Issues Relating to the Dublin Regulation

Articles 4 (right to information) and 5 (personal interview) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the so-called recast Dublin Regulation or Dublin III Regulation) are intended to ensure that the transfer of an applicant for international protection to the Member State responsible for examining the application takes place in compliance with uniform procedural safeguards. These guarantees are designed to ensure that the applicant is fully informed of the proceeding affecting them and fully aware of the meaning of the various acts concerning them and of the rights conferred through the specific informational safeguards (delivery of information leaflet) and participatory guarantees (personal interview) (see Yearbook 2022, p. 218).

The Italian Supreme Court has adhered to the interpretation provided by the Second Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment of 30 November 2023 (joined cases C-228/21, C-254/21, C-297/21, C-315/21 e C-328/21), clarifying in particular that the information obligations laid down in Article 4 of the Dublin III Regulation apply both in the  context of an initial application for international protection and the related take-charge procedure, and in the context of a subsequent application. Likewise, the CJEU specified that the obligation to conduct a personal interview under Article 5 of the Regulation applies in both situations as an essential instrument for fulfilling the information obligations. 

In line with this approach, the Italian Court of Cassation (Civil Division I, order no. 10331 of 17 April 2024) held that the information obligations incumbent upon the administrative authority cannot be regarded as absorbed or replaced by the guarantees provided under Article 10 of Legislative Decree No. 25/2008 (Guarantees for Asylum Seekers). In the case at issue, concerning a transfer decision adopted by the Dublin Unit for the purpose of a take-back procedure by another Member State, the Supreme Court of Cassation found unlawful the decision of the Rome Tribunal dismissing the applicant’s appeal, emphasising that the failure to demonstrate compliance with the information obligations laid down by the European Regulation entails the annulment of the transfer. The Court clarified that such obligations must specifically concern the information required by Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, insofar as they are instrumental in enabling the applicant to provide all elements relevant to determining the Member State responsible for examining the application for international protection (see also Civil Division I, order no. 12170 of 6 May 2024, Labour Division, order no. 19426 of 15 July 2024).

The Supreme Court of Cassation reached a similar conclusion in dismissing the appeal lodged by the Ministry of the Interior against the decision of the Rome Tribunal (decree of 18 November 2020), which had annulled the transfer of an Algerian national to France (Court of Cassation, Civil Division I, order no. 11000 of 23 April 2024). The Court reaffirmed that the failure to provide the information leaflet compliant with the standard European model, together with the absence of an adequate personal interview, constitutes a violation of the procedural safeguards established by the Dublin III Regulation, thereby rendering the transfer decision unlawful.

Subsequent case law of the Court of Cassation further clarified the scope of these obligations, stressing that the mere completion of form C3 and the delivery of an information leaflet not compliant with European standards are insufficient to fulfil the information obligations laid down by the Regulation. The Court also underlined that the personal interview constitutes an indispensable element in guaranteeing the right to an effective remedy (Court of Cassation, Civil Division I, order no. 18898 of July 2024; see also Civil Division I, order no. 23138 of 27 August 2024).

Alongside these issues, the Supreme Court of Cassation (Civil Division I, order no. 23050 of 22 August 2024) reaffirmed the duty of trial judges to conduct a concrete assessment of the reception conditions in the Member State responsible, relying on updated and reliable international sources. Accordingly, it quashed and remanded the decision of the lower court, which had dismissed the appeal against the transfer of a Pakistani national to Slovenia without adequately verifying, on the basis of qualified sources, the conditions of the Slovenian asylum system.

International Protection

With regard to subsidiary protection, the Court of Cassation (Civil Division I, order no. 11027 of 24 April 2024) reaffirmed the need for judges to adopt a contextual approach in assessing applications, particularly where complex phenomena affecting the applicant’s condition are involved. In examining the case of a Bangladeshi national who claimed to have fled a situation of extreme poverty aggravated by debts contracted with loan sharks, to have been subjected to forced labour in Libya, and to fear retaliation from creditors in the event of return, the Supreme Court of Cassation stressed the central importance of the duty of investigative cooperation and the hearing of the applicant as indispensable tools for establishing the applicant’s actual condition of vulnerability and the concrete risk of serious harm upon return. Such assessment must be conducted in light of an updated and reliable information on the country of origin, in accordance with European and UNHCR guidelines. The Court therefore quashed and remanded the decision of the Reggio Calabria Tribunal that rejected the application.

