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18/1/2005 (Archivio storico)

L'incubo di un futuro armato per le Nazioni Unite


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- The nightmare of an armed future for the United Nations

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Assessing the Report of the High-level Panel on threats, challenges and change“A more secure world: our shared responsibility”

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by Antonio Papisca, Interdepartmental Centre on Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples, of the University of Padua *

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1. Charter validity, lost opportunities

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The United Nations Organisation is sixty. Thewording “UN reform” sounds like a tiring leitmotiv in the political discourse of the last decades. Too much time has been wasted. We have to take the plunge, once for all. But we should start off on the right foot, bearing in mind that the UN reality is shade and light. No doubt the bureaucratic structure is gasping, mediocre is its present leadership, but as regards principles, objectives, the human development philosophy and the design of a world infrastructure of collective security under supranational authority, the UN Charter keeps unsallied validity from a political, juridical and moral standpoint. This is clearly reiterated by the Resolution of the UN General Assembly of August 13, 2004 (A/58/L.67.Re.1) on “Reaffirming the central role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of international cooperation”. The General Assembly urges states to commit thelselves to build up consensus on both concept and pratice of “human security”.

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The Charter validity is nourished by many factors - among others by the visibility provided by the UN system to NGOs and to women condition issues -, but I think it primarily relies on the existence of the International Law of Human Rights, the “new” universal law that from the very Charter originates and is worldwide resounding in the conscience of most human beings, groups and society organs: the UN and human rights are increasingly perceived as common heritage of “all members of the human family”.

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The UN and human rights cannot but share the same destiny.

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World is more interdependent and globalised than in 1945 and makes stronger the need for having multilateral institutions capable to “decide” and carry out international public policies for the equitable distribution and the transparent running of global public goods, including peace, security, development, and environment. Human rights, the international rule of law, subsidiarity, participatory democracy provide the suitable moral and legal paradigme.

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The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 offered circumstances that were objectively suitable to step up the pace of the reform, but what happened was only a sterile chattering and the nineties were marked by a crescendo of wars, genocides, ethnical cleansing, widespread violence. The terroristic attack of September 11 and the increase of terroristic behaviours fuelled long-standing unilateralistic intentions of the super-power: reference must be made to the model of New World Order that President Bush advertised even at the UN General Assembly in 1991, a hierarchical order of unequal armed sovereignties. The last attempt to ditch the United Nations came by Bush jr. with the “unilateral war” against Iraq, that was openly theorised and put into practice in blatant violation of International Law while claiming the formal support of the Security Council.

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The UN support was denied.

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Pressure from both governmental and civil society milieux is now growing to start once for all the UN reform, also to cope with a new reality that could be summarised as follows: the US and allies are able to make war without winning war, then without getting the added-value or the meta-power that is necessary to impose new world orders, as it was usual in the past centuries.

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- 2. Which credible “collective” security for which “human” security

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Following the above-mentioned Resolution of the General Assembly, in September 2003 Mr.Kofi Annan appointed a “high level panel of eminent persons” to prepare a report on “threats, challenges and change” that would include both diagnosis and prescription on how to strengthen the United Nations to provide collective security for all in the twenty-first century. The Report, entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility”, assumes that “the United Nations has been much more effective in addressing the major threats to peace and security than it is given credit for, but that nonetheless major changes are needed if the United Nations is to be effective, efficient and equitable in providing collective security for all” (transmittal letter of the panel’s Chairman, Anand Panyarachun).

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In accordance with the strategic vision of the General Assembly Resolution, the Report points out that the UN Charter is still fully valid and amendements should be limited to the provisions on the Security Council composition. Since threats to security have no boundaries, the Report says, states should endeavour to build up consensus on sharing both rights and responsilities in the multilateral framework of collective security. This is conceived as “human”, “multi-mensional” security (including economic, social, military, environmental, sanitary aspects). “State” security is instrumental to human security, that is to “people” security, and its objectives should be pursued in a coordinated way at world, regional and national level under the “supranational” supervision of the United Nations. States must be on the front line in combating security threats and the United Nations must be able to better assist them in enhancing their own capacities. With the only exception of “individual and collective self-defense” as provided by article 51 of the Charter, the use of force can be decided or authorised only by the UN Security Council. Regional organisations should work in the framework of a more effective coordination with the United Nations. The composition of the Security Council should be enlarged without extending the veto power to the new members. The Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC, should be strengthened in its statutory functions, that is as the pivot of a ‘coordination’ system.

