European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA): report on the state of civic space in Europe and Italy
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Structure and methodology of the report
- The European Pillars: monitoring, funding and participation
- Focus on Italy: between organisational excellence and structural barriers
- Conclusions
Introduction
Civic space is the legal, political, social and economic environment that enables citizens and civil society organisations (CSOs) to organise, participate and communicate without hindrance. It therefore serves as a barometer of the democratic health of the European Union. Unfortunately, the current historical context, marked by growing polarisation and authoritarian tendencies, has made it clear that this space can no longer be taken for granted. In recent years, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has stepped up its monitoring of this ecosystem, identifying a worrying trend: whilst institutional awareness of the importance of civil society is growing, practical, legal and financial barriers are multiplying. Civil society organisations are not merely ‘watchdogs’ that report rights violations, but are essential actors in the provision of services, the promotion of social cohesion and innovation in public policy. A shrinking civic space not only harms individual associations but weakens the entire Union’s ability to respond to global challenges, from the climate crisis to the management of migration flows. This article aims to analyse how the EU is mapping these dynamics, starting with an understanding of the analytical tools and then delving into the specifics of the Italian context.
Report structure and methodology
Monitoring civic space is not a one-off exercise, but a rigorous process based on a robust and comparative methodological framework. The “Civic Space Update 2026” report and its accompanying country-specific analyses are structured in such a way as to transform qualitative and quantitative data into concrete policy recommendations. The FRA does not merely observe the laws, but assesses the “enabling environment”, i.e. how those laws are applied in daily practice. The structure of the reports is usually based on three methodological pillars. Firstly, data collection takes place through the Franet network, comprising national experts across all 27 Member States, who provide real-time updates on legislative changes and documented incidents. Secondly, the reports adopt a cross-cutting thematic approach: they do not merely list each country’s problems, but identify ‘European trends’ (such as the rise in frivolous lawsuits or the digitalisation of dissent). Finally, each report includes a section on ‘National Snapshots’ or specific in-depth analyses, such as the one dedicated to Italy, which allow European challenges to be contextualised within the legal and political specificities of each state. The FRA’s approach is “rights-based”. This means that every obstacle identified is assessed in light of states’ international obligations. The report is therefore structured into sections reflecting the key areas of concern: the regulatory framework, the financial environment, the right to participation and, finally, the physical and digital safety of civil society actors. This breakdown makes it possible to identify not only where the state fails to protect, but also where it actively hinders civil society through bureaucratisation or public stigmatisation. Understanding this structure is essential for interpreting the data that follows, as it allows us to view civic space not as a monolith, but as a puzzle of interconnected freedoms.
The European pillars: monitoring, funding and participation
Looking more closely at the findings of the reports, the European landscape rests on a precarious balance. The monitoring carried out by the FRA identifies national monitoring as the primary weakness: many Member States lack independent bodies specifically dedicated to monitoring the civic sphere. Where National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) do exist, they are often underfunded or lack enforcement powers. Without effective monitoring, violations go unnoticed, and civil society finds itself isolated in its efforts to report abuses.
The second critical pillar is that of funding. The financial sustainability of CSOs is under attack in various forms. In some countries, laws on ‘transparency of foreign funding’ have been used to label organisations as ‘foreign agents’, limiting their ability to receive international funds. In other cases, as highlighted in the 2026 update, the challenge lies in the complexity of European and national calls for proposals, which favour large organisations at the expense of small, local ones. Freedom of association is meaningless unless accompanied by the freedom to seek, receive and use resources. Finally, the issue of participation represents a challenge to the quality of democracy. Civic participation cannot be limited to voting once every five years; it must be an ongoing process of consultation. FRA reports indicate that, although many governments have set up digital portals for public consultation, these tools are often perceived as purely formal. CSOs report that deadlines are too short to provide technical feedback on complex laws and that there is a chronic lack of feedback: contributions are submitted, but it is rarely known whether or how they have influenced the final decision. This creates a sense of ‘democratic fatigue’ that can lead to disengagement among the most critical organisations.
Focus on Italy: between associative excellence and structural barriers
The specific analysis of the Italian context was published in the report “Civic space in the EU: Mapping of national approaches to civic space monitoring, participation and protection”. On reading it, it becomes clear that, although Italy has one of the most vibrant and resilient civil societies in Europe, capable of stepping in to replace the state in providing welfare and protecting rights, it finds itself operating within a regulatory and political environment that is often hostile or inefficient. Three areas of particular concern have been highlighted: the reform of the Third Sector, the safety of activists and the right to demonstrate. The Third Sector Reform, embodied by the Single National Register (RUNTS), was introduced with the laudable aim of bringing order and transparency. However, the report highlights how its implementation has resulted in a ‘bureaucratic bloat’. For many small voluntary associations, management costs and reporting obligations have become unsustainable, leading to the closure of long-standing organisations that ensured social cohesion in small towns. This phenomenon risks transforming civil society into a sector reserved solely for “professionals”, excluding spontaneous and less structured voluntary work.
On the protection front, Italy is noted for its widespread use of SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation). Investigative journalists and environmental activists find themselves inundated with civil defamation lawsuits seeking millions in damages, brought by politicians or large industrial groups for the sole purpose of intimidation. Despite European calls, Italy still lacks an effective law allowing judges to swiftly dismiss these frivolous lawsuits. Furthermore, the climate of protection has deteriorated for those dealing with sensitive issues such as migration. The report documents cases of the criminalisation of NGOs carrying out sea rescues, through decrees that restrict the operations of ships and political rhetoric that portrays activists as “accomplices of traffickers”, undermining their safety and public legitimacy. Finally, freedom of assembly has recently been curtailed. Monitoring indicates a trend towards the use of restrictive administrative measures to prevent or limit demonstrations of dissent, particularly within environmental and student movements. The tightening of penalties for road blockades and the disproportionate use of police force in certain public spaces are indicators of an approach that prioritises public order over the expression of democratic dissent. Italy, therefore, whilst not being a country where civic space is formally closed off, presents numerous ‘warning signs’ that require constant attention from European institutions.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the mapping of civic space in the European Union and the detailed focus on Italy paint a worrying picture. Civic space is not a luxury, but a functional requirement of the rule of law. The FRA’s reports are clear: the state has a positive obligation to create an environment in which civic space can flourish. This means less punitive bureaucracy, more transparent funding and, above all, robust legal protection against those who use the law to silence dissent. For Italy, the path to improvement necessarily involves a review of the administrative burdens imposed by the Third Sector reform and the immediate adoption of the European anti-SLAPP directive. Monitoring must become an institutionalised practice, perhaps through the creation of an Independent Human Rights Authority, which is still absent from our legal system despite repeated international calls. Only by recognising civil society as a critical partner, rather than an adversary or a mere provider of low-cost services, can Italy and Europe ensure that public participation remains the beating heart of the common project. The FRA’s monitoring is not merely an academic exercise, but a call to action for politicians, legislators and citizens: protecting civic space today means preventing the democratic erosion of tomorrow.