Consistently with this interpretation, lower courts have recognised the relevance of situations of labour exploitation and debt bondage for the purposes of granting international protection. In particular, the Turin Tribunal (decree of 23 December 2024) granted refugee status to a Bangladeshi national, holding that the condition of vulnerability deriving from indebtedness and involvement in human trafficking networks could expose the applicant, in the event of return, to a concrete risk of acts amounting to persecution.

As regards the requirements for the recognition of refugee status, the Supreme Court of Cassation also reiterated the need for a non-steretypical assessment of the applicant’s allegations, especially in cases involving particularly sensitive personal conditions. In this regard, the Court of Cassation (Civil Division I, order no. 9290 of 8 April 2024) held that the assessment of the applicant’s credibility must take into account the applicant’s personal, family, and socio-political context, as well as the conditions in the country of origin. Thus, in ruling on an application lodged by an Iranian national, the Court criticised the finding of lack of credibility, highlighting the need to consider both the context of religious fundamentalism in the country and the applicant’s family background. 

Lower court case law has applied these principles in relation to situations falling within the grounds of persecution under Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In particular, with regard to sexual orientation, the Bologna Tribunal (decree of 25 November 2024) granted international protection to Pakistani national, holding that the risk of social stigmatisation and violence by family members or the community constitutes persecution based on membership of a particular social group, in a context where state authorities do not provide effective protection. 

The Turin Tribunal (decree of 30 September 2024) granted refugee status to a deaf applicant from Tunisia, emphasising that the severe lack of infrastructure and services for persons with disabilities, together with widespread social discrimination against deaf persons, may expose the individual to a concrete risk of persecutory acts linked to membership of a particular social group within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention. 

With regard to religious persecution, in a decree of 18 June 2024 the Florence Tribunal reaffirmed that the right freely to manifest one’s religion constitutes an essential element of freedom of religion, the restriction of which may amount to persecution. The Florentine judges accordingly granted refugee status to a Chinese national, holding that the impossibility of freely practising the Catholic faith in the country of origin entailed a serious limitation of fundamental rights. This interpretation was subsequently confirmed in cassation proceedings, in which the Court of Cassation (Civil Division I, order no. 29403 of 14 November 2024) reaffirmed the relevance of religious persecution for the recognition of refugee status. 

Particular significance also attaches to subsidiary protection in cases of indiscriminate violence arising from armed conflict. In this regard, the Supreme Court (Court of Cassation, Civil Division I, order no. 7273 of 19 March 2024) reiterated the principle according to which, for the purposes of protection under Article 14(c) of Legislative Decree No. 251/2007, no specific individualisation of the risk is required. The Court clarified that where the applicant originates from a context characterised by such a level of indiscriminate violence as to expose the civilian population to a generalised risk, mere presence in the territory is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a “real risk of suffering serious harm”. The same principle was reaffirmed in a subsequent decision of the same court (Court of Cassation, Civil Division I, order no. 27996 of 30 October 2024), in which the Court further specified that the assessment of indiscriminate violence must be conducted on the basis of updated and reliable sources, without requiring proof of specific individual exposure to risk.

International Protection and Gender-Based Violence

Throughout 2024, the jurisprudential approach recognising gender-based violence as constituting acts of persecution relevant for the recognition of international protection became further consolidated, also in light of the obligations arising from the 2011 Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (the so-called Istanbul Convention), regarded as a privileged interpretative framework.