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The Report identifies six clusters of threats to security: economic and social threats like poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; inter-State conflict; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; transnational organised crime. According to the Panel, effectiveness, efficiency and equity are the parameters of a “credible system” of collective security. In this vision the best track, or the main road remains prevention, the use of force is a last resort (extrema ratio). Contents and procedures are addressed with specific reference to each cluster of threats. The Report points out that “there is little evident international acceptance of the idea of security being best preserved by a balance of power, or by any single – even benignly motivated – superpower”. Here it is clear the claim for a supranational approach to security as well as the refusal of the USA hegemonic pretensions. The Panel even dares to quote literally a phrase pronounced by President Harry Truman in his speech to the final plenary session of the founding conference of the United Nations: “we all have to recognize – no matter how great our strength – that we must deny ourselves the licence to do always as we please”!.

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- 3. - Dangerous byzantinism on Article 51

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The Reports emphasises that all relevant competences and powers of the Security Council should be maintained. As regards the use of force, relying on the assumption that “there is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility of protecting” of every State when it comes to people suffering”, the Report “endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which soverign governmentas have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent”. The language used by the Panel relating to the issue of individual and collective self-defense is not clear, the delicate issue is addressed with an ambiguous wording that contradicts the “supranational approach” adopted by the Panel as a matter of principle by proclaiming that “article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations should be neither rewritten nor reinterpreted, either to extend its long-established scope ( so as to allow preventive measures to non-imminent threats) or to restrict it (so as to allow its application only to actual attacks)”. In fact, the Panel offers its own interpretation in a way that is not in accordance with the non ambiguous literal meaning of article 51, which refers exlusively to the use of force if an armed attack “occurs”. It seems that the Panel accepts the “classical” interpretation of self-defense when it says that “a threatened state, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate”. The Panel points out that “the problem arises, where the threat in question is not imminent but still claimed to be real”. The Panel’s questioning is expressed in a rather Byzantine language: “Can a State, without going to the Security Council, claim in these circumstances the right to act, in anticipatory self-defense, not just pre-emptively (against an imminent or proximate threat) but preventively (against a non-imminent or non-proximate one)(italics added)?”. I wonder why such large typology. The Panel provides its “short answer”: “if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorise such action if it chooses so”. My God, what armed prospects for “human” security and a “peace-loving” UN…

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- 4. Implementing Article 43

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The Report indicates 5 parameters of legitimacy (iusta causa) for the use of force: seriouseness of threat; proper purpose; last resort; proportional means; balance of consequences. As we see, four parameters are the usual criteria taken into consideration by the concerned chapter of “classical” inter-state (armed sovereignties) international law. For the fifth “new” parameter, the Panel invites to question whether “the consequences of action are not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction”: the case of the Iraq war provides an enormous amount of empirical evidence. The Report seems to shelve the idea of endowing the United Nations with the permanent military force forseen by article 43: the orientation is towards stand-by units provided preferably by regional organisations such as the European Union, the African Union and others (unquoted in the Report).

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We can easily say that agreements to be signed by the UN and the Regional organisations on the availability of military forces, do implement the substance of Article 43 of the Charter, then making possible the implementation of Article 42.

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In this perspective Chapter VIII of the UN Charter would become no less important than Chapter VII.

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By the way, NGOs are briefly mentioned only with regard to the “protection of civilians in armed conflicts”.

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- 5. - Nothing new for the General Assembly and the ECOSOC

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The future of the General Assembly is quickly addressed by only reminding the broad range of its competences. No mention at all of the growing popular support to the idea of establishing a second Assembly in the form of a Parliamentary Assembly.

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On the subject of NGOs role, the Panel says - again in a very coincise way - that relationships with NGOs and civil society actors should be improved following the Report of the “Panel of eminent persons on United Nations-Civil Society relations”.

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As regards the Economic and Social Council, the Report says something more than the few said for the General Assembly, but not enough to let us expect a real empowerment of the coordination role of the Council. The main proposal is to create a “Committee on the social and economic aspects of security threats”: here again NGOs are totally missing.

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The Human Rights Commission should move from the present membership of 54 to include all UN member states, without any mention of the indispensable role of NGOs in the varied “human” and “humanitarian” basin of ECOSOC.

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- 6. Which “new” Security Council keeping the “old” veto power

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Regarding the composition of the Security Council, the Report suggests two alternative models, the first of which would extend the present permanent membership to 6 new members, without veto power: 2 for Asia and Pacific, 2 for Africa, 1 for Europe, 1 for the Americas) and to 13 non-permanent members (two-year term, non renewable: 4 for Africa, 3 for Asia and Pacific, 2 for Europe, 4 for Americas): the total number will move form the present 15 to 24.

