individuals who, due to disability, are in an objectively different position from the majority of citizenship applicants.

The principle of equality, by contrast, requires that for this specific category of foreign nationals, integration should be assessed through criteria that are commensurate with—and therefore proportionate to—their individual capacities. Accordingly, a differentiated approach is necessary, including exemption from the language proficiency requirement.

Therefore, the principle of formal equality, as set out in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Constitution ("All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, personal and social conditions"), is violated with respect to "personal conditions"—a category which, according to established jurisprudence, undoubtedly includes disability. This condition is explicitly recognised and protected by Article 38 of the Constitution and, at the international level, by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has affirmed that the legal treatment of disability is informed by a set of principles rooted in the fundamental values underpinning the constitutional framework.

Upon closer examination, the Court also notes a violation of the substantive dimension of the principle of equality, as set out in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Constitution ("It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country"). The provision in question, rather than removing an obstacle, imposes one on the acquisition of citizenship for this specific category of vulnerable individuals. This results in a form of indirect discrimination, which may ultimately lead to social marginalisation.

Judgment No. 25 of 2025 thus serves as a reminder that the protection of persons with disabilities is firmly rooted in the constitutional framework and represents a direct expression of the fundamental principles that inspire the Charter itself.