In the field of international protection, the Supreme Court of Cassation (Civil Division I, order no. 7823 of 19 March 2024) clarified that trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation fulfils the requirements for the recognition of refugee status. The Court quashed and remanded the decision of the Genoa Tribunal, which had granted only special protection to a Nigerian woman applicant as a victim of trafficking stressing that the trial judge must assess not only the risk of re-trafficking but also the risk of social marginalisation, discrimination, and stigmatisation resulting from the victim’s vulnerable condition in the event of return (see also Court of Cassation, Civil Division I, order no. 5867 of 5 March 2024).

Lower court aligned themselves with this interpretative approach, recognising that the condition of women victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation may constitute a specific form of membership of a particular social group within the meaning of Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, by reason of their particular exposure to violence and discrimination (Bologna Tribunal, decree of 22 March 2024).

With regard to gender-based violence, the Grand Chamber judgement of the CJEU of 16 January 2024 (Case C-621/21) recognised violence against women as a form of persecution against a “particular social group”. The European judges established that women as a whole, or narrower groups of women sharing certain characteristics, may constitute a “particular social group” for the purposes of refugee status in cases of gender-based or domestic violence in their country of origin. Furthermore, the notion of “serious harm” includes the real threat of being killed or subjected to violence by private actors, family members or the community, including for alleged transgressions of cultural, religious or traditional norms, thereby justifying the grant of subsidiary protection.

Lower courts applied these principles in a variety of situations involving forced marriage, domestic violence and other forms of gender-based violence. In particular, the Bologna Tribunal (decree of 4 October 2024) granted refugee status to a Tunisian woman victim of forced marriage and domestic violence, emphasising her membership of a specific social group and expressly referring to Article 60 of the Istanbul Convention (Gender-based asylum claims). Similarly, the Turin Tribunal (decree of 9 December 2024; see also decree of 25 November 2025) granted international protection to women victims of domestic violence, underlining the lack of effective protection by the authorities of the country of origin. These decisions are consistent with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Cassation, according to which its judges (Civil Division I, order no. 6984 of 15 March 2024), in relation to domestic violence, expressly classified a case involving allegations of domestic or gender-based violence, as defined in Article 3 of the Istanbul Convention (Definitions), within the notion of “serious harm” relevant for the subsidiary protection under Article 14(c) of Legislative Decree No. 251/2007, applicable in the circumstances. In such situations, judges must consider that these forms of conduct constitute a serious limitation on the enjoyment of fundamental rights and must ascertain whether state authorities are capable of providing effective protection. In the absence of such protection, the “real risk” of suffering “serious harm” through inhuman and degrading treatment constitutes grounds for subsidiary protection. 

By decree of 7 November 2024, the Venice Tribunal granted international protection to a Nigerian woman and her minor daughters, holding that the risk of being subjected to female gential mutilation, together with the social consequences resulting from refusal of such practices, constitutes persecution on account of membership of a particular social group. The Court of Cassation (Civil Division I, order no. 7022 of 15 March 2024) further held that in cases where the applicant alleges having subjected to female gential mutilation, the judge is required to assess concretely the risk of gender discrimination as well as inhuman and degrading treatment in the event of return, taking into account both the socio-cultural context of the country of origin and the individual circumstances of the applicant. 

Special Protection

With regard to the recognition of special protection, particular relevance attaches to the case decided by the Court of Cassation (Civil Division I, order no. 27539 of 23 October 2024), concerning a Serbian national belonging to the Roma ethnic group. The Venice Tribunal had rejected both the application for international protection and the request for special protection, excluding the existence of a risk of serious harm upon return. The Supreme Court, however, quashed the decision, holding that membership of a social group constitutes a relevant factor in assessing vulnerability, in light of the widespread and systematic discrimination to which such group is exposed in the country of origin.

By order no. 29688 of 19 November 2024, the Supreme Court of Cassation addressed the recognition of special protection in light of Article 19 of Legislative Decree No. 286/1998 (Consolidated Immigration Act) and Article 8 ECHR (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life) in favour of foreign nationals with family ties in Italy. The Court reaffirmed its established case law concerning the protection of private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. The relevance of this provision arises not only in cases of family reunification, but also in all situations where the person has significant family ties within the national territory. Judges are therefore required to assess the effectiveness and intensity of the family ties established in Italy by the foreign national and to annul expulsion measures where these would result in a violation of the applicant’s right to private and family life.