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Second model: 8 new members, without veto power (four-year term, renewable: 2 for Asia, 2 for Africa, 2 for Europe, 2 for Americas) and 11 (two-year term, non renewable: 4 for Africa, 3 for Asia and Pacific, 1 for Europe, 3 for Americas). As regards the voting procedure, the Report proposes a system of “public indicative voting”, without veto possibility - then not binding -, while maintaining the present (binding) procedure for any subsequent formal vote. A detailed proposal relates to the establishment of a strictly intergovernmental Commission on Peace-Building, without any mention of the “classical” Report “An Agenda for Peace” of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and of the role of NGOs in the very peacebuilding process.

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- 7. Missing democracy, missing threats

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We all know that the way to the UN reform is marked by countless reports (of course, all prepared by illustrious, distinguished, even eminent persons…) lacking any significant political will behind them: the appropriate metaphor is a crowded cemetery the tumbs of which are the innumerable reports. The Report of the High-Panel stands out first of all for being particularly systematic and coincise. It is appreciable for emphasising the persistent validity of the UN Charter and the necessity to get more effective coordination of regional organisations, and for adopting the concept of “human security”.

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Somebody wrote: good diagnosis, poor prescription. I would precise: good but partial analysis, poor and dangerous prescription. The overall approach is strongly state-centered, there is no attention to democratising the UN and other international institutions. In the very moment in which the discourse on democracy is instrumental even to go to war, the Panel simply ignores international democracy in the genuine sense, that is more direct legitimation of the UN institutions, more political (popular) participation in its decision-making processes. (By the way, let’s remind that “one country one vote” translates the principle of equal sovereignty of states, not international-transnational democracy).

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Ignoring the topic of international democratisation explains why the Report does not care the dynamic and creative reality of thousands global civil society organisations and movements that are proving to be absolutely necessary to achieve the multi-dimensional security purposes. As pointed out above, no room is provided for NGOs in the Commission on Peace-Building nor in the enlarged composition of the Human Rights Commission nor in the ECOSOC Committee on social and economic aspects of security. And of course nothing is said to extend the regime of NGOs consultative status to the functioning of the Security Council.

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The list of “threats” to security, that the Panel pretends to be exhaustive, is silent on important threats such as:

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persistent violation of principles and rules of International law also by the so-called democratic states;

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the docrtine and practice of preventive war;

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rearmament, arms race and arms trade heavily involving all five permanent members of the Security Council;

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theorising and planning civilisations clash and religious wars;

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the persisting iniquitous “international division of labour” for the North-South relations;

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the ongoing de-regulation both of economy and institutions.

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Are these threats less dangerous than the five clusters included in the Report’s ‘scientific’ typology?

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- 8. Balancing the two Councils, dropping the scandalous Art.106

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The Report allows too much room to the states pleases as concerns the availability and the use of military instruments. Nothing is said in the Report on disarmament: does’nt it belong to the blueprint of collective security?

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Security Council membership is still envisaged as strictly limited to states: there is no perspective for some kind of “membership” of regional organisations outside the coordination framework run by the ECOSOC.

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The Report starts with good intentions by acceding to the philosophy of “human security”, but what follows is not consistent with such virtuous premises. Nothing concrete is suggested to balance functions and powers of the two pivot institutions in the interconnected field of “human security”, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. We would have expected that the ECOSOC should be empowered to face economic and social threats to security by enabling it both to “decide” international public policies and to orient and assess the policies of the International Monetary Fund and of the World Bank. Nothing is said on how to include the World Trade Organisation into the UN system of specialised agencies…

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As regards amendments to the UN Charter, the Panel suggests to drop articles 53 and 107 (referring to “enemy States”) as well article 47 (establishing a Military Staff Committee): OK.

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But what about article 106, that considers 4 plus 1 States (in practice the present five permanent members) as being above the Charter, legibus soluti?

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The scandalous text of article 106 (Chapter XVII: Transitional security arrangements…) reads as follows: “Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organisation as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”.

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Now, since the stand-by agreements with regional organisations would implement, as pointed out before, the substance of article 43, there is no further alibi not to drop the above mentioned Article 106!

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- 9. Major role for global civil society

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Furthermore, if security should be cosidered, as the Panel does, as “human” - that is primarily “people security”, and not “state security” -, why such ridiculous attention for civil society transnational organisations and movements which really represent and carry out common interests of the members of the human family? It is not enough to simply say that there is a ad hoc report of a Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relations. Nobody can actually deny that NGOs are absolutely necessary for the daily life of the UN and of many other international institutions, including the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc International Tribunals.

