Facts of the case

The case involves a public officer from Cagliari who was sexually assaulted by police officer C.C. after he responded to her domestic violence call. On December 2, 2008, the author was assaulted by her ex-husband and called the police. Officer C.C. arrived, and later that day began harassing her with persistent phone calls. The next day, C.C. gained entry to her home under false pretenses of having case information, then proceeded to sexually assault and rape her. The author preserved DNA evidence and sought medical attention, with doctors confirming injuries consistent with rape. She filed a criminal complaint in January 2009, leading to C.C.'s indictment in 2010. At trial in 2014, the court heard testimony from two other women about C.C.'s violent behavior and saw forensic evidence linking him to the crime, resulting in his conviction and a six-year prison sentence. However, in 2015 the District Court shockingly overturned the conviction, accepting C.C.'s claim that the sexual encounter was consensual and suggesting the author had fabricated the assault out of regret. The court relied on harmful gender stereotypes, criticizing the author's behavior after the assault as not fitting their expectations of how a rape victim should act. The Supreme Court upheld this decision in 2017.

Complaint

The author alleges she suffered discrimination under Article 1 of the Convention, arguing that the Regional Court's acquittal of her rapist was based on gender stereotypes and myths about rape victims' expected behavior, violating her rights under Articles 2(b)-(d), (f), 5(a) and 15(1) CEDAW. She contends these stereotypes obstructed her access to justice, causing continuous victimisation, and that the State failed to provide effective remedies as required under Articles 2(b)-(c) CEDAW by not implementing proper legislative protections against gender discrimination. The author further claims a violation of Article 2(d) CEDAW, as judicial gender bias compromised the court's impartiality when acquitting C.C., demonstrating the State's failure to prevent discriminatory practices. She asserts additional violations under Articles 2(f) and 5(a) CEDAW, as Italy neglected to reform laws and social patterns perpetuating gender discrimination. IN particular, the applicant criticises the legal definition of rape for centering on force rather than consent and lamented the lacking of judicial training on gender-based violence, leaving interpretation of the law prone to cultural stereotypes. The author maintains her Article 15(1) CEDAW rights were violated since court decisions relied on gender prejudices rather than objective evidence, denying her equal legal protection. She also cites excessive trial duration, systematic revictimization through judicial reinforcement of stereotypes, and financial damages from job loss and legal costs as compounding harms. The complaint fundamentally challenges how gender bias in Italy's legal system created multiple violations of her rights under the CEDAW through flawed judicial reasoning, inadequate legal frameworks, and institutional tolerance of discriminatory practices against women.

Observations of the State party regarding admissibility and the substance of the case

The State Party defends its legal framework as founded on democratic principles, gender equality, and human rights protections, citing constitutional and international standards. It references the Court's 2015 acquittal of C.C., which overturned the initial 2014 conviction, arguing the appeal court properly reassessed evidence through reasoned arguments as required by Supreme Court jurisprudence. The State emphasizes that when overturning convictions, courts must provide detailed alternative reasoning but need not rehear witnesses unless converting acquittals to convictions, aligning with European human rights standards. It notes the Supreme Court found the author's appeal generic and unfounded, particularly regarding witness credibility and forensic evidence about condom use supporting C.C.'s consent defence. The State highlights its robust legal protections against gender violence, including 2019's "Red Code" Act, establishing expedited procedures for victims, and the 2017-2020 National Strategic Plan enhancing multi-level anti-violence measures. It details legislative improvements like criminalising stalking (2009), expanding victim protections during proceedings, and providing specialised training for officials. The State references integrated victim support systems, including a 2018 committee to streamline assistance from reporting through compensation. While acknowledging the CEDAW Committee recommendations on gender justice, it maintains the judiciary acted without bias, with the Court's acquittal reflecting legitimate evidentiary reassessment rather than stereotypes. The State contends its laws adequately criminalise sexual violence, citing Supreme Court precedents strictly applying Penal Code Article 609-bis on coercive sexual acts. It rejects claims of systemic gender bias, pointing to ongoing reforms like increased funding for victim services and nationwide data collection on gender violence. Ultimately, the State asserts its full compliance with international obligations, arguing the author's case received fair judicial consideration without discriminatory treatment, and emphasises its continued cooperation with human rights mechanisms.