International Protection and the Notion of Safe Country of Origin

By decree of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, together with the Ministers of the Interior and Justice, dated 7 May 2024 and adopted pursuant to Article 2-bis of Legislative Decree No. 25/2008, the list of countries designated as “safe countries of origin” was updated, resulting in the application of a differentiated procedural regime to applications lodged by nationals of those States. Inclusion in the list entails, in particular, the application of an accelerated procedure for determining refugee status or entitlement to another form of international protection, unless the applicant adduces specific elements capable of demonstrating that, in their individual situation, the country cannot be regarded as safe. The most recent update of the list includes the following States as safe countries of origin: Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Morocco, Montenegro, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. 

In this context, the Grand Chamber judgment of the CJEU (Case C-406/22) clarified that the designation of a “safe country of origin” must be based on a current, rigorous, and comprehensive assessment of the conditions existing in the country, grounded on reliable and up-to-date information, and must concern the entire territory of the State, rather than being limited to specific areas or categories of persons.

On the basis of that judgment, the Italian Court of Cassation strengthened judicial review over the designation of safe countries, holding that judges are required to verify compliance with both European law (Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32/EU) and Italian law (Article 2-bis of Legislative Decree No. 25/2008), including by relying on precise and updated information concerning countries of origin. The Supreme Court of Cassation explained that, with regard to the scope and extent of judicial review over the designation of a country of origin as safe, trial judges must undertake an autonomous and individualised assessment of the application for protection.

Further classifications may be found in several decisions delivered at the end of 2024 (Court of Cassation, Civil Division I, orders nos. 34898 and 22146 of 30 December 2024) in which the Court held that, even where the designation has been made by the legislature, judges are nonetheless required to verify the existence of the legal conditions for designating the country of origin as safe. In particular, the Court stressed that such verification cannot be merely formal, but must instead be based on reliable and updated information capable of reflecting the actual situation in the applicant’s country of origin.

The above principle was also applied in relation to cases connected with the implementation of the Protocol between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on strengthening of cooperation in migration matters, signed in Rome on 6 November 2023 and ratified by Law No. 14 of 21 February 2024. The Court of Cassation highlighted the need to verify, already at the stage of validation of measures restricting personal liberty, the lawfulness of recourse to the accelerated procedure based on the applicant’s origin from a safe country. In particular, the Court observed that, in light of the CJEU judgment of 4 October 2024, the designation of a country as safe requires that such conditions exist throughout the entire territory of the State, thereby necessitating rigorous judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court of Cassation further referred a preliminary question to the CJEU concerning the compatibility of the Italian rules on safe countries of origin and accelerated procedures with EU law (order no. 34898 of 30 December 2024). 

Within the framework of decisions concerning the interministerial designation of safe countries, and beyond the issue of the possibility of judicial review, the Supreme Court of Cassation, in judgment no. 11399 of 9 April 2024, held that where an appeal is brought against a decision of the Territorial Commission declaring an asylum application manifestly unfounded on the ground that the applicant’s country of origin is included in the “safe countries” list, the challenged decision is automatically suspended, thereby restoring the ordinary procedure. In this context, lower courts implemented the principles developed by the Court of Cassation, particularly with regard to the suspension of the enforceability of rejection decisions adopted against applicants originating from safe countries of origin. The Catania Tribunal (decree of 21 November 2024), called upon to decide on an application for suspension of the enforceability of a rejection decision issued under the accelerated procedure against a Bangladeshi national, held that, in light of the case law of the CJEU, judges are required to verify the compatibility of the designation of the country of origin with the criteria established by Directive 2013/32/EU. In other words, coming from a country designated as safe cannot automatically lead to the rejection of the application, but requires an individual assessment of the applicant’s situation.