International context and applicable human rights framework

On 23 October 2025, the United Nations Special Rapporteur (SR) on the independence of judges and lawyers, Margaret Satterthwaite, addressed a formal communication to the Government of Italy, identified by reference OL ITA 7/2025. The SR's mandate was lastly extended until 2026 by Human Rights Council Resolution 53/12. 

The communication concerns a draft constitutional bill proposed on 29 May 2024, which introduces amendments to Articles 102, 104 and 105 of the Italian Constitution, which are provisions that lie at the core of the country’s judicial architecture and govern the organisation, autonomy and self-governance of the judiciary. 

The Special Rapporteur clarifies that her observations do not constitute an exhaustive assessment of the reform, but rather an analysis grounded in international human rights standards relevant to judicial independence and the right to a fair trial. These standards are drawn primarily from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Italy became a party on 15 September 1978. Article 10 of the UDHR enshrines the right of everyone to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, while Article 14 of the ICCPR provides a legally binding articulation of this right, affirming entitlement to a hearing before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 

The Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 32 (2007), has emphasised that equality before courts and tribunals and fair trial guarantees are fundamental to the protection of human rights and function as procedural safeguards for the rule of law itself. Within this framework, the Special Rapporteur underscores that the roles, status, and institutional positioning of both judges and public prosecutors are inseparable from the effective realisation of these rights. Her communication, therefore, situates the Italian constitutional reform within a broader normative context, in which States are required not merely to pursue efficiency or public confidence in justice systems, but to ensure that any structural or procedural reforms reinforce rather than undermine independence, impartiality and due process guarantees.

The Italian judicial system and the proposed Constitutional Reform

The communication recalls that the Italian constitutional system is historically grounded in the principle of the unity of the judiciary, under which ordinary judges and public prosecutors are all classified as magistrates, therefore sharing a common career structure, and are governed by a single self-governing institution, which is the Magistrate High Council or Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (CSM). 

This unified CSM has authority over critical aspects of judicial and prosecutorial careers, including appointments, promotions, transfers and disciplinary proceedings. A defining feature of this system is that a clear majority of the Council’s members are magistrates elected by their peers. This configuration is designed to safeguard the judiciary's autonomy from interference by the legislative or executive branches. The SR notes that this framework has ensured that judges and prosecutors benefit from a common set of constitutional guarantees, particularly with regard to external independence. Compared to the current system, the proposed constitutional amendments represent a fundamental structural shift by aiming to sever the two positions of prosecutors and judges. While the Government has articulated objectives such as strengthening judicial impartiality, preventing functional overlaps between adjudicatory and prosecutorial roles and enhancing public confidence in the justice system, the Special Rapporteur observes that such reforms must be carefully assessed in light of international standards. Structural change, in and of itself, is not incompatible with human rights obligations; however, it risks altering long-standing safeguards that protect judicial actors from undue influence or pressure. The SR therefore frames the Italian reform not as a purely domestic institutional matter, but as one that engages Italy’s international legal commitments, particularly where changes may affect the independence, security of tenure and procedural guarantees afforded to those exercising judicial functions.

Career separation  

A central component of the draft constitutional bill is the formal separation of the careers of judges and public prosecutors, effectively ending the current system in which magistrates may move between judicial and prosecutorial functions. The stated rationale for this separation is to ensure that judges adjudicating cases have not previously served as accusers, thereby reducing perceived or actual risks of bias and conflicts of interest. In conjunction with this separation, the reform proposes the establishment of two distinct High Councils, one for judges and one for public prosecutors, while maintaining the President of the Republic as the presiding authority over both bodies. These Councils would assume responsibility for appointments, career progression and disciplinary matters within their respective domains. 

The SR acknowledges the stated objectives of impartiality and public confidence, but raises concerns that dividing the judiciary into separate institutional tracks may weaken the guarantees of independence currently provided by the unified system. In particular, she warns that the prosecution service may be deprived of the constitutional status and external independence it currently enjoys under the principle of unity of the judiciary. 

International standards, as reflected in the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, require that those exercising judicial or prosecutorial functions be free from interference, intimidation or harassment. Moreover,  the SR stresses that, if the President of the Republic continues to play a role in the new councils, this role should be strictly symbolic, so as not to compromise their autonomy. She further emphasises that the creation of separate Councils necessitates heightened safeguards to prevent political influence, particularly in matters relating to appointments and discipline, which are among the most sensitive aspects of judicial governance.

Appointment mechanisms 

The proposed reform introduces significant changes to the appointment mechanisms of the envisaged High Councils, notably by adopting a lottery-based selection system. Under the draft bill, one-third of both Councils’ members would be selected randomly from a list of full professors of law and attorneys with at least 15 years of professional experience, compiled by Parliament, while the remaining members would be selected from among judges and prosecutors according to procedures yet to be defined by law. 

The SR expresses concern that random selection does not inherently guarantee appointments based on merit, integrity and professional competence, which are essential criteria under international standards. She recalls that, although no single model for judicial councils exists, there is an established international trend toward mixed bodies in which a majority of members are judges elected by their peers. 

The reform also proposes establishing a High Disciplinary Court, thereby removing disciplinary authority from the High Councils. This new court would consist of 15 members appointed for a non-renewable four-year term, including six lay (not judges or prosecutors) members and nine judges or public prosecutors. Particularly troubling, according to the SR, is the provision that appeals against first-instance disciplinary decisions would be heard by the same High Disciplinary Court (in a different composition), rather than by the Court of Cassation, as is currently the case. This arrangement risks undermining judicial independence by eliminating independent appellate review and concentrating disciplinary power within a single body. 

International and regional standards, including Principle 20 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, explicitly require that judges have the right to appeal disciplinary decisions before an ordinary court, particularly those involving suspension or removal from office. Similar guarantees apply to prosecutors under the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, which require that disciplinary proceedings be impartial, objective and subject to independent review.

International concerns and requests to the Italian Government 

In light of these considerations, the Special Rapporteur underscores that disciplinary systems for both judges and prosecutors must fully respect due process guarantees, including the right to a fair hearing and access to an independent appeal mechanism. 

She recalls that previous mandate holders have emphasised the importance of granting public prosecutors security of tenure, reasonable conditions of service and strict criteria governing dismissal, particularly given the central role prosecutors play in the administration of justice. As part of her mandate to clarify cases brought to her attention, the SR formally requests that the Government of Italy provides additional information or comments on the issues raised, therefore explaining how the proposed constitutional amendments comply with Italy’s obligations under international law - especially those arising under the ICCPR - and indicate whether measures have been taken to review the draft amendments in light of the observations presented. 

She concludes by urging a careful reassessment of the reform to ensure that it strengthens judicial independence and the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. The communication notes that, as a comment on pending legislation, any response from the Government will be made public via the United Nations communications reporting website and subsequently included in her report to be presented to the Human Rights Council.