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The Report points out that civil society milieux were heard in several “regional consultations and issue workshops”. But if we look at the Report’s Annex IV containing the list of such hearings, we shall realise that genuine organisations of global civil society, those which are really committed on the spot, are totally missing. For instance, in the meeting that took place in Rome on 27-29 May 2OO4 on “The United Nations and new threats: rethinking security”, 5 (extra-university) “Institutes”, including Aspen Institue, were formally consulted. Now, it is worldwide known that in Italy does exist a large and well structured network of thousands NGOs and hundreds “Local government institutions for peace and human rights” coordinated by the “Tavola della Pace” (Peace Roundtable). Since the first session of the “Assembly of the United Nations Peoples” (Perugia, September 1995) - a biennial international conference of global civil society, that is convened on the occasion of the Peace March Perugia-Assisi -, the Roundtable participants have constantly worked to develop a comprehensive and coherent set of reflexions on the very future of the United Nations.

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Finally, the Panel’s Report is accompanied by a letter signed by Mr.Kofi Annan, inviting governments to participate in “a lively debate”: here again NGOs are ignored. Why?

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- 10. Participatory democracy for the UN reform: the “conventional” way

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My conclusion is that the Report deserves attention, perhaps much more than others, but the suitable approach to the UN reform should be found in the progress-dossier that was launched, much before the Panel of “eminent persons”, by the NGOs and civil society movements bearing the password “strengthening and democratising the United Nations”.

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We cannot achieve an effective world system of collective human security without adequate legitimacy and lively political popular participation. If the UN institutions are requested to “decide” they must be duly legitimated and participatory. If security is also social, economic and environmental, the participation of global civil society actors is indispensable.

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International democratisation should be carried out since when proposals are formally discussed. The right venue for such fundamental process is a “Global Convention for strengthening and democratising the UN”, to be established upon resolution of the General Assembly (where there is no veto power) in accordance with article 22 (subsidiary bodies). In our case the ad hoc body would have a “plural” character, its membership would be providedby several representation segments: states (by regional groupings), international and regional organisations, parliamentary assemblies of regional organisations (Europena Parliament, Latinamerican Parliament-Parlatino, Panafrican Parliament..), Local government institutions, NGOs, Permanent Observers at the UN. On the agenda for sure there would be the Panel’s Report but also proposals coming from genuine global civil society milieux.

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The UN reform will definitely affect the structure of world order. The future of political, economic and environmental life in the planet is at stake. The UN reform cannot be left to the interests game of governmental summits.

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NGOs, local government authorities, transnational solidaristic movements, human rights centres, universities must urgently convey via internet to the UN Secretary General, to the President of the General Assembly, to the Presidents of national and international Parliaments, to the Chiefs of state or government, to the EU, OAS, ASEAN, African Union, League of Arab States,etc., to International Parties, International Labour, the request that the UN General Assembly in September 2005 decide to convene the first “Global Convention” of history. Special pression should be esercised on the European Union institutions to support the initiative reminding the original EU practice of convening “European Conventions” when major steps have to be taken for the future of the Union.

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Once the Global Convention is established, it would be asked to open suitable e.channels for broader civil dialogue.

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At the end of its work, the Global Convention would submit its Report to the General Assembly for any suitable follow up.

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I am aware that the “Convention” would not be the best of international democracy, but it would be certainly less self-referential than the ongoing inter-governmental summitry and would launch a non ambiguous signal of good will to world public opinion.

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Final remark: so far, empirical evidence proves that no state, including the superpower, is capable to impose its own “new world order”. Hopefully, I would say. Past history is contradicted: new world orders can no longer be the result of a victory of armed state sovereignties on the battlefield. Nowadays we can even wonder wheather it is possible to get a victory as the outcome of a ‘classical’ war

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If we wanted to procede by analogy with past history, we could not say anything certain for the future. What we really know are contradictory trends.

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In this situation, I think it is wise, legal, reasonable, rational to keep the United Nations and the “new” International law rooted in the UN Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a fertile common heritage and to pursue the goal of strenghtening and democratising the legitimate multilateralism in the world system. Keeping and developing the UN means building up on reality, on positive reality. This is the right way to peace. While states are still reluctant to find this road, global civil society organisations and movements are already walking in it.

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* Published in the Quarterly “Pace diritti umani/peace human rights”, 2005, 1.
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Aggiornato il

16/7/2009