Comments by the author regarding the State party’s observations

In her further submissions to the Committee, the author emphasises that her complaint does not seek to relitigate C.C.’s criminal liability but rather challenges the gender stereotypes that influenced his acquittal, violating her rights under the Convention. She notes the State party did not contest admissibility, which she argues should therefore be recognised as established. The author rejects the State’s claim that her case merely disputes evidentiary assessments, stressing instead that the Court’s ruling—and the Supreme Court’s failure to overturn it - relied on sexist myths about rape victims, contravening Italy’s constitutional and international obligations. She criticises the State’s observations for touting legislative reforms while ignoring how stereotypes undermined her access to justice, highlighting a persistent gap between formal legal protections and their implementation due to ingrained societal biases. Citing a 2019 National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) report, she underscores how pervasive stereotypes blame victims—with 39.3% of Italians believing women can avoid unwanted sex, 23.9% attributing rape to provocative clothing, and 15.1% faulting intoxicated victims. These biases, she argues, infect the judiciary, as documented by Judge Paola Di Nicola and ongoing research funded by the Department for Equal Opportunities. The author asserts violations of Articles 2(b)–(d) and (f), 5(a), and 15(1) CEDAW, contending that judicial stereotyping denied her an effective remedy, compromised impartiality, and perpetuated secondary victimisation. While acknowledging Italy’s progressive legal framework, she notes its effectiveness is hollowed out by cultural prejudices that distort judicial interpretations of consent and credibility. Referencing the Committee’s Vertido v. Philippines decision, she condemns rigid standards imposed on rape victims’ behavior. The author further criticises Italy’s rape legislation for centering on force rather than consent and allowing harassment charges to lapse due to statutes of limitations, exacerbating her denial of justice. She concludes that the State failed its positive obligations, causing moral, social, and financial harm—including job loss and legal expenses—due to protracted proceedings and revictimising stereotypes embedded in the acquittal judgment.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee 

The Committee first examined the communication’s admissibility, confirming that the matter was not under parallel international review and that domestic remedies had been exhausted. While acknowledging the State party’s argument that the author sought to relitigate factual assessments, the Committee emphasised its mandate to evaluate whether judicial reasoning was tainted by gender stereotypes constituting discrimination. It declared the communication admissible under Articles 2(b)–(d), (f), 5(a), and 15(1) CEDAW, as the author sufficiently substantiated claims that stereotypes distorted her access to justice. 

On the merits, the Committee scrutinised the Court’s acquittal of C.C., which overturned his initial conviction despite medical evidence, witness testimony, and DNA proof. The Committee noted the appeal court’s reliance on condom-use speculation to dismiss the author’s credibility while dismissing her injuries as “exuberance” in consensual sex. It highlighted the court’s gendered assumptions faulting the author for not behaving like a “real rape victim,” misinterpreting her post-assault actions as vengeful fabrication, and excusing C.C.’s inconsistencies as self-defense. The Supreme Court’s endorsement of this reasoning, without addressing its stereotyping, compounded the violation. 

The case demonstrates systemic failures in Italy's legal system to properly address sexual violence and eliminate gender bias, resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice where overwhelming evidence was disregarded in favour of discriminatory assumptions about women's behaviour.

The Committee found the State party’s judicial organs violated the Convention by:

1.  applying myths about rape victims (e.g., expected trauma responses, motives for false accusations);
2.  subjecting the author to disproportionate scrutiny while accepting C.C.’s testimony uncritically; 
3. failing to ensure impartiality, perpetuating a culture of impunity. 

The Committee underscored that Italy’s legal framework, which centers on force rather than consent, enables stereotyping by requiring victims to prove resistance rather than perpetrators to prove consent.

The Committee concluded that the State party violated Articles 2(b)–(d), (f), 3, 5, and 15, recommending:

1.  compensation for the author’s moral, social, and financial harms;
2.  procedural reforms to expedite sexual violence cases;
3.  mandatory judicial training to eliminate stereotypes; 
4. legislative amendments to define rape by lack of consent, shifting the burden of proof to perpetrators. 

The State party must report within six months on compliance.